Opinion issued June 25, 2026
In The
Court of Appeals For The
First District of Texas ———————————— NO. 01-24-00359-CR ——————————— REBBA CARYN STUART, Appellant V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the 412th Judicial District Court Brazoria County, Texas Trial Court Case No. 95748-CR
MEMORANDUM OPINION
A jury convicted Rebba Caryn Stuart of injury to an elderly individual and
sentenced her to thirty years’ confinement. See TEX. PENAL CODE § 22.04. On
appeal, Stuart contends the trial court erred by admitting certain evidence, denying
her the opportunity to make offers of proof on excluded evidence, depriving her of her constitutional right to present a complete defense, and ordering her to repay
attorney’s fees and other costs. We modify the trial court’s judgment to strike the
repayment of some fees and costs and affirm the judgment as modified.
Background
On March 21, 2022, Stuart drove southbound into an intersection through a
red light. At the same time, Florida Brown was passing eastbound through the
intersection on a green light and had the right of way. The two cars collided. Brown
was severely injured in the collision and later died.
A grand jury indicted Stuart for injury to elderly by causing her vehicle to
strike Brown’s vehicle. At trial, the State presented evidence that Stuart was driving
sixty miles per hour and never tried to slow down or stop before the collision. A
mechanical inspection of Stuart’s car showed no pre-collision problems with the
steering, brakes, or tires, and that the car was “controllable” and in “good shape.”
The State’s mechanical expert testified that Stuart should have been able to “stop,
stay, and steer.” When Deputy McReynolds, a first responder at the crash scene,
asked Stuart what happened, Stuart told McReynolds she was trying to kill herself.
Stuart was taken to the hospital and evaluated by a psychiatric nurse
practitioner. The nurse practitioner testified that Stuart was “alert,” “oriented,”
“calm,” “cooperative,” and “clear of thought” during the evaluation. Stuart claimed
to have no intention of harming anyone but was evasive on questions about harming
2 herself. Stuart deflected some of those questions but ultimately acknowledged
having suicidal thoughts. The nurse practitioner’s report recited that Stuart
“revealed to the primary team that the collision was intentional.”
Stuart also self-reported a history of depression, Post-Traumatic Stress
Disorder, and Borderline Personality Disorder. She told the nurse practitioner, “I
had a very rough life and sometimes I don’t want to be in it.” She disclosed that her
suicidal thoughts began at age seven, when she tried to “contract with her brother”
to kill her. And she told the nurse practitioner that, about two months before the
collision, she had been raped by her ex-boyfriend, leading her to terminate the
resulting pregnancy and end the relationship.
The nurse practitioner spoke with Stuart’s family, who expressed their belief
that these events had affected Stuart’s mental and emotional health. Stuart could not
sleep, cried frequently, and was verbally (but not physically) aggressive. They also
told the nurse practitioner that Stuart’s alcohol consumption had increased, which
conflicted with Stuart’s statement that she had not been drinking alcohol.
Stuart was involuntarily discharged to a psychiatric hospital for treatment.
She was involuntarily committed for inpatient psychiatric care a second time in April
2022.
Stuart’s defense at trial included testimony from three witnesses: a
psychologist, a paramedic who responded to the collision, and an accident
3 reconstructionist. The psychologist opined that Stuart did not have a diagnosable
mental-health disorder. The paramedic testified that Stuart may have injured her
head in the collision, was not making sense after the collision, and was in shock or
an altered state. The accident reconstructionist testified, among other things, that
Stuart did not have time to react to avoid the collision.
The jury ultimately found Stuart guilty and assessed her punishment at thirty
years’ confinement and a $10,000 fine. Although it found Stuart was indigent, the
trial court also ordered Stuart to pay a $250 reimbursement fee and her attorney’s
fees.
Admission of Evidence
We begin with Stuart’s first and third issues challenging the trial court’s
decision to admit into evidence (1) the data obtained from her car along with the
associated testimony and report generated from the data and (2) a series of Facebook
posts.
A. Car data
Stuart argues the trial court should not have admitted data obtained from her
car’s event data recorder, testimony about the data, or the report generated from that
data because the record does not show the State obtained the evidence with a valid
4 search warrant based on probable cause.1 See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 38.23(a)
(“No evidence obtained by an officer or other person in violation of any provisions
of the Constitution or laws of the State of Texas, or of the Constitution or laws of
the United States of America, shall be admitted in evidence against the
accused . . . .”). This issue is not preserved for our review.
After Stuart objected that the State had not shown it legally searched her car
and seized data, the State offered the search warrant into the evidence. The warrant
authorized officers to inspect Stuart’s car for “vehicle functionality” by, among other
things, examining the “airbag/electronic control module . . . that may record certain
data,” including the “speed [her] vehicle was traveling,” “engine cycle revolutions,”
“engine throttle pressure,” “braking information,” and any “change in velocity.” The
warrant expressly stated that an affidavit from a licensed peace officer was attached
and that the verified facts stated in the affidavit showed probable cause for the
warrant’s issuance. The State exhibited and offered the probable-cause affidavit
along with the warrant, but Stuart objected that the affidavit should be excluded.
1 To the extent Stuart’s brief can be read as challenging the constitutionality of the search of and retrieval of data from Brown’s car, Stuart lacks standing to make the challenge because she has not shown any reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of Brown’s car. See Kothe v. State, 152 S.W.3d 54, 59 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (“Proof of a ‘reasonable expectation of privacy’ is at the forefront of all Fourth Amendment claims. Any defendant seeking to suppress evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment must first show that he personally had a reasonable expectation of privacy that the government invaded.”). 5 According to Stuart, the affidavit contained hearsay, and its admission would violate
her Fourth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights because the State had not made
the affiant available to testify. The trial court admitted the search warrant into
evidence but excluded the probable-cause affidavit. The affidavit is not included in
the appellate record.
Stuart argues that because the affidavit does not appear in the record, the State
cannot establish the validity of the search warrant. This argument ignores Stuart’s
burden to preserve error.
It is the State’s burden to justify a contested search. See, e.g., Miller v. State,
736 S.W.2d 643, 648 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987). If the State relies on a search warrant,
the State must “produce the warrant and its supporting affidavit for inspection of the
trial court.” Moreno v. State, 858 S.W.2d 453, 461 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993). But
once the State produces the warrant and affidavit and they are “exhibited” to the trial
court, as here, the defendant bears the responsibility to ensure that the warrant and
affidavit are included in the record “if they are to be reviewed on appeal.” Id.; Miller,
736 S.W.2d at 648; see also Cannady v. State, 582 S.W.2d 467, 469 (Tex. Crim.
App. [Panel Op.] 1979). Because Stuart did not do so, she has not preserved this
issue for our review. See, e.g., Washington v. State, No. 14-23-00723-CR, 2025 WL
926468, at *4 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Mar. 27, 2025, no pet.) (mem. op.,
not designated for publication); Boldon v. State, No. 01-12-00486-CR, 2013 WL
6 5637031, at *7–8 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Oct. 15, 2013, pet. ref’d) (mem.
op., not designated for publication).
We overrule Stuart’s first issue.
B. Facebook posts
Stuart argues the trial court abused its discretion by admitting several
Facebook posts because the State did not properly authenticate the posts under Texas
Rule of Evidence 901. Stuart objected that the State could not show the posts
belonged to her through a sponsoring witness who had no personal knowledge of her
or her Facebook account. Assuming without deciding that the trial court abused its
discretion by overruling Stuart’s objection, we hold the error was harmless.
An erroneous evidentiary ruling is non-constitutional error. Gonzalez v. State,
544 S.W.3d 363, 373 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018). Non-constitutional error must be
reversed only if it affects the defendant’s substantial rights. See TEX. R. APP. P.
44.2(b). Substantial rights are not affected if an appellate court, after examining the
record, has fair assurance that the error did not influence the jury or had only a slight
effect. Gonzalez, 544 S.W.3d at 373. The reviewing court considers the entire
record, including any testimony or physical evidence admitted for the jury’s
consideration, the nature of the evidence supporting the verdict, the character of the
alleged error, and how the alleged error might be considered in connection with other
evidence in the case. Motilla v. State, 78 S.W.3d 352, 357–58 (Tex. Crim. App.
7 2002). The court may also consider the jury charge, the State’s theory and any
defensive theories, closing arguments, and voir dire, if material to the defendant’s
claims. Morales v. State, 32 S.W.3d 862, 867 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000).
Having considered the entire record, we cannot conclude the alleged error in
admitting the Facebook posts had a substantial and injurious effect on the jury’s
verdict. The State offered the Facebook posts to support its theory that Stuart
intended to crash her car because she was suicidal when she drove through the red
light. The admitted exhibit contained five posts, made between March 12, 2022, and
June 17, 2022, by an account using Stuart’s name and likeness. The posts shared
general or motivational statements about self-worth and mental health from other
Facebook accounts, including:
• “There is no self[-]development without self-awareness. You can read as many books as you like, but if you’re unable to read yourself you’ll never learn a thing.”
• “[T]here will always be someone who can’t see your worth. [D]on’t let it be you.”
• “Loving yourself isn’t vanity, it’s sanity. The storms of life don’t seem too bad when you have people around you that can support you. Find a licensed therapist . . . .”
• “Stop replaying the past in your mind. It’s gone. Use your mental energy to manifest something new. Don’t waste your precious life force being stuck on what didn’t work out or what you could’ve done. Do something new today. Each moment is another chance to recreate yourself.”
8 • “[S]top wondering if they care about you[.] [I]f you have to ask the answer is no[.]”
To the extent these Facebook posts were, as the State asserted, evidence of
Stuart’s poor mental health or suicidal ideation, it is weak evidence that would have
slight influence on the jury. The posts were cumulative of other stronger evidence
of Stuart’s mental state, including Deputy McReynolds’s testimony that Stuart told
him after the collision that she was trying to kill herself, the nurse practitioner’s
testimony that Stuart acknowledged a history of suicidal thoughts and experienced
trauma only two months before the collision, and various other testimony and
exhibits showing Stuart’s involuntary commitments for mental-health treatment in
the months surrounding the collision. See Lee v. State, 418 S.W.3d 892, 900 (Tex.
App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2013, pet. ref’d) (holding cumulative evidence
harmless). Thus, any error in admitting the Facebook posts was harmless. See
Mayes v. State, 816 S.W.2d 79, 88 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).
We overrule Stuart’s third issue.
Denial of Offer of Proof
Stuart asserts she was improperly denied the opportunity to make offers of
proof concerning the credibility and truthfulness of the investigating officers,
including the probable-cause affiant for the search warrant for Stuart’s car. See TEX.
R. EVID. 103(a)(2) (“[I]f the ruling excludes evidence, a party informs the court of
its substance by an offer of proof, unless the substance was apparent from the
9 context.”), (c) (“In a jury trial, the court must allow a party to make the offer outside
the jury’s presence and before the court reads its charge to the jury.”).
Stuart points to defense counsel’s effort to introduce evidence that two
officers involved in investigating Brown’s death, including the probable-cause
affiant, were the subject of an internal administrative investigation related to their
compliance with the Brazoria County Sheriff’s policies for handling evidence.
Defense counsel alleged the prosecutor’s office knew of the investigation before trial
but only disclosed it during trial, potentially violating Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S.
83, 87 (1963) (establishing that prosecutors must disclose exculpatory evidence). To
obtain information about the investigation, defense counsel served subpoenas for
documents related to the investigation and for the Sheriff and the District Attorney
to testify. On the State’s motion, however, the trial court quashed the subpoenas,
granted a protective order, and refused to let defense counsel make an offer of proof
on what notice the District Attorney’s office had of the administrative investigation
through question and answer with the Sheriff or the defense’s own investigator who
had talked with the Sheriff about the matter.2
The right to make an offer of proof is absolute; a trial court lacks discretion to
deny such a request. See Kipp v. State, 876 S.W.2d 330, 333 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994);
2 The State argued, among other things, that the discovery requests were too broad and that the conversations between the Sheriff and the District Attorney were privileged and confidential. 10 Spence v. State, 758 S.W.2d 597, 599 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988). But the court’s
refusal to allow a defendant an opportunity to make an offer of proof is still subject
to a non-constitutional harm analysis. See Potier v. State, 68 S.W.3d 657, 666 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2002) (stating that standard of review under Rule 103 is same as standard
for non-constitutional error); see also TEX. R. APP. P. 44.2(b) (non-constitutional
errors “must be disregarded” if they do not affect the defendant’s substantial rights).
Even assuming the trial court erred by refusing to let Stuart make an offer of
proof through question and answer with either the Sheriff or the defense investigator,
her substantial rights were not prejudiced because the substance of the evidence she
wished to offer is apparent from the context. See TEX. R. EVID. 103(a)(2).
Soon after learning of the administrative investigation, defense counsel
moved for a continuance and mistrial to gather additional information.3 In
considering the motion, the trial court heard testimony outside the jury’s presence
from another officer—a lieutenant of “professional standards” who was familiar
with the investigation’s existence but was not conducting the investigation himself.
He explained that the administrative investigation began after the Sheriff’s Office
had trouble locating some information requested in a public information request.
According to the lieutenant, the investigation did not involve allegations of criminal
3 The trial court granted a continuance of one day.
11 conduct on the officers’ part but a failure to comply with departmental policy. The
lieutenant testified that the Sheriff himself had notified the District Attorney that the
two officers were being investigated within two or three days of the investigation
beginning in late March or early April, only a few weeks before trial.
After the trial court quashed the subpoenas and granted the protective order,
defense counsel put on the record the questions he wanted to ask the Sheriff:
[M]y line of questioning with the Sheriff would be were you made aware of an investigation with [the two officers]? . . . [D]id you inform anybody about this investigation with the District Attorney’s Office? Who? And when? I would not ask [the Sheriff] to go into the details of his investigation or his department’s investigation into either [officer] as far as the Sheriff.
Defense counsel added that he wanted the record to reflect that the Sheriff, “in fact,
did have that conversation with [the District Attorney].” And as to his own
investigator, counsel wanted to make a record of the conversation he and the
investigator had with the Sheriff about the notice—specifically, that the Sheriff told
the defense’s investigator that “he did in fact notify [the District Attorney] that an
investigation was ongoing” before trial started.
Through these exchanges, defense counsel identified whom he wished to ask,
what he wished to ask, and why he wished to ask it. The context provided by these
exchanges, along with the State’s filings and their attachments, make clear what
12 Stuart wanted to preserve for appeal.4 See TEX. R. EVID. 103(a)(2); see also Coleman
v. State, 966 S.W.2d 525, 528 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) (“A defendant who has not
had an opportunity to interview a witness may make the necessary showing by
establishing the matters to which the witness might testify and the relevance and
importance of those matters to the success of the defense.”). Consequently, Stuart’s
substantial rights were not prejudiced by the trial court’s failure to permit a question-
and-answer offer of proof with the Sheriff or defense investigator. See, e.g., Smith
v. State, No. 01-13-00438-CR, 2014 WL 4219556, at *3 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st
Dist.] Aug. 26, 2014, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (trial
court’s refusal to allow defendant’s offer of proof on excluded testimony was
harmless because it was “apparent from the record what appellant was attempting to
establish by introducing [the evidence]”); Williams v. State, 964 S.W.2d 747, 753
(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1998, pet. ref’d) (same). There is no reversible
error regarding the denial of offers of proof.
We overrule Stuart’s second issue.
Denial of Opportunity to Present Defense
Stuart next argues that the trial court’s erroneous evidentiary rulings deprived
her of the constitutional right to present a complete defense. Reading Stuart’s brief
4 The State’s motions to quash and for protective orders included copies of the quashed subpoenas. 13 liberally, Stuart complains that the trial court should have admitted the probable-
cause affidavit for the warrant to search her car, along with the warrant itself,
because she challenged its “veracity.” Because the State did not call the probable-
cause affiant to testify, however, she was forced to object that the affidavit was
hearsay and its admission would violate other constitutional rights. And because the
affidavit was not admitted following her objection, she was denied her constitutional
right to present a complete defense. See Anderson v. State, 301 S.W.3d 276, 280
(Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (defendant’s right to present complete defense is rooted in
Fourteenth Amendment’s due-process clause and Sixth Amendment’s compulsory-
process and confrontation clauses).
Erroneous evidentiary rulings rarely rise to the level of denying the
constitutional right to present a complete defense. Wiley v. State, 74 S.W.3d 399,
405 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). Relevant here, however, a constitutional violation may
occur if the trial court’s “clearly erroneous ruling excluding otherwise relevant,
reliable evidence which ‘forms such a vital portion of the case that exclusion
effectively precludes the defendant from presenting a defense.’” Id. (quoting Potier,
68 S.W.3d at 665).
We cannot conclude that a constitutional violation occurred because we
cannot conclude the trial court’s evidentiary rulings were erroneous in the first place.
See id. at 408. Stuart’s argument ignores that the trial court excluded the probable-
14 cause affidavit only after she objected to its admission under the rule against hearsay
and on other constitutional grounds, including the Sixth Amendment right to
confront the witnesses against her. Even putting aside concerns that Stuart is making
an appellate error of an action she induced,5 we note her failure to ensure a copy of
the affidavit appeared in the record precludes any determination of whether the
affidavit was erroneously excluded. We cannot discern whether the affidavit
contained inadmissible hearsay or testimonial statements that would trigger an
opportunity to cross-examine the affiant. Cf. Johnson v. State, No. 01-22-00399-
CR, 2023 WL 5760868, at *6 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Sept. 7, 2023, no
pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (recognizing general principle that
even claims involving constitutional error must be preserved or they are waived);
Boldon, 2013 WL 5637031, at *7–8 (discussing scenarios under which defendant
has responsibility to ensure warrant and affidavit are included in record). Absent a
showing of evidentiary error, there is no showing of constitutional error. See Smith
v. State, 355 S.W.3d 138, 155 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, pet. ref’d) (no
constitutional violation occurred when trial court did not commit evidentiary error).
We overrule Stuart’s fourth issue.
5 See Druery v. State, 225 S.W.3d 491, 505–06 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (“[L]aw of invited error estops a party from making an appellate error of an action it induced.”). 15 Repayment of Fees
Stuart argues the trial court erred by ordering her to pay a $250 reimbursement
fee and $15,042 in fees for her court-appointed attorney because the record contains
no evidence that she had the ability to pay, as required by Article 26.05(g) of the
Code of Criminal Procedure.
We review the assessment of court costs, including court-appointed attorney’s
fees, to determine whether a basis exists for the award. See Johnson v. State, 423
S.W.3d 385, 389–90 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014). An indigent defendant is entitled to
have an attorney appointed to represent her in criminal proceedings at no cost. TEX.
CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 1.051(c). Once the court determines that a defendant is
indigent, the defendant is presumed to remain indigent for the rest of the
proceedings. Id. art. 26.04(p); Cates v. State, 402 S.W.3d 250, 251–52 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2013). A material change in the defendant’s financial circumstances must
occur to overcome this presumption. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 26.04(p); Cates,
402 S.W.3d at 251–52. If the trial court later finds that the defendant has resources
to pay the court-appointed attorney’s fees, the court may order her to do so. TEX.
CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 26.05(g).
The trial court found that Stuart was indigent and appointed counsel to
represent her. The State concedes, and we agree, the record contains no evidence
that would support a finding that Stuart could pay her attorney’s fees. Accordingly,
16 we reform the judgment to strike the portion ordering Stuart to repay the fees for her
court-appointed counsel. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 26.05(g); Cates, 402 S.W.3d
at 251–52 (explaining that when there is no basis in record to support assessment of
court-appointed attorney’s fees, proper remedy is to reform judgment by striking
fees). The reimbursement fee will be struck for the same reason. See TEX. CODE
CRIM. PROC. art. 26.05(g).
We sustain Stuart’s fifth issue.
Conclusion
We reform the trial court’s judgment to delete the assessment of $250 in
reimbursement fees and $15,042 in attorney’s fees. The trial court’s judgment is
affirmed as modified.
Andrew Johnson Justice
Panel consists of Justices Rivas-Molloy, Johnson, and Dokupil.
Do not publish. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).