Supreme Court of Florida ____________
No. SC2023-1735 ____________
RAYMOND BRIGHT, Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF FLORIDA, Appellee.
____________
No. SC2024-0876 ____________
RAYMOND BRIGHT, Petitioner,
SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Respondent.
February 26, 2026
GROSSHANS, J.
Raymond Bright brutally beat two men to death with a
hammer. Based on this conduct, Bright was found guilty of first-
degree murder and ultimately sentenced to death. In separate appeals, we affirmed his convictions and sentences. Bright later
filed a motion under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851,
asking the circuit court to vacate his death sentences. The court
denied that motion, which Bright now appeals. In addition to his
numerous arguments directed at the circuit court’s rulings, Bright
urges us to issue a writ of habeas corpus to remedy alleged errors
in his guilt and penalty phases. For the following reasons, we
affirm the challenged order and deny habeas relief. 1
I
In February 2008, Michael Majors visited Bright’s Jacksonville
home. Twenty-year-old Derrick King and sixteen-year-old Randall
Brown were also present at the residence. The next day, after
attempting to contact Brown, Majors returned to Bright’s house. No
one responded when Majors knocked, prompting him to enter the
home through an open window.
Once inside, Majors proceeded to the living room. There, he
discovered the dead bodies of Brown and King. Brown was on a
recliner, with his head propped against the wall and partially
1. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(1), (9), Fla. Const.
-2- covered by a blanket. King was lying face down on the floor, and
his head was beside the couch. There was a significant amount of
blood under the recliner and on the couch, as well as on the
adjacent wall and ceiling. Bright was not present.
After discovering the scene, Majors called 911, and law
enforcement officers responded to Bright’s home. As part of the
investigation that followed, crime scene technicians obtained
physical evidence from the area, including a hammer and guns they
found hidden in the front yard. Later testing revealed King’s DNA
on the hammer.
Meanwhile, with the investigation underway, Bright told his
friend Benjamin Lundy about the incident at his home, noting that
he “screwed up” and killed two people. Bright also spoke with his
former wife, who then contacted law enforcement and set up a
meeting for Bright to discuss the homicides. Prior to the meeting,
officers arrested Bright at his former wife’s house.
During his incarceration at the county jail, Bright spoke with
another inmate named Mickey Graham. Bright told Graham that a
confrontation occurred, which ended with Bright striking both
victims with a hammer. According to Bright, he could hear the men
-3- breathing and gurgling, but then the room became silent.
Ultimately, the State charged Bright with two counts of first-
degree murder and sought the death penalty for both crimes. At
the guilt-phase trial, the State called numerous witnesses,
including Majors, the responding officers, and the medical
examiners who conducted the autopsies. The medical examiners
opined that Brown and King each died from blunt force trauma to
the head. King had over fifty-five separate injuries, including thirty-
eight to his head and neck. The injuries to his body were consistent
with defensive wounds. Brown had at least eight skull fractures
and fourteen other independent injuries to his body, some of which
were consistent with defensive wounds.
After being presented with this and other evidence, the jury
found Bright guilty as charged. Following the penalty-phase trial in
which both parties presented additional evidence, the jury
recommended the death penalty for both murders by a vote of eight
to four. Consistent with those recommendations, the trial court
imposed two death sentences.
Bright appealed, challenging both his convictions and death
sentences. Bright v. State, 90 So. 3d 249, 252 (Fla. 2012). We
-4- affirmed after determining that sufficient evidence supported the
convictions and that none of Bright’s claims justified reversal. Id. at
258-62, 265.
Following our affirmance, Bright sought postconviction relief
in circuit court, asserting both guilt- and penalty-phase claims.
The circuit court rejected all guilt-phase claims. But as to the
penalty-phase claims, the court found counsel ineffective in
investigating and presenting mitigating evidence. Both the State
and Bright appealed. State v. Bright (Bright II), 200 So. 3d 710, 715
(Fla. 2016). We affirmed in all respects and remanded for a new
penalty phase. Id. at 742. At the second penalty phase (governed
by the post-Hurst, 2 pre-Poole3 sentencing regime), the State sought
to prove two aggravators: (1) that Bright had prior violent felony
convictions (PVF) and (2) that the murders were especially heinous,
atrocious, or cruel (HAC). See § 921.141(6)(b), (h), Fla. Stat. (2017).
2. Hurst v. State, 202 So. 3d 40 (Fla. 2016) (interpreting Hurst v. Florida, 577 U.S. 92 (2016), as requiring that a jury unanimously recommend the death penalty).
3. State v. Poole, 297 So. 3d 487 (Fla. 2020) (receding from Hurst’s interpretation requiring a unanimous jury recommendation of death).
-5- For the PVF aggravator, the State introduced Bright’s
contemporaneous murder convictions and 1990 robbery conviction.
To establish the HAC aggravator, the State called the chief medical
examiner, who had reviewed the autopsy records for both victims.
Her testimony largely paralleled the evidence outlined above. Of
note, she found evidence of a prolonged brutal attack with an object
consistent with a hammer.
For mitigation, Bright called family members and friends who
spoke of his difficult upbringing and military service. One such
witness was Bright’s sister, Janice Jones. Bright also presented
mental-health mitigation through the expert testimony of Dr. Harry
Krop, Dr. Steven Gold, and Dr. Robert Ouaou.
After deliberations, the jury unanimously recommended death
for each murder, finding PVF proven as to both murders and HAC
proven as to the King murder. In light of that recommendation, the
court held a separate Spencer 4 hearing. At this hearing, Bright’s
daughter testified about her relationship with her father and the
situation in his home leading up to the murders.
4. Spencer v. State, 615 So. 2d 688 (Fla. 1993).
-6- The court found the State proved the PVF aggravator beyond a
reasonable doubt. In addition, the court found the State had
proved the HAC aggravator as to King’s murder. The court gave
great weight to these aggravating factors. As for mitigation, the
court rejected the extreme-disturbance and substantial-impairment
statutory mitigators. See § 921.141(7)(b), (f), Fla. Stat. However,
the court found six categories of nonstatutory mitigating factors,
assigning little or no weight to each. 5 The court concluded that the
aggravators “heavily outweigh[ed]” the mitigating circumstances. It
therefore imposed a sentence of death for each murder.
Bright appealed his death sentences. Bright v. State (Bright
III), 299 So. 3d 985, 989 (Fla. 2020). We rejected all his claims and
affirmed. Id. at 997-98, 1012. Bright then unsuccessfully sought
review by the U.S. Supreme Court. Bright v. Florida, 141 S. Ct.
1697 (2021).
This brings us to Bright’s current postconviction motion,
5. (1) Bright was the victim of child abuse and neglect (no weight); (2) Bright’s military career (little weight); (3) Bright’s history of drug and alcohol abuse (little weight); (4) Bright’s positive relationships with others (little weight); (5) Bright’s good and mannerly behavior during court proceedings (no weight); and (6) Bright’s behavior while incarcerated (no weight).
-7- which is at issue in this appeal. In the motion, Bright raised
seventeen numbered claims for relief, asking that the circuit court
vacate his death sentences. He primarily argued that his penalty-
phase counsel provided ineffective assistance in various respects
under the standard set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.
668 (1984). Bright later sought to amend his motion to add four
more claims. However, the circuit court denied his request to
amend. It also denied his request to interview various penalty-
phase jurors.
As for the seventeen claims, the circuit court summarily
denied four but held an evidentiary hearing on the thirteen
remaining claims. At this hearing, Bright called numerous
witnesses and introduced certain documentary evidence. The
witnesses included Bright’s penalty-phase counsel and several
veterans who served with him or were his contemporaries. Bright
also called several experts.
The circuit court entered an order denying the remaining
claims, which Bright now appeals. He also petitions for a writ of
habeas corpus. We begin with Bright’s appeal.
-8- II
Before addressing Bright’s substantive claims, we consider his
challenges to certain threshold rulings made by the circuit court.
A
Bright first argues that the circuit court erred in denying his
request to amend his postconviction motion to add four additional
claims. Applying a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard of
review, we disagree. See Marek v. State, 8 So. 3d 1123, 1131 (Fla.
2009) (reviewing denial of a motion to amend a postconviction
motion for an abuse of discretion).
A postconviction motion “may not be amended unless good
cause is shown.” Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851(f)(4).
In Bright’s proposed amendment, he sought to add claims
based on information that was readily available when he filed his
postconviction motion. Nevertheless, Bright contends that good
cause existed for the late amendment because of the COVID-19
pandemic, voluminous records in his case, and turnover at the law
firm that represented him. We have carefully considered these
reasons but conclude that none, in isolation or in the aggregate,
constitute good cause for failing to include claims readily accessible
-9- to counsel at the postconviction motion’s initial filing. See Lugo v.
State, 2 So. 3d 1, 19 (Fla. 2008).
Accordingly, the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in
denying Bright’s motion to amend.
B
As another threshold claim, Bright argues that the circuit
court erred in denying his motion to interview jurors from his
second penalty phase. We conclude that the court did not abuse its
discretion in denying this motion. See Foster v. State, 132 So. 3d
40, 65 (Fla. 2013) (“A trial court’s decision on a motion to interview
jurors is reviewed pursuant to an abuse of discretion standard.”
(quoting Anderson v. State, 18 So. 3d 501, 519 (Fla. 2009))).
A motion to interview jurors must “be filed within 10 days after
the rendition of the verdict, unless good cause is shown for the
failure to make the motion within that time.” Fla. R. Crim. P.
3.575. Thus, a defendant whose motion is untimely bears the
burden of showing good cause for the delay. Bates v. State, 398 So.
3d 406, 407 (Fla. 2024).
Bright does not dispute that his motion was untimely. Rather,
he asserts that his penalty-phase counsel would not have
- 10 - interviewed the jurors due to an alleged personal conflict, forcing
him to wait to seek juror interviews. Even assuming this is true,
Bright fails to explain why his motion to interview jurors was filed
over a year after his current counsel took over representation.
Therefore, Bright has not shown good cause, and we affirm the
circuit court’s ruling. 6
C
We now focus on Bright’s substantive claims, beginning with
numerous assertions that his penalty-phase counsel was
ineffective.
“[C]laims of ineffective assistance of counsel are reviewed
under the two-prong test established by Strickland.” Salazar v.
State, 188 So. 3d 799, 814 (Fla. 2016). To succeed on a Strickland
claim, a defendant must prove that (1) counsel’s performance was
deficient—i.e., that it fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness—and (2) such deficiency was prejudicial. 466 U.S.
6. Bright also contends that the circuit court erred in sustaining the State’s objection to his proffer of trial counsel’s files, resulting in an incomplete appellate record. This argument is frivolous. As noted by the State, the record contains the documents that Bright proffered.
- 11 - at 687. The prejudice prong requires a showing “that there is a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors,
the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Id. at 694.
If the defendant fails to establish one prong, a court need not
address the other. Id. at 697.
When reviewing ineffective assistance claims following an
evidentiary hearing, “this Court defers to the factual findings of the
trial court to the extent that they are supported by competent,
substantial evidence, but reviews de novo the application of the law
to those facts.” Smith v. State, 330 So. 3d 867, 875 (Fla. 2021)
(quoting Johnson v. State, 135 So. 3d 1002, 1013 (Fla. 2014)).
Bright argues that he received ineffective assistance stemming
from penalty-phase counsel’s failure to use a victim-blaming
strategy. In various iterations, he asserts that counsel was
ineffective for failing to introduce evidence that the victims were
drug dealers, rebut the State’s description of the victims as
innocent, argue that Bright feared the victims, and blame the
victims in opening and closing statements. However, based on the
testimony at the evidentiary hearing, we agree with the lower court
- 12 - that counsel made a reasonable strategic decision not to victim
blame.
We have repeatedly stressed that there is “a strong
presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of
reasonable professional assistance,” and the defendant therefore
“must overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances,
the challenged action might be considered sound trial strategy.”
Hayward v. State, 183 So. 3d 286, 297 (Fla. 2015) (internal
quotation marks omitted) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689).
And consistent with these principles, we have held that “[s]trategic
decisions do not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel if
alternative courses have been considered and rejected and counsel’s
decision was reasonable under the norms of professional conduct.”
Smith, 330 So. 3d at 878 (quoting Occhicone v. State, 768 So. 2d
1037, 1048 (Fla. 2000)).
Here, counsel testified that she considered, and ultimately
rejected, the victim-blaming approach. Based on her years of
experience, she concluded that this strategy would be unwise
because it might hurt her rapport with the jury and have negative
consequences for Bright. Instead, she decided to emphasize mercy-
- 13 - related mitigation.
In our view, as found by the circuit court, this testimony
supports the legal conclusion that counsel had a strategic reason
for not impugning the reputation of the victims. And we think her
strategy was eminently reasonable under the facts and
circumstances of this case—a holding that accords with our prior
cases. See Spencer v. State, 842 So. 2d 52, 61-62 (Fla. 2003)
(holding that counsel did not perform deficiently by declining to
present evidence of the antagonistic relationship between the
defendant and the victim to avoid “being perceived as blaming the
victim”). Thus, Bright cannot show deficient performance in
counsel’s decision to refrain from victim blaming, both in argument
and witness examination.
Bright also fails to establish prejudice. The proposed
evidence—that the victims were drug dealers who threatened
Bright—would not have undermined the aggravating evidence 7 or
7. We specifically note and reject Bright’s contention that victim blaming would have rebutted the HAC aggravator. The HAC aggravator focuses on the “means and manner” in which the defendant inflicted the death—not the defendant’s “intent and motivation.” Barnhill v. State, 834 So. 2d 836, 850 (Fla. 2002); see also Cruz v. State, 320 So. 3d 695, 728 (Fla. 2021). Bright’s
- 14 - furnished significant mitigating evidence. And victim blaming
would have invited the State to point out the many alternatives
available to Bright in resolving any conflict between him and the
victims other than bludgeoning them to death. See Douglas v.
State, 141 So. 3d 107, 123-24, 126 (Fla. 2012) (finding the
defendant failed to establish prejudice where the proposed evidence
would have opened the door to other damaging testimony).
In sum, we reject each of Bright’s victim-denigration claims,
finding the record amply supports the circuit court’s conclusions.
Bright next argues that counsel was ineffective for failing to
investigate and present mitigation witnesses to testify regarding his
mental health, military service, and background. For the reasons
explained below, we affirm the circuit court’s denial of these claims.
As to his mental-health mitigation, Bright contends that
proposed evidence does not rebut the HAC aggravator, as it does not bear on the means and manner by which he killed the victims. As a result, there is no reasonable probability that Bright would have received a lesser sentence had counsel blamed the victims in this manner.
- 15 - counsel was ineffective for failing to prepare Dr. Krop as a witness
and to provide him with necessary background materials for a PTSD
assessment. 8 Bright argues that Dr. Krop contradicted other
experts when he stated he had not tested Bright for PTSD and he
lacked sufficient information to suggest that Bright was under
extreme mental or emotional disturbance. However, competent,
substantial evidence supports the circuit court’s finding that Dr.
Krop did not contradict those experts.
At the penalty-phase trial, Dr. Krop testified about his 2008
and 2009 testing of Bright and noted he had not tested Bright for
PTSD despite observing symptoms of the disorder. Bright fails to
explain how this contradicted the testimony of two other experts,
Dr. Gold and Dr. Ouaou, who opined that Bright had PTSD. Dr.
Krop never testified that Bright did not have PTSD. Moreover,
counsel introduced Dr. Krop’s testimony primarily to establish that
Bright did not have antisocial personality disorder. Testing for
PTSD was outside the scope of Dr. Krop’s review. Accordingly,
8. Bright also asserts in a single sentence that counsel was ineffective for failing to call Dr. Miller. Because this claim is improperly briefed, we do not consider it. See Trappman v. State, 384 So. 3d 742, 751 n.4 (Fla. 2024).
- 16 - Bright fails to show how counsel was deficient in her preparation of
Dr. Krop.
Second, Bright alleges that counsel was ineffective for failing to
present testimony from multiple individuals who served with him in
the military. At the postconviction evidentiary hearing, Bright
introduced testimony from these veterans. Collectively, they
indicated that Bright “was an extremely valuable asset,” and they
commented on his assumption of a high degree of responsibility as
he worked on the flight deck—“the most dangerous place in the
whole world to work.” According to Bright, penalty-phase counsel
could have used this testimony to show that Bright was a
responsible and hardworking Marine Sergeant. But this claim fails
as well.
As an initial matter, we find that counsel’s performance was
not deficient. At the penalty-phase trial, counsel called military
expert James Hernandez to present evidence of Bright’s military
service. Among other things, Hernandez underscored Bright’s
military contributions, which were reflected in the awards and
meritorious distinctions he earned. We acknowledge that the
- 17 - postconviction witnesses included additional details not
encompassed in Hernandez’s testimony, but this does not render
counsel’s performance deficient. See Valentine v. State, 98 So. 3d
44, 53 (Fla. 2012) (“[T]he presentation of more favorable testimony
in postconviction proceedings does not render counsel’s
investigation into mitigation deficient.”).
Moreover, counsel’s decision to use Hernandez’s testimony
alone was a reasonable strategic one. Counsel chose not to call
other witnesses, such as those who testified at the evidentiary
hearing, to avoid the possibility that the jury might hear about
negative incidents during Bright’s military service. See Dufour v.
State, 905 So. 2d 42, 57 (Fla. 2005) (“[C]ounsel is not deficient
where he makes a reasonable strategic decision to not present
[certain] mitigation testimony during the penalty phase because it
could open the door to other damaging testimony.” (quoting Griffin
v. State, 866 So. 2d 1, 9 (Fla. 2003))).
Nor can Bright show prejudice. The court gave Bright’s
military service little weight as a nonstatutory mitigator. We do not
think that presenting additional, largely cumulative evidence would
have altered the balance of aggravating and mitigating
- 18 - circumstances. See Hilton v. State, 326 So. 3d 640, 649 (Fla. 2021)
(“Where the additional mitigation is minor or cumulative and the
aggravating circumstances substantial, . . . confidence in the
outcome of the penalty phase is not undermined.”).
Finally, Bright argues that counsel failed to make reasonable
efforts to investigate and present mitigation regarding his
background. At the evidentiary hearing, Bright presented family
members and other lay witnesses to testify about his childhood,
their positive relationships with him, his work ethic, and his other
positive qualities.
However, Bright has failed to establish deficient performance
because counsel made every reasonable effort to contact these
witnesses. They could not be located, or they simply were
unwilling, and therefore unavailable, to testify at his penalty phase.
See White v. State, 964 So. 2d 1278, 1286 (Fla. 2007) (“A defendant
cannot establish ineffective assistance of counsel based on
counsel’s failure to call a witness who is unavailable.” (citing Melton
v. State, 949 So. 2d 994, 1004 (Fla. 2006))); see also Evans v. State,
995 So. 2d 933, 943 (Fla. 2008) (finding that counsel was not
- 19 - ineffective for failing to call an unavailable witness at trial where
reasonable efforts were made to find the witness).
The record in this case reflects significant effort by counsel to
locate the proposed witnesses. Counsel testified at the evidentiary
hearing that she and her investigator tried on numerous occasions
to contact Bright’s family. Although Bright presented evidence at
the hearing that was in tension with counsel’s testimony, the circuit
court found counsel more credible. Based on counsel’s credited
testimony, we affirm the court’s finding that counsel was not
deficient for failing to present these witnesses.
For the reasons outlined above, we deny this claim in its
entirety.
Bright also claims that counsel was deficient for failing to
impeach Majors and object to the introduction of Majors’s 911 call
on relevancy grounds. This claim lacks merit.
As to impeaching Majors, counsel explained she wanted to use
his testimony to suggest that the victims were awake on the night of
the murders. On cross-examination, she elicited what she needed
from Majors and did not want to discredit the favorable portions of
- 20 - his testimony by impeaching him with his criminal history. This
was a reasonable strategic decision and thus does not constitute
deficient performance. See Occhicone, 768 So. 2d at 1048.
With regard to the 911 call, we agree with the circuit court
that it was indeed relevant. See Bearden v. State, 161 So. 3d 1257,
1266 (Fla. 2015) (“Corroborative evidence is admissible ‘to
strengthen a witness’ testimony by evidence of matters showing its
consistency and reasonableness and tending to indicate that the
facts probably were as stated by the witness.’ ” (quoting Chaachou
v. Chaachou, 73 So. 2d 830, 837 (Fla. 1954))). Therefore, counsel’s
failure to object on relevancy grounds was not deficient. See
Rigterink v. State, 193 So. 3d 846, 873 (Fla. 2016) (holding that
counsel was not deficient for failing to object to the introduction of
relevant evidence). Although counsel could have offered a
nonfrivolous objection that the probative value was outweighed by
the danger of unfair prejudice, such an objection is not one that all
reasonable attorneys would make, especially given the limited scope
of the 911 call and everything else the jury heard and saw regarding
the horrific crime scene.
Accordingly, we deny relief on this claim.
- 21 - 4
Bright contends that counsel was ineffective for failing to
object to three remarks in the State’s closing argument regarding
Bright’s abusive childhood and his military service. The circuit
court properly denied this claim.
Bright first takes issue with his counsel’s failure to object to
the State’s assertion that sympathy for his childhood related only to
mitigation and could not provide a basis for the jury’s
recommendation of life or death. However, on direct appeal, we
held this comment was not improper. Bright III, 299 So. 3d at 999
(“[T]he prosecutor did not instruct the jurors to disregard evidence
of Bright’s abuse in reaching their decisions, but rather, explained
that the evidence of abuse is properly considered as mitigation, and
that their decisions may not be based upon sympathy.” (citing Zack
v. State, 753 So. 2d 9, 24 (Fla. 2000))); see also Saffle v. Parks, 494
U.S. 484, 490 (1990) (explaining mitigation is the evidence the jury
considers in making its sentencing recommendation whereas
sympathy is a lens through which the jury examines the evidence). 9
9. To the extent Bright is arguing that we were wrong in our assessment of that remark on direct appeal, his argument is
- 22 - In short, we see no basis to hold counsel deficient for failing to
object to a comment we found proper. Indeed, we have repeatedly
held that counsel cannot be deficient for failing to make a meritless
objection. See Cannon v. State, 310 So. 3d 1259, 1265 (Fla. 2020);
Matthews v. State, 288 So. 3d 1050, 1065 (Fla. 2019).
Bright also faults counsel for not objecting to two other
prosecutorial statements, namely, that he (1) did not get PTSD from
the military and (2) arrived at work intoxicated. Contrary to
Bright’s argument, counsel made reasonable strategic decisions not
to object to the statements.
Instead of objecting, counsel responded to the comments in a
way that she believed would engender sympathy from the jury.
This strategy was reasonable, as it comported with counsel’s
overarching theory of mitigation. Moreover, according to counsel’s
credited testimony, she determined that this approach avoided the
implication that Bright had something to hide. Thus, counsel was
not deficient for declining to object to the State’s comments. See
Brown v. State, 846 So. 2d 1114, 1122 (Fla. 2003) (“Counsel’s
procedurally barred and not subject to reconsideration. See Deparvine v. State, 146 So. 3d 1071, 1106 (Fla. 2014).
- 23 - strategic decisions will not be second-guessed on collateral attack.”
(quoting Johnson v. State, 769 So. 2d 990, 1001 (Fla. 2000))).
Bright has not shown error in the circuit court’s denial of this
claim, and we affirm.
Bright also asserts that counsel was ineffective for failing to
request a continuance of the penalty-phase trial due to Hurricane
Irma. We disagree.
At trial, defense counsel, the prosecutor, and the court
discussed how best to proceed in light of the impending hurricane.
At the postconviction evidentiary hearing, counsel testified to her
concerns about rescheduling the trial, including the risk of having
to select a new jury after securing a jury about which she felt
optimistic. She therefore made a strategic decision to move
forward. We see nothing unreasonable about that decision.
Moreover, Bright has not demonstrated prejudice. Bright
alleges only that the trial’s chaotic conditions were prejudicial. This
vague and conclusory allegation is insufficient to show a reasonable
probability that he would have received a life sentence had the trial
been rescheduled. See Jones v. State, 998 So. 2d 573, 584 (Fla.
- 24 - 2008) (holding that a conclusory allegation of prejudice is
insufficient).
Finding neither deficient performance nor prejudice, we affirm
the circuit court’s rejection of this claim.
Bright also claims that counsel was ineffective during voir dire
for failing to ask adequate life-qualifying questions. 10 The circuit
court summarily denied this claim, finding the record sufficient to
refute it. We agree with that ruling.
“To be entitled to an evidentiary hearing on a claim of
ineffective assistance, the defendant must allege specific facts that
are not conclusively rebutted by the record . . . .” Anderson v. State,
220 So. 3d 1133, 1142 (Fla. 2017) (quoting Rhodes v. State, 986 So.
2d 501, 513-14 (Fla. 2008)).
Here, the record conclusively refutes Bright’s claim. In
reaching that conclusion, we have carefully reviewed the relevant
portions of the trial transcript, which show that counsel gave legally
10. Life-qualifying questions examine whether a prospective juror will automatically recommend the death penalty after a defendant’s conviction regardless of the evidence presented. See Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 734-35 (1992).
- 25 - accurate statements on the law (including the significance of
aggravation and mitigation) and asked appropriate life-qualifying
questions. The judge also explained certain death-penalty concepts
to the jury. Accordingly, we affirm the circuit court’s summary
denial of this claim.
For his final ineffectiveness claim, Bright argues that counsel
should have objected to the verdict form because it failed to explain
that a penalty-phase juror “may not refuse to consider or be
precluded from considering any relevant mitigating evidence.” Mills
v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367, 374-75 (1988) (emphasis omitted)
(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Skipper v. South
Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 4 (1986)). This argument lacks merit.
As interpreted by the U.S. Supreme Court, the Constitution
forbids imposition of the death penalty if the jury is precluded from
considering any relevant mitigating evidence. Smith v. Spisak, 558
U.S. 139, 144 (2010). Applying that principle, the Court held that
jury instructions and verdict forms together may not indicate that a
mitigating circumstance must be found unanimously by the jury.
Id. (citing Mills, 486 U.S. at 380-81).
- 26 - The verdict form here did not indicate a unanimity
requirement. Instead, Bright merely takes issue with the form on
the ground that it did not expressly inform jurors that they could
consider a mitigator even if other jurors did not find that the
mitigator was established. However, the jury was properly
instructed that mitigation need not be determined on a unanimous
basis. And the six completed mitigation verdict forms show that the
jurors followed the instructions in that five of the verdicts contained
nonunanimous votes. As such, the record conclusively refutes the
claim that counsel’s performance was deficient. See Darling v.
State, 966 So. 2d 366, 384 (Fla. 2007) (explaining that counsel
cannot be ineffective for failing to raise a meritless objection).
We thus affirm the summary denial of this claim.
D
We now turn to Bright’s actual-conflict-of-interest claim, in
which he argues that counsel’s impending move influenced her
decision to not request a continuance in light of Hurricane Irma.
This conflict, Bright contends, excuses him from demonstrating
prejudice under Strickland. Even assuming this is the type of
- 27 - actual conflict that could entitle Bright to relief, 11 the facts
developed at the evidentiary hearing do not establish that a conflict
existed.
Generally, a defendant alleging an ineffective assistance claim
must demonstrate prejudice. Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 166-
67 (2002). But the U.S. Supreme Court has recognized that courts
may presume prejudice when the defendant’s attorney labors under
a conflict of interest. Id. at 166-68, 171-72. We have summarized
that a defendant must establish the following two elements before
prejudice is presumed: (1) counsel had an actual conflict of interest,
and (2) the conflict adversely affected counsel’s representation of
the defendant. See State v. Larzelere, 979 So. 2d 195, 208 (Fla.
2008); Sliney v. State, 944 So. 2d 270, 279 (Fla. 2006).
11. We have applied actual-conflict principles when a defendant alleges a conflict based on the defense attorney’s personal interests. See State v. Larzelere, 979 So. 2d 195, 208-10 (Fla. 2008); State v. Coney, 845 So. 2d 120, 133-34 (Fla. 2003). However, the U.S. Supreme Court has only ever applied these principles in the context of multiple representation. See Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 348-50 (1980); Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 166-67 (2002). Indeed, the Court has warned against “expansive application” of these principles to other kinds of conflict—the kind our precedents have entertained. See Mickens, 535 U.S. at 174-75.
- 28 - An actual conflict of interest exists when counsel “actively
represents conflicting interests.” Larzelere, 979 So. 2d at 208
(quoting Sliney, 944 So. 2d at 279). “To demonstrate an actual
conflict, the defendant must identify specific evidence in the record
that suggests that [counsel’s] interests were compromised. A
possible, speculative or merely hypothetical conflict is insufficient to
impugn a criminal conviction.” Id. (internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting Sliney, 944 So. 2d at 279).
At the postconviction evidentiary hearing, counsel repeatedly
denied that her impending move impacted her decision not to
request a continuance. Rather, she and Bright felt that a favorable
jury had been selected, and they did not want to risk selecting
another. The lower court credited this testimony. No other
evidence supports Bright’s claim that counsel’s personal interest in
moving compromised her efforts to represent him. As such, we
deny relief on this claim.
E
Lastly, Bright contends that the circuit court erred in failing to
find he was deprived of a fair trial due to cumulative error. We
disagree. We have assessed all of Bright’s ineffective assistance
- 29 - claims and find no deficient performance. Accordingly, this claim
cannot succeed. State v. Woodel, 145 So. 3d 782, 803 (Fla. 2014)
(“[B]ecause we do not find multiple errors in this case, there is no
cumulative error effect that establishes prejudice.”).
III
Bright has also filed a habeas petition in which he raises ten
individual claims. We deny them all.
Bright presents multiple claims regarding appellate counsel’s
representation in his 2020 appeal. “In general, claims of ineffective
assistance of appellate counsel are properly presented in a petition
for writ of habeas corpus . . . .” Brown v. State, 304 So. 3d 243,
278 (Fla. 2020) (citing Baker v. State, 214 So. 3d 530, 536 (Fla.
2017)). “The standard for a claim of ineffective assistance of
appellate counsel mirrors the Strickland standard for ineffective
assistance of trial counsel: the petitioner must demonstrate
deficient performance and resulting prejudice.” Hilton, 326 So. 3d
at 652 (citing Frances v. State, 143 So. 3d 340, 358 (Fla. 2014)).
Regarding the deficiency prong, Bright must show that
appellate counsel’s failure to raise certain issues “constitute[s] a
- 30 - serious error or substantial deficiency falling measurably outside
the range of professionally acceptable performance.” Pope v.
Wainwright, 496 So. 2d 798, 800 (Fla. 1986). As for prejudice, he
must prove that any deficiency “compromised the appellate process
to such a degree as to undermine confidence in the correctness of
the result.” Id. In other words, “the deficiency must concern an
issue which is error affecting the outcome, not simply harmless
error.” Freeman v. State, 761 So. 2d 1055, 1069 (Fla. 2000)
(quoting Knight v. State, 394 So. 2d 997, 1001 (Fla. 1981)).
Bright first argues that appellate counsel was ineffective for
failing to raise a claim related to prosecutorial misconduct. He
contends the State improperly suggested that the jury should not
consider a life sentence because Bright did not give that same
choice to the victims. In closing, the State argued:
Isn’t it ironic that in terms of – you have a choice. By his actions, he now is in the criminal justice system, and as a result, you have a choice as to whether he should get death or whether he should get life. Well, Raymond Bright never gave each of these victims a choice, did he?
We assume that the challenged comment was preserved by a
- 31 - sufficiently specific objection from penalty-phase counsel. Even so,
appellate counsel’s failure to raise the same-mercy argument on
direct appeal does not support a finding of prejudice.
Our precedent characterizes “same mercy” arguments as
“impermissible.” See Wolf v. State, 416 So. 3d 1117, 1132 (Fla.
2025), cert. denied, 2026 WL 135610 (U.S. Jan. 20, 2026). But “a
mercy argument standing alone does not constitute reversible
error.” Merck v. State, 975 So. 2d 1054, 1062 (Fla. 2007). This is
so especially when “the mercy comments [are] not dwelled upon or
emphasized in the context of the entire closing.” Id.
Here, considering the entire closing, the State did not dwell
upon or emphasize the mercy comments. Namely, the State did not
implore the jury to recommend death as a result of Bright’s failure
to show mercy. Considering these facts along with the strength of
the evidence against Bright and the gravity of the aggravators, we
find that any error would have been harmless. As such, Bright
cannot show that appellate counsel’s failure to raise this claim
prejudiced him.
Bright’s assertion of ineffectiveness in appellate counsel’s
- 32 - failure to argue the lack of life-qualifying questions is also meritless.
As discussed above, the record demonstrates that Bright’s counsel
adequately life-qualified the jury based on the facts and
circumstances of this case. Appellate counsel cannot be deemed
deficient for declining to raise nonmeritorious issues. See Zack v.
State, 911 So. 2d 1190, 1211 (Fla. 2005).
Bright’s argument that appellate counsel should have raised a
Sixth Amendment challenge based on penalty-phase counsel’s
asserted actual conflict of interest fails too. For the reasons given
above, we see no basis for finding an actual conflict. Again,
appellate counsel cannot be faulted for failing to brief a meritless
argument unsupported by the record and case law. See id.
Bright also contends that appellate counsel’s cumulative error
in his 2020 appeal entitles him to a new penalty phase. We reject
this argument, as his claims are meritless. See Porter v. Crosby,
840 So. 2d 981, 986 (Fla. 2003) (concluding that habeas corpus
petitioner’s cumulative error claim was properly denied where
individual claims were meritless and procedurally barred).
- 33 - B
Next, Bright asserts a due process violation because portions
of the appellate record were redacted in his direct appeal. This
claim fails for two reasons.
First, it is procedurally barred. See Covington v. State, 348 So.
3d 456, 481 (Fla. 2022) (claims that could have been previously
raised are barred in a habeas petition). Bright could have raised
his objection to an incomplete record on direct appeal but failed to
do so.
Second, Bright has not suggested that any portion of the
redacted record would have supported a viable appellate argument
or was necessary to bolster a claim that was raised in his briefing.
For these reasons, Bright’s due process claim fails.
Bright alleges multiple errors relating to his appellate
counsel’s representation in the direct appeal that followed his 2009
guilt phase. He advances three claims of ineffective assistance of
appellate counsel12 and one claim of cumulative error. At the
12. He argues that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise claims based on (1) a discovery violation, (2) the trial judge’s
- 34 - outset we note “[h]abeas corpus should not be used as a vehicle for
presenting issues which should have been raised at trial and on
appeal or in postconviction proceedings.” Smith v. State, 126 So. 3d
1038, 1053 (Fla. 2013) (quoting Wright v. State, 857 So. 2d 861,
874 (Fla. 2003)).
We previously reviewed Bright’s initial postconviction motion.
See Bright II, 200 So. 3d at 729-42 (affirming the postconviction
court’s order and remanding for a new penalty phase). Bright could
have and should have raised these arguments at that time.
Because he did not, these claims are procedurally barred.
Accordingly, we deny relief. 13
As his final habeas claim, Bright asserts that Florida’s
postconviction process is inherently biased because it allows the
same judge who presided over a defendant’s trial to adjudicate the
defendant’s postconviction claims. According to Bright, the judge
sidebar comment, and (3) the improper dismissal of two jurors under Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
13. Even if we considered these guilt-phase claims on the merits, we would conclude that they do not support relief.
- 35 - will be predisposed in postconviction towards presuming the
correctness of his or her previous actions and rulings. Bright
contends that because of this bias, he suffered a manifest injustice
during his postconviction proceedings, which amounted to a
violation of due process.
A defendant must file a motion to disqualify when he “believes
he cannot obtain a fair and impartial trial before the assigned trial
judge.” Livingston v. State, 441 So. 2d 1083, 1086 (Fla. 1983).
Bright did not file a motion for judicial disqualification or otherwise
present this argument below, so his current claim of inherent bias
is procedurally barred. See Morris v. State, 931 So. 2d 821, 837
n.14 (Fla. 2006) (rejecting a habeas claim as procedurally barred
when trial counsel did not object in the lower court).
Even if not barred, the argument is meritless. The Supreme
Court’s due process inquiry in this context asks if “as an objective
matter, ‘the average judge in his position is “likely” to be neutral, or
whether there is an unconstitutional “potential for bias.” ’ ”
Williams v. Pennsylvania, 579 U.S. 1, 8 (2016) (quoting Caperton v.
A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 881 (2009)). There is no
objectively reasonable basis to think a judge presiding over a
- 36 - postconviction motion cannot consider claims regarding a prior trial
over which he or she presided. Neutral judges are entrusted with
reviewing their prior decisions at multiple points in both civil and
criminal litigation, and Bright presents no reason to doubt this
practice.
We therefore deny relief on this claim.
IV
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the circuit court’s denial
of Bright’s postconviction motion, and we deny his petition for writ
of habeas corpus.
It is so ordered.
MUÑIZ, C.J., and LABARGA, COURIEL, FRANCIS, SASSO, and TANENBAUM, JJ., concur.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED.
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Duval County, Russell L. Healey, Judge – Case No. 162008CF002887AXXXMA And an Original Proceeding – Habeas Corpus
Dawn Macready, Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, Elizabeth Spiaggi, Assistant Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, and Nida Imtiaz, Assistant Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, Northern Region, Tallahassee, Florida,
for Appellant/Petitioner
- 37 - James Uthmeier, Attorney General, and Jason W. Rodriguez, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida,
for Appellee/Respondent
- 38 -