Real Advantage, Inc. v. Hood

12 Mass. L. Rptr. 70
CourtMassachusetts Superior Court
DecidedAugust 15, 2000
DocketNo. 00-1461
StatusPublished

This text of 12 Mass. L. Rptr. 70 (Real Advantage, Inc. v. Hood) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Massachusetts Superior Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Real Advantage, Inc. v. Hood, 12 Mass. L. Rptr. 70 (Mass. Ct. App. 2000).

Opinion

Agnes, A.J.

BACKGROUND

The plaintiff is a real estate brokerage firm and the defendant Howard Hood is the owner of approximately 8 acres of land in Ipswich, Massachusetts located at 317 and 319 Linebrook Road. The defendant, Kenneth Hood, [71]*71is the son of defendant Howard Hood, the trustee of a trust that holds the legal title to the real estate in question and holder of a durable power of attorney from Howard Hood. Complaint, exhibits A & B. Based on the hearing conducted by the court, there does not appear to be any dispute about some of the basic facts.

The parties entered into an exclusive listing agreement on or about September 16, 1999 whereby the plaintiff agreed to use reasonable efforts to procure a buyer for an “8.8± acres of land with 2 single-family wood frame homes . . . for 8112,250 per approved lot ($890,000 for 8 proposed lots) or such other price, terms and conditions accepted by the seller for the period from Thursday, November 18, 1999 through Friday, March 31, 2000.” Complaint, exhibit B. The seller, in turn, agreed to pay a fee for services (of 4.5% or 5.5% of the sale price depending on which broker actually sold the properly) “if a prospective purchaser is procured ready, willing, and able to buy in accordance with the price and terms of this agreement or such other price and terms acceptable to the seller.” Complaint, exhibit B. The agreement also contained a clause stating that “(b)uyer to employ and pay Meridian Engineering to obtain subdivision approval.” Complaint, exhibit B.

A prospective buyer, Mr. Thomas Groom, president of Groom Development Corporation, was procured by the plaintiff. Following negotiations among the parties, on December 17, 1999, Meridian Engineering provided the buyer with a proposal for engineering services relative to the above project. In particular, Meridian set forth in detail a plan for the preparation of a subdivision plan and the supporting documents necessary to obtain approval from the Town of Ipswich. Complaint, exhibit D. In particular, the plan included the cost of “on-site soil evaluation and percolation testing” and preparation of a “soil report” that was suitable for submission to the Town of Ipswich. Cost of the services was stated tobe $24,200. Thereafter, on or about January 27, 2000, Mr. Groom and the defendants signed a purchase and sales agreement. Complaint, exhibit E (hereafter, “P&S Agreement”). The agreement describes the property as the 8.8-acre parcel referred to in the listing agreement and provides further that the brokerage fee is to be paid only when seller receives the full purchase price and buyer accepts and records seller’s deed. Complaint, exhibit E. It calls for a closing no later than August 15, 2000.

The P&S Agreement contains a “rider” in which the parties agree that it is subject to the approval by the Ipswich Planning Board of a residential subdivision proposal prepared by Meridian Engineering Inc. The P&S Agreement sets out a schedule of purchase prices depending on whether there is an 8, 7 or 6 lot subdivision and provides that “[i]f the Town of Ipswich approves less than six lots then buyer will have the right to terminate the agreement, without legal or equitable recourse to either party and all deposits shall be returned to buyer.” Also, the rider states that ”[a]U costs of obtaining such approvals for this project shall be borne by the buyer. Seller shall provide final percolation tests for the eight residential lots each having a four-bedroom home.” Complaint, exhibit E. It also makes the buyer responsible for obtaining “preliminary” percolation tests “as soon as practical” and to make a “best effort” to obtain approval of the 8-lot subdivision.

It appears that during the first several months of this year, buyer paid money to Meridian Engineering and the preparation work for the subdivision plan went ahead. It also appears that buyer obtained a commitment for financing a subdivision with at least six approved lots. Sometime in March 2000, an application to schedule percolation tests on the property in question was submitted to the Town of Ipswich by Mr. Tom Groom of Groom Construction Corporation. The application notes that Howard Hood is the owner and indicates that the testing is to be conducted by Meridian Engineering, Inc. See Affidavit of Attorney Arthur K. Ross, Jr., exhibit B (and second affidavit of Mr. Ross as well). However, it turns out that the Town of Ipswich requires that applications for percolation testing must be filed by February 16th of each year. An effort was made by the buyer and Meridian Engineering, Inc. to secure a waiver of this deadline. Affidavit of Mr. Ross, exhibit C. However, on April 11, 2000, the Town rejected the request for a waiver. Affidavit of Mr. Ross, exhibit D; Affidavit of Richard Kallman, paragraph 5.

The defendants have offered evidence that the broker informed them that the buyer had arranged with Meridian Engineering, Inc. for the final percolation tests and that the seller would pay for them. Affidavit of Kenneth Hood, page 2.1 The plaintiff relies on the express language of the P&S Agreement that assigns to the seller responsibility to obtain the “final percolation tests” and adds that “[t]his provision was a critical element of the Agreement as Groom was purchasing the land for development of house lots for sale to the general public.” Affidavit of Attorney Kallman, paragraph 3. Also, the plaintiff relies on an affidavit by the buyer that he never undertook to assume responsibility for nor told anyone that he would obtain the final percolation tests, that he did not file the application with the Town of Ipswich, and that only the seller could apply for percolation tests. Affidavit of Thomas Groom.

It appears that there were further negotiations or discussions between the prospective buyer and the defendants. See Affidavit of Attorney Kallman, paragraphs 6-17. However, at some point, the deal broke down. There is evidence that the buyer was unable to secure the necessary financing without satisfactory percolation tests for however many lots might be approved for subdivision. See Affidavit of Attorney Kallman at paragraph 11.

At the hearing in this matter there was considerable attention given to the late filed application for percolation testing. Both parties now appear to agree that an application was indeed filed in March 2000. According to the plaintiff, the Health Director of the Town of Ipswich has [72]*72advised that it contains no signature and that “the owner of the property is the only person who is authorized to apply for a percolation test from the Board of Health.” Affidavit of Attorney Thomas Sullivan at 1.

DISCUSSION

The present litigation does not encompass the dispute between the buyer and the seller that may still exist. Instead, the broker-plaintiff takes the position that the buyer had the responsibility under the P&S Agreement to “provide final percolation tests” for the lots in question, and, therefore, the buyer is responsible for the late filing of the application' with the town. Thus, the plaintiff argues, the deal fell through as a result of the wrongful conduct of the buyer, and it is entitled to its real estate commission. Thus, the plaintiff reasons that it comes within the exception to the rule that a real estate transaction must be consummated before a broker is entitled to recover the commission expected upon completion of the sale. This exception was stated in Tristram’s Landing, Inc. v. Wait, 367 Mass. 622, 629 (1975), and elaborated on in Hillis v. Lake, 421 Mass. 537 (1995).

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Related

Tristram's Landing, Inc. v. Wait
327 N.E.2d 727 (Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, 1975)
Hillis v. Lake
421 Mass. 537 (Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, 1995)

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Bluebook (online)
12 Mass. L. Rptr. 70, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/real-advantage-inc-v-hood-masssuperct-2000.