Raynor v. Robinson

36 Barb. 128, 1862 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 32
CourtNew York Supreme Court
DecidedFebruary 10, 1862
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 36 Barb. 128 (Raynor v. Robinson) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering New York Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Raynor v. Robinson, 36 Barb. 128, 1862 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 32 (N.Y. Super. Ct. 1862).

Opinion

By the Oourt,

Brown, J.

Jonathan Robinson, the respondent, is one of the administrators of his late father, David Robinson, deceased, and as such, presented his petition to the suiTOgate of the county of Suffolk, alleging that the intestate was justly indebted to him in his lifetime, and at the time of his death, in the sum of $3000, for work and labor, and also for cutting and hauling wood and cutting it up at the door, and carrying it into the house, for the use of the wife of the intestate, (the mother of the respondent,) and for supplying her with vegetables and waiting and attending upon her necessities during a period of 25 years, she during that time living alone and being deserted by her husband. That such services were rendered, and the labor performed, under the expectation and upon the promise of the intestate that he would devise to the respondent Jonathan Robinson his homestead farm of the value of $4000, and a tract of meadow of the value of $600, upon Moriche’s Island, in the county of Suffolk. That he died intestate seised of the said farm and lands, leaving other persons entitled to share the lands, as well as himself. He prayed for the usual process, to the end that he might prove his claim and retain the amount thereof out of the personal estate in his hands. At the return day of the citation the children and next of Mn appeared before the surrogate and denied the existence of the claim, and also set up the statute of limitations as a bar to the recovery thereof. Testimony was taken and the cause heard at length by the surrogate, who made his decree awarding the peti[130]*130tioner, $50 a year for 25-years’services ($1250 in all) renderédthe father and mother, upon the ground that it was mutually .understood the .son .should receive compensation hy a devise of the homestead farm.

The proof shows that the farm consisted of 500 or 600 acres of land with 50- or 60 acres cleared, the- residue being in wood. That the respondent Jonathan Robinson had the use of it during the period, or for a large part of the period of time for which the services were claimed. The father and mother lived in.a..state of separation,; she occupying a small dwelling house upon the farm, about 80 rods from the residence of the respondent; her children, 1 assume, having married and moved away. How or where the. husband lived, in the meantime, does not exactly appear, further than that he remained in the same neighborhood, and was. occasionally at his son’s. The services and necessaries furnished the mother consisted, of cutting and preparing fuel for her fire by some of the- sons of the respondent. Some one of the respondent's daughters also milking the cow and baking and washing for her,; while one of-the sons usually slept in the house at night. Similar services were also sometimes rendered her by her married daughters. She was furnished from time to time with some garden vegetables for her table, and a few quarts of corn, occasionally, to feed 10 or 12 fowls which she kept around her house. The respondent says he once bought a barrel of flour for her, and paid for it, and bought her necessaries a number of times at the stores for her, and paid for them himself. It also appears that during the time, he cut from the farm or land of the intestate cord-wood, from time to time, which the respondent says he paid him for. There was also some. slight evidence that he did some business for his father, but what it was does not appear. Indeed the father seems to have had no business of any consequence, and the surrogate, in rendering his decree, seems very properly to have regarded this part of the case as of no moment, and the services of little or no value. The claim, in its most favora[131]*131Me aspect, is certainly a very novel one, attended by circumstances unusual, if not in some respects unnatural. For the services were those acts of kindness and affectionate regard which most sons would have been happy to have rendered to an aged and lone mother. Besides, they were for the most part the services of her grandchildren, the respondent’s sons and daughters, and it is said, in the testimony, the intestate never paid them any thing. In the absence of an express promise, it would be difficult to imply an assumpsit from acts performed under such circumstances. (Williams v. Hutchinson, 3 Cowen, 312.) But tMs is not all. The services were rendered during a period of more than 25 years. Ho account was ever kept of what was done, of who did it, or of what was furnished, or of the time when. Ho account was ever rendered to the intestate in Ms life, and there is notMng to show he was ever aware that he was under any duty or obligation whatever to compensate Ms son for these tMngs by a devise of the farm. The presentation of such a demand, for the first time, after the decease of the alleged debtor, and when Ms lips are forever closed against all defense and explanation, is calculated to awaken some suspicion as to its validity, and to demand clear and unequivocal evidence of its truth. HotMng short of tMs will satisfy the simplest demands of justice and good faith. The courts have gone quite far enough in favor of tMs class of claims—farther, I tMnk, than can be justified by reason or strict legal principles. To sustain the decree made by the surrogate, it is indispensable that the proof should establish a contract tó pay for the services rendered the mother, by a devise of the land. It cannot be upheld upon any other ground, and if the proof falls short of establisMng such a contract, or a mutual understanding to that effect, the claim, or the principal part of it, must fall to the ground. (Martin v. Wright’s Adm’rs, 13 Wend. 460, and the cases there referred to.) Because, 1st. Such is the claim in the petition of the respondent. He alleges a special contract to pay by a devise of the farm, and [132]*132although upon the failure to devise by will, the amount of the recovery is to be measured as in an action upon a quantum meruit, still the foundation of the recovery is the special contract and its subsequent breach. 2d. If there was no special contract, or mutual understanding, to make compensation in a given way, and at a future time, to wit, by the devise of the lands to take effect upon the death of the bargainor or party contracting to make the devise, then the remuneration for the services was payable presently, and the claim, or the most part of it, is barred by the statute of limitations. The contract—a valid subsisting contract—to make the devise of the farm in consideration of the services rendered, must be made out affirmatively by the proof, or the decree cannot be upheld.

It is another circumstance worthy of notice, that no witness was examined who was present when any such agreement was made. It is not pretended that it was reduced to writing, and no one ever heard the parties engaged in any treaty concerning it. If it exists, it is to be inferred from the declarations of the intestate proved upon the hearing. The times at which most of these declarations were made are not given. If they were made after most of the pretended services were rendered, and towards the close of the intestate’s life, their effect to make out the agreement would be materially diminished. I now proceed to ascertain what they are. David Eobinson, a son of the respondent, heard his grandfather, after telling him, the witness, to take good care of things, say, “ it would soon all be father’s ; I intend to give it to your father, and it will eventually be yours and your brothers. This he said in relation to keeping cattle off the sprouts.

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Bluebook (online)
36 Barb. 128, 1862 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 32, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/raynor-v-robinson-nysupct-1862.