Raymond Kirk Butler v. the State of Texas

• Court: Court of Appeals of Texas
• Decided: August 7, 2025
• Docket: 10-24-00234-CR
• Status: Published

Opinion

Court of Appeals Tenth Appellate District of Texas

10-24-00234-CR

Raymond Kirk Butler, Appellant

v.

The State of Texas, Appellee

On appeal from the 249th District Court of Somervell County, Texas Judge Tiffany Strother, presiding Trial Court Cause No. 23-213-DCCR-00021

JUSTICE SMITH delivered the opinion of the Court.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Raymond Kirk Butler appeals his conviction for felony driving while

intoxicated. After a trial before the court, the trial court sentenced Butler to

twenty-five years of confinement in the Texas Department of Criminal

Justice—Institutional Division. In his sole issue, Butler asserts the evidence

is insufficient to sustain a conviction for felony driving while intoxicated. We

affirm. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE

Butler contends the evidence is insufficient to support a conviction for

felony driving while intoxicated. Specifically, he asserts the State failed to

prove he was convicted of driving while intoxicated on June 25, 1987 in Hood

County, cause number 16537, as alleged in DWI enhancement paragraph one

of the indictment. Butler argues there is no evidence of a judgment or

functional equivalent of a judgment in the 1987 case.

In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we view the evidence in the

light most favorable to the prosecution, to determine whether any rational trier

of fact could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a

reasonable doubt. Isassi v. State, 330 S.W.3d 633, 638 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010);

Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 912 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). Because the trier

of fact is the sole judge of the witnesses' credibility and the weight to be given

their testimony, we defer to those determinations. Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 899.

A person commits an offense if the person is intoxicated while operating

a motor vehicle in a public place. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 49.04(a). An offense

under Section 49.04 is a felony of the third degree if it is shown on the trial of

the offense that the person has previously been convicted two times of any

other offense relating to the operating of a motor vehicle while intoxicated. Id.

§ 49.09(b)(2). This includes an offense under Article 6701l-1, Revised Statutes,

Butler v. State Page 2 as that law existed before September 1, 1994. Id. 49.09(c)(1)(C). For a DWI

offense that occurred between January 1, 1984 and September 1, 1994, “a

conviction . . . is a final conviction, whether or not the sentence for the

conviction is probated.” Ex parte Serrato, 3 S.W.3d 41, 42-43 (Tex. Crim. App.

1999) (per curiam).

The State offered as evidence an “Order Granting Misdemeanor

Probation” in cause number 16537 in Hood County, dated June 25, 1987. The

order states that the court found the evidence substantiates Butler’s guilt of

the offense of driving while intoxicated but placed Butler on probation for

twenty-four months. Probated convictions are considered final convictions

under Section 49.09. Id. at 43. Accordingly, the evidence is sufficient to prove

Butler was convicted of the offense of driving while intoxicated in Hood County

on June 25, 1987 as alleged in DWI enhancement paragraph one of the

indictment. We overrule Butler’s sole issue.

We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

STEVE SMITH Justice

Butler v. State Page 3 OPINION DELIVERED and FILED: August 7, 2025 Before Chief Justice Johnson, Justice Smith, and Justice Harris Affirmed Do not publish CRPM

Butler v. State Page 4