Rayonier Incorporated v. National Labor Relations Board

380 F.2d 187, 65 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2855, 1967 U.S. App. LEXIS 5651
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
DecidedJuly 12, 1967
Docket23646_1
StatusPublished
Cited by12 cases

This text of 380 F.2d 187 (Rayonier Incorporated v. National Labor Relations Board) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Rayonier Incorporated v. National Labor Relations Board, 380 F.2d 187, 65 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2855, 1967 U.S. App. LEXIS 5651 (5th Cir. 1967).

Opinion

SIMPSON, Circuit Judge:

The Union of Powerhouse Workers, Local No. 1, was certified as the bargaining representative of the employees in the Utilities Department of the mill owned and operated at Fernandina Beach, Florida, by Rayonier Incorporated. The employer unsuccessfully contended before the National Labor Relations Board that the employees of its powerhouse did not constitute an appropriate bargaining unit. It has since refused to bargain in order that it might here challenge the Board determination. Ray-onier petitions for review of the Board order of April 29, 1966, directing it to bargain (158 NLRB No. 30) and there is a cross-petition for enforcement. We grant Rayonier’s petition for review, deny the cross-petition, and remand for Board reconsideration in the light of prior Board decisions.

I

In Kalamazoo Paper Box Corporation, 136 N.L.R.B. 134 (1962), the Board set forth the standards to be applied by it in determining whether a particular unit is appropriate for bargaining. It held that a severance election should be allowed only if employees in the unit sought to be severed have substantially different interests and working conditions from other employees in the production unit. In Kalamazoo the Board enumerated the factors to be considered in determining whether the interests of the employees are different in the following language:

“Factors which warranted consideration in determining the existence of substantial differences in interests *189 and working conditions included: a difference in method of wages or compensation; different hours of work; different employment benefits; separate supervision; the degree of dissimilar qualifications, training and skills; differences in job functions * * *; the infrequency or lack of contact with other employees; lack of integration with the work functions of other employees or interchange with them; and the history of bargaining.”

The-Board wrote that in more recent times it had fallen into the practice of not examining the facts of each case, so that the net result had “been tantamount to a practice of automatically granting severance to truck drivers whenever requested.”

The opinion continued:

“To accord automatically to a subgroup of employees such as truck drivers, severance from a larger established and stable bargaining unit merely on the basis of the existence of the traditional job classification and a request for a separate unit encompassing such classification, does not, in our opinion, adequately discharge this basic and far-reaching responsibility placed upon the Board by Congress. A title or classification in common usage does not necessarily establish that separate special interests exist and are preponderant. This can be determined only by making an informed judgment based upon an analysis of the factual circumstances bearing upon the distinguishing factors present in each case.”

Recognizing that decision merely on the basis of an employee’s title or job classification “tends to disregard the community of interest which he may have with other employees” and “indeed may have little relevancy to the circumstances * * * ”, the Board continued:

“Therefore, we believe it is both necessary and desirable for us to return to the earlier practice of determining the predominate community of interest based upon consideration of the various factors stated above. Where these factors support a conclusion that the community of interest shared by truck drivers with other plant employees outweigh those which would be the basis for severance from an existing production and maintenance unit, we shall deny severance to truck drivers. To the extent that this approach is inconsistent with that implied in prior determinations, such cases are hereby overruled.”

Kalamazoo dealt only with truck drivers but the principles there enunciated have general application. There is no reason for according truck drivers different treatment from other groups. The Board did not regard Kalamazoo as restricted to truck drivers as shown by its characterization of that decision in its Twenty-Seventh Annual Report in the following language:

“The Board has never receded from its recognition in Kalamazoo that whether a severance election should be permitted depends upon whether the special interests of the employees involved override their general interests in common with the employees in the larger unit.”

In Kalamazoo, the Board said in effect that to decide these questions only on the basis of a title or classification was arbitrary and in its words a “failure to discharge * * * its responsibility”.

Section 8(b) of the Administrative Procedure Act (5 U.S.C., Sec. 1007) requires an agency in any ease to include in its decision its “findings [or] conclusions, as well as the reasons or basis therefor”. This requirement takes on added importance when the decision is an apparent reversal of a previously declared rule. This is not to say that the Board may not change its view of what test is to be applied in unit determination cases and what factors are to be considered in its application. If it does so, however, it should announce the change of mind and the reasons supporting the change.

*190 In Mary Carter Paint Co. v. F. T. C., 333 F.2d 654 (5 Cir. 1964), this Court reversed an order of the Federal Trade Commission on the ground that the Commission had departed from its previously established rule. Mary Carter was reversed on appeal 1 but the Supreme Court did not disagree with the principle we laid down but only with its application in that case. The Supreme Court’s opinion (p. 47 of 382 U.S., p. 221 of 86 S.Ct.) merely points out that the court could not say “that (the Commission’s) holding constituted a departure from Commission policy”.

The same principle is expressed in the concurring opinion of Judge Aldrich in Northeast Airlines, Inc. v. C. A. B., 331 F.2d 579, at 589 (1 Cir. 1964):

“The Board is free, of course, to make changes in policy, but the seriousness of this one, if that is what it is, would call not only for deep and mature thought, but for the assembly of the most cogent reasons. In the Board’s opinion I find neither.”

On December 28, 1966, the National Labor Relations Board decided three cases together which bear significantly on this one: Mallinckrodt Chemical Works, 162 N.L.R.B. No. 48; E. I. DuPont de Nemours and Co., 162 N.L.R.B. No. 49, and Holmberg, Inc., 162 N.L.R.B. No. 53. These cases reaffirmed the principles announced in Kalamazoo and applied those principles even where true craft units were involved. Applying a case by case examination of relevant factors carefully spelled out, the Board denied severance in Mallinckrodt and in Holmberg, Inc., and granted severance in DuPont. It is worth noting that in DuPont

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380 F.2d 187, 65 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2855, 1967 U.S. App. LEXIS 5651, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/rayonier-incorporated-v-national-labor-relations-board-ca5-1967.