Ready v. Pure Carbonic, Inc.

84 F. Supp. 321, 1949 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2653
CourtDistrict Court, S.D. Florida
DecidedJune 1, 1949
DocketCivil Action No. 1634-T
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 84 F. Supp. 321 (Ready v. Pure Carbonic, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Ready v. Pure Carbonic, Inc., 84 F. Supp. 321, 1949 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2653 (S.D. Fla. 1949).

Opinion

DE VANE, District Judge.

This is a suit brought by plaintiff to recover for loss and damages to her property and for personal injuries growing out of a motor vehicle collision which occurred during the night of November 15, 1947, on U. S. ITighway No. 41 in Pasco County, Florida.

Plaintiff alleges in her complaint that she was being transported in her automobile in a northerly direction at said time and place when the defendant, by and through its employee, negligently drove a [322]*322motor vehicle into the rear of plaintiff’s automobile, causing her automobile to catch fire and be destroyed and causing her to suffer personal injuries. The complaint claims damages for such personal injuries and from loss of and damage to personal property of plaintiff, including her automobile.

Defendant denies any negligence on its part and alleges contributory negligence on the part of plaintiff and the case is before the court on these issues. The case was tried to the court without a jury.

Negligence of Defendant

The court will first consider whether the evidence shows defendant guilty of negligence. The evidence shows that around 10:00 P.M. on the' night of November 15, 1947 Joe E. Johnson, Sr., a neighbor of plaintiff, dropped in on her at her home in Brooksville, Florida and after a few minutes conversation with her, invited her to go with him to find something to eat. They used plaintiff’s car and Johnson drove same. They first went to a restaurant in Brooksville, which was closed, and then to another eating place just outside of Brooksville, which they also found closed. They then proceeded to the Rainbow Inn, a few miles south of Brooksville, arriving there some time between 11:00 P.M. and midnight. Quite a crowd was gathered at the Inn and a barbeque supper was served around midnight. Plaintiff remained in her car from the time of their arrival until their departure. Johnson left her for awhile and mixed among the crowd until super was ready to be served, when he brought both their suppers to the car and they ate same. About the time they had finished with their supper an argument developed between a man and a woman in a parked car near the plaintiff’s car and Johnson and plaintiff decided to leave.

The Rainbow Inn is a small tavern standing some distance back from the highway at an isolated spot just south of the Hernando County Line. Access to the place from the highway is provided by a horseshoe drive, which leaves the' highway and circles in front of the Inn and returns to the highway. The two entrances on the highway are approximately 180 feet apart. Plaintiff left the Inn by the north 'exit, Johnson driving her automobile. The car in which they were riding had proceeded on the highway 300 feet or more north of the exit driveway when it was struck from the rear by defendant’s truck and was set fire and plaintiff was injured.

The facts regarding the circumstances of the accident are in substantial conflict. Plaintiff and plaintiff’s companion Johnson, testified their car was running approximately 25 miles per hour at the time of the impact; that an approaching automobile from the north had declined to dim its lights and that they were proceeding cautiously along the highway until they passed this approaching car. The agent of defendant, in charge of defendant’s truck, testified that plaintiff’s car had come to a stop on the highway at the time of the accident and his testimony was supported by testimony of one other witness at the barbeque party.

Defendant’s agent also testified that there were several cars approaching plaintiff’s car and defendant’s' truck from the north. They refused to dim their lights and he was completely blinded by the bright lights of the approaching cars, until he was within approximately 60 feet of plaintiff’s car.

Defendant also introduced in evidence testimony to- the effect that Johnson, companion of plaintiff, who was operating her automobile, had been drinking on the night of the accident. Defendant produced one witness who testified somewhere around 9 :00 P.M. on that night he had seen Johnson buy one bottle of beer and an attendant at the barbeque party testified' that Johnson (with whom he was not acquainted) joined a group he was in at the party and with other members of the group took a drink of his whiskey when he passed it around. The highway patrolman testified that when he arrived at the scene of the accident, some 45 minutes after the accident occurred, that he detected the odor of intoxicants on Johnson’s breath and Johnson’s conduct was that of a man who had been drinking. The highway patrolman sent Johnson to the hospital for treatment of a slight scalp injury he had received in the accident.

[323]*323The nurse at the hospital, who treated the wound, testified she neither saw nor smelled any evidence of drinking by Johnson. Plaintiff testified that Johnson had not had a drink all the time he was with her during the evening and that she did not smell alcohol on his breath.

The evidence shows that the highway in front of the Rainbow Inn is straight for a long distance on each side of the Inn; that it has two concrete strips 11 feet wide, with macadam surfaces between, 6 feet wide, making a paved highway 28 feet in width. Defendant testified that as he rounded the curve in the highway, quite some distance south of the Inn, he was driving between 40 and 45 miles per hour. He stated: “I came around the curve and saw the driveway going out and it came to my mind there might be somebody coming out drinking. I slowed down, but didn’t brake it, and after I passed the entrance I put my foot on the accelerator and fed the gas to it and I was meeting four or five cars and they had bright lights. Either the fourth or fifth dimmed his lights and at that time I saw the car parked in the road and then I applied my brakes.” He testified that when he saw the car it was approximately 60 feet ahead of him. He further testified that he could have readily left the highway, hut that he was unwilling to drive his ten-ton truck into the sand and was reasonably confident he could stop his truck before colliding with plaintiff’s automobile.

Based upon this testimony of defeaidant’s agent it is unnecessary to labor any of the other testimony in the record touching the question of defendant’s negligence. The law of Florida makes it the duty of anyone operating an automobile on the highway at night to so operate the vehicle as to avoid striking another vehicle on the highway, moving in the same direction, or even a parked vehicle if the stopping of the vehicle was the result of a sudden emergency. Mathers v. Botsford, 86 Fla. 40, 97 So. 282, 32 A.L.R. 881; Brandt v. Dodd, 150 Fla. 635, 8 So.2d 471; Spell v. U. S., D. C., 72 F.Supp. 731. The court holds that defendant was guilty of negligence in the operation of its vehicle on the highway at the time of the accident.

Contributory Negligence of Plaintiff

Under the Florida law the defendant carries the burden of proof upon this issue. The controversy centers around whether or not Johnson was under the influence of intoxicants and whether or not he had improperly stopped plaintiff’s car on the highway at the time of the accident.

On the question of whether or not Johnson had been drinking, the testimony is in hopeless conflict and is fairly evenly divided.

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Related

De Loach v. Lanier
125 F. Supp. 12 (N.D. Florida, 1954)

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Bluebook (online)
84 F. Supp. 321, 1949 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2653, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/ready-v-pure-carbonic-inc-flsd-1949.