Rebecca Cochran v. Applied Thin-Film Products, et al.

N.D. California

Rebecca Cochran v. Applied Thin-Film Products, et al.

DecidedApril 9, 2026

Docket3:25-cv-10635

StatusUnknown

This text of Rebecca Cochran v. Applied Thin-Film Products, et al. (Rebecca Cochran v. Applied Thin-Film Products, et al.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Rebecca Cochran v. Applied Thin-Film Products, et al., (N.D. Cal. 2026).

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1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 REBECCA COCHRAN, Case No. 25-cv-10635-AMO

8 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO 9 v. REMAND

10 APPLIED THIN-FILM PRODUCTS, et al., Re: Dkt. No. 19 Defendants. 11

12 13 This is a putative wage and hour class action. Before the Court is Plaintiff Rebecca 14 Cochran’s motion to remand. Having read the parties’ papers and carefully considered their 15 arguments and the relevant legal authority, and good cause appearing, the Court GRANTS the 16 motion for the following reasons. 17 BACKGROUND 18 I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 19 On November 7, 2025, Cochran filed this action against Defendants Applied Thin-Film 20 Products, Vishay Dale Electronics, LLC, and Vishay Intertechnology, Inc., (collectively, 21 “Applied”) in Alameda County Superior Court seeking recovery for Applied’s violations of the 22 California Labor Code. Dkt. No. 9-1. Cochran claims that she worked for Applied as a non- 23 exempt employee during the relevant statutory period. Id. ¶ 22. The complaint broadly alleges 24 that Applied maintained a common policy and practice of failing to pay employees for all hours 25 worked. Id. ¶ 23. As relevant here, the complaint is brought on behalf of the broader “Hourly 26 Employee Class”, which is thereafter narrowed into more discrete subclasses, such as the “Meal 27 Period Sub-Class” and “Rest Period Sub-Class”. Id. ¶ 14(a)-(c). For its meal period claim, the 1 members of the Meal Period Sub-Class with uninterrupted, duty-free meal periods.” Id. ¶ 46. 2 Similarly, the complaint alleges that Applied “maintained a policy or practice of not providing 3 members of the Rest Period Sub-Class with” adequate rest periods. Id. ¶ 59. The remainder of the 4 complaint details distinct sub-classes for corresponding claims. Cochran did not quantify the 5 monetary losses she attributes to Applied’s practices – the complaint is silent on the dollar value 6 of the claims. 7 II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY 8 On December 12, 2025, Applied filed a Notice of Removal, contending that this Court has 9 jurisdiction under the Class Action Fairness Act (“CAFA”). Dkt. No. 1. On January 13, 2026, 10 Cochran filed a motion to remand the case to state court arguing that jurisdiction under CAFA is 11 lacking because Applied failed to establish that the amount in controversy exceeds $5 million. 12 Dkt. No. 19. On January 27, 2026, Applied filed an opposition, Dkt. No. 20, and Cochran’s reply 13 followed on February 3, 2026, Dkt. No. 23. 14 DISCUSSION 15 I. LEGAL STANDARD 16 Only state court actions that could originally have been filed in federal court may be 17 removed. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a); Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987). CAFA 18 provides federal jurisdiction over class actions where there is minimal diversity of citizenship, the 19 putative class is comprised of at least 100 members, and the amount in controversy exceeds $5 20 million. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332 (d)(2), (d)(5). Here, Cochran does not dispute that the putative class 21 exceeds one hundred (100) members or that the parties are minimally diverse. Instead, Cochran 22 challenges only whether the amount in controversy exceeds $5 million. 23 “[W]hen a defendant’s assertion of the amount in controversy is challenged . . . both sides 24 submit proof and the court decides, by a preponderance of the evidence, whether the amount-in- 25 controversy requirement has been satisfied.” Dart Cherokee Basin Operating Co., LLC v. Owens, 26 574 U.S. 81, 88 (2014). The party seeking to invoke federal jurisdiction bears the burden of proof. 27 Id. at 88-89; Ibarra v. Manheim Investments, Inc., 775 F.3d 1193, 1197 (9th Cir. 2015) (“[I]f a 1 has the burden to put forward evidence showing that the amount in controversy exceeds $5 million 2 . . . and to persuade the court that the estimate of damages in controversy is a reasonable one.”). 3 To determine the aggregate amount in controversy, the court may consider allegations in the 4 complaint and “facts presented in the removal petition as well as any ‘summary-judgment-type 5 evidence relevant to the amount in controversy at the time of removal.’ ” Matheson v. Progressive 6 Specialty Ins. Co., 319 F.3d 1089, 1090 (9th Cir.2003)). 7 A plaintiff’s motion to remand may raise either a facial attack or a factual attack on the 8 defendant’s jurisdictional allegations. Reyes v. Fed. Express Corp., No. 23-CV-00693-AMO, 9 2023 WL 4183473, at *2 (N.D. Cal. June 23, 2023). Cochran’s motion to remand has challenged 10 the truth of Applied’s jurisdictional allegations in a factual attack. A factual attack need only 11 challenge the truth of the defendant’s jurisdictional allegations by making “a reasoned argument as 12 to why any assumptions on which [defendant’s numbers] are based are not supported by 13 evidence.” Id. at *2. Because the burden falls on the defendant to prove by a preponderance of 14 the evidence that the amount in controversy requirement is satisfied, “a plaintiff can secure 15 remand by showing, through argument alone, that the defendant has relied on unsupported, 16 unreasonable assumptions.” Benitez v. Hyatt Corp., 722 F. Supp. 3d 1094, 1100 (S.D. Cal. 2024). 17 II. CAFA JURISDICTION 18 Applied’s Notice of Removal was limited to the allegation that the $5 million jurisdictional 19 threshold is met because of Cochran’s claims for (1) overtime, (2) meal and rest periods, (3) 20 inaccurate wage statements, (4) waiting time penalties, and (5) attorney’s fees. Cochran contests 21 CAFA jurisdiction on the basis that Applied fails to carry its burden to show that the amount in 22 controversy exceeds $5 million. Dkt. No. 19 at 7. Specifically, Cochran contests the violation 23 rate that Applied used to calculate meal and rest period violations as well as the estimated amount 24 of attorney’s fees. Id. at 8. Cochran does not contest Applied’s calculation of the amount in 25 controversy for the overtime, wage statement, or waiting time penalty claims. See generally id. 26 Applied responds that the amount in controversy exceeds $5 million because the 27 allegations in the complaint support the assumption that class members suffered both meal and 1 However, a 20% violation rate for meal and rest break violations is more commonly accepted as 2 reasonable where the complaint alleges a “policy or practice” of such violations. See Garza v. 3 Brinderson Constructors, Inc., 178 F.Supp.3d 906, 912 (N.D. Cal. 2016) (using 20% violation rate 4 where the complaint alleged a “policy or practice” of both meal and rest break violations); Jimenez 5 v. Land O’Lakes, Inc., No. 1:23-CV-00891-JLT-SKO, 2025 WL 2992313, at *6 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 6 24, 2025) (holding 20% violation rate was reasonable). 7 Applied provides no evidence to persuade the Court to depart from the 20% violation rate. 8 Rather, Applied suggests that its assumed 80% violation rate for Cochran’s meal and rest break 9 claims is “drawn directly from the very allegations that Plaintiff chose to assert in her Complaint.” 10 Dkt. No. 20 at 9. But Cochran’s complaint makes no mention of any violation rate. Rather, like 11 in Jimenez and Garza, the complaint broadly alleges that Applied had a “policy and practice” of 12 meal and rest break violations. Dkt. No. 9-1 ¶¶ 46, 60. Because Applied has not provided the 13 Court with any evidence to support departing from a 20% violation rate, the Court applies a 20% 14 violation rate to determine the amount in controversy. Applying a 20% violation rate, the amount 15 in controversy for Cochran’s meal and rest break violations totals $870,675.12.

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1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 REBECCA COCHRAN, Case No. 25-cv-10635-AMO

8 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO 9 v. REMAND

10 APPLIED THIN-FILM PRODUCTS, et al., Re: Dkt. No. 19 Defendants. 11

12 13 This is a putative wage and hour class action. Before the Court is Plaintiff Rebecca 14 Cochran’s motion to remand. Having read the parties’ papers and carefully considered their 15 arguments and the relevant legal authority, and good cause appearing, the Court GRANTS the 16 motion for the following reasons. 17 BACKGROUND 18 I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 19 On November 7, 2025, Cochran filed this action against Defendants Applied Thin-Film 20 Products, Vishay Dale Electronics, LLC, and Vishay Intertechnology, Inc., (collectively, 21 “Applied”) in Alameda County Superior Court seeking recovery for Applied’s violations of the 22 California Labor Code. Dkt. No. 9-1. Cochran claims that she worked for Applied as a non- 23 exempt employee during the relevant statutory period. Id. ¶ 22. The complaint broadly alleges 24 that Applied maintained a common policy and practice of failing to pay employees for all hours 25 worked. Id. ¶ 23. As relevant here, the complaint is brought on behalf of the broader “Hourly 26 Employee Class”, which is thereafter narrowed into more discrete subclasses, such as the “Meal 27 Period Sub-Class” and “Rest Period Sub-Class”. Id. ¶ 14(a)-(c). For its meal period claim, the 1 members of the Meal Period Sub-Class with uninterrupted, duty-free meal periods.” Id. ¶ 46. 2 Similarly, the complaint alleges that Applied “maintained a policy or practice of not providing 3 members of the Rest Period Sub-Class with” adequate rest periods. Id. ¶ 59. The remainder of the 4 complaint details distinct sub-classes for corresponding claims. Cochran did not quantify the 5 monetary losses she attributes to Applied’s practices – the complaint is silent on the dollar value 6 of the claims. 7 II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY 8 On December 12, 2025, Applied filed a Notice of Removal, contending that this Court has 9 jurisdiction under the Class Action Fairness Act (“CAFA”). Dkt. No. 1. On January 13, 2026, 10 Cochran filed a motion to remand the case to state court arguing that jurisdiction under CAFA is 11 lacking because Applied failed to establish that the amount in controversy exceeds $5 million. 12 Dkt. No. 19. On January 27, 2026, Applied filed an opposition, Dkt. No. 20, and Cochran’s reply 13 followed on February 3, 2026, Dkt. No. 23. 14 DISCUSSION 15 I. LEGAL STANDARD 16 Only state court actions that could originally have been filed in federal court may be 17 removed. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a); Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987). CAFA 18 provides federal jurisdiction over class actions where there is minimal diversity of citizenship, the 19 putative class is comprised of at least 100 members, and the amount in controversy exceeds $5 20 million. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332 (d)(2), (d)(5). Here, Cochran does not dispute that the putative class 21 exceeds one hundred (100) members or that the parties are minimally diverse. Instead, Cochran 22 challenges only whether the amount in controversy exceeds $5 million. 23 “[W]hen a defendant’s assertion of the amount in controversy is challenged . . . both sides 24 submit proof and the court decides, by a preponderance of the evidence, whether the amount-in- 25 controversy requirement has been satisfied.” Dart Cherokee Basin Operating Co., LLC v. Owens, 26 574 U.S. 81, 88 (2014). The party seeking to invoke federal jurisdiction bears the burden of proof. 27 Id. at 88-89; Ibarra v. Manheim Investments, Inc., 775 F.3d 1193, 1197 (9th Cir. 2015) (“[I]f a 1 has the burden to put forward evidence showing that the amount in controversy exceeds $5 million 2 . . . and to persuade the court that the estimate of damages in controversy is a reasonable one.”). 3 To determine the aggregate amount in controversy, the court may consider allegations in the 4 complaint and “facts presented in the removal petition as well as any ‘summary-judgment-type 5 evidence relevant to the amount in controversy at the time of removal.’ ” Matheson v. Progressive 6 Specialty Ins. Co., 319 F.3d 1089, 1090 (9th Cir.2003)). 7 A plaintiff’s motion to remand may raise either a facial attack or a factual attack on the 8 defendant’s jurisdictional allegations. Reyes v. Fed. Express Corp., No. 23-CV-00693-AMO, 9 2023 WL 4183473, at *2 (N.D. Cal. June 23, 2023). Cochran’s motion to remand has challenged 10 the truth of Applied’s jurisdictional allegations in a factual attack. A factual attack need only 11 challenge the truth of the defendant’s jurisdictional allegations by making “a reasoned argument as 12 to why any assumptions on which [defendant’s numbers] are based are not supported by 13 evidence.” Id. at *2. Because the burden falls on the defendant to prove by a preponderance of 14 the evidence that the amount in controversy requirement is satisfied, “a plaintiff can secure 15 remand by showing, through argument alone, that the defendant has relied on unsupported, 16 unreasonable assumptions.” Benitez v. Hyatt Corp., 722 F. Supp. 3d 1094, 1100 (S.D. Cal. 2024). 17 II. CAFA JURISDICTION 18 Applied’s Notice of Removal was limited to the allegation that the $5 million jurisdictional 19 threshold is met because of Cochran’s claims for (1) overtime, (2) meal and rest periods, (3) 20 inaccurate wage statements, (4) waiting time penalties, and (5) attorney’s fees. Cochran contests 21 CAFA jurisdiction on the basis that Applied fails to carry its burden to show that the amount in 22 controversy exceeds $5 million. Dkt. No. 19 at 7. Specifically, Cochran contests the violation 23 rate that Applied used to calculate meal and rest period violations as well as the estimated amount 24 of attorney’s fees. Id. at 8. Cochran does not contest Applied’s calculation of the amount in 25 controversy for the overtime, wage statement, or waiting time penalty claims. See generally id. 26 Applied responds that the amount in controversy exceeds $5 million because the 27 allegations in the complaint support the assumption that class members suffered both meal and 1 However, a 20% violation rate for meal and rest break violations is more commonly accepted as 2 reasonable where the complaint alleges a “policy or practice” of such violations. See Garza v. 3 Brinderson Constructors, Inc., 178 F.Supp.3d 906, 912 (N.D. Cal. 2016) (using 20% violation rate 4 where the complaint alleged a “policy or practice” of both meal and rest break violations); Jimenez 5 v. Land O’Lakes, Inc., No. 1:23-CV-00891-JLT-SKO, 2025 WL 2992313, at *6 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 6 24, 2025) (holding 20% violation rate was reasonable). 7 Applied provides no evidence to persuade the Court to depart from the 20% violation rate. 8 Rather, Applied suggests that its assumed 80% violation rate for Cochran’s meal and rest break 9 claims is “drawn directly from the very allegations that Plaintiff chose to assert in her Complaint.” 10 Dkt. No. 20 at 9. But Cochran’s complaint makes no mention of any violation rate. Rather, like 11 in Jimenez and Garza, the complaint broadly alleges that Applied had a “policy and practice” of 12 meal and rest break violations. Dkt. No. 9-1 ¶¶ 46, 60. Because Applied has not provided the 13 Court with any evidence to support departing from a 20% violation rate, the Court applies a 20% 14 violation rate to determine the amount in controversy. Applying a 20% violation rate, the amount 15 in controversy for Cochran’s meal and rest break violations totals $870,675.12. 16 Cochran additionally argues that Applied’s assumption that its attorney’s fees could 17 amount to 25% is unreasonable. Even assuming attorney’s fees of 25%, Applied does not meet 18 the $5 million amount in controversy threshold. Thus, the Court declines to reach this argument.1 19 Applying a 20% violation rate to Cochran’s meal and rest break violation allegations, the total 20 amount in controversy is $2,567,665.83. As such, the amount in controversy does not meet the 21 threshold for CAFA jurisdiction. 22 CONCLUSION 23 Applied failed to meet its burden of proof that this Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 24 § 1332(d). Accordingly, Cochran’s motion to remand is GRANTED. The Court directs the Clerk 25 of Court to transmit the files in this matter back to the Alameda County Superior Court and close 26

27 1 In support of its attorney’s fees estimate, Applied asks the Court to take judicial notice of two ] the files in this Court. 2 3 IT IS SO ORDERED. 4 || Dated: April 9, 2026 5 6 . CELI MARTINEZ- U 7 United States District Judge 8 9 10 11 a 12

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