25CA1192 Ready v ICAO 12-24-2025
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 25CA1192 Industrial Claim Appeals Office of the State of Colorado DD No. 3644-2025
Amy K. Ready,
Petitioner,
v.
Industrial Claim Appeals Office of the State of Colorado and Weld County School District RE 5J,
Respondents.
ORDER AFFRIMED
Division VI Opinion by JUDGE GOMEZ Welling and Sullivan, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced December 24, 2025
Amy K. Ready, Pro Se
No Appearance for Respondent Industrial Claim Appeals Office
Caplan and Earnest LLC, Andrew M. Salazar, Boulder, Colorado, for Respondent Weld County School District RE 5J ¶1 Amy K. Ready appeals the order of the Industrial Claim
Appeals Office (the Panel) affirming a hearing officer’s denial of her
claim for unemployment benefits. We affirm.
I. Background
¶2 During the latter part of Ready’s employment with Weld
County School District RE 5J (the School District), she worked as a
special education paraprofessional at Roosevelt High School
(Roosevelt), starting there in December 2023. She quit her job with
the School District on April 1, 2024.
¶3 Ready applied for unemployment benefits, claiming that she
quit because she was being mistreated in the workplace by another
paraprofessional (the coworker). A deputy for the Division of
Unemployment Insurance denied her claim, and she appealed.
¶4 At the evidentiary hearing on appeal, the hearing officer heard
testimony from Ready, the principal at Roosevelt, and the director of
personnel for the School District. After the hearing, the hearing
officer issued a written ruling determining that Ready was
disqualified from receiving unemployment benefits under section
8-73-108(5)(e)(I), C.R.S. 2025. Compare § 8-73-108(5)(e)(I) (a
claimant is not entitled to unemployment benefits if they quit
1 because of dissatisfaction with, among other things, “standard
working conditions”), with § 8-73-108(4)(c) (a claimant is entitled to
unemployment benefits if their job separation was caused by
“unsatisfactory” working conditions). Specifically, the hearing
officer found that although Ready quit because the coworker was
being rude to her and ignoring her, that didn’t rise to the level of an
objectively unsatisfactory working condition.
¶5 Ready appealed, and the Panel affirmed the hearing officer’s
decision. In its ruling, the Panel determined that “it is apparent
that the hearing officer did not view [Ready’s] coworker’s behavior to
be so unreasonable, impractical, or burdensome as to be an
objectively unsatisfactory working condition.” The Panel then
concluded that because Ready’s working conditions weren’t
objectively unsatisfactory under section 8-73-108(4)(c), she was
disqualified from receiving unemployment benefits under section
8-73-108(5)(e)(I).
II. Applicable Law and Standard of Review
¶6 Relevant factors to consider in determining whether working
conditions were “unsatisfactory” under section 8-73-108(4)(c)
include “the degree of risk involved to [the person’s] health, safety,
2 and morals”; the person’s “physical fitness and prior training”; and
the person’s prior “experience.” § 8-73-108(4)(c). An objective
standard applies when determining whether working conditions
were unsatisfactory under section 8-73-108(4)(c). Yotes, Inc. v.
Indus. Claim Appeals Off., 2013 COA 124, ¶ 25.
¶7 We may set aside the Panel’s decision only if the Panel acted
without or in excess of its powers, the decision was procured by
fraud, the factual findings didn’t support the decision, or the
decision was erroneous as a matter of law. § 8-74-107(6)(a)-(d),
C.R.S. 2025.
¶8 We do not disturb a hearing officer’s factual findings if they
are supported by substantial evidence or reasonable inferences
drawn from that evidence. See Yotes, ¶ 10. But whether working
conditions were objectively “unsatisfactory” under section 8-73-
108(4)(c) is an ultimate conclusion of fact. See Commc’ns Workers
of Am. 7717 v. Indus. Claim Appeals Off., 2012 COA 148, ¶ 7
(ultimate conclusions of fact are conclusions of law or mixed
questions of law and fact that determine the parties’ rights and
liabilities and are generally phrased in the language of the
3 controlling statute or legal standard). We review an ultimate
conclusion of fact de novo. Id.
III. Analysis
¶9 As an initial matter, we address the School District’s two
arguments for why we should dismiss Ready’s appeal. First, it
argues that we should dismiss her appeal because her opening
brief, which she filed pro se, doesn’t comply with certain Colorado
appellate rules. Given the severity of that requested sanction, we
decline to do so. See People v. Alaniz, 2016 COA 101, ¶ 17 n.3 (an
appellate court has the discretion to hear an appeal even if the
appellant’s opening brief doesn’t comply with the appellate rules);
In re Marriage of Parr & Lyman, 240 P.3d 509, 513 (Colo. App. 2010)
(addressing arguments raised on appeal although the briefs didn’t
comply with the appellate rules).
¶ 10 Second, the School District argues that we should dismiss
Ready’s appeal because, in her opening brief, she doesn’t explicitly
argue any of the potential bases for setting aside the Panel’s
decision under section 8-74-107(6)(a)-(d). Here, too, we decline to
do so because “[p]leadings by pro se litigants must be broadly
construed to ensure that they are not denied review of important
4 issues because of [any] inability to articulate their argument like a
lawyer.” Jones v. Williams, 2019 CO 61, ¶ 5.
¶ 11 Having disposed of those initial matters, we turn to the merits.
Ready contends that her resignation amounted to a “constructive
discharge resulting from an ongoing hostile work environment and
the employer’s failure to take appropriate corrective action” and
that she was “essentially forced out” of the job.
¶ 12 We discern no error in the Panel’s ruling for two reasons.
First, we discern no error in the hearing officer’s ultimate
conclusion of fact, which the Panel affirmed, that the coworker’s
conduct toward Ready didn’t rise to the level of an “unsatisfactory”
working condition under section 8-73-108(4)(c).
¶ 13 In finding that Ready quit because the coworker was being
rude to her and ignoring her, the hearing officer appeared to credit
Ready’s testimony that she quit because the coworker was, for
example, ignoring her, “talking about [her] behind [her] back,” and
“giv[ing] [her] attitude.” Ready testified that the situation made her
feel “really uncomfortable” and “like [she] wasn’t a team member”
anymore, and that she “couldn’t handle [it] anymore.” But again,
an objective standard applies when determining whether working
5 conditions were unsatisfactory under section 8-73-108(4)(c), not “a
subjective standard based on the personal perspectives or beliefs of
a particular claimant.” Rodco Sys., Inc. v. Indus. Claim Appeals Off.,
981 P.2d 699, 701 (Colo. App. 1999). And “[a] claimant’s subjective
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25CA1192 Ready v ICAO 12-24-2025
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 25CA1192 Industrial Claim Appeals Office of the State of Colorado DD No. 3644-2025
Amy K. Ready,
Petitioner,
v.
Industrial Claim Appeals Office of the State of Colorado and Weld County School District RE 5J,
Respondents.
ORDER AFFRIMED
Division VI Opinion by JUDGE GOMEZ Welling and Sullivan, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced December 24, 2025
Amy K. Ready, Pro Se
No Appearance for Respondent Industrial Claim Appeals Office
Caplan and Earnest LLC, Andrew M. Salazar, Boulder, Colorado, for Respondent Weld County School District RE 5J ¶1 Amy K. Ready appeals the order of the Industrial Claim
Appeals Office (the Panel) affirming a hearing officer’s denial of her
claim for unemployment benefits. We affirm.
I. Background
¶2 During the latter part of Ready’s employment with Weld
County School District RE 5J (the School District), she worked as a
special education paraprofessional at Roosevelt High School
(Roosevelt), starting there in December 2023. She quit her job with
the School District on April 1, 2024.
¶3 Ready applied for unemployment benefits, claiming that she
quit because she was being mistreated in the workplace by another
paraprofessional (the coworker). A deputy for the Division of
Unemployment Insurance denied her claim, and she appealed.
¶4 At the evidentiary hearing on appeal, the hearing officer heard
testimony from Ready, the principal at Roosevelt, and the director of
personnel for the School District. After the hearing, the hearing
officer issued a written ruling determining that Ready was
disqualified from receiving unemployment benefits under section
8-73-108(5)(e)(I), C.R.S. 2025. Compare § 8-73-108(5)(e)(I) (a
claimant is not entitled to unemployment benefits if they quit
1 because of dissatisfaction with, among other things, “standard
working conditions”), with § 8-73-108(4)(c) (a claimant is entitled to
unemployment benefits if their job separation was caused by
“unsatisfactory” working conditions). Specifically, the hearing
officer found that although Ready quit because the coworker was
being rude to her and ignoring her, that didn’t rise to the level of an
objectively unsatisfactory working condition.
¶5 Ready appealed, and the Panel affirmed the hearing officer’s
decision. In its ruling, the Panel determined that “it is apparent
that the hearing officer did not view [Ready’s] coworker’s behavior to
be so unreasonable, impractical, or burdensome as to be an
objectively unsatisfactory working condition.” The Panel then
concluded that because Ready’s working conditions weren’t
objectively unsatisfactory under section 8-73-108(4)(c), she was
disqualified from receiving unemployment benefits under section
8-73-108(5)(e)(I).
II. Applicable Law and Standard of Review
¶6 Relevant factors to consider in determining whether working
conditions were “unsatisfactory” under section 8-73-108(4)(c)
include “the degree of risk involved to [the person’s] health, safety,
2 and morals”; the person’s “physical fitness and prior training”; and
the person’s prior “experience.” § 8-73-108(4)(c). An objective
standard applies when determining whether working conditions
were unsatisfactory under section 8-73-108(4)(c). Yotes, Inc. v.
Indus. Claim Appeals Off., 2013 COA 124, ¶ 25.
¶7 We may set aside the Panel’s decision only if the Panel acted
without or in excess of its powers, the decision was procured by
fraud, the factual findings didn’t support the decision, or the
decision was erroneous as a matter of law. § 8-74-107(6)(a)-(d),
C.R.S. 2025.
¶8 We do not disturb a hearing officer’s factual findings if they
are supported by substantial evidence or reasonable inferences
drawn from that evidence. See Yotes, ¶ 10. But whether working
conditions were objectively “unsatisfactory” under section 8-73-
108(4)(c) is an ultimate conclusion of fact. See Commc’ns Workers
of Am. 7717 v. Indus. Claim Appeals Off., 2012 COA 148, ¶ 7
(ultimate conclusions of fact are conclusions of law or mixed
questions of law and fact that determine the parties’ rights and
liabilities and are generally phrased in the language of the
3 controlling statute or legal standard). We review an ultimate
conclusion of fact de novo. Id.
III. Analysis
¶9 As an initial matter, we address the School District’s two
arguments for why we should dismiss Ready’s appeal. First, it
argues that we should dismiss her appeal because her opening
brief, which she filed pro se, doesn’t comply with certain Colorado
appellate rules. Given the severity of that requested sanction, we
decline to do so. See People v. Alaniz, 2016 COA 101, ¶ 17 n.3 (an
appellate court has the discretion to hear an appeal even if the
appellant’s opening brief doesn’t comply with the appellate rules);
In re Marriage of Parr & Lyman, 240 P.3d 509, 513 (Colo. App. 2010)
(addressing arguments raised on appeal although the briefs didn’t
comply with the appellate rules).
¶ 10 Second, the School District argues that we should dismiss
Ready’s appeal because, in her opening brief, she doesn’t explicitly
argue any of the potential bases for setting aside the Panel’s
decision under section 8-74-107(6)(a)-(d). Here, too, we decline to
do so because “[p]leadings by pro se litigants must be broadly
construed to ensure that they are not denied review of important
4 issues because of [any] inability to articulate their argument like a
lawyer.” Jones v. Williams, 2019 CO 61, ¶ 5.
¶ 11 Having disposed of those initial matters, we turn to the merits.
Ready contends that her resignation amounted to a “constructive
discharge resulting from an ongoing hostile work environment and
the employer’s failure to take appropriate corrective action” and
that she was “essentially forced out” of the job.
¶ 12 We discern no error in the Panel’s ruling for two reasons.
First, we discern no error in the hearing officer’s ultimate
conclusion of fact, which the Panel affirmed, that the coworker’s
conduct toward Ready didn’t rise to the level of an “unsatisfactory”
working condition under section 8-73-108(4)(c).
¶ 13 In finding that Ready quit because the coworker was being
rude to her and ignoring her, the hearing officer appeared to credit
Ready’s testimony that she quit because the coworker was, for
example, ignoring her, “talking about [her] behind [her] back,” and
“giv[ing] [her] attitude.” Ready testified that the situation made her
feel “really uncomfortable” and “like [she] wasn’t a team member”
anymore, and that she “couldn’t handle [it] anymore.” But again,
an objective standard applies when determining whether working
5 conditions were unsatisfactory under section 8-73-108(4)(c), not “a
subjective standard based on the personal perspectives or beliefs of
a particular claimant.” Rodco Sys., Inc. v. Indus. Claim Appeals Off.,
981 P.2d 699, 701 (Colo. App. 1999). And “[a] claimant’s subjective
determination that working conditions are unsatisfactory is
insufficient.” Campbell v. Indus. Claim Appeals Off., 97 P.3d 204,
211 (Colo. App. 2003).
¶ 14 The objective standard we must apply is a “reasonableness
standard” based on the circumstances of the case, “including [the
factors] set forth in [section 8-73-108(4)(c)]” for determining whether
working conditions were objectively unsatisfactory. Campbell, 97
P.3d at 211. Notably, the hearing officer questioned Ready about
several of the relevant factors under section 8-73-108(4)(c).
Specifically, the hearing officer asked Ready, “Was the situation
with [the coworker] a risk to your health, safety, or morals?” Ready
answered, “No. I just didn’t like the environment.” The hearing
officer then asked Ready, “Were you physically and mentally able to
perform your job duties?” Ready answered, “Yeah, barely.” Finally,
the hearing officer asked Ready, “Did you have the skills and
qualifications to perform your job duties?” Ready answered, “Yes,”
6 but then qualified that answer by saying, “When I got transferred
[to Roosevelt], I did not know what I was getting into. They did not
explain to me my job.” That testimony — specifically, (1) that the
situation with the coworker wasn’t a risk to Ready’s health, safety,
or morals; and (2) that Ready was (barely) able to perform her job
duties, despite her coworker’s behavior — constitutes sufficient
evidence that Ready’s working conditions were not objectively
unsatisfactory under section 8-73-108(4)(c).
¶ 15 Second, we are unpersuaded by Ready’s argument that
reversal is warranted because of “the employer’s failure to take
appropriate corrective action.” Ready testified that she asked the
principal at Roosevelt to transfer her to a different position within
the school because of her conflict with the coworker, but he
responded that there weren’t any other open positions for her. If
indeed there weren’t any other open positions at Roosevelt — a fact
Ready doesn’t contest — the principal’s response to Ready’s request
was reasonable. Further, we haven’t found any evidence in the
record, and Ready doesn’t cite to any, supporting her assertion on
appeal that she also asked to be transferred to a different school.
7 ¶ 16 More significantly, though, the hearing officer found that the
principal set up a meeting “to potentially resolve” the issue between
Ready and the coworker, but Ready chose not to attend the meeting
and quit shortly thereafter. That finding is well supported by both
the principal’s testimony and Ready’s own testimony. Ready
testified that the meeting “was just going to be a big complain fest,
and [she] didn’t want to hear it.” And in an email to the principal
shortly before her resignation, Ready wrote, “I am not interested in
the meeting as I don’t feel like I am part of the team and I don’t
want to hear the blame game.” Ready’s decision not to attend the
meeting undercuts her claim that the principal didn’t take
appropriate corrective action. See Yotes, ¶¶ 24-32 (upholding the
hearing officer’s denial of unemployment benefits based on allegedly
unsatisfactory working conditions caused by a coworker’s conduct
because, among other reasons, “[the] employer told [the] claimant it
would investigate the matter and schedule a meeting with the
coworker,” but the claimant quit before the meeting could occur).
¶ 17 For these reasons, we discern no error in the hearing officer’s
ultimate conclusion, which the Panel affirmed, that Ready’s working
conditions were not “unsatisfactory” under section 8-73-108(4)(c).
8 Therefore, we also discern no error in the hearing officer’s and
Panel’s rulings that Ready was disqualified from receiving
unemployment benefits under section 8-73-108(5)(e)(I).
IV. Disposition
¶ 18 The order is affirmed.
JUDGE WELLING and JUDGE SULLIVAN concur.