NUMBER 13-13-00182-CR
COURT OF APPEALS
THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG
RAYMOND BROUSSARD JR., Appellant,
v.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee.
On appeal from the 94th District Court of Nueces County, Texas.
MEMORANDUM OPINION Before Chief Justice Valdez and Justices Garza and Perkes Memorandum Opinion by Justice Garza A jury convicted appellant, Raymond Broussard Jr., of robbery, a second-degree
felony, and assessed punishment at eight years’ imprisonment and a $10,000 fine. See
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 29.02 (a)(1), (b) (West 2011). By a single issue, appellant
challenges the legal sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction. We affirm. I. BACKGROUND
Curtis Manning, the alleged robbery victim, testified that he was home at his
apartment in Corpus Christi, Texas, late in the evening on September 23, 2011. A
woman he had met and exchanged phone numbers with the day before, “Cici” (later
identified as Cecilia Jensen), called and said that she would come by later. Manning
was outside when she arrived. Jensen, who was driving the vehicle, exited and quickly
entered Manning’s apartment, followed by two other men, later identified as appellant
and Ricky Perales. Jensen opened Manning’s refrigerator and handed cans of Coke to
appellant and Perales. Manning told them to leave his house. Perales hit him in the
head with his fist or a Coke can. At some point, a third passenger, later identified as
Charles Harris, entered the apartment, and all three men beat Manning. The men took
$70 in cash out of Manning’s pocket. After Jensen and the men left, Manning called
911 and described the vehicle and a partial license plate number to the dispatcher.
Appellant, Harris, and Perales were tried together for robbery.1 Jensen pleaded
guilty to robbery before the trial. At trial, however, she testified that she did not commit
robbery and that she had pleaded guilty only because her lawyer pressured her to do
so.2
Jensen testified that she had known appellant for several months and that he
lived with her in a motel room that she has rented. Jensen stated that she is a
prostitute, that she had known Manning for several years, and that he had been a
customer on about eight occasions. On the day of the incident, Jensen and Perales
were using crack cocaine most of the day. Jensen went to Manning’s apartment
1 The jury found Perales guilty, but found Harris not guilty. 2 The trial judge appointed another lawyer to represent Jensen during Broussard’s trial.
2 because he owed her several hundred dollars. Appellant, Perales, and Harris went with
her, but she did not tell them where she was going or why. There was no plan to rob
anyone. Jensen stated that Manning had been using crack that day; that, when she
arrived at his apartment, Manning “got all crazy” and became aggressive; and that what
happened after that is “a blur.”
Jensen and the others drove away from Manning’s apartment. They were
stopped by the police shortly thereafter based on Manning’s description of the vehicle.
Manning identified the vehicle’s occupants as the robbers.
Perales testified that he knows Jensen and has seen her prostituting in the
neighborhood. Jensen picked him up on the night of the incident to give him a ride to
his sister’s home. Perales stated that he, Harris, and appellant were in the vehicle
when Jensen stopped at Manning’s apartment. Appellant and Jensen went inside, but
Perales and Harris waited outside. The apartment door was open. Perales saw
Manning pull out a $50 bill and then Manning appeared to become aggressive and
pushed Jensen. Appellant and Harris tried to calm Manning down. Manning “kind of
went down, like fell down.” Manning gave Jensen a $50 bill and a $20 bill. They left the
apartment, with Jensen driving the vehicle.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW AND APPLICABLE LAW
The court of criminal appeals has held that there is “no meaningful distinction
between the Jackson v. Virginia legal sufficiency standard and the Clewis factual-
sufficiency standard” and that the Jackson standard “is the only standard that a
reviewing court should apply in determining whether the evidence is sufficient to support
each element of a criminal offense that the State is required to prove beyond a
3 reasonable doubt.” Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 902–03, 912 (Tex. Crim. App.
2010) (plurality op.) (citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)). Accordingly,
we review claims of evidentiary insufficiency under “a rigorous and proper application of
the Jackson standard of review.” Id. at 906–07, 912. Under the Jackson standard, “the
relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to
the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the
crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319; see Brooks, 323 S.W.3d
at 898–99 (characterizing the Jackson standard as: “Considering all of the evidence in
the light most favorable to the verdict, was a jury rationally justified in finding guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt.”). The fact-finder is the exclusive judge of the credibility of
witnesses and of the weight to be given to their testimony. Anderson v. State, 322
S.W.3d 401, 405 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2010, pet. ref’d) (citing Lancon v.
State, 253 S.W.3d 699, 707 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008)). Reconciliation of conflicts in the
evidence is within the fact-finder's exclusive province. Id. (citing Wyatt v. State, 23
S.W.3d 18, 30 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000)). We must resolve any inconsistencies in the
testimony in favor of the verdict. Id. (citing Curry v. State, 30 S.W.3d 394, 406 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2000)).
Sufficiency of the evidence is measured by the elements of the offense as
defined by a hypothetically correct jury charge. Malik v. State, 953 S.W.W2d 234, 240
(Tex. Crim. App. 1997). Such a charge is one that accurately sets out the law, is
authorized by the indictment, and does not necessarily increase the State’s burden of
proof or unnecessarily restrict the State’s theories of liability, and adequately describes
the particular offense for which the defendant was tried. Id.
4 Here, the State was required to prove that appellant: (1) in the course of
committing theft as defined in chapter 31 of the penal code, and (2) with intent to obtain
or maintain control of the property, (3) intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly (4) caused
bodily injury to Manning. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 29.02(a)(1); Sorrells v. State,
343 S.W.3d 152, 155 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011). The phrase “in the course of committing
theft” is defined by section 29.01 of the penal code to mean “conduct that occurs in an
attempt to commit, during the commission, or in immediate flight after the attempt or
commission of theft.” See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 29.01 (West 2011); Sorrells, 343
S.W.3d at 155–56. A person commits theft under chapter 31 if he unlawfully
appropriates property with intent to deprive the owner of the property.
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NUMBER 13-13-00182-CR
COURT OF APPEALS
THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG
RAYMOND BROUSSARD JR., Appellant,
v.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee.
On appeal from the 94th District Court of Nueces County, Texas.
MEMORANDUM OPINION Before Chief Justice Valdez and Justices Garza and Perkes Memorandum Opinion by Justice Garza A jury convicted appellant, Raymond Broussard Jr., of robbery, a second-degree
felony, and assessed punishment at eight years’ imprisonment and a $10,000 fine. See
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 29.02 (a)(1), (b) (West 2011). By a single issue, appellant
challenges the legal sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction. We affirm. I. BACKGROUND
Curtis Manning, the alleged robbery victim, testified that he was home at his
apartment in Corpus Christi, Texas, late in the evening on September 23, 2011. A
woman he had met and exchanged phone numbers with the day before, “Cici” (later
identified as Cecilia Jensen), called and said that she would come by later. Manning
was outside when she arrived. Jensen, who was driving the vehicle, exited and quickly
entered Manning’s apartment, followed by two other men, later identified as appellant
and Ricky Perales. Jensen opened Manning’s refrigerator and handed cans of Coke to
appellant and Perales. Manning told them to leave his house. Perales hit him in the
head with his fist or a Coke can. At some point, a third passenger, later identified as
Charles Harris, entered the apartment, and all three men beat Manning. The men took
$70 in cash out of Manning’s pocket. After Jensen and the men left, Manning called
911 and described the vehicle and a partial license plate number to the dispatcher.
Appellant, Harris, and Perales were tried together for robbery.1 Jensen pleaded
guilty to robbery before the trial. At trial, however, she testified that she did not commit
robbery and that she had pleaded guilty only because her lawyer pressured her to do
so.2
Jensen testified that she had known appellant for several months and that he
lived with her in a motel room that she has rented. Jensen stated that she is a
prostitute, that she had known Manning for several years, and that he had been a
customer on about eight occasions. On the day of the incident, Jensen and Perales
were using crack cocaine most of the day. Jensen went to Manning’s apartment
1 The jury found Perales guilty, but found Harris not guilty. 2 The trial judge appointed another lawyer to represent Jensen during Broussard’s trial.
2 because he owed her several hundred dollars. Appellant, Perales, and Harris went with
her, but she did not tell them where she was going or why. There was no plan to rob
anyone. Jensen stated that Manning had been using crack that day; that, when she
arrived at his apartment, Manning “got all crazy” and became aggressive; and that what
happened after that is “a blur.”
Jensen and the others drove away from Manning’s apartment. They were
stopped by the police shortly thereafter based on Manning’s description of the vehicle.
Manning identified the vehicle’s occupants as the robbers.
Perales testified that he knows Jensen and has seen her prostituting in the
neighborhood. Jensen picked him up on the night of the incident to give him a ride to
his sister’s home. Perales stated that he, Harris, and appellant were in the vehicle
when Jensen stopped at Manning’s apartment. Appellant and Jensen went inside, but
Perales and Harris waited outside. The apartment door was open. Perales saw
Manning pull out a $50 bill and then Manning appeared to become aggressive and
pushed Jensen. Appellant and Harris tried to calm Manning down. Manning “kind of
went down, like fell down.” Manning gave Jensen a $50 bill and a $20 bill. They left the
apartment, with Jensen driving the vehicle.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW AND APPLICABLE LAW
The court of criminal appeals has held that there is “no meaningful distinction
between the Jackson v. Virginia legal sufficiency standard and the Clewis factual-
sufficiency standard” and that the Jackson standard “is the only standard that a
reviewing court should apply in determining whether the evidence is sufficient to support
each element of a criminal offense that the State is required to prove beyond a
3 reasonable doubt.” Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 902–03, 912 (Tex. Crim. App.
2010) (plurality op.) (citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)). Accordingly,
we review claims of evidentiary insufficiency under “a rigorous and proper application of
the Jackson standard of review.” Id. at 906–07, 912. Under the Jackson standard, “the
relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to
the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the
crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319; see Brooks, 323 S.W.3d
at 898–99 (characterizing the Jackson standard as: “Considering all of the evidence in
the light most favorable to the verdict, was a jury rationally justified in finding guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt.”). The fact-finder is the exclusive judge of the credibility of
witnesses and of the weight to be given to their testimony. Anderson v. State, 322
S.W.3d 401, 405 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2010, pet. ref’d) (citing Lancon v.
State, 253 S.W.3d 699, 707 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008)). Reconciliation of conflicts in the
evidence is within the fact-finder's exclusive province. Id. (citing Wyatt v. State, 23
S.W.3d 18, 30 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000)). We must resolve any inconsistencies in the
testimony in favor of the verdict. Id. (citing Curry v. State, 30 S.W.3d 394, 406 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2000)).
Sufficiency of the evidence is measured by the elements of the offense as
defined by a hypothetically correct jury charge. Malik v. State, 953 S.W.W2d 234, 240
(Tex. Crim. App. 1997). Such a charge is one that accurately sets out the law, is
authorized by the indictment, and does not necessarily increase the State’s burden of
proof or unnecessarily restrict the State’s theories of liability, and adequately describes
the particular offense for which the defendant was tried. Id.
4 Here, the State was required to prove that appellant: (1) in the course of
committing theft as defined in chapter 31 of the penal code, and (2) with intent to obtain
or maintain control of the property, (3) intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly (4) caused
bodily injury to Manning. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 29.02(a)(1); Sorrells v. State,
343 S.W.3d 152, 155 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011). The phrase “in the course of committing
theft” is defined by section 29.01 of the penal code to mean “conduct that occurs in an
attempt to commit, during the commission, or in immediate flight after the attempt or
commission of theft.” See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 29.01 (West 2011); Sorrells, 343
S.W.3d at 155–56. A person commits theft under chapter 31 if he unlawfully
appropriates property with intent to deprive the owner of the property. See TEX. PENAL
CODE ANN. § 31.03(a) (West Supp. 2011); Sorrells, 343 S.W.3d at 156.
III. DISCUSSION
The State argues that appellant’s issue is inadequately briefed and presents
nothing for review. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1; Gallegos v. State, 76 S.W.3d 224, 228
(Tex. App.—Dallas 2002, pet. ref’d).
Except for stating the applicable standard of review, appellant’s argument, in its
entirety, is as follows:
Circumstantially, it appears as though Mr. Curtiss [sic] was a willing client of the prostitute Cecilia Jensen involved in this case. Curtiss’s [sic] credibility was damaged by the circumstances surrounding his involvement in this case. The fact that he apparently was a customer of this prostitute who, coincidentally, knew exactly where he lived, combined with his coincidentally standing outside at the same time that the prostitute was returning to his house to collect money, reeks of untruthfulness. The $70 that Curtiss [sic] verified was taken from him obviously was payment for her prostitution services. The totality of the circumstances indicates that Curtiss [sic] did indeed utilize the services of a prostitute. It cannot be ascertained from the witnesses presented at trial what exactly the circumstances were that led to whatever dispute happened.
5 Because of the dearth of credible witnesses presented against the defendant, the jury’s finding that defendant did commit the offense of aggravated robbery was erroneous due to legally sufficient evidence presented at trial. A new trial is required.[3]
Appellant’s brief contains no citations to the record, does not discuss the
elements of the offense, does not identify the specific element challenged, and does not
discuss how the State’s evidence is insufficient. The jury was charged on the law of
parties, but appellant’s brief does not mention or discuss the law of parties. See TEX.
PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 7.01, 7.02 (West 2011). Accordingly, we conclude that appellant’s
issue is inadequately briefed and presents nothing for review. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1;
Gallegos, 76 S.W.3d at 228; see also Pierce v. State, No. 10-09-00320-CR, 2010 WL
2683052, at *3 (Tex. App.—Waco July 7, 2010, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for
publication) (“At the very least, [appellant’s brief] must direct the Court to an element or
elements of the offense that is being challenged.”); Camacho v. State, No. 08-06-
00090-CR, 2008 WL 882640, at *4 (Tex. App.—El Paso April 3, 2008, no pet.) (not
designated for publication) (finding issue inadequately briefed where evidence was not
discussed, there were no citations to the record, and no argument pointing out how the
evidence was insufficient or what element of the offense was insufficiently proven).
Nevertheless, in our sole discretion, we have reviewed the record under the
appropriate standards. We conclude the evidence is sufficient to support appellant’s
conviction. The jury, as fact-finder, is the exclusive judge of the credibility of witnesses
and of the weight to be given to their testimony. Anderson, 322 S.W.3d at 405. It is the
jury’s exclusive province to reconcile conflicts in the evidence. Id. The jury could have
3 An appellate court finding that evidence is insufficient mandates that the appellant be acquitted. Benavidez v. State, 323 S.W.3d 179, 181 n.12 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010).
6 believed Manning’s testimony and disbelieved any conflicting testimony. See id. Giving
proper deference to the jury's role as fact-finder and viewing the evidence in the light
most favorable to the verdict, see id., we conclude the evidence is sufficient to support
appellant’s conviction. We overrule appellant’s sole issue.
IV. CONCLUSION
We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
________________________ DORI CONTRERAS GARZA Justice
Do not publish. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).
Delivered and filed the 15th day of August, 2013.