Rebecca Lynn Binsfeld v. Commissioner of Social Security

• Court: District Court, E.D. California
• Decided: June 22, 2026
• Docket: 2:25-cv-01728
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 REBECCA LYNN BINSFELD, No. 2:25-cv-01728-SCR 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER 14 COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, 15 Defendant. 16

17 18 Plaintiff seeks judicial review of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security 19 (“Commissioner”), denying her application for Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) under Title 20 XVI of the Social Security Act. For the reasons that follow, the Court will DENY Plaintiff’s 21 motion for summary judgment and GRANT the Commissioner’s cross-motion for summary 22 judgment. 23 I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 24 Plaintiff applied for SSI benefits in September 2021. Administrative Record (“AR”) 74.1 25 Plaintiff alleged disability beginning in June 2009, but later amended her alleged onset date to 26 September 2021. AR 48, 74; see also ECF No. 13 at 3. Plaintiff’s application was denied

27 1 The AR is electronically filed at ECF No. 10. When referencing the AR, page references are to the number in the lower right corner of the page, not the CM/ECF generated header. References 28 to briefs are to the page number generated on the CM/ECF header. 1 initially, and on reconsideration. AR 119-123; 132-137. Thereafter, a hearing was held before 2 administrative law judge (“ALJ”) Plauche F. Villere, Jr., on September 8, 2023, at which Plaintiff 3 was present and testified. AR 54-73. A second hearing was held on May 8, 2024, at which 4 Plaintiff was present with counsel, along with two medical experts and a vocational expert 5 (“VE”). AR 34-53. 6 On May 20, 2024, the ALJ issued an unfavorable decision, finding plaintiff “not disabled” 7 under Section 1614(a)(3)(A) of the Act. AR 17-28 (decision). On April 25, 2025, the Appeals 8 Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review, leaving the ALJ’s decision as the final decision of 9 the Commissioner of Social Security. AR 1-3. 10 Plaintiff filed this on June 19, 2025. ECF No. 1. The parties filed cross-motions for 11 summary judgment, based upon the Administrative Record filed by the Commissioner. ECF Nos. 12 13 & 15. Plaintiff did not file an optional reply brief. 13 II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 14 Plaintiff was born in 1982, and was 41 years old at the time of the hearing before the ALJ. 15 AR 58. Plaintiff has a GED. AR 60. Her past work experience included working as a blackjack 16 dealer from 2007 to 2009, and from 2019 to 2021 as a housekeeper at a hospital. AR 63. 17 Plaintiff testified she has problems with lower back pain which led to difficulty standing 18 for long periods of time and fatigue. AR 60. She testified that she sometimes has difficulty with 19 self care, she can cook, and can drive, but only limited distances. AR 61-63. Plaintiff testified 20 she could not work a simple, sit down job because she can only sit for 15 to 20 minutes at a time. 21 AR 70. Plaintiff also testified to pain in her hands that causes difficulties holding things – such as 22 when washing dishes, or using a pen to write. AR 70-71. 23 Plaintiff testified that she takes medication for Lupus and sees a rheumatologist about 24 once every four months. AR 63. She stated she had tried injections for lower back pain. AR 64. 25 Plaintiff testified to having insomnia, and that she takes Zoloft for anxiety to help address the 26 insomnia. AR 66. She also takes Hydroxyzine. AR 66. Plaintiff stated that for her anxiety and 27 depression she was not taking any medication other than the Zoloft and Hydroxyzine, but that she 28 had been referred for therapy, but had not yet gone. AR 68. Plaintiff stated she had been taking 1 the medications for six months, and that they sometimes caused dizziness and lightheadedness. 2 AR 71. 3 III. LEGAL STANDARDS 4 The Commissioner’s decision that a claimant is not disabled will be upheld “if it is 5 supported by substantial evidence and if the Commissioner applied the correct legal standards.” 6 Howard ex rel. Wolff v. Barnhart, 341 F.3d 1006, 1011 (9th Cir. 2003). “‘The findings of the 7 Secretary as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive[.]’” Andrews v. 8 Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 1995) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)). 9 Substantial evidence is “more than a mere scintilla,” but “may be less than a 10 preponderance.” Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1111 (9th Cir. 2012). “It means such relevant 11 evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Richardson v. 12 Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (internal quotation marks omitted). “While inferences from 13 the record can constitute substantial evidence, only those ‘reasonably drawn from the record’ will 14 suffice.” Widmark v. Barnhart, 454 F.3d 1063, 1066 (9th Cir. 2006) (citation omitted). 15 Although this court cannot substitute its discretion for that of the Commissioner, the court 16 nonetheless must review the record as a whole, “weighing both the evidence that supports and the 17 evidence that detracts from the [Commissioner’s] conclusion.” Desrosiers v. Secretary of HHS, 18 846 F.2d 573, 576 (9th Cir. 1988); Jones v. Heckler, 760 F.2d 993, 995 (9th Cir. 1985) (“The 19 court must consider both evidence that supports and evidence that detracts from the ALJ’s 20 conclusion; it may not affirm simply by isolating a specific quantum of supporting evidence.”). 21 “The ALJ is responsible for determining credibility, resolving conflicts in medical 22 testimony, and resolving ambiguities.” Edlund v. Massanari, 253 F.3d 1152, 1156 (9th 23 Cir. 2001). “Where the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, one of 24 which supports the ALJ’s decision, the ALJ’s conclusion must be upheld.” Thomas v. Barnhart, 25 278 F.3d 947, 954 (9th Cir. 2002). However, the court may review only the reasons stated by the 26 ALJ in his decision “and may not affirm the ALJ on a ground upon which he did not rely.” Orn 27 v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 630 (9th Cir. 2007); Connett v. Barnhart, 340 F.3d 871, 874 (9th Cir. 28 2003) (“It was error for the district court to affirm the ALJ’s credibility decision based on 1 evidence that the ALJ did not discuss”). 2 The court will not reverse the Commissioner’s decision if it is based on harmless error, 3 which exists only when it is “clear from the record that an ALJ’s error was ‘inconsequential to the 4 ultimate nondisability determination.’” Robbins v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 466 F.3d 880, 885 (9th Cir. 5 2006) (quoting Stout v. Commissioner, 454 F.3d 1050, 1055 (9th Cir. 2006)); see also Burch v. 6 Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 679 (9th Cir. 2005). 7 IV. RELEVANT LAW 8 Social Security benefits are available for eligible individuals who are “disabled.” 42 9 U.S.C. § 1381a. An individual is “disabled” if unable to “engage in any substantial gainful 10 activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be 11 expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period 12 of not less than twelve months.” 42 U.S.C. §1382c(a)(3)(A); see also Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 13 137, 140 (1987). 14 The Commissioner uses a five-step sequential evaluation process to determine whether an 15 applicant is disabled and entitled to benefits. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4), 416.920(a)(4); 16 Barnhart v. Thomas, 540 U.S. 20, 24-25 (2003) (setting forth the “five-step sequential evaluation 17 process to determine disability” under Title II and Title XVI). The following summarizes the 18 sequential evaluation: 19 Step one: Is the claimant engaging in substantial gainful activity? If so, the claimant is not disabled. If not, proceed to step two. 20 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(i), (b); 416.920(a)(4)(i), (b). 21 Step two: Does the claimant have a “severe” impairment? If so, 22 proceed to step three. If not, the claimant is not disabled. 23 Id., §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(ii), (c); 416.920(a)(4)(ii), (c). 24 Step three: Does the claimant’s impairment or combination of impairments meet or equal an impairment listed in 20 C.F.R., Pt. 404, 25 Subpt. P, App. 1? If so, the claimant is disabled. If not, proceed to step four. 26 Id., §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iii), (d); 416.920(a)(4)(iii), (d). 27 Step four: Does the claimant’s residual functional capacity make her 28 capable of performing her past work? If so, the claimant is not 1 disabled. If not, proceed to step five. 2 Id., §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iv), (e), (f); 416.920(a)(4)(iv), (e), (f). 3 Step five: Does the claimant have the residual functional capacity perform any other work? If so, the claimant is not disabled. If not, 4 the claimant is disabled. 5 Id., §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v), (g); 416.920(a)(4)(v), (g). 6 The claimant bears the burden of proof in the first four steps of the sequential evaluation 7 process. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1512(a), 416.912(a) (“In general, you have to prove to us that you are 8 blind or disabled”); Bowen, 482 U.S. at 146 n.5. However, “[a]t the fifth step of the sequential 9 analysis, the burden shifts to the Commissioner to demonstrate that the claimant is not disabled 10 and can engage in work that exists in significant numbers in the national economy.” Hill v. 11 Astrue, 698 F.3d 1153, 1161 (9th Cir. 2012); Bowen, 482 U.S. at 146 n.5. 12 V. THE ALJ’s DECISION 13 The ALJ made the following findings: 14 1. [Step 1] The claimant has not engaged in substantial gainful activity (“SGA”) since September 20, 2021, the application date (AR 15 19). 16 2. [Step 2] The claimant has the following severe impairment: lumbar spine disorder (AR 19). 17 3. [Step 3] The claimant does not have an impairment or combination 18 of impairments that meets or medically equals the severity of one of the listed impairments in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 19 (AR 22). 20 4. [Preparation for Step 4] The ALJ found that the claimant has the residual functional capacity (RFC) to perform light work as defined 21 in 20 CFR 416.967(b) except the claimant is further limited to walking 3 hours at a time, 6 hours total in an 8-hour workday; 22 standing 4 hours at a time, for 7 hours total in an 8-hour workday; occasional postural activities; no working around extremes in 23 temperature, humidity, unprotected heights or moving mechanical parts; simple, routine tasks; occasional interaction with the public; 24 frequent working around coworkers and supervisors; and no production pace or quota-driven work (AR 23). 25 5. [Step 4] The claimant is unable to perform past relevant work (AR 26 27). 27 6. [Step 5] The claimant was born in July 1982 and was 39 years old, which is defined as a “younger individual” on the application date 28 (20 CFR § 416.964). (AR 27). 1 7. [Step 5, continued] The claimant has a high school education (AR 27). 2 8. [Step 5, continued] Transferability of job skills is not material to 3 the determination of disability because using the Medical-Vocational Rules as a framework supports a finding that the claimant is “not 4 disabled,” whether or not the claimant has transferable job skills (AR 27). 5 9. [Step 5, continued] Considering the claimant’s age, education, 6 work experience, and residual functional capacity, there are jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy that the claimant 7 can perform (AR 27). 8 10. The claimant has not been under a disability, as defined in the Social Security Act, from September 20, 2021, through the date of 9 the ALJ’s decision. (AR 28). 10 VI. ANALYSIS 11 Plaintiff’s opening brief presents one issue for review. ECF No. 13 at 3. Plaintiff 12 contends the RFC is incorrect because the ALJ failed to perform a proper analysis of the 13 consistency and supportability of the opinion of Ona Stiles, Ph.D. Id. Defendant contends that 14 the ALJ’s assessment of Stiles’s opinion was supported by substantial evidence.2 ECF No. 15 at 15 4. 16 1. Medical Evaluation by Ona Stiles 17 Ona Stiles, Ph.D. (“Stiles”), conducted a comprehensive mental status evaluation of 18 Plaintiff on January 11, 2022. AR 638-642. Stiles observed that Plaintiff appeared in casual 19 appropriate attire and grooming was adequate. AR 638. Plaintiff “presented in a friendly 20 manner, made good eye contact, and facial expression was normal.” AR 638. Plaintiff 21 “interacted appropriately with the examiner and office staff throughout the evaluation.” AR 638. 22 Plaintiff reported depression and anxiety. AR 638. She reported that anxiety was 23 interfering with her sleep. AR 638. She stated she had been having these symptoms for at least 24 ten years, but they were getting “worse and more persistent.” AR 638. She reported that she had 25 tried medications, but not talk therapy. AR 638. Plaintiff reported “no significant difficulties 26 2 Defendant further argues that Plaintiff has waived any other challenge to the Commissioner’s 27 final decision by raising only one issue in the opening brief. Id. at 3. Plaintiff did not file an optional reply brief to counter Defendant’s waiver assertion. Accordingly, the Court will address 28 only the one issue clearly presented. 1 with shopping, self-care, or independent living.” AR 640. On the mental status exam, Stiles 2 described Plaintiff as cooperative, alert, fully oriented, and with intact intelligence. AR 640. Her 3 attention and concentration were both rated as “fair to good.” AR 640. Her intelligence and 4 judgment were intact, and memory was adequate. AR 640-41. Plaintiff’s mood was “dysthymic” 5 and she cried, and her affect was described as “congruent with mood.” AR 641. 6 Stiles found that Plaintiff was not limited in her ability to understand, remember, and 7 perform simple written and oral instructions. AR 641. However, as to complex instructions, 8 Plaintiff was “moderately limited because of distraction and low motivation due to depression and 9 anxiety.” AR 641. Stiles assessed that Plaintiff was “markedly limited” in her ability to maintain 10 regular attendance, and “moderately to markedly limited” in her ability to complete a normal 11 workday or workweek without interruption from her psychiatric condition. AR 641-42. As to her 12 ability to interact with coworkers and the public, Stiles assessed moderate limitations. AR 642. 13 Stiles found Plaintiff was not significantly limited in her interactions with supervisors and was 14 capable of managing funds. AR 642. 15 With respect to medical opinions, new regulations apply to claims filed on or after March 16 27, 2017, which changed the framework for evaluation of medical opinion evidence. Revisions to 17 Rules Regarding the Evaluation of Medical Evidence, 2017 WL 168819, 82 Fed. Reg. 5844-01 18 (Jan. 18, 2017); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c. The regulations provide that the ALJ will no longer 19 “give any specific evidentiary weight ... to any medical opinion(s)” but instead must consider and 20 evaluate the persuasiveness of all medical opinions or prior administrative medical findings from 21 medical sources and evaluate their persuasiveness. Revisions to Rules, 2017 WL 168819, 82 Fed. 22 Reg. 5844, at 5867-68; see 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c(a) and (b), 416.920c(a) and (b); see also 23 Woods v. Kijakazi, 32 F.4th 785, 787 (9th Cir. 2022) (“For claims subject to the new regulations, 24 the former hierarchy of medical opinions—in which we assign presumptive weight based on the 25 extent of the doctor’s relationship with the claimant—no longer applies. Now an ALJ’s decision, 26 including the decision to discredit any medical opinion, must simply be supported by substantial 27 evidence.”). 28 The factors for evaluating the persuasiveness of a physician opinion include 1 supportability, consistency, relationship with the claimant (including length of the treatment, 2 frequency of examinations, purpose of the treatment, extent of the treatment, and the existence of 3 an examination), specialization, and “other factors that tend to support or contradict 4 a medical opinion or prior administrative medical finding” (including, but not limited to, 5 “evidence showing a medical source has familiarity with the other evidence in the claim or an 6 understanding of our disability program’s policies and evidentiary requirements”). 20 C.F.R. §§ 7 416.920c(c)(1)-(5). Supportability and consistency are the most important factors, and therefore 8 the ALJ is required to explain how both factors were considered. 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.920c(b)(2). 9 The Ninth Circuit has confirmed that the new regulatory framework eliminates the 10 “treating physician rule” and displaces the longstanding case law requiring an ALJ to provide 11 “specific and legitimate” or “clear and convincing” reasons for rejecting a treating or examining 12 doctor’s opinion. Woods v. Kijakazi, 32 F.4th 785, 787 (9th Cir. 2022). Still, in rejecting any 13 medical opinion as unsupported or inconsistent, an ALJ must provide an explanation supported 14 by substantial evidence. Id. at 792. In sum, the ALJ “must ‘articulate ... how persuasive’ [he or 15 she] finds ‘all of the medical opinions’ from each doctor or other source ... and ‘explain how [he 16 or she] considered the supportability and consistency factors’ in reaching these 17 findings.” Id. (citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c(b), 404.1520(b)(2)). 18 The ALJ found Stiles’s opinion unpersuasive: “While the undersigned has considered Dr. 19 Stiles’s observations at the consultative examination when assessing the claimant’s mental 20 functional limitations, the undersigned finds Dr. Stiles’s conclusions unpersuasive, as they are not 21 consistent with or supported by the longitudinal evidence of record, which generally reflects 22 normal mental status examinations.” AR 21. The ALJ additionally stated that, “Dr. Stiles’s 23 conclusions are not consistent with or supported by her own observations at the examination, 24 which reflect that the claimant had intact intelligence, concentration, judgment, and insight.” AR 25 21. 26 The ALJ clearly engaged in a supportability and consistency analysis. Plaintiff argues it 27 was not a “proper” analysis. ECF No. 13 at 15. Plaintiff contends the ALJ “cherry picked” from 28 the record and “relied upon vague reference to purportedly normal examination findings.” Id. at 1 19. Plaintiff also appears to contend that the ALJ improperly used the supportability and 2 consistency terms interchangeably, or conflated them. Id. at 20. Defendant contends that the 3 ALJ’s decision is supported by substantial evidence and that the ALJ may find an opinion 4 unpersuasive based on it being either unsupported or inconsistent with other evidence. ECF No. 5 15 at 5. 6 The Court does not find the ALJ improperly cherry picked the record. The ALJ provided 7 several citations to the record in which the source found Plaintiff’s mental status examinations 8 were generally within normal limits. AR 20, citing 478, 620, 627, 646, 652, 747, 898, 911, 920, 9 944, 948, 989, 1031, 1038, 1044. The ALJ’s citations to the record support the ALJ’s conclusion. 10 For example, the ALJ cites an office visit of August 2021, where Plaintiff presents with “normal 11 mood and affect” and good judgment. AR 478. At another visit in August 2021, Plaintiff is 12 described as having “normal mood and affect” and being “active and alert.” AR 620. Again, in 13 September 2021, Plaintiff is described as presenting with “normal mood and affect.” AR 627. 14 The ALJ’s other references are similar. See for example AR 646 (“normal mood and affect”, 15 good judgement, normal memory); AR 747 (“cooperative”, “no mood swings or psychotic 16 features”, “insight is good”); AR 948 (“Does not appear anxious or withdrawn.”). 17 A litigant’s conclusory allegation of cherry picking is generally not useful to the Court's 18 review. Social security records are voluminous and often contain evidence that both supports and 19 undermines the claimant's arguments. See White v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 572 F.3d 272, 284-85 20 (6th Cir. 2009) (acknowledging a cherry picking argument often “cuts both ways” and finding 21 “little indication that the ALJ improperly cherry picked evidence; the same process can be 22 described more neutrally as weighing the evidence”). As discussed above, the ALJ cited several 23 instances of generally normal findings, and Plaintiff’s argument does not demonstrate the ALJ 24 ignored contrary evidence. 25 As for Plaintiff’s second argument, that the ALJ improperly used the terms 26 interchangeably, the Court disagrees. The ALJ considered supportability when he found Stiles’s 27 opinion not “supported by her own observations at the examination.” AR 21. The ALJ 28 considered consistency when he referenced the numerous other generally normal mental status 1 exams in the record. In Woods v. Kijakazi, 32 F.4th 785, 793 (9th Cir. 2022), the Ninth Circuit 2 affirmed the ALJ’s decision despite some imprecision with the supportability and consistency 3 language. The Ninth Circuit stated: “The ALJ described Dr. Causeya’s opinion as ‘not supported 4 by’ the record, but the ALJ plainly did not intend to make a supportability finding . . . Rather, the 5 ALJ meant only that Dr. Causeya’s opinion was inconsistent with other record evidence.” Id. at 6 n.4. The Ninth Circuit found the ALJ’s meaning “clear from context”, but also cautioned that 7 ALJs “should endeavor to use these two terms of art—‘consistent’ and ‘supported’—with 8 precision.” Id. 9 The ALJ’s assessment of Stiles’s opinion is supported by substantial evidence. The ALJ 10 explained that he found the opinion to be inconsistent with numerous generally normal mental 11 status exams. The ALJ also found convincing the opinion of Dr. Peterson, who testified at the 12 hearing and found that Plaintiff’s mental limitations were generally mild to moderate. AR 26. 13 The ALJ additionally considered the opinions of state agency consultants. AR 26. One such 14 consultant, Dr. Joynson, Ph.D., found that Plaintiff had no limitations in her ability to understand, 15 remember or apply information, or to interact with others. AR 26. The ALJ rejected Joynson’s 16 opinions as unpersuasive because they were not consistent with the longitudinal record “which 17 reflects that [Plaintiff] suffers from anxiety and depression, which, in combination, cause mild 18 impairments in [Plaintiff’s] ability to function cognitively and socially.” AR 26. The ALJ “is 19 responsible for determining credibility, resolving conflicts in medical testimony, and for resolving 20 ambiguities.” Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1010 (9th Cir. 2014) (citation omitted). The 21 ALJ weighed the varying medical evidence and opinions and reached a conclusion. “Where the 22 evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, one of which supports the ALJ’s 23 decision, the ALJ’s conclusion must be upheld.” Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 954 (9th 24 Cir. 2002). The Court finds the ALJ’s conclusion is supported by substantial evidence. 25 VII. CONCLUSION 26 A plaintiff has the burden to prove disability. See Parra v. Astrue, 481 F.3d 742, 746 (9th 27 Cir. 2007) (“The claimant bears the burden of proving steps one through four, consistent with the 28 general rule that at all times, the burden is on the claimant to establish entitlement to disability 1 | insurance benefits.”) (cleaned up). The ALJ found that Plaintiff did not meet his burden, and that 2 | decision will be upheld if it is supported by substantial evidence. See Biestek v. Berryhill, 587 3 || US. 97, 102-03 (2019). This evidentiary threshold “is not high ... and means only—such 4 | relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” /d. at 5 || 103. The Court finds the ALJ’s decision meets the substantial evidence standard. 6 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 7 1. Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 13) is DENIED. 8 2. The Commissioner’s cross-motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 15) is 9 GRANTED. 10 3. The Clerk shall enter Judgment for Defendant and close this case. 11 | SOORDERED. 12 || DATED: June 22, 2026

14 SEAN C. RIORDAN 15 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 1]