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4 5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 6 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT TACOMA 7 RAYMOND SPENCER, et al., Case No. 2:25-cv-00204-TMC 8 Plaintiffs, ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND 9 DENYING IN PART MOTION FOR v. SUMMARY JUDGMENT AGAINST 10 SPENCER PLAINTIFFS KING COUNTY, 11 Defendant. 12 13
14 WAVERLY HILLS CLUB 15 INCORPORATED, 16 Plaintiff, 17 v. 18 KING COUNTY, 19 Defendant. 20 21 22 23 24 1 KING COUNTY, 2 Counter-Plaintiff, 3 v.
4 RAYMOND SPENCER, et al., 5 Counter-Defendants. 6 7 8 KING COUNTY, 9 Counter-Plaintiff, 10 v. 11 WAVERLY HILLS CLUB, 12 INCORPORATED,
13 Counter-Defendant. 14 I. INTRODUCTION 15 Plaintiffs Raymond and Lael Spencer and Defendant King County dispute ownership 16 over a strip of land located along the East Lake Sammamish Trail (“ELST”). King County now 17 moves for summary judgment on both the Spencers’ claims and its own counterclaims. Dkt. 19. 18 For the reasons explained below, the Court concludes that King County owns the disputed land 19 in fee simple, and it is entitled to summary judgment on all claims except for: (1) the Spencers’ 20 claims under the Fourteenth Amendment and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which are not barred by the 21 statute of limitations and have not been adequately briefed on the merits; and (2) King County’s 22 counterclaim for trespass and waste in the disputed strip, which remains the subject of genuine 23 24 1 disputes of material fact. The Court therefore GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART the 2 motion for summary judgment. 3 II. BACKGROUND
4 A. Facts This case centers on a strip of land (the “right of way” or “ROW”) that was formerly part 5 of a railway line running alongside Lake Sammamish in Sammamish, Washington. See Dkts. 20- 6 2, 20-19, 20-21. In 1887, private landowners Jim and Alice Yonderpump conveyed an interest in 7 the ROW to the Seattle, Lake Shore and Eastern Railway Company (“SLS&E”) via a right of 8 way deed. Dkt. 20-2. Through subsequent conveyances, the Spencers now possess a portion of 9 the Yonderpumps’ land adjacent to the ROW, and King County now possesses SLS&E’s interest 10 in the ROW. The parties dispute whether the Yonderpump deed conveyed an easement or a fee 11 interest. Dkt. 24 ¶ 11; Dkt. 19 at 20–25. If the former, then the Spencers now own the ROW 12 subject to King County’s easement; if the latter, then King County now owns the ROW in fee. 13 1. Yonderpump deed and subsequent conveyances 14 In 1884, homesteader Jim Yonderpump obtained title to a tract of land (the “Yonderpump 15 lot”), which included the land now constituting the ROW and the land now owned by the 16 Spencers. Dkts. 20-1, 20-25. In May 1887, the Yonderpumps executed a deed granting SLS&E 17 an interest in the ROW. Dkt. 20-2. The granting clause of the deed read as follows: 18 In Consideration of the benefits and advantages to accrue to us from the location, 19 construction and operation of the Seattle, Lake Shore and Eastern Railway in the County of King, in Washington Territory we do hereby donate, grant and convey 20 unto said Seattle, Lake Shore and Eastern Railway Company a right of way one hundred (100) feet in width through our lands in said County. 21 Id. at 2. The deed described the conveyance as “[s]uch right of way strip to be fifty (50) feet in 22 width on each side of the center line of the railway track as located across our said lands by the 23 Engineer of [SLS&E].” Id. It concluded with a habendum clause: “To Have and to Hold the said 24 1 premises, with the appurtenances, unto the said party of the second part, and to its successors and 2 assigns forever.” Id. 3 Over the next century, portions of the Yonderpump lot changed hands several times.
4 Many of these deeds did not mention the ROW. See Dkts. 20-5, 20-7, 20-8, 20-10. Meanwhile, 5 SLS&E was acquired by the Northern Pacific Railway Company, which later became part of the 6 Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Company (“BNSF”). See Beres v. United States, 104 7 Fed. Cl. 408, 416 (2012). In 1956, a deed conveying a portion of the Yonderpump lot to the 8 Spencers’ direct predecessor-in-interest mentioned “Norther[n] Pacific Railway Right of way” 9 when describing the boundary lines of the conveyance. Dkt. 20-16. It also mentioned a separate 10 roadway easement. Id. 11 In April 1997, BNSF conveyed its interest in the ROW to The Land Conservancy of 12 Seattle and King County by quit claim deed. Dkt. 20-19. Then, on September 16, 1998, the
13 Surface Transportation Board—the federal agency that regulates railways—authorized the 14 issuance of a notice of interim trail use (“NITU”) allowing BNSF to abandon its rail line along 15 Lake Sammamish and permitting the construction of an interim public trail. The Burlington N. & 16 Santa Fe Ry. Co.-Abandonment Exemption-in King Cnty., No. AB-6 (SUB 380X), 1998 WL 17 638432 (Sept. 16, 1998). Two days later, the NITU was issued, and The Land Conservancy 18 conveyed its interest in the ROW to King County by quit claim deed. Dkt. 20-20; see Beres, 104 19 Fed. Cl. at 416. Over the next 25 years, King County constructed the ELST. Dkt. 20-21 at 2. 20 2. The Spencers’ activities in the ROW 21 In July 1992, the Spencers obtained title to a portion of the Yonderpump lot via a 22 statutory warranty deed. Dkt. 20-17. The deed provided that it was subject to a “[r]ailroad right
23 of way” and “[e]asements under recording numbers 2628804 and 4712061.” Id. at 2. The 24 1 property description in the deed referenced the “Northern Pacific Railway right-of-way” when 2 describing the property boundaries. Id. at 3. 3 At the time of purchase, the Spencers believed that their land included the ROW and that
4 BNSF’s interest in the ROW was only an easement. Dkt. 29 ¶¶ 2–3. Consistent with that 5 understanding, the Spencers constructed a garden bed bordered by concrete blocks inside the 6 ROW. Id. ¶¶ 3, 5. But beginning in July 2000, King County contacted the Spencers and informed 7 them of its position that it owned the ROW in fee. Dkts. 20-26, 20-27, 20-28; Dkt. 29 ¶¶ 6–10. 8 King County representatives told the Spencers that their use of ROW land was unauthorized. 9 Dkt. 20-28 at 3. In December 2002, in an attempt to ensure that they owned the ROW in fee, the 10 Spencers obtained a quit claim deed from Agnes Moe—another successor-in-interest to the 11 Yonderpumps—conveying her interest in the ROW. Dkt. 20-18; Dkt. 29 ¶¶ 11–12. 12 In 2003, the Spencers obtained a 10-year special use permit (“SUP”) from King County
13 allowing them to maintain a garden in the ROW. Dkts. 20-29, 20-30, 20-31; Dkt. 29 ¶ 12. In 14 their SUP application, the Spencers maintained their position that they owned the ROW in fee. 15 Dkt. 20-30 at 3. After the SUP expired in 2013, the Spencers did not renew it, and they continued 16 to maintain their garden after the SUP had lapsed. See Dkt. 29 ¶¶ 13, 16, 32–33. 17 In 2004, the Spencers sued the United States in the Court of Federal Claims, alleging that 18 the 1998 NITU was a taking of their property without just compensation. Beres v. United States, 19 143 Fed. Cl. 27, 35 (2019); Dkt. 20-22 at 2. During this litigation, the Court of Federal Claims 20 determined that the Yonderpumps had conveyed only an easement to SLS&E, rather than 21 conveying the ROW in fee simple. Beres v. United States, 97 Fed. Cl. 757, 809 (2011). This 22 lawsuit resulted in a settlement agreement under which the United States agreed to compensate
23 the Spencers. Dkt. 20-22 at 2, 4. 24 1 Over the following years, communications between the Spencers and King County 2 continued. In November 2019, the Spencers sent a letter to King County requesting “assurances 3 from the City and County regarding the final permitted trail design and the immediate return of
4 several areas near Mr. Spencer’s property to their pre-construction conditions.” Dkt. 20-32 at 3. 5 They expressed an intent to sue King County if those requests were not met. Id. The Spencers 6 reiterated their concerns in a response the next month. Dkt. 20-35. 7 In January 2020, King County sent a letter to the Spencers informing them that any 8 landscaping and structures impeding construction of the ELST would need to be removed from 9 the ROW by September of that year, either by the Spencers themselves or by King County. 10 Dkt. 20-34. Between 2021 and 2024, the Spencers and the County continued to communicate 11 about the Spencers’ unauthorized activities in the ROW. Dkts. 20-36, 20-37, 20-38, 20-39, 20- 12 41. On September 17, 2024, a King County employee sent Mr. Spencer an email notifying him
13 that he would need to obtain an SUP to continue maintaining structures in the ROW. Dkt. 20-41. 14 A few weeks later, King County sent the Spencers a cease-and-desist letter seeking 15 reimbursement related to the removal and damage of county property. Dkt. 20-42. The letter 16 stated that King County would sue the Spencers if they failed to agree to a settlement of King 17 County’s claims against them. Id. at 3. On November 6, 2024, King County sent a follow-up 18 letter to the Spencers’ attorney. Dkt. 20-43. 19 3. Settlement agreement between Sammamish Homeowners and King County 20 Sammamish Homeowners (“SHO”) is a nonprofit corporation that advocates for property 21 owners in the City of Sammamish and along the ELST. Dkt. 20-24 at 2. The Spencers have been 22 members of Sammamish Homeowners, and Mr. Spencer “was familiar with their activities and
23 interest regarding the trail and spring lake flooding.” Dkt. 29 ¶ 14. 24 1 In July 2012, King County applied for a permit to make improvements to a portion of the 2 ELST. Dkt. 20-24 at 2. After the permit was conditionally approved by the city of Sammamish, 3 two local homeowners and SHO challenged the application before the Shorelines Hearings
4 Board. Id. These proceedings resulted in a settlement agreement between King County, the 5 named homeowners, and SHO. Id. Under the settlement, King County agreed that property 6 owners along the ELST would be permitted to “install landscaping improvements and vegetation 7 within the County’s right of way” subject to certain criteria. Id. at 3, 8. The agreement also 8 provided that property owners who had already obtained an SUP would “not be required to 9 obtain a new one for new landscaping improvements or vegetation necessitated or desired as a 10 result of the County’s forthcoming construction.” Id. at 3. Enforcement of the agreement could 11 be obtained by filing suit in King County Superior Court. Id. at 5–6. 12 The Spencers were not named in the agreement, and there is no evidence that they took
13 part in the proceedings. See id. at 2. However, Mr. Spencer attests that he was aware of the 14 negotiations between King County and SHO. Dkt. 29 ¶ 15. 15 B. Procedural history 16 In January 2025, the Spencers sued King County over its use of the ROW. Dkt. 1. The 17 Spencers allege that they own the ROW “subject to a trail easement owned by King County and 18 a dormant railroad easement.” Dkt. 24 ¶¶ 79–82. They claim that King County has violated 19 (1) the Trails Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1247(d), by using the ROW in a manner unauthorized by that law, 20 (2) the SHO settlement agreement, by threatening to sue the Spencers for their activities in the 21 ROW, and (3) the Fourteenth Amendment, by treating the Spencers differently from other 22 homeowners along the ELST. Id. ¶¶ 71–78, 83–112. Based on those allegations, the Spencers
23 seek quiet title, declaratory relief, and damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Id. at 25–26. King 24 1 County contends that it owns the ROW in fee, and it countersues for quiet title, trespass, and 2 waste. Dkt. 15 at 28–30. 3 On June 18, 2025, King County moved for summary judgment on the Spencers’ claims
4 and King County’s counterclaims against the Spencers. Dkt. 19. On July 9, the Spencers filed a 5 response. Dkt. 27. King County filed a reply one week later. Dkt. 31. The motion is now ripe for 6 the Court’s review. 7 III. LEGAL STANDARD “The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine 8 dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. 9 Civ. P. 56(a). A dispute as to a material fact is genuine “if the evidence is such that a reasonable 10 jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Villiarimo v. Aloha Island Air, Inc., 281 11 F.3d 1054, 1061 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 12 (1986)). The moving party has the initial burden of “‘showing’—that is, pointing out to the 13 district court—that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case.” 14 Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986). If the moving party meets its initial burden, 15 the non-moving party must go beyond the pleadings and “set forth specific facts showing that 16 there is a genuine issue for trial.” Zellmer v. Meta Platforms, Inc., 104 F.4th 1117, 1122 (9th Cir. 17 2024) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256). 18 The evidence relied upon by the nonmoving party must be able to be “presented in a form 19 that would be admissible in evidence.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(2). “An affidavit or declaration 20 used to support or oppose a motion must be made on personal knowledge, set out facts that 21 would be admissible in evidence, and show that the affiant or declarant is competent to testify on 22 the matters stated.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(4); see also Fed. R. Ev. 602 (“A witness may testify to 23 a matter only if evidence is introduced sufficient to support a finding that the witness has 24 1 personal knowledge of the matter. Evidence to prove personal knowledge may consist of the 2 witness’s own testimony.”). 3 Conclusory, nonspecific statements in affidavits are not sufficient, and “missing facts”
4 will not be “presume[d].” Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871, 889 (1990). However, 5 “[t]he evidence of the nonmovant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn 6 in his favor.” Tolan v. Cotton, 572 U.S. 650, 651 (2014) (per curiam) (quoting Anderson, 477 7 U.S. at 255). Consequently, “a District Court must resolve any factual issues of controversy in 8 favor of the non-moving party only in the sense that, where the facts specifically averred by that 9 party contradict facts specifically averred by the movant, the motion must be denied.” Lujan, 497 10 U.S. at 888 (internal quotations omitted). 11 “In general, when construing a deed, the intent of the parties is of paramount importance 12 and the court’s duty to ascertain and enforce.” Brown v. State, 130 Wn.2d 430, 437, 924 P.2d
13 908 (1996). Any “ambiguity in a deed is resolved against the grantor.” Kershaw Sunnyside 14 Ranches, Inc. v. Yakima Interurban Lines Ass’n, 156 Wn.2d 253, 272, 126 P.3d 16 (2006). 15 IV. DISCUSSION For the reasons explained below, King County owns the ROW in fee, and the Spencers 16 therefore lack standing to bring claims related to King County’s activities in the ROW. The 17 Spencers’ claim for declaratory relief under the SHO settlement agreement also fails as a matter 18 of law, as this Court is not the proper forum to seek relief under that document. But the Spencers 19 have presented sufficient evidence to overcome summary judgment on King County’s argument 20 that their Section 1983 claim is time-barred. Finally, King County is not entitled to summary 21 judgment on its trespass and waste claims. 22 23 24 1 A. The Yonderpump deed conveyed a fee interest to SLS&E. 2 The primary dispute in this case is whether the Yonderpump deed conveyed a fee interest 3 or an easement to SLS&E. Decades of case law inform the Court’s analysis of this question. The
4 Court discusses each relevant decision in turn. 5 In Brown v. State, 130 Wn.2d 430, 924 P.2d 908 (1996), the Washington Supreme Court 6 described factors that courts should consider in determining whether a railway deed conveys an 7 easement or fee simple title: 8 (1) whether the deed conveyed a strip of land, and did not contain additional language relating to the use or purpose to which the land was to be put, or in other 9 ways limiting the estate conveyed; (2) whether the deed conveyed a strip of land and limited its use to a specific purpose; (3) whether the deed conveyed a right of 10 way over a tract of land, rather than a strip thereof; (4) whether the deed granted only the privilege of constructing, operating, or maintaining a railroad over the 11 land; (5) whether the deed contained a clause providing that if the railroad ceased to operate, the land conveyed would revert to the grantor; (6) whether the 12 consideration expressed was substantial or nominal; and (7) whether the conveyance did or did not contain a habendum clause, and many other 13 considerations suggested by the language of the particular deed. Id. at 438. Other relevant considerations include “the circumstances surrounding the deed’s 14 execution and the subsequent conduct of the parties.” Id. 15 The Brown court recognized that the term “right of way” in a railroad deed may evince an 16 intent to convey an easement if there is a “specifically declared purpose that the grant was a right 17 of way for railroad purposes” and “no persuasive evidence of intent to the contrary.” Id. at 438– 18 39. The court explained that “the use of the term ‘right of way’ as a limitation or to specify the 19 purpose of the grant generally creates only an easement.” Id. at 439. But “where there is no 20 language in the deed relating to the purpose of the grant or limiting the estate conveyed, and it 21 conveys a definite strip of land, the deed will be construed to convey fee simple title.” Id. at 439– 22 40. 23 24 1 In King County v. Rasmussen, 299 F.3d 1077 (9th Cir. 2002), the Ninth Circuit 2 interpreted the “Hilchkanum deed,” a deed from an area landowner to SLS&E that was 3 identically worded to the Yonderpump deed. Id. at 1080. Relying on Brown, the court
4 determined that the Hilchkanum deed conveyed land in fee simple. Id. at 1084–88. Specifically, 5 the court determined that the use of the words “convey” and “strip” in the deed’s granting clause, 6 along with a metes-and-bounds description, indicated an intent to convey a fee interest. Id. at 7 1087. The court then considered subsequent deeds by the Hilchkanums, which “explicitly 8 excepted the strip of land belonging to the Railway,” and concluded that they were evidence that 9 the original deed had conveyed a strip to SLS&E in fee simple. Id. But it also concluded that a 10 failure to mention the strip in other subsequent deeds “is not significantly probative of whether 11 or not the parties intended to convey a fee simple estate.” Id. at 1087–88. 12 The Washington Court of Appeals interpreted the Hilchkanum deed two years later in
13 Ray v. King County, 120 Wn. App. 564, 86 P.3d 183 (2004), and reached the same conclusion as 14 the Ninth Circuit. After determining that the form of the deed and the use of the term “right of 15 way” did not create any presumption of a fee title conveyance, the court considered the 16 remaining Brown factors. Id. at 574–78. The court reasoned that the granting clause suggested a 17 fee simple conveyance because it “grant[ed] a right of way to the Railway without expressly 18 restricting how that right of way was to be used.” Id. at 578–80. The court noted that the deed 19 included a provision permitting SLS&E to cut trees as needed on adjacent property, and it 20 determined that “[t]he lack of any limitation in the use of the strip starkly contrasts with the more 21 limited right to cut trees only on the property adjacent to the strip.” Id. at 581. Finally, the court 22 rejected arguments that the deed should be construed against SLS&E based on allegations that
23 the notary was an agent of SLS&E and undisputed evidence that the Hilchkanums could not read 24 or write. Id. at 586–87. 1 Next, in Kershaw Sunnyside Ranches, Inc. v. Yakima Interurban Lines Ass’n, 156 Wn.2d 2 253, 126 P.3d 16 (2006), the Washington Supreme Court determined that a 1905 deed granting a 3 right of way to BNSF’s predecessor in interest conveyed only an easement. Id. at 262–71. The
4 court clarified that Brown did not overrule prior cases that had concluded that the use of the term 5 “right of way” created the presumption of an easement. Id. at 265–66. Instead, Brown had 6 “distinguished them on the limited basis that none of the deeds at issue in Brown possessed 7 language relating to the purpose of the grant or limiting the estate conveyed.” Id. at 266. The 8 court ultimately concluded that for the grant at issue, “the word ‘right of way’ is used to establish 9 the purpose of the grant and thus presumptively conveys an easement interest.” Id. 10 In Beres v. United States, 97 Fed. Cl. 757 (2011), the Court of Federal Claims became the 11 first to interpret the Yonderpump deed itself, concluding that it conveyed only an easement. Id. at 12 809. Before reaching a decision, the court certified questions to the Washington Supreme Court
13 regarding whether the use of the phrase “right of way” in several disputed deeds—including the 14 Yonderpump and Hilchkanum deeds—indicated an easement or fee simple conveyance. Id. at 15 765. The Washington Supreme Court declined the certification request: 16 The court is of the view that, in light of existing precedent such as Brown v. State, 130 Wash.2d 430, 924 P.2d 908 (1996) and Ray v. King County, 120 Wash.App. 17 564, 86 P.3d 183, review denied, 152 Wash.2d 1027, 101 P.3d 421 (2004), the questions posed by the federal court are not “question[s] of state law . . . which 18 [have] not been clearly determined.” Id. 19 In its decision, the Beres court applied the Brown factors and disagreed with prior case 20 law interpreting the Hilchkanum deed, reasoning that it likely had a more developed record 21 before it. Id. at 786–92. But in its interpretation of the Yonderpump deed, the court found no 22 probative external evidence of the parties’ intent, concluding that subsequent conveyances by the 23 24 1 Yonderpumps that did not mention the ROW were not “helpful to explain the grantors’ intent.” 2 Id. at 794. 3 Finally, in Hornish v. King County, 899 F.3d 680 (9th Cir. 2018), the Ninth Circuit
4 revisited its analysis of the Hilchkanum deed and once again held that it conveyed a fee interest. 5 Id. at 692–94. The court concluded that it was bound by Rasmussen and Ray, and that Kershaw 6 did not change the analysis from those cases. Id. at 692–93. The court noted that in Kershaw, the 7 Washington Supreme Court had “affirmed the correctness of Ray.” Id. at 693. It also determined 8 that the Washington Supreme Court’s denial of the certification request from the Court of 9 Federal Claims was “persuasive evidence” that Ray remained applicable. Id. at 693–94. 10 Ultimately, the court held “that the ‘right of way’ language in the granting clause is not limiting, 11 and does not give rise to the Kershaw easement presumption.” Id. at 694. 12 Because the Yonderpump deed and the Hilchkanum deed are identically worded,
13 Hornish, Rasmussen, and Ray control this Court’s analysis of the deed’s text. See Yong v. I.N.S., 14 208 F.3d 1116, 1119 n.2 (9th Cir. 2000) (“[O]nce a federal circuit court issues a decision, the 15 district courts within that circuit are bound to follow it.”); In re Watts, 298 F.3d 1077, 1083 (9th 16 Cir. 2002) (explaining that when considering state law issues, a federal court is bound by the 17 decision of an intermediate state appellate court absent persuasive evidence that the state’s 18 highest court would reach a different decision). Therefore, the Court may only conclude that the 19 Yonderpump deed conveyed an easement if “the circumstances surrounding the deed’s execution 20 and the subsequent conduct of the parties” can overcome the text of the deed, which weighs in 21 favor of a fee simple conveyance. See Brown, 130 Wn.2d at 438. No such circumstances have 22 been presented here.
23 The Spencers attempt to distinguish Hornish, Rasmussen, and Ray by supplying 24 additional evidence regarding the Yonderpump deed, including (1) identical language in other 1 deeds conveying land to SLS&E on the same day, which they argue indicates that SLS&E 2 drafted the deeds, Dkt. 27 at 24–25; (2) statements regarding Mr. Yonderpump’s alleged 3 illiteracy, id. at 25–26; and (3) subsequent conveyances by the Yonderpumps that did not
4 mention the ROW, id. at 26–27. But none of this evidence “clearly indicate[s]” the intent to 5 convey an easement. See Rasmussen, 299 F.3d at 1084. First, the Spencers’ arguments about 6 SLS&E’s role in drafting the deeds and Mr. Yonderpump’s illiteracy, even if true, would not 7 necessarily show that the Yonderpumps did not understand the nature of the conveyance. See 8 Ray, 120 Wn. App. at 586. The Spencers submit two affidavits stating that Mr. Yonderpump was 9 “unable to read and write the English language.” Dkts. 30-9, 30-10. Even assuming that these 10 affidavits could be presented in an admissible form at trial, they do not state that Mr. 11 Yonderpump could not communicate verbally in English. Second, as both the Ninth Circuit and 12 the Court of Federal Claims recognized, the failure of subsequent conveyances to mention the
13 ROW is not useful in ascertaining the parties’ intent. Beres, 97 Fed. Cl. at 794; see also 14 Rasmussen, 299 F.3d at 1087–88. 15 Based on the text and surrounding circumstances, the Court concludes that the 16 Yonderpump deed conveyed the ROW to SLS&E in fee simple.1 King County, as SLS&E’s 17 successor in interest, is entitled to quiet title in the disputed property. And because the 18 Yonderpumps were predecessors in interest to both the Spencers and Agnes Moe, the 2002 quit 19 claim deed did not convey any interest in the ROW. 20
21 1 The parties dispute the applicability of (1) real estate contracts executed by the Yonderpumps’ successors in interest and (2) King County tax records, both of which expressly exclude the 22 ROW. See Dkt. 19 at 5–6, 18–19; Dkts. 20-9, 21-1, 21-2, 21-3, 21-4, 21-5; Dkt. 27 at 15–16; Dkt. 28 (declaration of title examination expert Dwight Bickel). These documents are not 23 “subsequent conduct of the parties” to the original conveyance and thus have limited bearing on the intent of those parties. However, they do show that later landowners treated the Yonderpump 24 deed as a fee title conveyance. 1 B. The Spencers did not obtain title to the ROW by adverse possession. 2 The Spencers next argue that even if the Yonderpump deed conveyed the ROW in fee, 3 they have adversely possessed the ROW by building and using their garden in the ROW for over
4 30 years. Dkt. 27 at 30–32. King County responds that the Spencers have failed to meet the 5 requirements for an adverse possession claim. Dkt. 31 at 3–4. The Court agrees with King 6 County. 7 “In order to establish a claim of adverse possession, there must be possession that is: 8 (1) open and notorious, (2) actual and uninterrupted, (3) exclusive, and (4) hostile.” ITT 9 Rayonier, Inc. v. Bell, 112 Wn.2d 754, 757, 774 P.2d 6 (1989). “Possession of the property with 10 each of the necessary concurrent elements must exist for the statutorily prescribed period of 10 11 years.” Id.; RCW 4.16.020(1). 12 Under RCW 7.28.090, a party may not bring an action for adverse possession of any
13 “land[] held for any public purpose.” Washington courts have therefore held that “adverse 14 possession does not run against a governmental body holding land for public purposes.” Sisson v. 15 Koelle, 10 Wn. App. 746, 748, 520 P.2d 1380 (1974); Neighbors v. King County, 15 Wn. App. 16 2d 71, 74, 83, 479 P.3d 724 (2020) (analyzing the same railway corridor at issue here and 17 concluding that “[t]he County is immune from adverse possession claims for its public lands 18 under RCW 7.28.090”); see also Town of W. Seattle v. W. Seattle Land & Improvement Co., 38 19 Wash. 359, 363, 80 P. 549 (1905) (“The general rule is that a party cannot acquire title by 20 adverse possession to property held by a municipality in its governmental capacity for public 21 purposes.”). But if a party adversely possesses a property before a state or local government 22 obtains record title, “the adverse possessor is automatically vested with title to the subject
23 property,” and “[t]he prior owner cannot extinguish this title by transferring record title to the 24 government.” Gorman v. City of Woodinville, 175 Wn.2d 68, 74–75, 283 P.3d 1082 (2012). 1 Here, the Spencers obtained title to their property on July 22, 1992. Dkt. 20-17 at 2. King 2 County obtained title to the ROW on September 18, 1998, just over six years later. Dkt. 20-20 at 3 2–3. There is no evidence in the record as to exactly when the Spencers built their garden in the
4 ROW, see Dkt. 29 ¶ 3, and the Spencers argue in their brief that they constructed the garden bed 5 “in 1992 or 1993.” Dkt. 27 at 31. Even assuming that the Spencers installed their garden bed the 6 day they obtained title to their property, their “possession” of the ROW did not span for the 7 statutorily mandated 10-year period before the land became publicly owned and dedicated to 8 public use.2 See Dkt. 20-26 (letter from King County employee to area residents describing its 9 management of the ELST for public use). 10 Moreover, there is no evidence to suggest that the Spencers’ use of the ROW has ever 11 been “exclusive” for the purposes of adverse possession. See Michel v. City of Seattle, 19 Wn. 12 App. 2d 783, 790–91, 498 P.3d 522 (2021) (“[T]he exclusivity element means that an adverse 13 possessor may not share possession of the area claimed with the true owner and, though less 14 critical, not too much with third persons who are there without the adverse possessor’s consent.” 15 (alteration in original) (quoting 17 WILLIAM B. STOEBUCK & JOHN W. WEAVER, WASHINGTON 16 PRACTICE: REAL ESTATE: PROPERTY LAW § 8.19, at 541 (2d ed. 2004))). Instead, Mr. Spencer’s 17 declaration, submitted alongside the Spencers’ opposition brief, describes a train running weekly 18 through the ROW “[f]or years.” Dkt. 29 ¶ 4. Nor was their use seemingly “hostile” while the 19 railroad company owned the land—Mr. Spencer’s declaration also states that a railroad 20 employee knew he planned to build the garden beds and told him “that as long as [he] was more 21 than 11 feet from the nearest rail, it would not interfere with railroad use.” Id. ¶ 3. 22 2 Though neither party argues this, there is also authority suggesting that the Spencers could not 23 adversely possess land owned by a railroad in fee. Neighbors, 15 Wn. App. 2d at 85 (holding that the Interstate Commerce Commission Termination Act “preempts operation of Washington 24 adverse possession statutes against railroads”). 1 C. The Spencers lack standing to bring claims for quiet title and declaratory relief against King County’s interest in the ROW. 2 King County argues that the Spencers lack standing for their declaratory relief and quiet 3 title claims related to the ROW because they have no ownership interest or possessory rights in 4 that piece of property. Dkt. 19 at 16–20; Dkt. 31 at 2–5. The Spencers respond that they have 5 standing to pursue declaratory relief related to the ROW because they “assert a concrete interest” 6 in the ROW, and their alleged injury is “fairly traceable” to King County. Dkt. 27 at 12–14. 7 Similarly, they argue that they have standing to pursue their quiet title claim because they “have 8 alleged ownership and a right to possess, subject to the County’s trail easement.” Id. at 15–16. 9 Hornish governs the Court’s standing inquiry. In Hornish, the Ninth Circuit explained 10 that a plaintiff who lacks any interest in a piece of property has no standing to challenge another 11 party’s interest in that property. Hornish, 899 F.3d at 691–92 (discussing a claim for declaratory 12 relief). There, the plaintiffs-appellants sought a declaratory judgment against King County 13 related to its use of a strip of land along Lake Sammamish. Id. at 686, 691. The court concluded 14 that to demonstrate “standing to challenge King County’s interest in the Corridor, Plaintiffs- 15 Appellants must show that Defendants-Appellees’ possession or use of the Corridor injured 16 Plaintiffs-Appellants’ interests therein.” Id. at 692. Based on its conclusion that King County 17 owned the disputed property in fee, the Ninth Circuit held that the plaintiffs-appellants had no 18 property interests therein and thus lacked standing to pursue declaratory relief. Id. This logic 19 from Hornish also applies to quiet title claims: under Washington statutory law, a person seeking 20 quiet title must “hav[e] a valid subsisting interest in real property, and a right to the possession 21 thereof.” RCW 7.28.010; see also Wash. Sec. & Inv. Corp. v. Horse Heaven Heights, Inc., 132 22 Wn. App. 188, 195, 130 P.3d 880 (2006) (“A party seeking to quiet title must succeed on the 23 strength of its own title, and cannot prevail based on the weakness of the other party’s title.”). 24 1 Standing is “an indispensable part of the plaintiff’s case” and “must be supported in the 2 same way as any other matter on which the plaintiff bears the burden of proof, i.e., with the 3 manner and degree of evidence required at the successive stages of the litigation.” Lujan v. Defs.
4 of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992). Where standing depends on a showing of interest in a 5 specific property, a party responding to a motion for summary judgment must “set forth specific 6 facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial” as to the property interest. Zellmer, 104 F.4th 7 at 1122. As explained above, King County has established that it is entitled to judgment as a 8 matter of law regarding its ownership of the ROW. The Spencers have thus failed to set forth the 9 “manner and degree of evidence” required to demonstrate standing for their claims related to the 10 ROW at this stage of the litigation, even if their assertions of a property interest were sufficient 11 at the pleading stage. Although the Court recognizes that framing this question as one of standing 12 seems odd given its substantial overlap with the merits of the disputed ownership claims, that is
13 the framing set out by the Ninth Circuit that this Court is bound to follow. Summary judgment is 14 warranted on these claims. 15 D. This is not the proper forum to seek relief under the SHO settlement agreement. 16 The Spencers seek the following declaratory relief under the SHO settlement agreement: 17 (1) “[b]y threatening Plaintiffs with legal action for work done within the right of way which is 18 permissible under King County’s settlement with Sammamish Homeowners, King County is in 19 violation of the Settlement Agreement”; (2) “Plaintiffs are members of Sammamish 20 Homeowners and are entitled to the benefits of that Settlement Agreement”; (3) “[a]lternatively, 21 Plaintiffs are third party beneficiaries of the Settlement Agreement which was intended to 22 resolve uncertainties about what private property owners would be allowed to do on the right of 23 24 1 way adjacent to their property”; and (4) “King County has a duty imposed by the Settlement 2 Agreement to accept work authorized under the Settlement Agreement.” Dkt. 24 ¶¶ 84–87. 3 King County argues that the Spencers lack standing to enforce the SHO settlement
4 agreement because “[a]lthough the Spencers claim to be members of SHO, they bring this action 5 in their capacity as individuals.” Dkt. 19 at 30–31. This argument is unpersuasive: the Spencers 6 present undisputed evidence that they were members of the SHO at the time of the agreement 7 and thus have an interest in its enforcement. Dkt. 29 ¶ 14; see Dkt. 20-24 at 2. However, this 8 Court is not the proper forum for such an action. 9 Under Washington’s Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act, a court may enter a declaratory 10 judgment “in any proceeding . . . in which a judgment or decree will terminate the controversy or 11 remove an uncertainty.” RCW 7.24.050. The Washington Supreme Court “has limited the 12 operation of the uniform declaratory judgment act to cases where there is no satisfactory remedy
13 at law available.” Hawk v. Mayer, 36 Wn. 2d 858, 866, 220 P.2d 885 (1950); Grandmaster 14 Sheng-Yen Lu v. King County, 110 Wn. App. 92, 98–99, 38 P.3d 1040 (2002) (“One is not 15 entitled to relief by way of a declaratory judgment if there is available a completely adequate 16 alternative remedy.”). 17 King County maintains that the Spencers’ requests for declaratory relief related to the 18 SHO settlement agreement are not proper because they are duplicative of their Section 1983 19 claim; there is an adequate remedy at law; and a declaratory judgment would not be proper under 20 RCW 7.24.050. Dkt. 19 at 28–29; Dkt. 31 at 16–17. The Court agrees that the settlement 21 agreement itself provides “a completely adequate alternative remedy.” Grandmaster, 110 Wn. 22 App. at 98–99. The agreement provides that it “may be enforced by filing an action in King
23 County Superior Court,” and that a party alleging breach “may seek specific performance and/or 24 injunctive relief” and “recover its reasonable costs and attorney’s fees.” Dkt. 20-24 at 5. The 1 Spencers have not shown that this remedy is inadequate or unenforceable. They are therefore not 2 able to obtain relief through Washington’s declaratory judgment act, and King County is entitled 3 to summary judgment on this claim.
4 E. The Spencers have presented sufficient evidence of “discrete acts” occurring within the statute of limitations for the purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 5 The Spencers’ final claims seek relief under the Fourteenth Amendment and 42 U.S.C. 6 § 1983, based on their allegation that King County treated the Spencers differently from 7 similarly situated landowners along the ELST in its response to their activities in the ROW. 8 Dkt. 24 ¶¶ 89–117. 9 In Washington, a Section 1983 action is subject to a three-year statute of limitations. Rose 10 v. Rinaldi, 654 F.2d 546, 547 (9th Cir. 1981); RCW 4.16.080(2). A Section 1983 claim “accrues 11 when the plaintiff knows or should know of the injury that is the basis of the cause of action.” 12 Hawkins v. City of Federal Way, No. C26-5012-KKE, 2026 WL 689622, at *2 (W.D. Wash. 13 Mar. 11, 2026) (quoting Douglas v. Noelle, 567 F.3d 1103, 1109 (9th Cir. 2009)). A claim may 14 be timely if the plaintiff has “alleged ‘discrete acts’ that would violate the Constitution that 15 occurred within the limitations period.” RK Ventures, Inc. v. City of Seattle, 307 F.3d 1045, 1058 16 (9th Cir. 2002). For discrete acts, as opposed to continuing violations, only those acts that fall 17 within the statute of limitations are actionable as part of a Section 1983 claim. Cholla Ready Mix, 18 Inc. v. Civish, 382 F.3d 969, 974 (9th Cir. 2004) (“Discrete acts are not actionable if time barred, 19 even if related to acts alleged in timely filed charges.”); see also Bird v. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 20 935 F.3d 738, 746–48 (9th Cir. 2019) (discussing evolution of the continuing violation doctrine). 21 King County argues that the Spencers’ Section 1983 claim is untimely because “the 22 Spencers knew the basis for their constitutional claims as early as 2002, when their conflict with 23 King County over their landscaping and other activities in the [ROW] began.” Dkt. 19 at 32–33. 24 1 The Spencers contend that the claim is not time-barred because at least some of King County’s 2 allegedly discriminatory actions took place after January 31, 2022, three years before the 3 Spencers initiated this case. Dkt. 27 at 48–49.
4 The Court agrees that the Spencers have presented evidence of at least some discrete 5 acts—threats of enforcement actions from King County to the Spencers regarding their activities 6 in the ROW—that occurred after that date. See Dkts. 20-41, 20-42, 20-43. To the extent that the 7 Spencers’ Section 1983 claim relies on those acts, it is not time-barred, and summary judgment 8 is not warranted on that basis. In making this determination, the Court does not reach the merits, 9 which have not been adequately briefed at this stage. And having limited this claim to discrete 10 acts that occurred after January 31, 2022, the Court does not reach King County’s argument that 11 the claim is barred by laches. See Dkt. 19 at 33–34; Dkt. 31 at 18–19. 12 F. King County is not entitled to summary judgment under RCW 4.24.630(1).
13 Finally, King County seeks recovery for trespass and waste under RCW 4.24.630(1).3 Per 14 that statute, 15 [e]very person who goes onto the land of another and who removes timber, crops, minerals, or other similar valuable property from the land, or wrongfully causes 16 waste or injury to the land, or wrongfully injures personal property or improvements to real estate on the land, is liable to the injured party for treble the 17 amount of the damages caused by the removal, waste, or injury. Acting “wrongfully” means that “the person intentionally and unreasonably commits the act or 18 acts while knowing, or having reason to know, that he or she lacks authorization to so act.” Id. 19 King County argues that the Spencers violated RCW 4.24.630(1) by knowingly entering 20 county land, removing or relocating county property, and replacing that property with their own 21 structures. Dkt. 19 at 26–27. It contends that the Spencers knew that they were not permitted to 22 23 3 To the extent that King County raises a common law trespass claim against the Spencers, that 24 issue has not been adequately briefed. 1 undertake those activities, based on the terms of their previous SUP. Id. The Spencers respond 2 that they did not act “wrongfully” under the statute because they had been in a “good faith 3 dispute over ownership.” Dkt. 27 at 42–43.
4 Summary judgment is not appropriate on this claim because there is a genuine dispute of 5 material fact as to whether the Spencers acted “wrongfully” as defined by the statute. The 6 Spencers were aware of King County’s position that their activities were unauthorized before 7 and after the term of their SUP. But it may have been reasonable for them to believe that King 8 County was incorrect about the nature of its interest in the ROW, as the only court to rule on the 9 Yonderpump deed had concluded that it conveyed only an easement. See Beres, 97 Fed. Cl. at 10 809. And before their SUP expired, their garden had been “tolerated—indeed, even authorized— 11 by [King County] and [the railroad] for numerous years.” King County v. Abernathy, No. C20- 12 0060-RAJ-SKV, 2021 WL 3472379, at *25 (W.D. Wash. July 26, 2021). The only action under
13 the statute that does not require “wrongful” conduct is “remov[ing] timber, crops, minerals, or 14 other similar valuable property from the land,” and King County does not argue that the 15 Spencers’ removal of “bollards, boulders, habitat logs, and landscaping plants belonging to the 16 County” equates to the removal of natural resources like timber or crops. Dkt. 19 at 26. Without 17 undisputed proof of wrongful conduct, King County has not shown that it is entitled to judgment 18 as a matter of law on its trespass and waste claims. 19 V. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, the Court ORDERS: 20 1. Defendant King County’s motion for summary judgment against the Spencer 21 Plaintiffs (Dkt. 19) is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. 22 2. Quiet title is GRANTED to King County in the disputed property. King County 23 owns the fee title to that portion of the ELST Corridor adjoining the Spencers’ 24 l property, located in Government Lot 2 of Section 32, Township 25N, Range 6 2 East, King County Tax Parcel No. 322506-9015. 3 3. To the extent additional proceedings are required on remedies for King County’s 4 quiet title claim, the parties shall meet and confer and file a joint status report no 5 later than April 30, 2026 proposing a schedule for those proceedings. 6 4. The Spencers’ first, second, and third claims for relief are DISMISSED without 7 prejudice. 8 5. The Spencers’ Section 1983 claim, and the County’s counterclaims for trespass 9 and waste, will proceed on the case schedule set forth at Dkt. 60. 10 11 Dated this 31st day of March, 2026. Lae OS 13 Tiffany. Cartwright United States District Judge 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 ORDER GRANTING: IN PART AND DENYING IN PART MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AGAINST