This opinion will be unpublished and may not be cited except as provided by Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2012).
STATE OF MINNESOTA IN COURT OF APPEALS A14-0462
Raymond Darrel Pfarr, petitioner, Appellant,
vs.
State of Minnesota, Respondent.
Filed November 17, 2014 Affirmed Larkin, Judge
Chippewa County District Court File No. 12-CR-10-160
Raymond Darrel Pfarr, Moose Lake, Minnesota (pro se appellant)
Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and
David Gilbertson, Chippewa County Attorney, Montevideo, Minnesota; and
Scott A. Hersey, Special Assistant County Attorney, St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent)
Considered and decided by Peterson, Presiding Judge; Hudson, Judge; and Larkin,
Judge. UNPUBLISHED OPINION
LARKIN, Judge
Appellant challenges the postconviction court’s summary denial of his petition for
postconviction relief, arguing that the state improperly impeached him at trial, his trial
attorneys were ineffective, and his appellate attorney was ineffective. We affirm.
FACTS
Respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant Raymond Darrel Pfarr with
third-degree criminal sexual conduct. A jury found Pfarr guilty, and the district court
sentenced him to serve 72 months in prison. Pfarr appealed to this court, arguing that the
evidence was insufficient to support his conviction, and we affirmed. State v. Pfarr, No.
A11-592, 2012 WL 1149329, at *1-2 (Minn. App. Apr. 9, 2012).
Later, Pfarr filed a pro se petition for postconviction relief. Pfarr argued that the
district court erred by allowing the state to impeach him at trial with his custodial
statements because he was not advised of his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S.
436, 86 S. Ct. 1602 (1966), and the police ignored his request for counsel during the
interrogation. Pfarr also argued that his trial attorneys were ineffective. Lastly, Pfarr
argued that his appellate attorney was ineffective because he met with Pfarr for only one
hour during the appellate process and he “should have raised constitutional issues in [the]
direct appeal.”
The postconviction court concluded that Pfarr’s “claims that the state improperly
impeached him and that his trial attorneys were ineffective are barred because they could
have been raised in his direct appeal.” The postconviction court further concluded that
2 Pfarr’s “claim that his appellate attorney was ineffective failed to allege sufficient facts to
entitle him to relief on that basis.” The postconviction court therefore denied Pfarr’s
petition for postconviction relief without a hearing. This appeal follows.
DECISION
A postconviction court must hold a hearing on a petition “[u]nless the petition and
the files and records of the proceeding conclusively show that the petitioner is entitled to
no relief.” Minn. Stat. § 590.04, subd. 1 (2012). We review summary denial of a petition
for postconviction relief for an abuse of discretion. Riley v. State, 819 N.W.2d 162, 167
(Minn. 2012). “A postconviction court abuses its discretion when its decision is based on
an erroneous view of the law or is against logic and the facts in the record.” Id.
(quotation omitted).
I.
Pfarr argues that his claims of improper impeachment and ineffective assistance of
trial counsel “should not be procedurally barred.”
When “direct appeal has once been taken,” all issues raised in the appeal, and all
issues “known but not raised, will not be considered [in] a subsequent petition for
postconviction relief.” State v. Knaffla, 309 Minn. 246, 252, 243 N.W.2d 737, 741
(1976). “This rule applies if the defendant knew or should have known about the issue at
the time of appeal.” King v. State, 649 N.W.2d 149, 156 (Minn. 2002). There are two
exceptions to the Knaffla rule. First, a claim will not be barred if its novelty is so great
that its legal basis was not reasonably available when direct appeal was taken. Roby v.
State, 531 N.W.2d 482, 484 (Minn. 1995). Second, even if the claim’s legal basis was
3 sufficiently available, substantive review may be allowed “when fairness so requires and
when the petitioner did not deliberately and inexcusably fail to raise the issue on direct
appeal.” Russell v. State, 562 N.W.2d 670, 672 (Minn. 1997) (quotation omitted).
Pfarr argues that he “could not have possibly known these newly discovered issues
at the time of direct appeal.” But Pfarr’s claims of improper impeachment and
ineffective assistance of trial counsel are based on events that occurred at trial and that
were known or should have been known at the time of his direct appeal. See Wright v.
State, 765 N.W.2d 85, 90 (Minn. 2009) (concluding that “[p]ostconviction review of
claims other than ineffective assistance of appellate counsel and ‘new evidence’ is barred
because these claims are based on evidence in the trial record, and therefore these 11
claims were known or should have been known to Wright at the time of his direct
appeal”); White v. State, 711 N.W.2d 106, 110 (Minn. 2006) (“All of these claims can be
decided on the basis of the district court record and are therefore Knaffla-barred on this
postconviction review.”).
For example, Pfarr alleged that one of his trial attorneys “was ineffective due to a
conflict of interest.” As support for that allegation, Pfarr submitted a letter that his
attorney sent him explaining that he had represented one of the witnesses against Pfarr at
a juvenile-detention hearing. But the letter was dated September 16, 2010, which was
before the trial date in this case. And on appeal, Pfarr concedes that he “attempted to
address this issue before trial at an omnibus hearing.” Thus, Pfarr knew about this issue
at the time of his direct appeal. See Sontoya v. State, 829 N.W.2d 602, 604 (Minn. 2013)
(“Given all of these facts, we hold that Sontoya either knew or should have known about
4 trial counsel’s representation of the victim’s cousin, and his claim is therefore barred by
the Knaffla rule.”).
Pfarr further argues that “the issues raised on Post-Conviction were in fact novel.”
But Pfarr does not present a novel legal issue, and he relies on application of
longstanding cases such as Miranda and Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.
Ct. 2052 (1984), to support his claims.
Lastly Pfarr argues that “his extraordinary circumstances be considered” in the
“interests of fairness and justice.” “Claims decided in the interests of justice require that
the claims have substantive merit, and that the defendant did not deliberately and
inexcusably fail to raise the issue on direct appeal.” Deegan v. State, 711 N.W.2d 89, 94
(Minn. 2006) (citation and quotations omitted). The record is clear that Pfarr was aware
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This opinion will be unpublished and may not be cited except as provided by Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2012).
STATE OF MINNESOTA IN COURT OF APPEALS A14-0462
Raymond Darrel Pfarr, petitioner, Appellant,
vs.
State of Minnesota, Respondent.
Filed November 17, 2014 Affirmed Larkin, Judge
Chippewa County District Court File No. 12-CR-10-160
Raymond Darrel Pfarr, Moose Lake, Minnesota (pro se appellant)
Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and
David Gilbertson, Chippewa County Attorney, Montevideo, Minnesota; and
Scott A. Hersey, Special Assistant County Attorney, St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent)
Considered and decided by Peterson, Presiding Judge; Hudson, Judge; and Larkin,
Judge. UNPUBLISHED OPINION
LARKIN, Judge
Appellant challenges the postconviction court’s summary denial of his petition for
postconviction relief, arguing that the state improperly impeached him at trial, his trial
attorneys were ineffective, and his appellate attorney was ineffective. We affirm.
FACTS
Respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant Raymond Darrel Pfarr with
third-degree criminal sexual conduct. A jury found Pfarr guilty, and the district court
sentenced him to serve 72 months in prison. Pfarr appealed to this court, arguing that the
evidence was insufficient to support his conviction, and we affirmed. State v. Pfarr, No.
A11-592, 2012 WL 1149329, at *1-2 (Minn. App. Apr. 9, 2012).
Later, Pfarr filed a pro se petition for postconviction relief. Pfarr argued that the
district court erred by allowing the state to impeach him at trial with his custodial
statements because he was not advised of his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S.
436, 86 S. Ct. 1602 (1966), and the police ignored his request for counsel during the
interrogation. Pfarr also argued that his trial attorneys were ineffective. Lastly, Pfarr
argued that his appellate attorney was ineffective because he met with Pfarr for only one
hour during the appellate process and he “should have raised constitutional issues in [the]
direct appeal.”
The postconviction court concluded that Pfarr’s “claims that the state improperly
impeached him and that his trial attorneys were ineffective are barred because they could
have been raised in his direct appeal.” The postconviction court further concluded that
2 Pfarr’s “claim that his appellate attorney was ineffective failed to allege sufficient facts to
entitle him to relief on that basis.” The postconviction court therefore denied Pfarr’s
petition for postconviction relief without a hearing. This appeal follows.
DECISION
A postconviction court must hold a hearing on a petition “[u]nless the petition and
the files and records of the proceeding conclusively show that the petitioner is entitled to
no relief.” Minn. Stat. § 590.04, subd. 1 (2012). We review summary denial of a petition
for postconviction relief for an abuse of discretion. Riley v. State, 819 N.W.2d 162, 167
(Minn. 2012). “A postconviction court abuses its discretion when its decision is based on
an erroneous view of the law or is against logic and the facts in the record.” Id.
(quotation omitted).
I.
Pfarr argues that his claims of improper impeachment and ineffective assistance of
trial counsel “should not be procedurally barred.”
When “direct appeal has once been taken,” all issues raised in the appeal, and all
issues “known but not raised, will not be considered [in] a subsequent petition for
postconviction relief.” State v. Knaffla, 309 Minn. 246, 252, 243 N.W.2d 737, 741
(1976). “This rule applies if the defendant knew or should have known about the issue at
the time of appeal.” King v. State, 649 N.W.2d 149, 156 (Minn. 2002). There are two
exceptions to the Knaffla rule. First, a claim will not be barred if its novelty is so great
that its legal basis was not reasonably available when direct appeal was taken. Roby v.
State, 531 N.W.2d 482, 484 (Minn. 1995). Second, even if the claim’s legal basis was
3 sufficiently available, substantive review may be allowed “when fairness so requires and
when the petitioner did not deliberately and inexcusably fail to raise the issue on direct
appeal.” Russell v. State, 562 N.W.2d 670, 672 (Minn. 1997) (quotation omitted).
Pfarr argues that he “could not have possibly known these newly discovered issues
at the time of direct appeal.” But Pfarr’s claims of improper impeachment and
ineffective assistance of trial counsel are based on events that occurred at trial and that
were known or should have been known at the time of his direct appeal. See Wright v.
State, 765 N.W.2d 85, 90 (Minn. 2009) (concluding that “[p]ostconviction review of
claims other than ineffective assistance of appellate counsel and ‘new evidence’ is barred
because these claims are based on evidence in the trial record, and therefore these 11
claims were known or should have been known to Wright at the time of his direct
appeal”); White v. State, 711 N.W.2d 106, 110 (Minn. 2006) (“All of these claims can be
decided on the basis of the district court record and are therefore Knaffla-barred on this
postconviction review.”).
For example, Pfarr alleged that one of his trial attorneys “was ineffective due to a
conflict of interest.” As support for that allegation, Pfarr submitted a letter that his
attorney sent him explaining that he had represented one of the witnesses against Pfarr at
a juvenile-detention hearing. But the letter was dated September 16, 2010, which was
before the trial date in this case. And on appeal, Pfarr concedes that he “attempted to
address this issue before trial at an omnibus hearing.” Thus, Pfarr knew about this issue
at the time of his direct appeal. See Sontoya v. State, 829 N.W.2d 602, 604 (Minn. 2013)
(“Given all of these facts, we hold that Sontoya either knew or should have known about
4 trial counsel’s representation of the victim’s cousin, and his claim is therefore barred by
the Knaffla rule.”).
Pfarr further argues that “the issues raised on Post-Conviction were in fact novel.”
But Pfarr does not present a novel legal issue, and he relies on application of
longstanding cases such as Miranda and Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.
Ct. 2052 (1984), to support his claims.
Lastly Pfarr argues that “his extraordinary circumstances be considered” in the
“interests of fairness and justice.” “Claims decided in the interests of justice require that
the claims have substantive merit, and that the defendant did not deliberately and
inexcusably fail to raise the issue on direct appeal.” Deegan v. State, 711 N.W.2d 89, 94
(Minn. 2006) (citation and quotations omitted). The record is clear that Pfarr was aware
of the impeachment and trial counsel issues at the time of trial. Pfarr states in his brief
that after the prosecutor improperly impeached him at trial, he was left “stuttering and
stammering in front of the jury in what would have appeared to be someone attempting to
lie.” Pfarr also states that he attempted to address his trial attorney’s purported conflict of
interest “before trial at an omnibus hearing.” Pfarr knew of those issues, and he does not
establish that his failure to raise the issues on direct appeal was excusable. Therefore, we
do not consider the claims in the interests of justice. See id.
In sum, the postconviction court did not err by concluding that Pfarr’s claims of
improper impeachment and ineffective assistance of trial counsel are procedurally barred.
5 II.
Pfarr claims that his appellate counsel was ineffective and that the district court
should have held an evidentiary hearing on that claim. To receive an evidentiary hearing
on a postconviction claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a petitioner must allege
facts that, if proved by a fair preponderance of the evidence, would satisfy the two-prong
test of Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88, 104 S. Ct. at 2064. Bobo v. State, 820 N.W.2d
511, 516 (Minn. 2012). Under that test, “[w]hen a convicted defendant complains of the
ineffectiveness of counsel’s assistance, the defendant must show that counsel’s
representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.” Strickland, 466 U.S.
at 687-88, 104 S. Ct. at 2064. And “[t]he defendant must show that there is a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding
would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to
undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. at 694, 104 S. Ct. at 2068. An appellate court
“need not address both the performance and prejudice prongs if one is determinative.”
State v. Rhodes, 657 N.W.2d 823, 842 (Minn. 2003). And “[t]he petitioner must
overcome the presumption that counsel’s performance fell within a wide range of
reasonable representation.” Wright, 765 N.W.2d at 91 (quotation omitted).
An evidentiary hearing on a claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel is
not warranted when a petitioner’s arguments “are presented solely as argumentative
assertions without factual support,” or when the petitioner “does not identify any issues
that his counsel should have pursued but did not.” Davis v. State, 784 N.W.2d 387, 391
(Minn. 2010); see also Wright, 765 N.W.2d at 91.
6 In his petition for postconviction relief, Pfarr alleged that his appellate attorney
met with him for only one hour and that his attorney “should have raised constitutional
issues in [the] direct appeal.” Pfarr did not identify which constitutional issues he
believes his attorney should have pursued. On appeal, Pfarr argues that it was not
necessary to explicitly identify the constitutional issues because “it was obvious what
issues appellate counsel . . . should have pursued.” But “generalized allegations of
incompetence [of counsel] are not reason for an evidentiary hearing.” Fratzke v. State,
450 N.W.2d 101, 102 (Minn. 1990). Pfarr’s reliance on what he believes is obvious is
insufficient. He had the burden to identify for the postconviction court “any issues that
his [appellate] counsel should have pursued but did not.” Davis, 784 N.W.2d at 391.
Moreover, “[a]ppellate counsel is not required to raise all possible claims on direct
appeal, and counsel need not raise a claim if she could have legitimately concluded that it
would not prevail.” Arredondo v. State, 754 N.W.2d 566, 571 (Minn. 2008) (quotation
omitted). “And counsel has no duty to include claims which would detract from other
more meritorious issues.” Davis, 784 N.W.2d at 391 (quotation omitted). For example,
Pfarr argues that one of the “obvious” claims his appellate counsel should have raised
was his improper-impeachment claim. But suppressed statements can generally be used
for impeachment purposes. See Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 722, 95 S. Ct. 1215, 1221
(1975) (stating that “the shield provided by Miranda is not to be perverted to a license to
testify inconsistently, or even perjuriously, free from the risk of confrontation with prior
inconsistent utterances”).
7 In sum, Pfarr did not allege facts that would satisfy the two-prong test of
Strickland. He did not explain how his attorney’s representation fell below an objective
standard of reasonableness or how, but for his attorney’s errors, the result of the appeal
would have been different. The postconviction court therefore did not err by summarily
rejecting Pfarr’s claim that his appellate attorney was ineffective. See Davis, 784 N.W.2d
at 391.
III.
Pfarr raises additional issues that were not raised in the postconviction court. For
example, he claims that his statement to the police was not voluntary. And he makes
several complaints regarding his appellate attorney that he did not raise below. Because
he did not raise these issues in his petition for postconviction relief, we do not consider
them. See Azure v. State, 700 N.W.2d 443, 447 (Minn. 2005) (“It is well settled that a
party may not raise issues for the first time on appeal from denial of postconviction
relief” (quotation omitted)).
In conclusion, “a postconviction court abuses its discretion when its decision is
based on an erroneous view of the law or is against logic and the facts in the record.”
Riley, 819 N.W.2d at 167 (quotation omitted). In this case, the postconviction court
properly applied the law and its decision is not against logic or the facts in the record.
The postconviction court properly reasoned that Pfarr’s claims of improper impeachment
and ineffective assistance of trial counsel were Knaffla barred because Pfarr knew or
should have known about the claims at the time of his direct appeal. And the
postconviction court properly concluded that Pfarr’s “general claim of ineffective
8 assistance of appellate counsel is . . . insufficiently specific to warrant an evidentiary
hearing.” There is no basis for this court to reverse.
Affirmed.