Raymond Earl Caraway, Jr. v. the State of Texas

• Court: Court of Appeals of Texas
• Decided: July 31, 2024
• Docket: 05-23-00271-CR
• Status: Published

Opinion

AFFIRMED and Opinion Filed July 31, 2024

S In The Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas No. 05-23-00271-CR

RAYMOND EARL CARAWAY, JR., Appellant V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 366th Judicial District Court Collin County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 366-80305-2023

MEMORANDUM OPINION Before Justices Reichek, Miskel, and Breedlove Opinion by Justice Breedlove Appellant Raymond Earl Caraway, Jr., was convicted of manslaughter and

sentenced to 20 years in prison. In two issues, appellant argues that the trial court

erred in overruling his Batson1 challenge and by permitting testimony from a

counselor regarding statements made by appellant about alcohol use. We conclude

that appellant did not satisfy the first step of the Batson analysis and that, the error,

if any, of admitting the counselor’s testimony was harmless. Accordingly, we affirm

the trial court’s judgment.

1 See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 89 (1986). BACKGROUND

On May 27, 2021, appellant drove a truck through an intersection while the

stoplight was red and collided with a car driven by Charles Brazil, who died at the

scene. Crash data from appellant’s truck showed that appellant was traveling at

nearly 70 miles per hour a half second before impact. The data also showed appellant

did not use the brakes until impact. Photograph still-shots showed that the traffic

light was red when appellant’s truck went through the intersection.

Witnesses observed appellant exit the truck and walk across a bridge near the

scene of the accident. Officer Luke Bedford arrived on the scene and saw appellant

in a frantic state screaming to a person on the phone that he thought he had just killed

someone. Bedford stayed with appellant until paramedics arrived. Appellant was

treated at the scene and transported to the hospital.

Appellant was treated by Dr. Ramsey Stone, a trauma surgeon, who believed

appellant was intoxicated. Appellant underwent surgery for an emergency

splenectomy. Police obtained a search warrant for appellant’s blood, which was

taken by hospital personnel at the time appellant was admitted. Appellant’s blood

was sent to a forensic lab for testing, and the blood alcohol result came back as 0.377,

more than four times the legal limit.

After surgery, appellant was seen at the hospital by Salana Reza, a licensed

professional counselor. She was called to screen appellant because he was admitted

as a trauma patient. During her screening, she asked appellant about his substance

–2– use, including specific questions regarding the amount and frequency of appellant’s

alcohol consumption.

Appellant was charged with manslaughter. A jury trial was held on February

20, 2023, and the jury found appellant guilty of manslaughter. The jury also found

that appellant used or exhibited a deadly weapon. Appellant was sentenced to 20

years in prison. This appeal followed.

DISCUSSION

Issue 1: Batson Challenge

In his first issue, appellant argues the trial court erred in denying its Batson

challenge to the State’s peremptory strike of prospective juror Kezia Pittman, juror

number 23.

During voir dire, Pittman provided the following information regarding her

potential service as a juror:

STATE: …I want you to answer what you think the primary purpose of the criminal justice system is, okay? So it's punishment, deterrence, or rehabilitation…. *** PITTMAN: Punishment. *** STATE: How do you feel about serving on a jury? *** PITTMAN: I do not like the idea of being here.

STATE: Okay. Why not?

PITTMAN: I don’t like the idea of having someone’s fate in my hands. And I also don’t like the opposite side of hearing of someone being harmed. I don’t like either side of it.

–3– STATE: Do you think that if you were put on a jury that you would be able to reach a decision in this case, or would it just be too much? PITTMAN: It’s a lot for me. I don’t -- I mean, this is somebody’s life both ways.

After the State used one of its peremptory strikes against Pittman, appellant

stated he objected to the State’s striking Pittman “for Batson grounds.”

The court then asked for the State’s response and the following exchange

occurred:

STATE: Judge, Number 23, first of all, she’s an underwriter for insurance, which has something to do with car accidents. In addition to that, she said she doesn’t like the idea of being here. She doesn’t like making a decision, and it would be a lot for her to make a decision on either side. Judge, based on that, we do not believe that she was a juror that we wanted on the jury panel.

THE COURT: All right.

DEFENSE: Just for the appellate record. Mr. – I’m sorry. Ms. Pittman is one of the very few African American panel members. She said that she doesn’t want to hear about the victim’s death, that it would be very difficult for her, and says that the justice system is for punishment.

THE COURT: Okay. So are you providing for the record the reasons why she would have been struck, or – I’m failing to see.

DEFENSE: I just want the record to reflect why I made a Batson challenge. And why I thought the State would like her as a juror.

The trial court ultimately announced it was overruling the Batson challenge,

noting that there were a couple of black jurors still left on the jury, and that the State

provided several reasons why it did not want Pittman on the jury.

–4– A Batson challenge to the State’s use of a peremptory strike generally gives

rise to a three-step analysis. Simpson v. State, 119 S.W.3d 262, 268 (Tex. Crim. App.

2003). First, the opponent of the strike must establish a prima facie case of racial

discrimination. Nieto v. State, 365 S.W.3d 673, 675–76 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012). A

prima facie case requires that appellant show a minimum quantity of evidence

supporting a rational inference that purposeful racial discrimination occurred. See

Harris v. State, 827 S.W.2d 949, 955 n. 4 (Tex. Crim. App.1992). Merely reciting

the struck-juror’s race does not establish a prima facie case of discrimination. See

Stanley v. State, 887 S.W.2d 885, 891 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994). Rather, appellant

must show he is member of an identifiable race and offer relevant evidence that tends

to demonstrate the State purposefully excluded the complained-of jurors because of

their race. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 35.261(a); Rousseau v. State, 824

S.W.2d 579, 584 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992); Williams v. State, 804 S.W.2d 95, 101

(Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (op. on remand). Removal of every prospective juror of the

same race establishes a prima facie case of racial discrimination. See Salazar v. State,

795 S.W.2d 187, 193 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990). Removal of a high rate of prospective

jurors of the same race may also constitute a prima facie case of racial

discrimination. See Linscomb v. State, 829 S.W.2d 164, 166 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992).

But, the burden of persuasion remains with the appellant. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC.

ANN. art. 35.261.

–5– If appellant makes a prima facie case, the burden then shifts to the State to

offer a race-neutral explanation. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 97. It is only after appellant

has established a prima facie case that the State must come forth with a neutral

explanation for striking prospective jurors. The trial court must then decide on

whether the State struck the jurors for racial reasons. See id. at 98.

Appellant’s only Batson-related objection to Pittman’s dismissal was that

appellant is black and that Pittman, who was one of only a few black jurors on the

panel, seemed like she would be a good juror for the State because she stated that

the primary purpose of the justice system was punishment. Providing evidence that

the State struck a high rate of prospective jurors of a specific race may constitute a

prima facie case of racial discrimination. Linscomb, 829 S.W.2d at 166 (emphasis

added). However, appellant did not assert that, or provide evidence to suggest, that

the State struck a high rate of black panelists, merely that there were not very many

black panelists on the panel generally. In fact, appellant does not assert that the State

struck any other black panelists or that the jury was devoid of black jurors. Appellant

has not demonstrated that the bare act of striking Pittman, who happened to be one

of only a few black members on the panel, was an act of racial discrimination. We

conclude appellant has not met his prima facie burden of showing racial

discrimination at step one of the Batson analysis. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN.

art. 35.261. Therefore, the burden never shifted to the State to provide a race-neutral

–6– reason for striking Pittman, and the trial court did not err in failing to find that the

State violated Batson. We overrule appellant’s first issue.

Issue 2: Admission of Counselor’s Testimony

Appellant argues that the trial court erred in overruling his objection to the

testimony of a counselor regarding appellant’s alcohol use. The State responds that

appellant failed to properly preserve the issue, and, alternatively, any error in the

testimony’s admission was harmless.

Prior to the counselor’s testimony, appellant objected in anticipation of

testimony by the counselor that appellant told her how often he drank and his

feelings about whether he had a drinking problem. Appellant’s objection to Ms.

Reza’s testimony and the court’s response are reflected in the following exchange:

DEFENSE: Judge, we need to object to the testimony that I anticipate this witness will give which is that—which is statements of the Defendant about his own personal medical needs. Those statements should be protected under doctor-patient privilege and are hearsay.

THE COURT: Okay. So unless you can point me to something—case law that says that this would not be hearsay as admission by party opponent, number one. Number two, I don’t think there's any provision in the Rules of Evidence that you can point me to that say that this would not be admissible.

DEFENSE: Judge, we would—we would offer that this is tantamount to therapy records and should not have been obtained by the State. And so the Defendant has a legitimate expectation of privacy in his mental health and counseling records and has not waived that.

THE COURT: That objection is overruled. Do you have any others? Just to be clear, though, this is only going to be his— I don't know

–7– what’s being offered. I assume it’s going to be admissions by the Defendant.

STATE: Yes, Your Honor. The testimony that we intend to offer is the statements that he gave to this witness about how often he drinks, the fact that he felt like his drinking was a problem, but that he was not willing to engage in any treatment for alcohol and reported, I’ll just stop drinking. And the fact that this witness gave him referrals.

THE COURT: Okay. So just be sure to confine your questions and instruct your witness to only confine her answers to what the Defendant said and not what was said to—by her or anybody else relating to those. Are these written statements or will they be coming in—

STATE: It’s a part of the hospital records. It’s State’s 14. However, I'm just going to have her testify as to their interaction.

THE COURT: Okay. So there’s not going to be any redacted portions that are admitted as evidence, or exhibits, I should say?

STATE: No, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. Anything else from the Defense?

DEFENSE: Nothing further.

The State argues that appellant’s issue on appeal does not comport with the

objection made at trial. We assume, without deciding, that appellant’s objection at

trial was made on the basis of Texas Rule of Evidence 509(b) and hold that the

evidence was not excludable on that basis.2

While appellant might successfully argue that the communications satisfy the

first prong of Rule 509(b), appellant’s own testimony forecloses his ability to satisfy

2 Because the determination of whether the trial objection comported with appellant’s issue on appeal would not change the disposition of this issue, we decline to address it. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.1. –8– the second prong. Rather than seek treatment for substance abuse, appellant actively

rejected Reza’s attempts to discuss treatment with him and indicated that he would

not stop drinking despite knowing he had a problem. See TEX. R. EVID. 509(b).

Further, the record does not demonstrate that appellant was harmed by the

admission of Reza’s testimony. The erroneous admission of hearsay evidence is

nonconstitutional error. Johnson v. State, 967 S.W.2d 410, 417 (Tex. Crim. App.

1998). Nonconstitutional error requires reversal only when the error affected a

party’s substantial rights. See TEX. R. APP. P. 44.2(b). Error that has a substantial

and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict affects a substantial

right. Coble v. State, 330 S.W.3d 253, 280 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010).

Reza testified that appellant told her that he drank alcohol on average four

days a week and that he admitted to having five or more drinks a day about 200 times

in the past year. Reza also testified that appellant was unwilling to seek treatment

for his drinking. This was not the only evidence offered by the State regarding

appellant’s drinking. The facts of the offense itself showed that appellant had a BAC

more than four times over the legal limit, appellant drove through an intersection at

a red light at nearly 70 mph without braking, and his truck was littered with empty

beer cans and liquor bottles. Appellant’s own mother testified that appellant drank

heavily, and the State admitted evidence of appellant’s prior DWI conviction. Thus,

Reza’s testimony was not the only or best evidence supporting the assertion that

appellant had a problem with alcohol.

–9– “Erroneously admitting evidence ‘will not result in reversal when other such

evidence was received without objection, either before or after the complained-of

ruling.” Coble, 330 S.W.3d at 282. This holds true even when the evidence is not the

same but is very similar or substantially the same evidence. Estrada v. State, 313

S.W.3d 274, 302 n. 29 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (very similar evidence admitted);

Mayes v. State, 816 S.W.2d 79, 88 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (substantially the same

evidence admitted). Therefore, even if the evidence had been improperly admitted

through Reza, we cannot conclude that appellant suffered harm. We overrule

appellant’s second issue.

CONCLUSION

We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

/Maricela Breedlove/ MARICELA BREEDLOVE Do Not Publish JUSTICE TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b)

230271F.U05

–10– S Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas JUDGMENT

RAYMOND EARL CARAWAY, On Appeal from the 366th Judicial JR., Appellant District Court, Collin County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 366-80305- No. 05-23-00271-CR V. 2023. Opinion delivered by Justice THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee Breedlove. Justices Reichek and Miskel participating.

Based on the Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED.

Judgment entered July 31, 2024

–11–