Raymond v. Dias de Araujo

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedDecember 28, 2023
Docket7:23-cv-07578
StatusUnknown

This text of Raymond v. Dias de Araujo (Raymond v. Dias de Araujo) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Raymond v. Dias de Araujo, (S.D.N.Y. 2023).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK ---------------------------------------------------------X WENDY RAYMOND,

Plaintiff, v. OPINION AND ORDER

GEOVANES DIAS de ARAUJO, et al., 23-CV-07578 (PMH)

Defendants. ---------------------------------------------------------X

PHILIP M. HALPERN, United States District Judge: On or about August 2, 2023, Plaintiff Wendy Raymond (“Plaintiff”) commenced an action in the Supreme Court of the State of New York, County of Rockland against Defendants Geovanes Dias de Araujo (“Dias de Araujo” and ES Express Transport Inc., (“Corporate Defendant” and together, “Defendants”) by the service and filing of a Summons and Complaint. (Doc. 1, “Not.” ¶¶ 2-4; Doc. 1-2, “Compl.”). On August 25, 2023, Defendants removed this action from state court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441 and 1446. (Not. at 1). The basis for removal set forth in the Notice of Removal was the alleged diversity of the parties under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). (Id. ¶¶ 11-13). Presently pending before the Court is Plaintiff’s motion to remand filed on September 25, 2023. (Doc. 8; Doc. 9; Doc. 10, “Pl. Br.”). Defendants, at the Court’s direction, filed their opposition to Plaintiff’s motion on October 18, 2023. (Doc. 12; Doc. 13, “Def. Br.”). Plaintiff filed her reply on October 25, 2023. (Doc. 14, “Reply”). For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiff’s motion is GRANTED. STANDARD OF REVIEW Under 28 U.S.C. § 1441, “any civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant . . . .” 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). “The [federal] district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and is between—(1) citizens of different States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). “An individual’s citizenship, within the meaning of the diversity statute, is determined by his domicile.” Palazzo v. Corio, 232 F.3d 38, 42 (2d Cir. 2000).1 “Allegations of residency alone cannot establish

citizenship.” Canedy v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 126 F.3d 100, 103 (2d Cir. 1997). “The Supreme Court has held that the party asserting diversity jurisdiction in federal court has the burden of establishing the existence of the jurisdictional amount in controversy.” Villafana v. So, No. 13-CV-00180, 2013 WL 2367792, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. May 29, 2013) (quoting Lupo v. Human Affairs Int’l, Inc., 28 F.3d 269, 273 (2d Cir. 1994)). While defendants need not “prove the amount in controversy to an absolute certainty,” they have “the burden of proving that it appears to a reasonable probability that the claim is in excess of the statutory jurisdictional amount.” Id. (quoting Mehlenbacher v. Akzo Nobel Salt, Inc., 216 F.3d 291, 296 (2d Cir. 2000)). “[I]f the jurisdictional amount is not clearly alleged in the plaintiff’s complaint, and the defendants’ notice of removal fails to allege facts adequate to establish that the amount in controversy exceeds the

jurisdictional amount, federal courts lack diversity jurisdiction as a basis for removing the plaintiff’s action from state court.” Id. (quoting Lupo, 28 F.3d at 273-74). DISCUSSION Defendants, in the Notice of Removal, claimed that this Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this dispute because: (1) complete diversity exists between the parties; and (2) the amount in controversy exceeds the jurisdictional limit of $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs, based upon Plaintiff’s settlement demand for “a sum well in excess of $75,000.” (Not. ¶¶ 11-13). Plaintiff seeks remand on the grounds that: (1) the Complaint, Answer, and Notice of

1 Unless otherwise indicated, case quotations omit all internal citations, quotation marks, footnotes, and alterations. Removal refer only to the parties’ “residence” as opposed to “domicile” which is insufficient to establish diversity of citizenship; (2) the Complaint and Answer give confusing and conflicting information with respect to the Corporate Defendant’s citizenship, which “leaves open the question” of the Corporate Defendant’s citizenship; and (3) Defendants have not carried their

burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that the jurisdictional threshold has been met. (See generally Plf. Br.). Defendants argue in opposition to Plaintiff’s motion that the totality of the facts support that New York is not simply Plaintiff’s residence, but her domicile, and that Defendants are conclusively citizens of the State of Massachusetts. (See generally Def. Br.). Defendants also argue that Plaintiff’s written settlement demand for $1,000,000 is sufficient to establish that the amount in controversy exceeds the $75,000 jurisdictional threshold. (Id.). I. Diversity of Citizenship Regarding Plaintiff’s challenge to diversity of citizenship, “[i]t is well established that a statement of residence, unlike domicile, tells the court only where the parties are living and not of

which state they are citizens.” Adrian Fam. Partners I, L.P. v. ExxonMobil Corp., 79 F. App’x 489, 491 (2d Cir. 2003). “Allegations of residency alone cannot establish citizenship.” Canedy, 126 F.3d at 103. Here, Defendants do not rely solely on allegations of residency to establish citizenship. The Complaint alleges that Plaintiff “was, and still is, a resident of the State of New York, County of Rockland.” (Compl. ¶ 1). Additionally, Defendant came forth with evidence that Plaintiff had a New York State driver’s license with a New York address on the day of the subject collision. (Def. Br. at 3; Doc. 12-1). The Court further notes that Plaintiff does not admit or deny in her Motion that New York is her domicile. (See generally Plf. Br.). On these facts, Defendants have not sufficiently established that Plaintiff is a citizen of the State of New York. With respect to Defendant Dias de Araujo, the Complaint alleges that he “was, and still is, a resident of the State of Massachusetts, County of Middlesex.” (Compl. ¶ 2). Dias de Araujo had

a Massachusetts’s State driver’s license on the day of the subject collision. (Def. Br. at 2-3; Doc. 12-1). Additionally, Defendants offer hearsay, third party evidence that Dias de Araujo has only ever lived and worked in Massachusetts since immigrating the to the United States in 2001. (Doc. 12-3). Taken together, the Court finds that Defendants have not sufficiently established that Dias de Araujo is a citizen of the State of Massachusetts. Finally, the Complaint alleges that the Corporate Defendant “was and still is an out of state corporation, duly organized under and existing by virtue of the laws of the State of New York.” (Compl. ¶ 3). Defendants’ answer states that the Corporate Defendant “was a Domestic Profit Corporation, organized in the State of Massachusetts, with a principal place of business in Shrewsbury, Massachusetts” and denies that it is organized and existing by virtue of the laws of

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Related

Marian R. Canedy v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Company
126 F.3d 100 (Second Circuit, 1997)
Palazzo v. Corio
232 F.3d 38 (Second Circuit, 2000)
Broidy Capital v. Benomar
944 F.3d 436 (Second Circuit, 2019)
Mehlenbacher v. Akzo Nobel Salt, Inc.
216 F.3d 291 (Second Circuit, 2000)
Adrian Family Partners I, LP v. Exxonmobil Corp.
79 F. App'x 489 (Second Circuit, 2003)

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Raymond v. Dias de Araujo, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/raymond-v-dias-de-araujo-nysd-2023.