Reardon v. Leone

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Reardon v. Leone

280 A.D.2d 461, 720 N.Y.S.2d 372, 2001 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 1185

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedFebruary 5, 2001

StatusPublished

This text of 280 A.D.2d 461 (Reardon v. Leone) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Reardon v. Leone, 280 A.D.2d 461, 720 N.Y.S.2d 372, 2001 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 1185 (N.Y. Ct. App. 2001).

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Opinion

—In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, etc., the defendants Jose Ramon Leone and Maria J. Carpió appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (I. Aronin, J.), dated May 1, 2000, which denied their motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and cross claims insofar as asserted against them.

Ordered that the order is reversed, on the law, with costs payable by the plaintiffs, the motion is granted, the complaint and cross claims are dismissed insofar as asserted against the appellants, and the action against the remaining defendants is severed.

In opposition to the appellants’ prima facie demonstration of entitlement to judgment as a matter of law dismissing the complaint and cross claims insofar as asserted against them, the plaintiffs failed to raise a triable issue of fact that the injured plaintiff sustained a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) (see, Gaddy v Eyler, 79 NY2d 955; Smith v Askew, 264 AD2d 834; Kauderer v Penta, 261 AD2d 365; Flanagan v Hoeg, 212 AD2d 756). Ritter, J. P., Krausman, Florio and Feuerstein, JJ., concur.

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—In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, etc., the defendants Jose Ramon Leone and Maria J. Carpió appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (I. Aronin, J.), dated May 1, 2000, which denied their motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and cross claims insofar as asserted against them.

Ordered that the order is reversed, on the law, with costs payable by the plaintiffs, the motion is granted, the complaint and cross claims are dismissed insofar as asserted against the appellants, and the action against the remaining defendants is severed.

In opposition to the appellants’ prima facie demonstration of entitlement to judgment as a matter of law dismissing the complaint and cross claims insofar as asserted against them, the plaintiffs failed to raise a triable issue of fact that the injured plaintiff sustained a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) (see, Gaddy v Eyler, 79 NY2d 955; Smith v Askew, 264 AD2d 834; Kauderer v Penta, 261 AD2d 365; Flanagan v Hoeg, 212 AD2d 756). Ritter, J. P., Krausman, Florio and Feuerstein, JJ., concur.

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Bluebook (online)

280 A.D.2d 461, 720 N.Y.S.2d 372, 2001 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 1185, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/reardon-v-leone-nyappdiv-2001.

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