Ray v. Quisenberry

CourtDistrict Court, W.D. Oklahoma
DecidedMarch 10, 2023
Docket5:22-cv-00823
StatusUnknown

This text of Ray v. Quisenberry (Ray v. Quisenberry) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, W.D. Oklahoma primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Ray v. Quisenberry, (W.D. Okla. 2023).

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA

LANCEY DARNELL RAY, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) Case No. CIV-22-823-D ) TERRY QUISENBERRY, et al. ) ) Defendants. )

ORDER

Plaintiff Lancey Darnell Ray, a state prisoner, brought this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendants Kyle Cabelka, Eric Pfiefer, Lloyd Austin, III, Gerald Neuwirth, Andrew Sibly, Terry Quisenberry, Inas Yacoub, Jordan Cabelka, Eddie Valdez, and Fred Colson Smith, Jr.1 The matter was referred to United States Magistrate Shon T. Erwin for initial proceedings in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and (C). On January 26, 2021, the magistrate judge issued a report and recommendation, where he recommended that the Court dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint in its entirety. See [Doc. No. 14]. Plaintiff timely filed an objection. [Doc. No. 15]. After conducting a de novo review of the issues at hand, the Court agrees with the conclusions and recommendations in the report as set forth herein.

1Plaintiff sued Defendants K. Cabelka, Pfiefer, Austin and Neuwirth in their official capacities, and sued Defendants Sibly, Quisenberry, Yacoub, J. Cabelka, Valdez, and Smith in their individual capacities. Discussion I. Defendants K. Cabelka, Pfiefer, and Austin The magistrate judge recommends that the claims against Kyle Cabelka, Eric

Pfeifer, and Lloyd Austin, III be dismissed without prejudice for failure to state a claim. Plaintiff concedes that, in his complaint, he fails to allege any wrongdoing committed by these Defendants. See Obj. to R. & R. at 5 (“Plaintiff agrees with the magistrate judge’s report . . . [and] does not allege any violations occurred under the watch of the defendants named above.”). Instead, Plaintiff now argues that he “seeks prospective relief to prevent

future violations respective to each office” held by these Defendants. Id. at 6. Plaintiff’s objection is an attempt to introduce new arguments. But “[i]ssues raised for the first time in objections to the magistrate judge’s recommendation are deemed waived.” Marshall v. Chater, 75 F.3d 1421, 1426 (10th Cir. 1996). Therefore, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s objection should be overruled.

II. Defendants Sibly, Yacoub, J. Cabelka, Quisenberry and Valdez The magistrate judge recommends that the claims against Andrew Sibly, Inas Yacoub, Jordan Cabelka, Terry Quisenberry and Eddie Valdez be dismissed, as they are either (1) premature pursuant to Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), or (2) barred by the applicable statute of limitations.2

2 The magistrate judge recommends dismissal without prejudice regarding any claims which are premature under Heck. As for any time-barred claims, the magistrate judge recommends dismissal with prejudice. In his complaint, Plaintiff requests relief in the form of “compensatory damages” against Defendants Sibly, Yacoub, Quisenberry, and Valdez, and “additional nominal damages” against Defendants Valdez and J. Cabelka pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See

Compl. [Doc. No. 1 at 30]. In his objection, Plaintiff claims that the magistrate judge improperly applied Heck under these circumstances. But Plaintiff’s argument is misguided, as Heck squarely applies here. In Heck, the Court held: [W]hen a state prisoner seeks damages in a § 1983 suit, the district court must consider whether a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence; if it would, the compliant must be dismissed unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated. But if the district court determines that the plaintiff’s action, even if successful, will not demonstrate the invalidity of any outstanding criminal judgment against the plaintiff, the action should be allowed to proceed, in the absence of some other bar to the suit.

512 U.S. at 487 (emphasis in original). Plaintiff, a state prisoner, seeks damages against Defendants Sibly, Yacoub, J. Cabelka, Quisenberry, and Valdez pursuant to § 1983. Thus, the magistrate judge properly applied Heck to determine whether Plaintiff’s claims against these Defendants were premature. Plaintiff’s argument that the magistrate judge improperly applied the statute of limitations set forth in Okla. Stat. tit. 12, § 95(3) is similarly flawed. Although his claims arise under federal law, it is well settled that the applicable statute of limitations for a claim under § 1983 “is drawn from the personal-injury statute of the state in which the federal district court sits.” Mondragon v. Thompson, 519 F.3d 1078, 1082 (10th Cir. 2008); see Burkley v. Correctional Healthcare Mgmt. of Okla., Inc., 141 F. App’x 714, 715 (10th Cir. 2005) (applying Okla. Stat. tit. 12, § 95(3) to a plaintiff’s § 1983 claims).3 For these reasons, the Court finds that these objections should be overruled. III. Defendant Neuwirth

The magistrate judge recommends that the claims against former Comanche County District Court Judge Gerald Neuwirth be dismissed under the doctrine of judicial immunity. Plaintiff argues that judicial immunity does not apply because he is seeking injunctive and declaratory relief against Defendant Neuwirth. Specifically, Plaintiff clarifies that he seeks relief in the form of requiring Defendant Neuwirth to “(1) hear his timely filed, pending

[motion brought under Okla. Stat. tit. 22, § 994], and (2) address [his] allegation of legally insufficient evidence therein.” Obj. to R. & R. at 3. But “[j]udicial officers are explicitly immunized not only against damages but also against suits for injunctive relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.” Ysais v. New Mexico, 373 F. App’x 863, 866 (10th Cir. 2010). To the extent Defendant seeks declaratory relief, his claims also must fail. See id. at 866 (“A

declaratory judgment is meant to define the legal rights and obligations of the parties in anticipation of some future conduct, not simply to proclaim liability for a past act.”); see also Utah Animal Rts. Coal. v. Salt Lake City Corp., 371 F.3d 1248, 1266 (10th Cir. 2004)

3 Plaintiff also disputes the magistrate judge’s determination of the accrual date regarding his claims against Defendant Quisenberry, but fails to provide any authority or argument in support of his position. In addition, Plaintiff argues that his claims against Defendant Valdez should be allowed to proceed pursuant to “the Medicine Lodge Treaty of 1867 between the United States and the Kiowa and Comanche Indians,” but fails to articulate how this treaty undermines the magistrate judge’s determination that Plaintiff’s claims are premature under Heck or time-barred under the applicable statute of limitations. Obj. to R. & R. at 10. (“[A] declaratory judgment action involving past conduct that will not recur is not justiciable.”).

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Related

Ysais v. State of NM Judicial Standard
373 F. App'x 863 (Tenth Circuit, 2010)
Heck v. Humphrey
512 U.S. 477 (Supreme Court, 1994)
Utah Animal Rights Coalition v. Salt Lake City Corp.
371 F.3d 1248 (Tenth Circuit, 2004)
Nasious v. Two Unknown B.I.C.E. Agents
492 F.3d 1158 (Tenth Circuit, 2007)
Mondragon v. Thompson
519 F.3d 1078 (Tenth Circuit, 2008)

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Ray v. Quisenberry, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/ray-v-quisenberry-okwd-2023.