Raymond L. E. Smith v. United States

340 F.2d 797, 119 U.S. App. D.C. 272, 1964 U.S. App. LEXIS 3624

• Court: Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit
• Decided: December 10, 1964
• Docket: 17827
• Status: Published

Opinion

PER CURIAM.

Appellant was convicted of robbery. 22 D.C.Code § 2901 (1961). His primary contention on appeal relates to the sufficiency of the evidence. We have examined the entire record. We conclude that there is sufficient evidence to support the jury finding of guilty.

Appellant also contends that it was plain error for the court to admit evidence of the complaining witness’ extra-judicial identification of appellant. The complaining witness testified, on direct examination, that he had identified the appellant during a police lineup held several days after the robbery. A police officer who was present during the lineup also testified, on direct examination, to the identification made by the complaining witness.

In some jurisdictions, evidence of an extra-judicial identification is inadmissible, except when the circumstances would justify admitting any prior consistent statement made by a witness. 1 Other authorities suggest that such evidence may be admitted more freely. 2 In prior cases we have not reached the question of admissibility of such evidence but held merely that its admission in the circumstances of those cases did not prejudice the defendant. Williams v. United States, 119 U.S.App.D.C. -, 338 F.2d 530 (1964); Baber v. United States, 116 U.S.App.D.C. 358, 324 F.2d 390 (1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 972, 84 S.Ct. 1139, 12 L.Ed.2d 86 (1964); Harrod v. United States, 58 App.D.C. 254, 29 F.2d 454 (1928); Leeper v. United States, 117 U.S.App.D.C. 310, 329 F.2d 878, cert. denied, 377 U.S. 959, 84 S.Ct. 1641, 12 L.Ed.2d 502 (1964).

In this case, the evidence was admitted without objection by defense counsel. In the circumstances of this case, we find no “[p]lain errors or defects affecting substantial rights.” Rule 52(b), Fed.R.Crim.P.

Affirmed.

1 . Poole v. United States, 9 Cir., 97 F.2d 423 (1938); Trimble v. State, 227 Ark. 867, 302 S.W.2d 83 (1957); People v. Cioffii, 1 N.Y.2d 70,150 N.Y.S.2d 192, 133 N.E.2d 703 (1956); People v. Trowbridge, 305 N.Y. 471, 113 N.E.2d 841 (1953); People v. Hagedorny, 272 App. Div. 830, 70 N.Y.S.2d 511 (1947); Thompson v. State, 223 Ind. 39, 58 N.E. 2d 112 (1944). See generally, Comment, 19 Md.L.Rev. 201 (1959); see also 109 U.Pa.L.Rev. 1182 (1961); 36 Minn.L. Rev. 530 (1952).

2 . E.g., United States v. Forzano, 2 Cir., 190 F.2d 687 (1951) (to corroborate unimpeached courtroom identification); Bolling v. United States, 4 Cir., 18 F.2d 863 (1927) (same); 4 Wiomobe, Evidence § 1130, p. 208 (3d ed. 1940) (same); of. McCobmick, Evidence § 49, pp. 109-110 (1954) (state may show rape Iirosecutrix’ complaint made withiu reasonable time of alleged act even absent impeachment). See also People v. Spinello, 303 N.Y. 193, 101 N.E.2d 457 (1951) (witness’ testimony to own prior identification of accused admissible substantively for any purpose); Uniform Rule of Evidence 63(1), Handbook oe the National Conbebence ob ComMISSIONEES ON ÜNIBOBM STATE LAWS 197 (1953) (hearsay declaration admissible substantively if declarant present and subject to cross-examination); McCobmick, supra, § 39 (same); Rule 503, Amebican Law Institute, Model Code ob Evidence 231 (1942) (hearsay declaration admissible substantively if declaa-ant unavailable as witness or present and subject to cross-examination).