Raydel Iglesias Pena v. Warden, Glades County Detention Center, US Attorney General

• Court: District Court, M.D. Florida
• Decided: March 10, 2026
• Docket: 2:26-cv-00660
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA FORT MYERS DIVISION

RAYDEL IGLESIAS PENA,

Petitioner, Case No. 2:26-cv-660-KCD-NPM

v.

WARDEN, GLADES COUNTY DETENTION CENTER, US ATTORNEY GENERAL,

Respondents. /

ORDER Petitioner Raydel Iglesias Pena is a non-citizen currently detained by immigration authorities. He has filed a habeas corpus petition (Doc. 1) and an accompanying emergency motion for temporary restraining order (Doc. 2).1 He asks this Court to intervene quickly. Specifically, he seeks an order preventing the Government from removing him from this judicial district while his habeas petition is pending. According to Pena, without this pause button, the Government might whisk him away and deprive him of a chance to litigate this case. (Id. at 1.) To obtain a temporary restraining order or a preliminary injunction, the movant must establish: “(1) a substantial likelihood of success on the merits; (2) that irreparable injury will be suffered if the relief is not granted;

1 Unless otherwise indicated, all internal quotation marks, citations, case history, and alterations have been omitted in this and later citations. (3) that the threatened injury outweighs the harm the relief would inflict on the non-movant; and (4) that entry of the relief would serve the public

interest.” Schiavo ex rel. Schindler v. Schiavo, 403 F.3d 1223, 1225-26 (11th Cir. 2005). Immediate injunctive relief is an “extraordinary and drastic remedy, and [the movant] bears the burden of persuasion to clearly establish all four of these prerequisites.” Wreal, LLC v. Amazon.com, Inc., 840 F.3d

1244, 1247 (11th Cir. 2016). Pena’s underlying habeas petition raises substantive arguments that are not easily dismissed. But having a good argument is not alone enough for a TRO—you must also seek a remedy that the Court can give. See, e.g.,

Sekona v. Perez, No. 1:19-CV-00400-JLT-HBK, 2025 WL 2140093, at *2 (E.D. Cal. July 29, 2025) (“The injunctive relief an applicant requests must relate to the claims brought in the complaint.”). The fundamental stumbling block here is the relief Pena now requests.

“[J]urisdiction attaches upon the initial filing of the § 2241 petition and will not be destroyed by a petitioner’s subsequent Government-effectuated transfer and accompanying change in physical custodian.” Villa v. Normand, No. 5:25-CV-89, 2025 WL 3113200, at *4 (S.D. Ga. Oct. 16, 2025). So an order

enjoining Pena’s transfer to somewhere besides the Middle District of Florida is superfluous. We do not issue injunctions to prevent harms that legally cannot happen. Cf. Santillanes v. U.S. Parole Comm’n, 754 F.2d 887, 888 (10th Cir. 1985). While the Court takes Pena’s underlying liberty claims seriously, the specific stopgap measure he requests is beside the point. Accordingly, his Motion for Temporary Restraining Order (Doc. 2) is DENIED, and the case will proceed to a review of the merits of the habeas petition. ORDERED in Fort Myers, Florida on March 10, 2026.

Kyle C. Dudek oe ot

United States District Judge