1 2 3 4 5 6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 8 REBECCA FLORES, Case No. 1:26-cv-00307-KES-SKO
9 FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS Plaintiff, THAT PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT AND 10 v. EX PARTE MOTION FOR A TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER 11 BE DISMISSED FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION 12 CALIFORNIA PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION, et al., (Doc. 7) 13 14-DAY DEADLINE 14 Defendants. 15 16 Plaintiff proceeds pro se and in forma pauperis with a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. 17 section 1983. Plaintiff has filed an ex parte “Application for Temporary Restraining Order and 18 Order to Show Cause Re: Preliminary Injunction,” seeking “an order preventing Defendants from 19 disconnecting her electric service during the pendency of this action.” (Doc. 7). 20 Because the Court lacks jurisdiction, the undersigned recommends dismissing the First 21 Amended Complaint and Application for a Temporary Restraining Order for lack of jurisdiction. 22 I. BACKGROUND 23 Plaintiff is proceeding on her First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) filed on February 9, 24 2026. (Doc. 5). The FAC alleges “ongoing deprivations of Plaintiff’s constitutionally protected 25 property and utility service interests without adequate notice or a meaningful opportunity to be 26 heard.” (Id. at 1). 27 28 1 On March 16, 2026, the undersigned screened the FAC and found it stated a cognizable 2 section 1983 procedural due process claim against Defendants and, therefore, found service of the 3 FAC on Defendants appropriate. (Doc. 6 at 1). 4 II. PLAINTIFF'S TRO MOTION 5 In her application for a Temporary Restraining Order (“TRO”), Plaintiff alleges that she 6 has “previously experienced disconnection of her electrical service” related to what amounts to a 7 billing dispute at the center of the matter before this Court. (See Doc. 7 at 1). Plaintiff alleges 8 that upon receipt of “a final administrative decision from the California Public Utilities 9 Commission dismissing her complaint,” she no longer has “any remaining administrative avenue 10 for relief” and “faces irreparable harm from the loss of essential utility service.” (Id.). In a 11 supplemental declaration, Plaintiff declares that “[o]n or about March 19, 2026 . . . [she] received 12 a disconnection notice from PG&E.” (Doc. 11 at 3). 13 III. LEGAL STANDARD 14 The Court has an obligation to examine subject-matter jurisdiction issues sua sponte. 15 Gonzalez v. Thaler, 565 U.S. 134, 141 (2012). Federal courts are of limited jurisdiction, having 16 subject-matter jurisdiction only over matters authorized by the Constitution and Congress. 17 Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). 18 IV. DISCUSSION 19 Under the Johnson Act, federal courts lack jurisdiction over “all suits affecting state- 20 approved utility rates.” Abcarian v. Levine, 972 F.3d 1019, 1029–30 (9th Cir. 2020). The Johnson 21 Act states:
22 The district courts shall not enjoin, suspend or restrain the operation of, or compliance with, any order affecting rates chargeable by a public utility and made by a State administrative 23 agency or a rate-making body of a State political subdivision, where:
24 (1) Jurisdiction is based solely on diversity of citizenship or repugnance of the order to the Federal Constitution; and, 25 (2) The order does not interfere with interstate commerce; and, 26 (3) The order has been made after reasonable notice and hearing; and, 27 (4) A plain, speedy and efficient remedy may be had in the courts of such State. 28 1 28 U.S.C. § 1342. 2 Although the text of the Johnson Act focuses on ratemaking “orders,” the Ninth Circuit 3 has construed it to apply to “all suits affecting state-approved utility rates.” Abcarian, 972 F.3d 4 at 1029–30. Indeed, when “a party challenges the rate-making system, including any particular 5 procedure th[e] . . . system employs, the Johnson Act bars federal jurisdiction.” US West, Inc. v. 6 Nelson, 146 F.3d 718, 722 (9th Cir. 1998). 7 The Ninth Circuit has broadly interpreted the Johnson Act as prohibiting both direct 8 challenges to a specific rate-setting order, as well as indirect challenges that “might have an impact 9 on future rate orders” or that could be used to enjoin enforcement of a past order. Id. at 722–23; 10 Brooks v. Sulphur Springs Valley Elec. Coop., 951 F.2d 1050, 1054 (9th Cir. 1991) (“Congress 11 did not intend to withdraw from federal courts the power to enjoin state rate orders directly but 12 leave undisturbed the power to do so indirectly.”). The Ninth Circuit has cautioned that a 13 Plaintiff’s description or characterization of their challenge is not determinative. US West, 146 14 F.3d at 722. Nor does a plaintiff avoid the Johnson Act by alleging constitutional claims that are 15 unrelated to state ratemaking orders. Id.; Abcarian, 972 F.3d at 1030. 16 The plaintiffs in US West, for example, claimed to challenge a policy rather than a specific 17 rate order. 146 F.3d at 722. The Ninth Circuit was not convinced and instructed that “the way 18 that [plaintiffs] have chosen to describe their grievance does not control whether the Johnson Act 19 bars this action.” Id. And in Abcarian, the Ninth Circuit explained that the Johnson Act would 20 “be a nullity if it could be evaded through the simple artifice of adding some other federal claim 21 to the complaint.” 972 F.3d at 1030. 22 In sum, the Ninth Circuit has repeatedly emphasized the jurisdictional nature of the 23 Johnson Act: 24 In barring federal courts from exercising jurisdiction to interfere with state rate orders in specified circumstances, the text of the Johnson Act necessarily focuses on the 25 jurisdictional basis on which the court is asked to grant such relief. The happenstance that there may or may not be other claims in the case is irrelevant—especially given the fact 26 that ... the additional claims asserted in the action may have nothing to do with state rate orders at all. 27 28 1 Cannara v. Nemeth, 21 F.4th 1169, 1175 (9th Cir. 2021) (quoting Abcarian, 972 F.3d at 1030). 2 And Ninth Circuit precedent establishes that the substance and effect of a plaintiff’s challenge 3 drives the jurisdictional analysis, not the form. US West, 146 F.3d at 722. And the Ninth Circuit 4 has “broadly construed the Act’s jurisdictional bar to oust federal courts of jurisdiction over all 5 challenges affecting rates.” Cannara, 21 F.4th at 1175 (quoting Brooks, 951 F.2d at 1054); US 6 West, Inc. v. Tristani, 182 F.3d 1202, 1207 (10th Cir. 1999) (explaining the Johnson Act is 7 designed to keep rate challenges out of federal courts “lock, stock, and barrel” and relying on US 8 West v. Nelson and other Ninth Circuit cases interpreting the Act). 9 Here, Plaintiff’s claims are subject to the Johnson Act. The First Amended Complaint 10 describes the wildfire surcharge at issue as resulting in “ongoing deprivations of Plaintiff’s 11 constitutionally protected property and utility service interests without adequate notice or a 12 meaningful opportunity to be heard.” (Doc. 5 at 1).
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1 2 3 4 5 6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 8 REBECCA FLORES, Case No. 1:26-cv-00307-KES-SKO
9 FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS Plaintiff, THAT PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT AND 10 v. EX PARTE MOTION FOR A TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER 11 BE DISMISSED FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION 12 CALIFORNIA PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION, et al., (Doc. 7) 13 14-DAY DEADLINE 14 Defendants. 15 16 Plaintiff proceeds pro se and in forma pauperis with a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. 17 section 1983. Plaintiff has filed an ex parte “Application for Temporary Restraining Order and 18 Order to Show Cause Re: Preliminary Injunction,” seeking “an order preventing Defendants from 19 disconnecting her electric service during the pendency of this action.” (Doc. 7). 20 Because the Court lacks jurisdiction, the undersigned recommends dismissing the First 21 Amended Complaint and Application for a Temporary Restraining Order for lack of jurisdiction. 22 I. BACKGROUND 23 Plaintiff is proceeding on her First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) filed on February 9, 24 2026. (Doc. 5). The FAC alleges “ongoing deprivations of Plaintiff’s constitutionally protected 25 property and utility service interests without adequate notice or a meaningful opportunity to be 26 heard.” (Id. at 1). 27 28 1 On March 16, 2026, the undersigned screened the FAC and found it stated a cognizable 2 section 1983 procedural due process claim against Defendants and, therefore, found service of the 3 FAC on Defendants appropriate. (Doc. 6 at 1). 4 II. PLAINTIFF'S TRO MOTION 5 In her application for a Temporary Restraining Order (“TRO”), Plaintiff alleges that she 6 has “previously experienced disconnection of her electrical service” related to what amounts to a 7 billing dispute at the center of the matter before this Court. (See Doc. 7 at 1). Plaintiff alleges 8 that upon receipt of “a final administrative decision from the California Public Utilities 9 Commission dismissing her complaint,” she no longer has “any remaining administrative avenue 10 for relief” and “faces irreparable harm from the loss of essential utility service.” (Id.). In a 11 supplemental declaration, Plaintiff declares that “[o]n or about March 19, 2026 . . . [she] received 12 a disconnection notice from PG&E.” (Doc. 11 at 3). 13 III. LEGAL STANDARD 14 The Court has an obligation to examine subject-matter jurisdiction issues sua sponte. 15 Gonzalez v. Thaler, 565 U.S. 134, 141 (2012). Federal courts are of limited jurisdiction, having 16 subject-matter jurisdiction only over matters authorized by the Constitution and Congress. 17 Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). 18 IV. DISCUSSION 19 Under the Johnson Act, federal courts lack jurisdiction over “all suits affecting state- 20 approved utility rates.” Abcarian v. Levine, 972 F.3d 1019, 1029–30 (9th Cir. 2020). The Johnson 21 Act states:
22 The district courts shall not enjoin, suspend or restrain the operation of, or compliance with, any order affecting rates chargeable by a public utility and made by a State administrative 23 agency or a rate-making body of a State political subdivision, where:
24 (1) Jurisdiction is based solely on diversity of citizenship or repugnance of the order to the Federal Constitution; and, 25 (2) The order does not interfere with interstate commerce; and, 26 (3) The order has been made after reasonable notice and hearing; and, 27 (4) A plain, speedy and efficient remedy may be had in the courts of such State. 28 1 28 U.S.C. § 1342. 2 Although the text of the Johnson Act focuses on ratemaking “orders,” the Ninth Circuit 3 has construed it to apply to “all suits affecting state-approved utility rates.” Abcarian, 972 F.3d 4 at 1029–30. Indeed, when “a party challenges the rate-making system, including any particular 5 procedure th[e] . . . system employs, the Johnson Act bars federal jurisdiction.” US West, Inc. v. 6 Nelson, 146 F.3d 718, 722 (9th Cir. 1998). 7 The Ninth Circuit has broadly interpreted the Johnson Act as prohibiting both direct 8 challenges to a specific rate-setting order, as well as indirect challenges that “might have an impact 9 on future rate orders” or that could be used to enjoin enforcement of a past order. Id. at 722–23; 10 Brooks v. Sulphur Springs Valley Elec. Coop., 951 F.2d 1050, 1054 (9th Cir. 1991) (“Congress 11 did not intend to withdraw from federal courts the power to enjoin state rate orders directly but 12 leave undisturbed the power to do so indirectly.”). The Ninth Circuit has cautioned that a 13 Plaintiff’s description or characterization of their challenge is not determinative. US West, 146 14 F.3d at 722. Nor does a plaintiff avoid the Johnson Act by alleging constitutional claims that are 15 unrelated to state ratemaking orders. Id.; Abcarian, 972 F.3d at 1030. 16 The plaintiffs in US West, for example, claimed to challenge a policy rather than a specific 17 rate order. 146 F.3d at 722. The Ninth Circuit was not convinced and instructed that “the way 18 that [plaintiffs] have chosen to describe their grievance does not control whether the Johnson Act 19 bars this action.” Id. And in Abcarian, the Ninth Circuit explained that the Johnson Act would 20 “be a nullity if it could be evaded through the simple artifice of adding some other federal claim 21 to the complaint.” 972 F.3d at 1030. 22 In sum, the Ninth Circuit has repeatedly emphasized the jurisdictional nature of the 23 Johnson Act: 24 In barring federal courts from exercising jurisdiction to interfere with state rate orders in specified circumstances, the text of the Johnson Act necessarily focuses on the 25 jurisdictional basis on which the court is asked to grant such relief. The happenstance that there may or may not be other claims in the case is irrelevant—especially given the fact 26 that ... the additional claims asserted in the action may have nothing to do with state rate orders at all. 27 28 1 Cannara v. Nemeth, 21 F.4th 1169, 1175 (9th Cir. 2021) (quoting Abcarian, 972 F.3d at 1030). 2 And Ninth Circuit precedent establishes that the substance and effect of a plaintiff’s challenge 3 drives the jurisdictional analysis, not the form. US West, 146 F.3d at 722. And the Ninth Circuit 4 has “broadly construed the Act’s jurisdictional bar to oust federal courts of jurisdiction over all 5 challenges affecting rates.” Cannara, 21 F.4th at 1175 (quoting Brooks, 951 F.2d at 1054); US 6 West, Inc. v. Tristani, 182 F.3d 1202, 1207 (10th Cir. 1999) (explaining the Johnson Act is 7 designed to keep rate challenges out of federal courts “lock, stock, and barrel” and relying on US 8 West v. Nelson and other Ninth Circuit cases interpreting the Act). 9 Here, Plaintiff’s claims are subject to the Johnson Act. The First Amended Complaint 10 describes the wildfire surcharge at issue as resulting in “ongoing deprivations of Plaintiff’s 11 constitutionally protected property and utility service interests without adequate notice or a 12 meaningful opportunity to be heard.” (Doc. 5 at 1). The second paragraph of the First Amended 13 Complaint states “[t]his action challenges a statue -authorized securitization structure created and 14 enforced by defendants that converts customer-derived billing revenues into pledged ‘recovery 15 property,’ monetizes those revenues for the benefit of third-party bond holders, and imposes 16 automatic, non-bypassable charges on residential utility customers without individual notice or 17 pre-deprivation process.” More significantly, the relief Plaintiff seeks conclusively demonstrates 18 that she is challenging a ratemaking: Plaintiff asks the Court to find unconstitutional “Defendants’ 19 policies and practices of imposing and enforcing recovery-related or securitized charges against 20 Plaintiff’s utility account without constitutionally adequate notice and a meaningful opportunity 21 to be heard” and to enjoin “Defendants from collecting, enforcing, or threatening disconnection 22 based upon such charges against Plaintiff unless and until constitutionally sufficient pre- 23 deprivation notice and hearing procedures are provided.” (Id. at 16). This relief would necessarily 24 “affect state-approved utility rates,” despite Plaintiff’s effort to reframe her claims as non-rate 25 related. See Abcarian, 972 F.3d at 1029–30. 26 The undersigned acknowledges that the Johnson Act has several procedural requirements, 27 including the “reasonable notice and hearing” requirement. 28 U.S.C. § 1342. In Brooks, the 28 Ninth Circuit concluded that “hold[ing] a hearing before approving any rate change” and 1 “provid[ing] thirty days notice” was sufficient. 951 F.2d at 1054. In Abcarian, the Ninth Circuit 2 addressed the procedural requirement in a single conclusory sentence: “The official records of the 3 City Council confirm that the three rate-setting ordinances at issue were indisputably ‘made after 4 reasonable notice and hearing.’” 972 F.3d at 1032. And in Cannara, the Ninth Circuit held that 5 “the process that the CPUC provided in its [wildfire] surcharge proceedings,” the same policies at 6 issue here, “surpassed what [the Ninth Circuit] accepted in prior cases.” Cannara, 21 F.4th at 7 1176 (citing Brooks, 951 F.2d at 1054). The undersigned finds that the Johnson Act’s requirement 8 of reasonable notice and hearing has likewise been met here. 9 Finally, the undersigned finds that there is no plausible allegation of interference with 10 interstate commerce, see Desoto Cab Co., Inc. v. Picker, 196 F. Supp. 3d 1107, 1114 (N.D. Cal. 11 2016) (“the mere fact that [transportation network carriers] engage in interstate commerce is not 12 enough to establish interference with interstate commerce”), and there are adequate remedies in 13 state court, see Cannara, 467 F. Supp. 3d 877, 883 n.2 (N.D. Cal. 2020) (noting that “[j]udicial 14 review of CPUC orders is provided for by California state law,” that “[s]uch appeals are granted 15 preference, . . . and where constitutional challenges are raised, California state courts are directed 16 to ‘exercise independent judgment on the law and the facts’” (quoting Cal. Pub. Util. Code 17 §§ 1756−67)), aff’d, 21 F.4th 1169 (9th Cir. 2021); see also US West, 146 F.3d at 725−26; Brooks, 18 951 F.2d at 1055−56). 19 In sum, the undersigned finds that the Johnson Act’s procedural conditions have been met 20 and the Act strips this Court of jurisdiction over this matter. 21 V. CONCLUSION 22 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff’s First Amended 23 Complaint, (Doc. 5), and Application for Temporary Restraining Order, (Doc. 7), be DISMISSED 24 for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 25 These findings and recommendations are submitted to the District Judge assigned to this 26 action, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and this Court’s Local Rule 304. Within fourteen 27 (14) days of service of these recommendations, any party may file written objections to these 28 1 findings and recommendations with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document 2 should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” 3 The District Judge will review the Magistrate Judge’s findings and recommendations 4 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). The parties are advised that failure to file objections within 5 the specified time may result in the waiver of rights on appeal. Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 6 834, 839 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Baxter v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1391, 1394 (9th Cir. 1991)). 7 IT IS SO ORDERED. 8
9 Dated: April 2, 2026 /s/ Sheila K. Oberto . UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 10
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