Raymond S. Winton v. Anita B. (Winton) Dean

Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI NO. 2024-CA-01326-COA

RAYMOND S. WINTON APPELLANT v. ANITA B. (WINTON) DEAN APPELLEE

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 11/05/2024 TRIAL JUDGE: HON. RODNEY PURVIS FAVER COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: OKTIBBEHA COUNTY CHANCERY COURT

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: MATTHEW DANIEL WILSON ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: ROY E. CARPENTER JR. NATURE OF THE CASE: CIVIL - DOMESTIC RELATIONS DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED - 08/11/2026 MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:

BEFORE BARNES, C.J., WESTBROOKS AND McDONALD, JJ.

WESTBROOKS, J., FOR THE COURT:

¶1. Anita Dean and Raymond Winton divorced in 2001. As part of the chancellor’s determination of their property division, Anita was awarded 50% of Raymond’s Public Employees’ Retirement System (PERS) benefits calculated as if Raymond retired on October 18, 2000, including the cost of living adjustment (COLA). Raymond was further required to select an annuity option with Anita as the beneficiary instead of selecting his maximum benefit option. Because selection of the annuity option prevented Raymond from receiving his maximum benefit, the chancellor ordered Anita to compensate Raymond for the difference between the maximum benefit and the mandatorily selected annuity. Raymond began making payments to Anita in July 2017 following his retirement. In 2024, Anita filed

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a motion for contempt, arguing that Raymond’s payments failed to account for the COLA as required under the original judgments. Raymond argued in response that the COLA did not compound on Anita’s benefits during the seventeen years he continued to work following the divorce, and he counterclaimed that Anita had not satisfied her obligation to compensate Raymond for the difference between his maximum benefits and the mandatory annuity option.

¶2. The current chancellor (hereafter “the chancellor”) determined that the COLA applied to Anita’s benefits starting in 2001, which is when the COLA would have begun had Raymond retired in 2000. The chancellor further determined that Raymond’s payments to Anita should be proportionally adjusted to account for Anita’s compensation obligation. Applying these methods to the financial statements provided by the parties, the chancellor calculated Raymond to be in arrears in the amount of $13,352.56. Finding no error in the chancellor’s methodology or calculations, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶3. Anita and Raymond married in 1973 and divorced in 2001. At the time of the divorce, Anita worked as an accountant and Raymond worked as a professor at Mississippi State University. Under the judgment of divorce and property division, as clarified by an order entered in 2002, Anita was awarded 50% of Raymond’s PERS retirement benefits computed as of October 18, 2000.1 The order specified that “[f]ifty percent (50%) of those benefits

1 The parties submitted the issue of property division to the court and did not enter into an agreed property settlement.

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including COLA shall belong to the Plaintiff, and the Defendant shall pay Plaintiff those benefits at the time the Defendant retires[.]”

¶4. Raymond was also required to select “the 50% Joint and Survivor Annuity Benefit Payment Plan (Option 4-A) naming the Plaintiff, Anita B. Winton, as beneficiary.”2 Raymond could not change the selection unless Anita predeceased him. Additionally, since selection of Option 4-A would “reduce the maximum retirement benefits [Raymond] could receive were he permitted to select the Option for maximum benefits,” Anita was ordered to compensate Raymond “for the decrease in his portion of said benefits,” including “for the years of credible service earned by [Raymond] beyond October 18, 2000.”

¶5. In 2002, PERS provided Raymond a document calculating his approximate benefits as if he had retired in October 2000. His maximum benefit was estimated to be approximately $3,392.31 per month. His benefit for selecting the annuity Option 4A was estimated to be approximately $3,014.41 per month. The original judgment of divorce noted that at the time of the divorce in 2001, Raymond was 61 years old and intended to retire at the age of 62. However, Raymond did not retire until 2017. His 2017 final estimate of benefits provided by PERS calculated his maximum benefit to be $9,294.67 per month and his Option 4A benefit to be $7,623.49 per month.

¶6. Raymond began making monthly payments of approximately $750 to Anita when he retired in 2017. Each following year, he increased the payment to account for the annual

2 Anita’s 50% annuity interest was valued at Raymond’s years of service at the time of the divorce.

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three-percent COLA.3 In 2024, Anita filed a motion for contempt, alleging that Raymond was underpaying her and that he was in arrears in the amount of $26,003.52. Anita’s expert submitted documentation to the court and testified at the hearing on the motion. By the expert’s calculations, Raymond should have paid Anita approximately $1,050 each month starting in 2017. To arrive at this number, the expert started by taking 50% of Raymond’s maximum benefit as if he had retired in 2000 and then added a compounding COLA starting in 2001. The expert then adjusted the amount to account for Anita’s compensation obligation to Raymond for his selection of Option 4A, using the final 2017 PERS estimates. This adjustment was calculated proportionally, consistent with the original order’s directive for Anita to compensate Raymond “for the decrease in his said portion.”

¶7. The chancellor disagreed with Anita’s expert that the starting point for calculating the payment to Anita should be 50% of Raymond’s maximum benefit. The chancellor found that it would be inequitable to Raymond to use his estimated maximum benefit given the mandatory selection of Option 4A. Therefore, the chancellor started by calculating 50% of Raymond’s reduced benefits under Option 4A as calculated by PERS as if Raymond had retired in 2000. But the chancellor agreed with the methodology of Anita’s expert in adding the compounding COLA and then adjusting the payment to account for Anita’s proportional compensation obligation. He found the compensation to apply the “fractional portion of the

3 Anita testified at the hearing that she had to annually remind Raymond to increase the payments.

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benefits that [Anita] is receiving versus what [Raymond] is receiving.” Under these calculation methods, Raymond received 70.716305% of his retirement benefit, and Anita received 29.283695%. By the chancellor’s calculations, Raymond should have paid Anita $820 starting in July 2017, plus the subsequent annual COLA.

¶8. The chancellor rejected Raymond’s counterclaim argument that the COLA arrears did not apply and that Anita owed Raymond the entire difference between his maximum benefit option and the benefit under Option 4A, instead of a proportional amount. Raymond argued that because his final retirement benefit was reduced from $9,294.67 to $7,623.49 per month, Anita owed him the full monthly difference of $1,671.18. By Raymond’s calculations, Anita was in arrears to him in the amount of $85,289.11. The chancellor noted that “If the Court were to accept [Raymond’s] interpretation of the Order, [Anita] would owe [Raymond] money, which was clearly not [the original chancellor’s] intent.”

¶9. Although Raymond was found in arrears for the COLA, the chancellor declined to hold Raymond in contempt, determining that “there was no willful and wanton disregard of the [c]ourt’s prior Orders” given the “interpretive nature” of the proceedings. Raymond now appeals.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶10. “A chancellor’s division and distribution will be upheld if it is supported by substantial credible evidence. However, this Court will not hesitate to reverse if it finds the chancellor’s decision is manifestly wrong, or that the court applied an erroneous legal

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standard.” Jenkins v. Jenkins, 67 So. 3d 5, 8-9 (¶8) (Miss. Ct. App. 2011). “Chancellors are afforded wide latitude in fashioning equitable remedies in domestic relations matters, and their decisions will not be reversed if the findings of fact are supported by substantial credible evidence in the record.” Lewis v. Pagel, 172 So. 3d 162, 172 (¶16) (Miss. 2015) (quoting Gutierrez v. Gutierrez, 153 So. 3d 703, 707 (¶9) (Miss. 2014)). “Contempt is determined by the facts and left to the chancellor’s discretion.” Stallings v. Allen, 201 So. 3d 500, 504 (¶14) (Miss. Ct. App. 2016). “The standard of review for civil contempt on appeal is manifest error, meaning ‘the factual findings of the chancellor are affirmed unless manifest error is present and apparent.’” Id. (quoting Purvis v. Purvis, 657 So. 2d 794, 797 (Miss. 1994)). A de novo review applies to questions of statutory interpretation. Greenville Pub. Sch. Dist. v. Thomas, 352 So. 3d 190, 192 (¶6) (Miss. 2022).

DISCUSSION

¶11. Raymond’s primary argument on appeal is that the chancellor erred in holding that the COLA applied to Anita’s awarded benefits starting in 2001. Raymond cites Mississippi Code Annotated section 25-11-112 (Rev. 2024), which provides that a PERS member must receive a monthly benefit for at least one full year before becoming eligible to collect the annual COLA. Anita argues that the statute does not preclude a court-awarded COLA proxy from accruing on her awarded benefit given that the benefit was to be calculated as if Raymond had retired on October 18, 2000, “including COLA.”

¶12. The chancellor agreed with Anita and cited equitable considerations, stating that “the

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[c]ourt is not persuaded that [the original chancellor’s] intent was to deny Plaintiff the cost- of-living increase from the year 2000 until [Raymond’s] retirement in 2017 . . . . [I]f the [c]ourt followed the logic of the Defendant, the Defendant’s benefit would increase almost 40% over the sixteen years between the time the Order was entered and the time of the Defendant’s retirement in 2017 . . . if Plaintiff’s benefit were to stay the same, this would be egregiously inequitable.”4 Anita points out that under the logic of Raymond’s additional arguments, if he delayed retirement long enough, he would not owe Anita any money, and she might owe him money.

¶13. We agree with the chancellor’s determinations. Anita was awarded 50% of Raymond’s retirement benefits as if Raymond had retired on October 18, 2000, “including COLA[.]” Had Raymond retired in October 2000, the COLA would apply starting in 2001. The chancellor applied this parameter in his calculations, noting that “no COLA would be paid in 2000, the first year [of retirement].” We find that the chancellor’s interpretation of the original orders was reasonable and supported by substantial evidence. The chancellor made equitable considerations in favor of each party, including starting the calculations from Raymond’s reduced benefit option, the uncertainty of when Raymond would retire, and the compounding inequity to Anita’s share of the benefits (which she could not access) if the COLA did not accrue as contemplated by the original order.

4 Raymond earned an additional two or two-and-a-half-percent for each additional year he was employed.

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¶14. After adjusting Anita’s benefit to account for the COLA arrears and her compensation obligation, the chancellor determined that Anita’s monthly benefit due as of July 2017 was $820.00, subject to subsequent annual COLAs. At the time of the contempt proceedings in 2024, Raymond owed Anita a total of $84,473.83 and had paid $71,121.27, leaving arrears of $13,352.56. Finding no manifest error, we affirm.

CONCLUSION

¶15. The chancellor did not err in finding that the intent of the original judgment as amended was for Anita’s COLA benefit to accrue as if Raymond had retired in October 2000. Under this application, the COLA accrued on Anita’s 50% award of Raymond’s retirement benefits beginning in 2001. The chancellor further appropriately determined that Raymond’s payments to Anita should be proportionally adjusted to account for her compensation obligation given Raymond’s mandatory selection of annuity Option 4A.

¶16. AFFIRMED.

BARNES, C.J., McDONALD, LAWRENCE, McCARTY, WEDDLE AND LASSITTER ST. PÉ, JJ., CONCUR. CARLTON AND WILSON, P.JJ., AND EMFINGER, J., CONCUR IN RESULT ONLY WITHOUT SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION.