Reali v. Mazda Motor of America, Inc.

106 F. Supp. 2d 75, 2000 WL 987764
CourtDistrict Court, D. Maine
DecidedJuly 12, 2000
DocketCivil 98-358 P-H
StatusPublished
Cited by8 cases

This text of 106 F. Supp. 2d 75 (Reali v. Mazda Motor of America, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Maine primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Reali v. Mazda Motor of America, Inc., 106 F. Supp. 2d 75, 2000 WL 987764 (D. Me. 2000).

Opinion

AMENDED ORDER ON MOTIONS IN LIMINE AND DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

HORNBY, Chief Judge.

The plaintiff, Paul Reali (“Reali”), was a front seat passenger in a 1992 Mazda Protegé automobile when it was rear-ended by a pickup truck. As a result, he suffered diffuse axonal injury, a form of mild traumatic brain injury. He has sued the defendants Mazda Motor of America, Inc. d/b/a Mazda North American Operations and Mazda Motor Corporation (collectively “Mazda”) claiming that Mazda defectively designed the seat and thereby caused his injuries. •

This Order addresses two motions in limine and a summary judgment motion filed by Mazda. The motions in limine seek to exclude expert testimony of Professor Mariusz Ziejewski and Terrell Schaefer. After reviewing the moving papers, the case law and the record assembled up to this point, I exclude certain, critical testimony of Ziejewski and Schae-fer. In' the absence of such testimony, Reali cannot survive Mazda’s motion for summary judgment.

TESTIMONY OF PROFESSOR MARIUSZ ZIEJEWSKI

Reali offers the testimony of Professor Ziejewski, a biomechanical engineer, to prove two issues: first, that the forces created in this accident were sufficient to cause Reali’s diffuse axonal injury; and second, that had Mazda employed an alternative seat design, Reali would not have suffered his injury. Mazda maintains that Ziejewski’s testimony is based on comput *77 er simulations that are unreliable and irrelevant under the standards of Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993), and Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 119 S.Ct. 1167, 143 L.Ed.2d 238 (1999).

1. Human Tolerance Levels

Both parties appear to accept that diffuse axonal injury is caused by high velocity, angular acceleration of the head and, consequently, the brain. Angular acceleration velocity is measured in radians per second squared (“rpss”). The parties disagree on the threshold level at which angular acceleration velocity leads to diffuse axonal injury. Reali maintains that it is 1,800 rpss. Mazda maintains that it is at least 4,500 rpss. In support of his figure, Reali cites a 1968 peer reviewed article authored by Dr. A.K. Ommaya and a National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (“NHTSA”) report citing Dr. Omma-ya’s results. Mazda claims that Ommaya’s article is outdated and contradicted by Ommaya’s own testimony in at least one other trial, and that the NHTSA report pertains to the development of child crash test dummies. Mazda observes that Zie-jewski has done no independent research on this subject and claims that Ziejewski is insufficiently familiar with the relevant literature.

I conclude on this record that Ziejewski may testify on human tolerance levels. Mazda concedes that an expert may render an opinion based on the relevant literature and I do not find that Ziejewski has insufficient familiarity with the literature. The reliability of Ziejewski’s opinion is bolstered by the fact that a government agency apparently relies upon Ommaya’s 1968 conclusions, the same conclusions on which Ziejewski’s opinion relies. (Reali has submitted a copy of the Ommaya study; unfortunately, neither party has presented me with a copy of the NHTSA report.) Ommaya’s study might be outdated, or NHTSA’s report might have a tenuous connection to the issues in this case, but on the record as presented these assertions go to credibility, not admissibility. 1

2. Accident Forces

Professor Ziejewski used a computer application called Articulated Total Body (“ATB”) to understand the forces involved in the accident. ATB allows its user to model human body dynamics, a critical step in biomechanical analysis. An important data point in ATB modeling is Delta V, the change in the velocity of one object when struck by another. Ziejewski used a Delta V of 12 m.p.h. to run his two ATB simulations. Mazda argues that the 12 m.p.h. figure is unreliable because of the way in which Ziejewski derived that figure — making assumptions based on the vehicle bumper rating and partly through viewing photographs of the damaged automobile and estimating Delta V based on what he saw in the photographs. Reali responds that Ziejewski’s figure is based on a rehable analysis of the automobile by Ziejewski, a biomechanical engineer with 25 years experience, and that Mazda’s complaint is a red herring because Mazda’s own experts estimate that the Delta V could have been as high as 11 m.p.h.

I conclude that the 12 m.p.h. figure is unreliable. Under Daubert and Kumho Tire, I am to determine whether opinions are scientifically valid — derived from an application of the scientific method or methods that are accepted in the relevant field. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589, 113 S.Ct. 2786; Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 151-52, 119 S.Ct. 1167. Ziejewski derived the 12 m.p.h. figure in large part from eyeballing accident photographs. See Ziejewski Dep. at 36-17 to 38-15. Reali has pro *78 duced no testimony or record evidence suggesting that this is an acceptable way to determine Delta Y. Consequently, I find the 12 m.p.h. figure unreliable.

Reali’s red herring argument does not save Ziejewski’s Delta V opinion. Under Daubert, I must consider the methodology, not the results. See 509 U.S. at 590, 592-93, 113 S.Ct. 2786. That Ziejewski’s low end figure comes close to Mazda’s experts’ high end figure tells me very little about the validity of his method. Perhaps Zie-jewski could be asked hypothetical questions regarding Mazda’s 11 m.p.h. figure, but only if that figure is introduced at trial, an event that is uncertain. Even if such questions could be posed, the current record does not furnish an answer to them. At his deposition, Ziejewski refused to opine on the forces of the accident, given a hypothetical Delta V figure, without running the computer simulation. See Dep. at 45-13 to 46-16. 2

3. ATB Simulations

Professor Ziejewski relied upon two ATB simulations to render his opinions about the accident forces and about the forces that would have occurred with an alternative design. Mazda complains both that ATB is an unreliable way to test accident forces and that Ziejewski’s results are irrelevant because he did not model the defects identified by Reali’s car seat design expert, Terrell Schaefer, nor the alternative design proposed by Schaefer. Reali responds that ATB modeling is reliable and that Ziejewski did model the Schaefer-identified defects.

A trial judge may exclude expert testimony that is irrelevant — testimony that does not fit with the facts of the case. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 591-93, 113 S.Ct. 2786; accord Bogosian v. Mercedes-Benz of No. America, Inc.,

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Bluebook (online)
106 F. Supp. 2d 75, 2000 WL 987764, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/reali-v-mazda-motor-of-america-inc-med-2000.