Raynor God v. United States of America

• Court: District Court, District of Columbia
• Decided: October 19, 2023
• Docket: Civil Action No. 2023-2563
• Status: Published

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

GILBERT RYAN RAYNOR GOD, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) Civil Action No. 23-02563 (UNA) ) ) UNITED STATES OF AMERICA et al., ) ) Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION

This action, brought pro se, is before the Court on review of Plaintiff’s Complaint, ECF

No. 1, and application to proceed in forma pauperis, ECF No. 2. The Court will grant the

application and dismiss this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) (requiring immediate

dismissal of a case upon a determination that the complaint is frivolous or seeks monetary relief

from an immune defendant).

Plaintiff is a resident of Portsmouth, Virginia, who has sued the United States. He states

that the “Air Force and the United States could have prevented the tortures” he has “endured from

the start.” ECF No. 1 at 4. Plaintiff alleges that because of Defendants’ negligent practices, he

has “been tortured [and] experimented on as a telephist [sic].” Id. He seeks $150,000,000 for the

“tortures endured” and $15,000,000 for the experimentation. Id. at 5. As the basis of jurisdiction,

Plaintiff mentions “the Geneva Convention; 2340 [and] Torture,” ECF No. 1 at 3, which invokes

at best 28 U.S.C. § 1350, titled “Alien’s action for tort.” See Escarria-Montano v. United States,

797 F. Supp. 2d 21, 24 (D.D.C. 2011) (“Torture is a subject the courts are authorized to address

under § 1350” because the Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991 (TVPA) “creates a cause of

action against an individual who subjects another to torture or ‘extrajudicial killing’ while acting ‘under actual or apparent authority, or color of law, of any foreign nation.’ ”) (quoting § 1350, note

Sec. 2(a)); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(e) (“Pleadings must be construed so as to do justice.”); Estelle

v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976) (Pro se pleadings are “to be liberally construed”).

Federal courts “are without power to entertain claims otherwise within their jurisdiction if

they are so attenuated and unsubstantial as to be absolutely devoid of merit, wholly insubstantial,

[or] obviously frivolous[.]” Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 536–37 (1974) (internal quotation

marks and citations omitted). A complaint “is properly dismissed as frivolous” when “it is clear

from the face of the pleading that the named defendant is absolutely immune from suit on the

claims asserted,” Crisafi v. Holland, 655 F.2d 1305, 1308 (D.C. Cir. 1981), or when it lacks “an

arguable basis either in law or in fact,” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). Plaintiff’s

complaint satisfies both standards. See id. (the term frivolous “embraces not only the inarguable

legal conclusion, but also the fanciful factual allegation”). Most important, the United States and

its agencies are immune from suit save “clear congressional consent,” United States v. Mitchell,

445 U.S. 535, 538 (1980), and a waiver of sovereign immunity “must be unequivocally expressed

in statutory text,” Mowrer v. United States Dep’t of Transportation, 14 F.4th 723, 728 (D.C. Cir.

2021). The TVPA does not “contain[] language authorizing a lawsuit against the United States.”

Escarria-Montano, 797 F. Supp. 2d at 24. Consequently, this case will be dismissed by separate

order.

____________________ JIA M. COBB Date: October 19, 2023 United States District Judge