Raymond Carey v. Foley & Lardner, LLP

577 F. App'x 573
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
DecidedAugust 25, 2014
Docket13-2331
StatusUnpublished
Cited by7 cases

This text of 577 F. App'x 573 (Raymond Carey v. Foley & Lardner, LLP) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Raymond Carey v. Foley & Lardner, LLP, 577 F. App'x 573 (6th Cir. 2014).

Opinion

OPINION

KAREN NELSON MOORE, Circuit Judge.

Raymond J. Carey, a partner in the Detroit office of Foley & Lardner LLP (“Foley”), became dissatisfied after comparing his compensation to that of other partners. He calculated the rate- of pay per billable hour for all partners in the Detroit office and determined that his rate of compensation was among the lowest. Carey argues that Foley discriminated against him on the basis of gender, race, and age because female, minority, and younger partners were compensated at a higher rate based on their income per billable hour. Because Carey failed to provide evidence that any of the partners to whom he compared himself performed *575 substantially equal work, we conclude that he cannot establish a genuine factual dispute regarding at least one element of a prima facie case of discrimination. Therefore, we AFFIRM the district court’s grant of summary judgment.

I. BACKGROUND

Raymond J. Carey joined Foley & Lardner LLP as a partner in the Labor & Employment Group in October 2000. Carey’s practice involved advising and representing companies in a range of employment-related matters, including “negotiating a collective bargaining agreement or managing and strategizing ... to defeat corporate-wide organizing campaigns.” R. 39-23 (Carey Dep. at 172) (Page ID # 1367). Although Carey temporarily served as the Litigation Chair for the Detroit Office in 2002, he did not take an active role in firm management. Carey retired on January 31, 2014 at the age of sixty.

As an active partner, Carey’s compensation was determined by the Management Committee, which assigned each partner a number of compensation “units” based upon recommendations produced by the Compensation Committee. The Compensation Committee considered comments submitted by the “office managing partner and department chair, [and] comments sent by Industry Team department chair,” R. 48-3 (Jaspan 30(b)(6) Dep. at 31) (Page ID # 3224), as well as the memorandum each partner prepared describing his own “contributions to the Firm during the current fiscal year.” R. 48-2 (Compensation Mem. Email) (Page ID # 3036). Foley does not use a mathematical “formula” or “numeric weighting” to calculate compensation. R. 48-3 (Jaspan 30(b)(6) Dep. at 130) (Page ID #3323); R. 48-4 (Jaspan Dep. at 125) (Page ID # 3463). Instead, the Management and Compensation Committees consider both “quantitative data regarding each partner’s personal production, billings, collections, work in process and receivables” and a range qualitative metrics in a holistic manner to make compensation decisions. R. 48-2 (Year-End Report Mem.) (Page ID # 2980). The qualitative factors include:

• the skill level of the partner (e.g., does he/she first-chair bet-the-company cases or lead major transactions, or is the partner’s contribution primarily in support roles or smaller matters) and his/her effort to build a practice with a national reputation,
• the partner’s actions truly indicative of ownership in the firm (ie., acting beyond his/her self-interest for the benefit of the firm ...),
• the quality of the partner’s investment time,
• unacceptable or outstanding practices relating to the partner’s overall time commitment to the firm,
• the partner’s contribution to client share initiatives, teamwork and enterprise creation,
• unacceptable or outstanding conduct pertaining to interaction with associates, and specific performance as a formal or informal mentor,
• situations of work hoarding by partners to the detriment of associates and/or younger partners,
• the partner’s actions to promote diversity in the firm, [and]
• the partner’s pro bono contribution.

R. 48-2 (Year-End Report Mem.) (Page ID #2980). Foley also “look[s] longer term than a single year’s contribution” and places “limitations on the down side [and] on the up side as to what [it] would do with [compensation] in a particular year.” R. 48-4 (Jaspan Dep. at 127) (Page ID *576 # 3465). The long-term view promotes gradual rises and falls in compensation so that a partner “whose practice falls off’ in a given year will not experience a drastic drop in salary. Id.

Carey claims that he was never sent a document “specifying objective criteria against which [he was] going to be evaluated for compensation purposes,” and instead he insists that he was told “that compensation decisions were highly subjective.” R. 39-23 (Carey Dep. at 191-93) (Page ID # 1372). However, Carey does not dispute that each year Foley emailed all partners with instructions to submit a compensation memorandum describing their contributions to the firm in specified categories, such as teamwork and contribution to business expansion, business practices, business planning, supervision and mentoring, diversity, and other investment time activities. R. 48-2 (Compensation Mem.) (Page ID # 3029-56).

From the beginning of Carey’s employment with Foley, the Management Committee noticed problems with Carey’s method of practice. The Management Committee commented that Carey “[d]oes not use associates [and that associates do not like working with him when they have the opportunity.” R. 41 (Management Committee Comments) (Page ID # 1644). The Committee received reports that characterized Carey as a “lo[ne] wolf,” a “silo,” a “[t]otal island,” and a “one man band.” Id. (Page ID # 1645, 1647-49). At the end of the 2008/2009 fiscal year, Carey’s department chair commented: “Unfortunately, [Carey] is somewhat of a silo and does not leverage his work. As a result the compensation recommendation is somewhat lower than his numbers would suggest. He needs to be told that he would make more money ‘if he pushed some of the work down.” Id. (Carey Year-End Profile) (Page ID # 1616). The Compensation Committee considered these comments regarding Carey’s lack of collaboration with other partners and associates, and determined that Carey “need[ed] to pay [a] heavy tax for [his] mode of practice/lack of enterprise creation.” Id. Accordingly, the Management Committee fixed Carey’s compensation for fiscal years 2007/2008 through 2011/2012 1 as follows:

Billable Hours/ Fiscal Year Compensation Units Annual Compensation Total Hours
2007/2008 45 $387,855 1936/2467
2008/2009 52 $421,044 2088/2440
2009/2010 68 $475,252 2400/2684
2010/2011 68 $481,508 1744/2249
2011/2012 60 $393,540 1223/1909

R. 41 (Carey Year-End Partner Profiles) (Page ID # 1593-1642).

Carey was dissatisfied with his compensation for the 2008/2009 fiscal year. On April 15, 2009, he emailed Stanley Jaspan, Foley’s Managing Partner, and Ralf-Rein-hard Boer, Foley’s Chairman, making alle

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Bluebook (online)
577 F. App'x 573, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/raymond-carey-v-foley-lardner-llp-ca6-2014.