Real Estate Trust Co.'s Appeal

21 Pa. D. & C. 438, 1934 Pa. Dist. & Cnty. Dec. LEXIS 134
CourtPennsylvania Court of Common Pleas, Philadelphia County
DecidedSeptember 20, 1934
StatusPublished

This text of 21 Pa. D. & C. 438 (Real Estate Trust Co.'s Appeal) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas, Philadelphia County primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Real Estate Trust Co.'s Appeal, 21 Pa. D. & C. 438, 1934 Pa. Dist. & Cnty. Dec. LEXIS 134 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1934).

Opinion

MacNeille, J.,

This is an appeal of Real Estate Trust Company of Philadelphia from the action of the Board of Revision of Taxes in assessing the premises 1338-1348 Chestnut Street, in the eighth ward of the City and County of Philadelphia, for the year 1934, in the sum of $4,000,000.

Neither counsel for the appellant nor for the respondent has filed requests for findings of fact or conclusions of law. We will therefore dispose of this matter in our discussion.

Discussion

The property is known as the Real Estate Trust Building and is located at the southeast corner of Broad and Chestnut Streets, in the City of Philadelphia. It has 125 feet on Chestnut Street and 119 feet on Broad Street, and is irregular in shape. A full description appears in the second paragraph of the appeal.

The improvement is built in several sections as an office building containing stores on Chestnut Street and a banking institution on Broad Street. The construction took place at various times between 1895 and 1927.

The appellant, in its petition, says that the assessment for 1934 is $4,000,000. This is slightly inaccurate, as the assessment seems to be $3,994,824.

Continuously from 1926 to 1932, the Board of Revision of Taxes fixed the value of the land at $3,000,000, but in 1933 it raised this value to $3,498,568, and in 1934 fixed it at $3,426,962.

In arriving at the value of the land, the assesors used a unit value for 1 front foot 100 feet in depth on Chestnut Street, inside ground, $18,000, and on Broad Street, $14,700, and for corner influence, the 50 feet at Broad and Chestnut Streets, fronting on Broad Street, it was valued at $27,500 a front foot.

The building improvements covering this ground have suffered considerable depreciation and obsolescence, arising from the erection of a number of new office buildings nearby. The gross revenue from the improvements decreased from $367,740 in 1927 to $205,258 in 1933.

The assessment for 1934 is made up of the value of the land, $3,426,962 and the value of the building, $567,862.

There is no dispute as to the fairness of the assessment of the building, all [439]*439witnesses having practically agreed that, by reason of obsolescence and the general condition of the building, its value is about what it was assessed at, and the assessors displayed their usual good judgment in making the reduction in the value of the building, which the testimony amply justifies.

With reference to the land, the assessors and the Board of Revision of Taxes fixed the value at $3,000,000 from 1926 to 1932, and there does not seem to be any substantial reason for increasing this assessment in 1933 and 1934, while the income of the property was decreasing and there were small decreases in the assessed value of other neighboring properties. The assessors and Board of Revision of Taxes are a highly skilled and specially trained body of men, who keep in constant touch with all sources of information that will enable them to reach a proper distribution of the tax burden, they have utilized their skill and knowledge in a fair and painstaking way at a time when their task is most difficult, and the fact that they assessed the land for at least 7 years for $3,000,000, along with the testimony that was produced at the trial, is sufficient to overcome the prima facie case established by the assessment and the testimony that was produced at the trial on behalf of the city.

An attempt to justify the increase is made on the ground that this property and the contiguous properties were revalued in accordance with the Hoffman Rule, which resulted in a higher value for this property, and also that the owner placed a higher value on the property in its annual statement than the assessed value.

The Hoffman Rule referred to, promulgated by Judge Murray Hoffman some fifty years ago and used generally by assessors, is based on the declaration that the front half of a lot 100 feet deep is worth two thirds of the value of the full lot. Based on this rule, tables were prepared by Henry Harman Neill, called the Hoffman-Neill Tables, which, taking 100 feet as a basis of depth, show value of lots of various depths. This table has also been extended to lots over 100 feet deep, the value increasing at a diminishing rate.

If all the lots were 100 feet deep, the unit used as a standard, the value of the lot 1 foot by 100 feet deep would be mathematically accurate in its results. However, when shorter or deeper lots must be compared there is an element of approximation in the calculations, but it is the best means available under the circumstances. However, where the lots are more than 100 feet deep, all calculations should be based on depths of at least 100 feet or more, as the depth is less of a factor after 100 feet deep than in shorter lots.

From the figures submitted it appears that the Wanamaker Building and the Land Title Building were both figured as fronting on Broad Street, to the full depth, which was 100 feet or over, and the Girard Trust Company Building was figured as fronting on Broad Street to a depth of 118 feet, but the Real Estate Trust Building was figured as fronting on Broad Street to a depth of 63 feet and on Chestnut Street for the balance of the easternmost 62 feet. If the Real Estate Trust land is refigured as fronting entirely on Broad Street to a depth of 125 feet, including the two 17J-foot strips and then deducting the value of the two 17i-foot strips recalculated (as the assessed value of this strip seems to be much lower),. the value thus obtained for the whole land will be $3,033,405, after allowing 10 percent for plottage, as was done in the original calculation. Since, however, the Girard Trust Building was only figured to a depth of 118 feet as Broad Street frontage and 21 feet 11 inches on Chestnut Street, to make an accurate comparison with it we should also take the Real Estate Trust as Broad Street frontage to a depth of 118 feet, leaving as Chestnut Street frontage 7 feet and refiguring on that basis the value of this ground is $3,100,937, and even if we only calculated the Broad Street frontage to a [440]*440depth of 100 feet, leaving 25 feet on Chestnut Street, the value will only be $3,321,618.

The importance the arrangement of the subdivisions bears to the value is clearly indicated by the fact that the easternmost 25 feet on Chestnut Street figured as Chestnut street frontage has a value of $578,000, while when it is taken as the rear portion of the Broad Street frontage it has a value of only $301,278.

Moreover, the amount added per front foot for corner influence on the Real Estate Trust property is too high. $12,800 per front foot for 50 feet of frontage was added to the Real Estate Trust property, while to the Girard Trust and Wanamaker properties only $11,000 per front foot was added. To ascertain the value of corner influence undoubtedly is the most difficult task which confronts the assessor. Almost every city has its own method of determining this, and as long as the method is reasonable it is entirely within the discretion of the assessors: Pardee et al. v. Schuylkill County et al., 276 Pa. 246; DuBois’ Appeal, 293 Pa. 186.

The Somers Rule for calculating corner influence is based on the increment of value of a corner plot of 100 feet by 100 feet, which depends upon the relative value of the intersecting streets.

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Related

Dubois's Appeal
142 A. 134 (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 1928)
East Brandywine & Waynesburg Railroad v. Ranck
78 Pa. 454 (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 1875)
Houston v. Western Washington Railroad
54 A. 166 (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 1903)
Pardee v. Schuylkill County
120 A. 139 (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 1923)

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Bluebook (online)
21 Pa. D. & C. 438, 1934 Pa. Dist. & Cnty. Dec. LEXIS 134, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/real-estate-trust-cos-appeal-pactcomplphilad-1934.