Rebecca S. v. Frank Bisignano, Commissioner of Social Security

Opinion

1 Jul 06, 2026

SEAN F. MCAVOY, CLERK 2

4 5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 6

7 REBECCA S.,1 No. 1:25-cv-3187-EFS

8 Plaintiff, ORDER REVERSING THE 9 v. ALJ’S DENIAL OF BENEFITS, AND REMANDING FOR 10 FRANK BISIGNANO, MORE PROCEEDINGS Commissioner of Social Security, 11 Defendant. 12

13 Plaintiff Rebecca S. claims she is unable to work due to physical 14 and mental impairments and asks the Court to reverse the 15 Administrative Law Judge’s (ALJ) denial of Title 2 and Title 16 16 17

18 1 For privacy reasons, Plaintiff is referred to by first name and last 19 initial or as “Plaintiff.” See LCivR 5.2(c). 20 1 benefits. Plaintiff establishes that additional vocational expert

2 testimony is necessary to determine whether she can complete the 3 training period for the identified occupations considering her social- 4 interaction limitations, and if she is able to complete the training

5 period, then a new evaluation of the medical opinions and Plaintiff’s 6 symptom reports is required due to evaluation errors by the ALJ. 7 I. Background

8 Plaintiff filed for benefits based on lupus, Arnold Chiari, 9 depression, anxiety, bipolar, and arthritis.2 After her applications were 10 denied, she attended a telephone hearing before an ALJ in May 2023.3

11 Plaintiff testified that she lives with her three-year-old son and her 12 mother, walks to do errands, cleans the litter box and vacuums, 13

14 2 Administrative Record (AR) 208–70. As the ALJ noted, there are two 15 different claims periods: for the Title 2 claim, the alleged onset date is 16 July 5, 2018, and the date last insured is December 31, 2019; for the 17 Title 16 claim, the relevant period begins on the protective filing date 18 of April 28, 2021. 19 3 AR 46–76, 124–40. 20 1 completed the eighth grade and later obtained a GED and a

2 phlebotomy certification, lost prior part-time jobs because she would 3 get overwhelmed and need to call out, socializes with a friend who 4 comes over once or twice a month, enjoys crafting, and has daily

5 headaches and migraines which require her to lay down about three 6 times a week, and her prescribed mood stabilizer does not manage her 7 constant anxiety and depression.4

8 The ALJ issued a decision denying benefits.5 Plaintiff sought 9 federal-court review of the denial, and the district court reversed the 10 ALJ’s denial of benefits, remanding the case for further proceedings,

11 including assessing the severity and limiting nature of Plaintiff’s 12 migraines and correctly crediting Christopher Waters, PhD’s treating 13 opinions to him rather than to a non-medical source.6

14 15 16

17 4 AR 49–67. 18 5 AR 14–38. 19 6 AR 1415–63 (EDWA No. 1:24-cv-3039-EFS). 20 1 The second administrative hearing was held in July 2025 with

2 ALJ Richard Geib.7 Plaintiff, medical expert Vladimir Karpitskiy, MD, 3 PhD, and a vocational expert testified. After the hearing, the ALJ 4 issued a decision again finding Plaintiff not disabled.8 The ALJ found

5 Plaintiff’s alleged symptoms were “not entirely consistent with the 6 medical evidence and other evidence.”9 As to the medical opinions, the 7 ALJ found:

8 • The opinions of Norman Staley, MD, Mark Magdaleno, MD, 9 Carole Moore, PhD, and Dr. Karpitskiy persuasive. 10 • The opinion of Lisa Benton, ARNP, generally persuasive.

11 12 13

14 7 AR 1354–81. 15 8 AR 1318–49. Per 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)–(g), 416.920(a)–(g), a five- 16 step evaluation determines whether a claimant is disabled. 17 9 AR 1329. As recommended by the Ninth Circuit in Smartt v. Kijakazi, 18 the ALJ should consider replacing the phrase “not entirely consistent” 19 with “inconsistent.” 53 F.4th 489, 499, n.2 (9th Cir. 2022). 20 1 • Renee Eisenhauer, PhD’s finding of insufficient evidence on the

2 Title 2 claim unpersuasive but her opined limitations for the 3 Title 16 claim persuasive. 4 • The opinions of Kayla Elliott, PA-C, Jenifer Schultz, PhD,

5 David Morgan, PhD, and Dr. Waters not persuasive.10 6 As to the sequential disability analysis, the ALJ found: 7 • Plaintiff met the insured status requirements through

8 December 31, 2019. 9 • Step one: Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful 10 activity since July 5, 2018, the alleged onset date.

11 • Step two: Plaintiff had the following medically determinable 12 severe impairments: lumbar degenerative disc disease, 13 fibromyalgia, lupus, migraine headaches, generalized anxiety

14 disorder, social anxiety, and bipolar 1 disorder. 15 • Step three: Plaintiff did not have an impairment or 16 combination of impairments that met or medically equaled the

17 severity of one of the listed impairments. 18

19 10 AR 1325–40. 20 1 • RFC: Plaintiff could perform light work except she:

2 can frequently climb ramps and stairs; can never climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds; and can occasionally balance, 3 stoop, kneel, crouch, and crawl. The claimant can have occasional exposure to fumes, odors, dusts, gases and 4 poor ventilation, and occasional exposure to work hazards (such as unprotected heights and moving 5 machinery. The claimant can understand, remember, and carry out simple and detailed instructions that can be 6 learned in thirty days or less. The claimant can have occasional contact with the general public, coworkers, 7 and supervisors, and can perform work involving occasional changes in the work routine and setting. The 8 claimant can perform work in normal ambient lighting.

9 • Step four: Plaintiff has no past relevant work. 10 • Step five: considering Plaintiff’s RFC, age, education, and work 11 history, Plaintiff could perform work that existed in significant 12 numbers in the national economy, such as marker, routing 13 clerk, and small products assembly II.11 14 Plaintiff did not file written exceptions to the ALJ’s decision with the 15 Appeals Council and the Appeals Council did not assume jurisdiction 16 17 18

19 11 AR 1321–42. 20 1 on its own, so the ALJ’s decision became the Commissioner’s final

2 decision.12 Plaintiff now appeals to the district court.13 3 II. Standard of Review 4 The ALJ’s decision is reversed “only if it is not supported by

5 substantial evidence or is based on legal error”14 and such error 6 impacted the nondisability determination.15 Substantial evidence is 7 “more than a mere scintilla but less than a preponderance; it is such

8 9 10

12 12 See AR 1319. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.984, 416.1484. 13 13 ECF No. 1. 14 14 Hill v. Astrue, 698 F.3d 1153, 1158 (9th Cir. 2012). See 42 U.S.C. § 15 405(g). 16 15 Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1115 (9th Cir. 2012), superseded on 17 other grounds by 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a) (recognizing that the court may 18 not reverse an ALJ decision due to a harmless error—one that “is 19 inconsequential to the ultimate nondisability determination”). 20 1 relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to

2 support a conclusion.”16 3 III. Analysis 4 Plaintiff argues several errors by the ALJ: (1) the RFC is

5 consistent with disability, rather than nondisability; (2) the ALJ erred 6 when assessing Plaintiff’s testimony; (3) the ALJ erred when 7 evaluating the medical opinions; and (4) the ALJ did not properly

8 assess Listings 12.04 and 12.06. The Commissioner argues Plaintiff 9 fails to show that the ALJ’s nondisability decision is unsupported by 10 substantial evidence. As is explained below, due to an error relating to

12 16 Hill, 698 F.3d at 1159 (quoting Sandgathe v. Chater, 108 F.3d 978, 13 980 (9th Cir. 1997)). See also Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028, 14 1035 (9th Cir. 2007) (The court “must consider the entire record as a 15 whole, weighing both the evidence that supports and the evidence that 16 detracts from the Commissioner's conclusion,” not simply the evidence 17 cited by the ALJ or the parties.) (cleaned up); Black v. Apfel, 143 F.3d 18 383, 386 (8th Cir. 1998) (“An ALJ’s failure to cite specific evidence does 19 not indicate that such evidence was not considered[.]”). 20 1 the RFC, additional vocational expert testimony is required. Further, if

2 necessary, on remand, the ALJ must bridge the analytical gap between 3 the treatment records and the ALJ’s evaluation of Plaintiff’s symptom 4 reports and the medical opinions, particularly for the period before

5 Plaintiff resumed mental-health medications following her sessions 6 with Dr. Waters. 7 A. RFC: Plaintiff establishes consequential error.

8 The RFC restricts Plaintiff to work with “occasional contact with 9 the general public, coworkers, and supervisor.”17 Yet, as Plaintiff 10 highlighted, the vocational expert (VE) testified that Plaintiff’s contact

11 with a supervisor would be more than occasional during the 12 training/probationary period. Therefore, Plaintiff argues that, per the 13 VE testimony, she is unable to complete the necessary training period

15 17 AR 1328. “[T]he ALJ is responsible for translating and incorporating 16 clinical findings into a succinct RFC.” Rounds v. Comm’r Soc. Sec. 17 Admin., 807 F.3d 996, 1006 (9th Cir. 2015). See also Robbins. v. Soc. 18 Sec. Admin., 466 F.3d 880, 886 (9th Cir. 2006); SSR 96-8p: Assessing 19 Residual Functional Capacity in Initial Claims. 20 1 for the identified occupations and thus a remand for benefits is proper.

2 In response, the Commissioner highlights that the VE testified that 3 Plaintiff could perform the “material duties of the occupation” and 4 therefore the ALJ’s step-five finding is supported by the VE’s

5 testimony. 6 First, the VE testified that an individual with the at-issue RFC 7 could perform work as a marker (DOT 209.587-034, with 165,175 jobs),

8 routing clerk (DOT 222.687-022, with 122,348 jobs), and small products 9 assembler II (DOT 739.687-030, with 28,749 jobs).18 Second, the VE 10 testified that these occupations have a training period that is up to

11 thirty days.19 This testimony was then followed by: 12 Q (by counsel): If during that time period the individual is only able to have occasional contact with their, you know, 13 supervisors, co-workers and job trainers that, you know comes to the training, HR meetings and those sort of things 14 that would happen during that time period, would this be consistent with competitive work or would this be maybe a 15 special accommodation.

16 A (by VE): The exposure would be more than occasional during the training and probationary period, but like you 17

18 18 AR 1376–78. 19 19 AR 1378. 20 1 said, as far as performing the material duties of the occupation, they would not require more than occasional 2 contact with others as specified in the hypothetical.20

3 There was no follow-up testimony by the VE as to the nature or 4 duration of the training for the at-issue occupations. Therefore, it is 5 unclear whether an individual with the identified RFC could complete 6 the training for some of the at-issue jobs, or more pointedly, whether 7 there remained a significant number of these jobs in the national

8 economy for which such an individual could complete the training 9 period and perform the material duties. 10 On remand, the ALJ is to take additional VE testimony and

11 explain why Plaintiff can or cannot complete the training period given 12 her social-interaction limitations.21 13

15 20 Id. 16 21 See Sczepanski v. Saul, 946 F.3d 152, 161–62 (2d Cir. 2020) 17 (remanding for determination of whether the identified jobs had 18 probationary periods). See also Gatliff v. Comm’r of the SSA, 172 F.3d 19 690, 694 (9th Cir. 1999) (“[S]ubstantial gainful activity means more 20 1 B. Other Issues

2 Plaintiff also argues the ALJ erred by not properly assessing her 3 testimony, including her allegations about headaches and mental- 4 health symptoms, and the medical opinions offered by Dr. Karpitskiy,

5 Dr. Waters, Dr. Morgan, Dr. Schultz, PA-C Elliott, Dr. Moore, and 6 Dr. Eisenhauer, and by not properly assessing the Listings. 7 If on remand, the VE testifies that an individual with Plaintiff’s

8 RFC can complete the training period and perform the material duties 9 of a significant number of jobs in the national economy, the ALJ must 10 engage in a new sequential disability evaluation, as Plaintiff has

11 established error by the ALJ when evaluating her symptom reports 12 and the medical opinions. 13 First, regarding the ALJ’s assessment of Plaintiff’s reported

14 headache symptoms, although the ALJ summarized the treatment 15 records discussing Plaintiff’s reported headache symptoms, 16 Dr. Karpitskiy’s testimony, and the prescribed medication, this

18 than merely the ability to find a job and physically perform it; it also 19 requires the ability to hold the job for a significant period of time.”). 20 1 summary does not sufficiently explain why the ALJ found Plaintiff’s

2 reported headache symptoms inconsistent with her treatment and the 3 treatment records. The ALJ must explain the basis for his findings on 4 remand to permit court review of such for substantial evidence.22

5 Second, on remand, the ALJ must consider whether, how, and 6 when Plaintiff’s mental-health symptoms improved with treatment.23 7

8 22 Blakes v. Barnhart, 331 F.3d 565, 569 (7th Cir. 2003) (“We require 9 the ALJ to build an accurate and logical bridge from the evidence to 10 her conclusions so that we may afford the claimant meaningful review 11 of the SSA’s ultimate findings.”). 12 23 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.929(c)(3), 404.1529(c)(3). See Smith v. Kijakazi, 14 13 F.4th 1108, 1113–16 (9th Cir. 2021) (requiring the ALJ to consider how 14 a claimant’s impairment improved or declined over the relevant 15 period); Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1017 (9th Cir. 2014) (“Cycles 16 of improvement and debilitating symptoms are a common occurrence, 17 and in such circumstances it is error for an ALJ to pick out a few 18 isolated instances of improvement over a period of months or years and 19 to treat them as a basis for concluding a claimant is capable of 20 1 The ALJ’s failure to meaningfully consider that Plaintiff’s mental-

2 health symptoms were more severe when she was not taking mental- 3 health medications and that she had good cause to not take mental- 4 health medications when breastfeeding impacted the ALJ’s evaluation

5 of the longitudinal treatment record and in turn Plaintiff’s reported 6 symptoms and the medical opinions. For instance, when Dr. Waters 7 began treating Plaintiff in July 2020 he observed more severe mental-

8 health symptoms, such as fidgeting hands, motor fatigue, and severe 9 anxiety, than when he completed treating Plaintiff in May 2022, when 10 he still observed an anxious and blunted mood, blunted affect, limited

11 eye contact, and soft speech.24 Dr. Waters issued his opinions when he 12 was mid-treatment with Plaintiff in January and June 2021. Providing 13

14 working.”); Warre v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 439 F.3d 1001, 1006 15 (9th Cir. 2006) (“Impairments that can be controlled effectively with 16 medication are not disabling for the purpose of determining eligibility 17 for SSI benefits.”). 18 24 See, e.g., AR 515–19, 542–47, 552–63, 596–97, 605–06, 610–11, 616– 19 19, 623–24, 630–37, 641–42, 660–63, 676–79, 686–97, 769–76, 849–60. 20 1 further comparison are the later medical records, which reflect that

2 Plaintiff began reporting that her anxiety was manageable, her mood 3 was “ok,” and no depression at times.25 On this record, it is critical that 4 Dr. Waters’ opinions, like the other medical opinions, be evaluated

5 against the timing of Plaintiff’s treatment and improvement. 6 Likewise, the timing and nature of Plaintiff’s activities during the 7 relevant period must be considered. The ALJ found several of the

8 opinions inconsistent with Plaintiff’s socializing and activities—a valid 9 consideration. However, the treatment records reflect that Plaintiff’s 10 socializing and activities increased in 2023 and 2024, years after the

11 start of the relevant claims periods.26 12

13 25 See, e.g., AR 1866–67, 1882–83, 2038–41, 2055–56, 2083. 14 26 Compare AR 567 (“She spends her days staying at home most of the 15 time, taking care of her son, and trying to take care of tasks around the 16 house. She also plays games on her phone and will do art projects”), 17 with AR 1751, 1766, 1781, 1792 (sharing that she is talking with 18 friends and family and watching shows and doing crafts), and AR 1810, 19 1833 (attending paint night and going shopping with a friend), AR 20 1 IV. Conclusion

2 Plaintiff established the ALJ erred. On remand, the ALJ is to 3 obtain additional vocational testimony. If based on such testimony, 4 there is a significant number of jobs that Plaintiff can complete the

5 training period for and sustain the work, the ALJ is to re-evaluate the 6 medical opinions and Plaintiff’s symptom reports with meaningful 7 articulation and evidentiary support considering the course of

8 Plaintiff’s impairments and their symptoms. 9 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 10 1. The ALJ’s nondisability decision is REVERSED, and this

11 matter is REMANDED to the Commissioner of Social 12 Security for further proceedings pursuant to 13 sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).

14 2. The Clerk’s Office shall TERM the parties’ briefs, ECF 15 Nos. 17 and 20, enter JUDGMENT in favor of Plaintiff, 16 and CLOSE the case.

18 2041 (mentioning that she has been playing dungeons and dragons and 19 dating). 20 1 IT IS SO ORDERED. The Clerk’s Office 1s directed to file this

2 ||order and provide copies to all counsel.

3 DATED this 6th day of July 2026. heed Show EDWARD F.SHEA 5 Senior United States District Judge 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 DISPOSITIVE ORDER - 17