Raymond Hurt, Jr. v. Commonwealth of Kentucky

CourtCourt of Appeals of Kentucky
DecidedMarch 16, 2023
Docket2022 CA 001090
StatusUnknown

This text of Raymond Hurt, Jr. v. Commonwealth of Kentucky (Raymond Hurt, Jr. v. Commonwealth of Kentucky) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Kentucky primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Raymond Hurt, Jr. v. Commonwealth of Kentucky, (Ky. Ct. App. 2023).

Opinion

RENDERED: MARCH 17, 2023; 10:00 A.M. NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

Commonwealth of Kentucky Court of Appeals

NO. 2022-CA-1090-MR

RAYMOND HURT, JR. APPELLANT

APPEAL FROM CHRISTIAN CIRCUIT COURT v. HONORABLE ANDREW SELF, JUDGE ACTION NO. 13-CR-00553

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLEE

OPINION AFFIRMING

** ** ** ** **

BEFORE: EASTON, LAMBERT, AND MCNEILL, JUDGES.

EASTON, JUDGE: The Appellant, Raymond Hurt, Jr. (“Hurt”), pro se, asks this

Court to reverse the circuit court’s denial of jail credit. Finding the circuit court

did not err in denying Hurt’s CR1 60.02 motion, we affirm.

1 Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Hurt pled guilty to multiple counts of trafficking in cocaine. He also

pled guilty to being a persistent felony offender. For this case, he received a

sentence of ten years. For another case2 in the Christian Circuit Court, Hurt

received another sentence of three years for a reduced charge of possession of

cocaine. The original charge in this other case was another charge of trafficking

in cocaine.

Hurt also had charges in Tennessee and in Muhlenberg County in

Kentucky. The parties agreed the three-year sentence and the ten-year sentence in

Christian County would be concurrent with each other and with any sentence to be

imposed in Tennessee. Any sentence in Muhlenberg County would be

consecutive. Hurt entered his plea in Christian County on February 12, 2015. At

the initial sentencing hearing on May 20, 2015, the parties agreed to allow

Tennessee to proceed first. It would be one year and three months later when the

sentencing for this case in Kentucky could be completed on August 31, 2016.

During the pendency of this case, Hurt had been released on a non-

cash bond but with home incarceration with an ankle monitor. The time of this

monitoring was from December 12, 2013, through March 13, 2014, when Hurt was

allowed to post a ten percent deposit bond, the ankle monitor condition was

2 Case Number 13-CR-00223.

-2- removed, and Hurt was placed on monitored conditional release (“MCR”). Hurt

eventually was arrested again and was in custody when he entered his guilty plea.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Hurt filed a motion for relief pursuant to CR 60.02. We review a

denial of such a motion for an abuse of discretion. Gross v. Commonwealth, 648

S.W.2d 853 (Ky. 1983). “The test for abuse of discretion is whether the trial

judge’s decision was arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by sound legal

principles.” Foley v. Commonwealth, 425 S.W.3d 880, 886 (Ky. 2014).

“Appellate review of a trial court’s factual findings is governed by the clearly

erroneous standard; factual determinations supported by substantial evidence will

not be disturbed.” Legg v. Commonwealth, 500 S.W.3d 837, 839 (Ky. App. 2016).

ANALYSIS

KRS3 532.120(7) mandates credit for pretrial time spent on home

incarceration. The time the circuit court authorized the ankle monitor system in

this case must be counted for this purpose. KRS 431.517; KRS 532.245. Time on

MCR does not satisfy these statutes. Sanders v. Commonwealth, 600 S.W.3d 266

(Ky. 2020).

The circuit court does not determine jail credit. KRS 532.120(3). The

circuit court may address jail credit by motion after a defendant has exhausted

3 Kentucky Revised Statutes.

-3- administrative review with the Department of Corrections (“DOC”). KRS

532.120(9). Hurt did not present any evidence he had exhausted DOC review

before he filed his CR 60.02 motion. If considered as a CR 60.02 motion, Hurt’s

motion was not filed within a “reasonable time” as required by the specific

provisions of that rule. Hurt filed his motion almost six years after his belated

sentencing.

Despite these impediments to Hurt’s motion, the circuit court

reviewed the merits of Hurt’s motion. Based upon evidence in the file, the circuit

court found the amount of time previously calculated by the DOC was correct.

This finding is not clearly erroneous, and the circuit court did not abuse its

discretion by denying Hurt’s motion.

CONCLUSION

The order denying Hurt’s CR 60.02 motion is AFFIRMED.

ALL CONCUR.

BRIEF FOR APPELLANT: BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:

Raymond Hurt, Jr., pro se Daniel Cameron West Liberty, Kentucky Attorney General of Kentucky

Stephanie L. McKeehan Assistant Attorney General Frankfort, Kentucky

-4-

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Gross v. Commonwealth
648 S.W.2d 853 (Kentucky Supreme Court, 1983)
Foley v. Commonwealth
425 S.W.3d 880 (Kentucky Supreme Court, 2014)
Legg v. Commonwealth
500 S.W.3d 837 (Court of Appeals of Kentucky, 2016)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
Raymond Hurt, Jr. v. Commonwealth of Kentucky, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/raymond-hurt-jr-v-commonwealth-of-kentucky-kyctapp-2023.