Raymond Feldman v. Bosco Credit LLC

Ninth Circuit

Raymond Feldman v. Bosco Credit LLC

699 F. App'x 718

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

DecidedOctober 26, 2017

Docket16-56470

StatusUnpublished

This text of 699 F. App'x 718 (Raymond Feldman v. Bosco Credit LLC) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Raymond Feldman v. Bosco Credit LLC, 699 F. App'x 718 (9th Cir. 2017).

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Opinion

MEMORANDUM **

Raymond Feldman appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment in his diversity action seeking to set aside a state court judgment. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Progressive Cas. Ins. Co. v. Owen, 519 F.3d 1035, 1037 (9th Cir. 2008). We may affirm on any basis supported by the record. Hell’s Angels Motorcycle Corp. v. McKinley, 360 F.3d 930, 933 (9th Cir. 2004). We affirm.

The district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Feldman’s collateral attack on the state court judgment under the Rooker-Peldman doctrine because Feld-man’s action amounted to a forbidden “de facto appeal” of a prior, final state court judgment. See Noel v. Hall, 341 F.3d 1148, 1154 (9th Cir. 2003) (“It is a forbidden de facto appeal under Rooker-Feldman when the plaintiff in federal district court complains of a legal wrong allegedly, committed by the state court, and seeks relief from the judgment of that court.”).

We reject as without merit Feldman’s contention that he was entitled to summary judgment in his favor based on the district court’s granting of the parties’ requests for judicial notice.

We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued in the opening brief. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F,3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

AFFIRMED.

**

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

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MEMORANDUM **

Raymond Feldman appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment in his diversity action seeking to set aside a state court judgment. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Progressive Cas. Ins. Co. v. Owen, 519 F.3d 1035, 1037 (9th Cir. 2008). We may affirm on any basis supported by the record. Hell’s Angels Motorcycle Corp. v. McKinley, 360 F.3d 930, 933 (9th Cir. 2004). We affirm.

The district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Feldman’s collateral attack on the state court judgment under the Rooker-Peldman doctrine because Feld-man’s action amounted to a forbidden “de facto appeal” of a prior, final state court judgment. See Noel v. Hall, 341 F.3d 1148, 1154 (9th Cir. 2003) (“It is a forbidden de facto appeal under Rooker-Feldman when the plaintiff in federal district court complains of a legal wrong allegedly, committed by the state court, and seeks relief from the judgment of that court.”).

We reject as without merit Feldman’s contention that he was entitled to summary judgment in his favor based on the district court’s granting of the parties’ requests for judicial notice.

We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued in the opening brief. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F,3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

AFFIRMED.

**

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

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699 F. App'x 718, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/raymond-feldman-v-bosco-credit-llc-ca9-2017.

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