Ready v. Noakes

29 N.J. Eq. 497
CourtNew Jersey Court of Chancery
DecidedMay 15, 1878
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 29 N.J. Eq. 497 (Ready v. Noakes) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering New Jersey Court of Chancery primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Ready v. Noakes, 29 N.J. Eq. 497 (N.J. Ct. App. 1878).

Opinion

The Chancellor.

The complainant files his bill for a decree for specific performance of a contract for the sale of laiicl in Jersey City, [498]*498belonging to tbe defendant Sarah Ann Noakes, and sold to him on the 7th day of June, 1877, at a public auction held by Joseph Warren, auctioneer, who was duly authorized by Mrs. Noakes so to sell the property. The property is the middle one of three adjoining houses, the lot being of the dimensions of fourteen feet by fifty. At the sale the complainant was the highest bidder, and the property was struck off to him at $1,250, cash, of jvhich he paid, according to the conditions of sale, ten per cent, at the time of the purchase. He signed an acknowledgment of his purchase in accordance with the conditions, and received from Mr. Warren an acknowledgment, signed by the latter, of the sale to him. The deed, according to the conditions of the sale, was to be delivered on or before the 25th day of June, then next. At that time the complainant duly tendered to Mrs. Noakes and Mr. Warren respectively, the balance of the purchase-money in cash, and demanded the deed for the premises, which was refused by Mrs. Noakes, upon the ground that the price at which the property was sold was far below its true value. The complainant thereupon filed his bill in this court for relief it the premises.

Mrs. Noakes, by her answer, resists his application on the sole ground of inadequacy of price. She insists that the property was worth, at the time of the sale, from $2,500 to $3,000, and that it ought to have brought at the sale from $2,000 to $2,600.

Courts of equity seldom interfere to set aside sales and contracts on the ground of inadequacy of price, but leave the parties to their legal remedies. When they are called upon for extraordinary aid to enforce a contract, they take the liberty to examine into the consideration to be given, its fairness and equality, and all the circumstances connected with it, and if anything manifestly inequitable appears in that part of the transaction, they will not lend their power to carry the contract into execution. Rodman v. Zilley, Sax. 320, 324, 325. But mere difference in value, though it be considerable, is not of itself a sufficient ground for refusing [499]*499specific performance. Lord Eldon, in Emery v. Wase, 8 Ves. 517 ; Babington on Auctions, 162.

As was said by Lord Eldon, in White v. Damon, 7 Ves. 34, 35, and in Coles v. Trecothick, 9 Ves. 234, 236: “Specific performance is matter of discretion; but it is not an arbitrary, capricious discretion. It must be regulated upon grounds that will make it judicial. Unless the inadequacy of price is such as shocks the conscience, and amounts in itself to conclusive and decisive evidence of fraud in the transaction, it is not itself a sufficient ground for refusing a decree of specific performance.” Or, as was said by Chief Justice Marshall, in Garnett v. Macon, 2 Brock. 185, 246: “ It is settled that mere inadequacy of price is not a sufficient ground for a court of equity to refuse its assistance, unless the difference between the sum to be given, and the value of the land be so enormous as to countenance the idea of fraud and imposition.”

A distinction has been properly made between private sales and sales at public auction, in favor of the latter. In White v. Damon, ubi supra, Lord Eldon said that he was inclined to say that a sale by auction, where no fraud ■ or surprise, &c. was shown, could not be set aside for mere inadequacy of price; and in ex parte Datham, he subsequently expressed the same opinion.

Vice-Chancellor "Wigram lays down the reasonable rule upon the whole subject in Borell v. Dann, 2 Hare 440, 450, 451. He says: “ I certainly understand the rule of the court to be that, even in ordinary casesj and, a fortiori, in cases of sales by public auction, mere inadequacy'of consideration is not a ground even for refusing a decree for specific performance of an unexecuted contract; and still less can it be a ground for rescinding an executed contract. The only exception which I believe can be stated is, where the inadequacy of consideration is so gross as of itself to prove fraud or imposition on the part of the purchaser. Eraud in the purchaser is of the essence of the objection to the contract in such a case. The case must, however, be strong indeed, [500]*500in which a court of justice shall say that a purchaser at public auction, between whom and the vendor there has been no previous communication affecting the fairness of the sale, is chargeable with fraud or imposition, only because his bidding did not greatly exceed the amount of the vendor’s reserved bidding.”

The property in question in this suit is described by one of the witnesses as being a three-story basement brick house, about fourteen feet in front by about thirty feet in depth, the lot being of the width of fourteen feet front by about fifty feet in depth; the house in bad order, cracked, and apparently having settled; the rear wall having bulged out and being.sustained by a brace or anchor, and the window blinds on the front of the house being in bad condition, the greater part of the slats being broken out. Another witness, a person who was present at the sale with a view to purchasing the property, says that the house was in a very bad condition at that time; that it appeared to have been occupied by several families; that it had apparently been built for occupation by but one family, but had been altered so as to accommodate a family on each floor. He also says, that it was in a filthy condition; and adds that it, in fact, was a property that he wanted nothing to do with.

The sale was, in all. respects, fair. It was open and public, and was attended by a large number of persons; some of the witnesses state that the number was about fifty. It appears from the testimony that several persons bid upon the property. The bidding commenced at $600, and rau up to $1,250, the price at which it was struck off to the complainant. The sale was extensively advertised. Mr. Warren, who testifies on the subject, says it was as well advertised as it would have been if the property had been of the value of $25,000, and it appears, from his testimony on the subject, that it was indeed thoroughly advertised. Mrs. Noakes has produced five witnesses to testify as to the value of the property and the price which it ought to have brought at the sale. The first of these, Mr. Eaiigsland, says that the prop[501]*501erty was worth at the time of the sale $2,200, and that it ought to have brought that sum at a fair auction sale. Mr. Van Syclde testifies that the property was then worth, in his opinion, $3,000, and it ought to bring that sum at a fair sale in ordinary times, and that at the time of the sale it should have brought at a fair sale, from $2,000 to $2,500. Mr. Hnapp says, that in his opinion, the property ought to have brought at a fair sale, at the time wdien it was sold, $2,500 at public auction. Philip Botzong says, he was willing to pay $2,000 in cash for the property, and would have bought it for an investment at that price, that it ought to have brought at a fair sale at auction, at the time when it was sold, at least $2,500, and that, had he been present, he would have bid it up to $2,000. Mr.

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Bluebook (online)
29 N.J. Eq. 497, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/ready-v-noakes-njch-1878.