Daly, J.
This is an appeal from the judgment of the trial court reversing the defendant’s (hereinafter commission) denial of the plaintiff’s (hereinafter company) application for subdivision approval of certain property located on Fodor Lane (now Oakview Drive) in Trumbull, to permit the use of those premises as conforming building lots.
The factual circumstances are undisputed: In 1970, the company acquired some thirty-seven and one-half acres of land; of these, approximately thirty acres were zoned Industrial IL-2, and the remaining seven and one-half acres were zoned Residential A. Shortly thereafter, the commission authorized a zone change to Industrial IL-2 from the Residential A classification for the seven and one-half acres. At the time of this zone change, the company submitted a preliminary drawing showing a subdivision of the property into four parcels separated by a proposed north-south dead end road with a cul-de-sac, designated as Oakview Drive, and a proposed east-west road connecting with Reservoir Avenue, located to the east, and designated as an access road on the map. This access road was the forerunner of the present Lindeman Drive in the Trumbull Comprehensive Plan. The company never applied for approval of the subdivision plan for the four lots.
On April 5,1971, the company filed an application for approval of a plan for a preliminary subdivision of the property into two parcels, divided from north to south by Oakview Drive. Parcel I, located to the east of Oakview Drive, is the present location of the company’s world corporate headquarters. Parcel II at that time remained undeveloped. The commission approved this application on April 21, 1971,
delineating certain conditions relative to Oakview Drive and specifying that “future east-west roads might he required.” Thereafter the commission approved the final plan of subdivision and granted the special permit application for the company’s world corporate headquarters.
On February 6, 1974, the company applied for final approval of a further subdivision plan to create two parcels of land from Parcel II, located on the easterly side of Oakview Drive. The commission denied this application on February 27, 1974; the court dismissed the plaintiff’s appeal from this denial on June 10, 1975, because the company had failed to establish aggrievement.
Meanwhile, the commission had created and adopted for the town of Trumbull a revised plan of development, which became effective on December 11, 1974. This plan specifically proposed the extension of Lindeman Drive, between Reservoir Avenue and Oakview Drive.
To reflect and implement this new plan of development, the commission revised the subdivision regulations in July of 1975. Thereafter, on April 7, 1976, the company filed the present application, which mirrored the one the commission had denied two years earlier. When the commission also denied the April, 1976 application, the company appealed to the trial court. That court remanded the case to the commission, holding that the commission lacked the necessary authority under the Trumbull planning and zoning regulations “to exact from the plaintiffs a dedication of a portion of the requested subdivision for use as a public highway to be an
extension of Lindeman Drive a highway which in its present state does not extend to plaintiffs’ boundary.”
The commission has appealed from this decision, claiming that the court erred (a) in finding that the commission lacked authority to require, as a condition of subdivision approval, that the company provide for the extension of Lindeman Drive to the boundary of its property; (b) in failing to dismiss the case because the company’s original application did not comply with the requirements set forth in the 1974 plan of development, effective December, 1974, and the Trumbull subdivision regulations, effective in July, 1975; (c) in failing to find that the company’s appeal should have been dismissed because of a lack of any change of conditions between the commission’s 1974 denial of an application identical to that proffered in 1976; and (d) in finding that the commission acted illegally, arbitrarily and in abuse of its discretion.
In reviewing these claims of error, we are mindful that “courts do not and should not substitute their judgment for that of the local authority.”
Hall
v.
Planning & Zoning Board,
153 Conn. 574, 577, 219 A.2d 445 (1966). If it appears that the commission has reasonably and fairly exercised its honest judgment after a full hearing, the trial court must be cautious about disturbing the decision of the authority.
Young
v.
Town Planning & Zoning Commission,
151 Conn. 235, 245, 196 A.2d 427 (1963);
Kutcher
v.
Town Planning Commission,
138 Conn. 705, 710, 88 A.2d 538 (1952). The trial court may not substitute its judgment for the wide and liberal discretion vested in the local authority when acting within its prescribed legislative powers.
Farring
ton
v.
Zoning Board of Appeals,
177 Conn. 186, 190, 413 A.2d 817 (1979);
Summ
v.
Zoning Commission,
150 Conn. 79, 89, 186 A.2d 160 (1962). The court must invest such broad discretion in these authorities when determining the public need and the manner of meeting it, because they are closest to the circumstances and conditions which “create the problem and shape the solution.”
Stiles
v.
Town Council,
159 Conn. 212, 219, 268 A.2d 395 (1970). Thus, the court may grant relief on appeal only where the local authority has acted illegally or arbitrarily or has abused its discretion.
McCrann
v.
Town Planning & Zoning Commission,
161 Conn. 65, 74, 282 A.2d 900 (1971).
When disapproving the application for the 1976 subdivision, the commission stated that the proposed “lot layout is not satisfactory in that it precludes the extension of Lindeman Drive through to intersect with Oakview Drive. For a more proper arrangement and development of streets in this area . . . provisions shall be made for extension of Lindeman Drive. The . . . development proposed . . .
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Daly, J.
This is an appeal from the judgment of the trial court reversing the defendant’s (hereinafter commission) denial of the plaintiff’s (hereinafter company) application for subdivision approval of certain property located on Fodor Lane (now Oakview Drive) in Trumbull, to permit the use of those premises as conforming building lots.
The factual circumstances are undisputed: In 1970, the company acquired some thirty-seven and one-half acres of land; of these, approximately thirty acres were zoned Industrial IL-2, and the remaining seven and one-half acres were zoned Residential A. Shortly thereafter, the commission authorized a zone change to Industrial IL-2 from the Residential A classification for the seven and one-half acres. At the time of this zone change, the company submitted a preliminary drawing showing a subdivision of the property into four parcels separated by a proposed north-south dead end road with a cul-de-sac, designated as Oakview Drive, and a proposed east-west road connecting with Reservoir Avenue, located to the east, and designated as an access road on the map. This access road was the forerunner of the present Lindeman Drive in the Trumbull Comprehensive Plan. The company never applied for approval of the subdivision plan for the four lots.
On April 5,1971, the company filed an application for approval of a plan for a preliminary subdivision of the property into two parcels, divided from north to south by Oakview Drive. Parcel I, located to the east of Oakview Drive, is the present location of the company’s world corporate headquarters. Parcel II at that time remained undeveloped. The commission approved this application on April 21, 1971,
delineating certain conditions relative to Oakview Drive and specifying that “future east-west roads might he required.” Thereafter the commission approved the final plan of subdivision and granted the special permit application for the company’s world corporate headquarters.
On February 6, 1974, the company applied for final approval of a further subdivision plan to create two parcels of land from Parcel II, located on the easterly side of Oakview Drive. The commission denied this application on February 27, 1974; the court dismissed the plaintiff’s appeal from this denial on June 10, 1975, because the company had failed to establish aggrievement.
Meanwhile, the commission had created and adopted for the town of Trumbull a revised plan of development, which became effective on December 11, 1974. This plan specifically proposed the extension of Lindeman Drive, between Reservoir Avenue and Oakview Drive.
To reflect and implement this new plan of development, the commission revised the subdivision regulations in July of 1975. Thereafter, on April 7, 1976, the company filed the present application, which mirrored the one the commission had denied two years earlier. When the commission also denied the April, 1976 application, the company appealed to the trial court. That court remanded the case to the commission, holding that the commission lacked the necessary authority under the Trumbull planning and zoning regulations “to exact from the plaintiffs a dedication of a portion of the requested subdivision for use as a public highway to be an
extension of Lindeman Drive a highway which in its present state does not extend to plaintiffs’ boundary.”
The commission has appealed from this decision, claiming that the court erred (a) in finding that the commission lacked authority to require, as a condition of subdivision approval, that the company provide for the extension of Lindeman Drive to the boundary of its property; (b) in failing to dismiss the case because the company’s original application did not comply with the requirements set forth in the 1974 plan of development, effective December, 1974, and the Trumbull subdivision regulations, effective in July, 1975; (c) in failing to find that the company’s appeal should have been dismissed because of a lack of any change of conditions between the commission’s 1974 denial of an application identical to that proffered in 1976; and (d) in finding that the commission acted illegally, arbitrarily and in abuse of its discretion.
In reviewing these claims of error, we are mindful that “courts do not and should not substitute their judgment for that of the local authority.”
Hall
v.
Planning & Zoning Board,
153 Conn. 574, 577, 219 A.2d 445 (1966). If it appears that the commission has reasonably and fairly exercised its honest judgment after a full hearing, the trial court must be cautious about disturbing the decision of the authority.
Young
v.
Town Planning & Zoning Commission,
151 Conn. 235, 245, 196 A.2d 427 (1963);
Kutcher
v.
Town Planning Commission,
138 Conn. 705, 710, 88 A.2d 538 (1952). The trial court may not substitute its judgment for the wide and liberal discretion vested in the local authority when acting within its prescribed legislative powers.
Farring
ton
v.
Zoning Board of Appeals,
177 Conn. 186, 190, 413 A.2d 817 (1979);
Summ
v.
Zoning Commission,
150 Conn. 79, 89, 186 A.2d 160 (1962). The court must invest such broad discretion in these authorities when determining the public need and the manner of meeting it, because they are closest to the circumstances and conditions which “create the problem and shape the solution.”
Stiles
v.
Town Council,
159 Conn. 212, 219, 268 A.2d 395 (1970). Thus, the court may grant relief on appeal only where the local authority has acted illegally or arbitrarily or has abused its discretion.
McCrann
v.
Town Planning & Zoning Commission,
161 Conn. 65, 74, 282 A.2d 900 (1971).
When disapproving the application for the 1976 subdivision, the commission stated that the proposed “lot layout is not satisfactory in that it precludes the extension of Lindeman Drive through to intersect with Oakview Drive. For a more proper arrangement and development of streets in this area . . . provisions shall be made for extension of Lindeman Drive. The . . . development proposed . . . would result in substantial increase in traffic volume ....” The commission also found that extension of Lindeman Drive would facilitate dispersal of traffic from the development to “arterial and expressway streets at peak hours.” Further, the commisssion found that the extension would provide “more adequate access for fire fighting apparatus, police protection and other essential services; thus, protecting the public welfare and minimizing any hazardous effects on neighboring areas.”
This court has previously sanctioned the authority of a planning and zoning commission to impose upon a property owner conditions precedent
to subdivision approval, particularly where compliance with the condition would cause the proposed subdivision to comport more closely with the comprehensive plan of development. See
Whittaker
v.
Zoning Board of Appeals,
179 Conn. 650, 660, 427 A.2d 1346 (1980);
Nicoli
v.
Planning & Zoning Commission,
171 Conn. 89, 95-96, 368 A.2d 24 (1976). “The imposition of subdivision controls is an exercise of the police power, and it seeks to accomplish the orthodox ends of the police power by serving the health, safety, morals, and general welfare of the community .... The public benefit which flows from subdivision control does not require that such control be exercised through the power of eminent domain rather than the police power.” 4 Anderson, American Law of Zoning (2d Ed.) § 23.04. Where reasonable and impartial, a commission’s power to regulate the use of land does not constitute a taking without due process of law or just compensation. “One who chooses to engage in subdividing land by that decision thus chooses also to be subject to the reasonable regulation of the local planning commission.”
Whit-taker
v.
Zoning Board of Appeals,
supra, 661. Accordingly, we conclude that the commission was authorized to require the extension of Lindeman Drive to protect the health, safety and welfare of the inhabitants of the town of Trumbull.
Furthermore, the commission’s actions were authorized by pertinent state statutes, as well as the Trumbull subdivision regulations and plan of development. Section 8-25
empowers a planning
and zoning commission to adopt subdivision regulations which promote the harmonious development of local traffic patterns so as “to provide an
adequate and convenient system for present and prospective traffic needs.” Moreover, § 8-23
authorizes a commission to prepare a plan of development
for the coxmmmity which shows “the commission’s recommendation for a system of principal thoroughfares, parkways, bridges, streets and other public ways----”
Pursuant to these statutes, the commission created the 1974 plan of development, which specifically indicated its proposal for extension of Lindeman Drive: “Manhattan-Raybestos has purchased four sites off of Oakview Drive, and has begun construction of a corporate headquarters on one of them .... Access to these sites would he improved greatly by construction of a cross-connector linking Oakview Drive with Reservoir Avenue.” Presaging this aspect of the 1974 plan, the commission’s April 21, 1971 approval of the company’s application for a preliminary plan of subdivision specifically stated that “future east-west roads may be required.”
Finally, the Trumbull subdivision regulations, which mandate that “[a] 11 subdivisions shall conform to the duly adopted and existing Town Plan as approved by the Commission,” provide that “[wjhenever any proposed subdivision shall adjoin another tract or acreage, streets that may logically be extended in the event of subdivision of such adjoining acreage shall be required to extend through to the boundary of the adjoining acreage.” Trumbull Subdivision Regulations, c. V, §§ 1, 3. These regulations further provide that dead-end or cul-de-sac streets “shall not exceed 750 feet in length.” Id., c. Y, § 4. Lindeman Drive is 1000 feet in length, and would be in violation of the aforesaid section if not cross-connected.
Accordingly, we find that the commission possessed ample authority to disapprove the proposed subdivision absent an extension of Lindeman Drive. In view of our finding, it is unnecessary to consider the other claims of error.
There is error, the judgment is set aside and the case remanded with direction to render judgment for the defendant.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.