Ray v. Norwood

CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Oklahoma
DecidedFebruary 21, 2024
Docket6:22-cv-00196
StatusUnknown

This text of Ray v. Norwood (Ray v. Norwood) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Oklahoma primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Ray v. Norwood, (E.D. Okla. 2024).

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA RAYMOND ALEXANDER RAY, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) No. CIV 22-196-RAW-JAR ) JOE NORWOOD, et al., ) ) Defendants. ) OPINION AND ORDER This action is before the Court on Defendants’ motion for summary judgment. (Dkt. 26). Plaintiff is a pro se prisoner in the custody of the Oklahoma Department of Corrections (DOC) who is incarcerated at Oklahoma State Penitentiary in McAlester, Oklahoma. He brings this action under the authority of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, seeking relief for alleged constitutional violations during his incarceration at Davis Correctional Facility (DCF), a private prison in Holdenville, Oklahoma.1 The defendants are Joe Norwood, DCF Warden; Julia Dorman, DCF Chief of Unit Manager; Airnesto Martinez, DCF Unit Manager; James Bailey, Unit Manager; and DCF/Core Civic, Inc. The Court has before it for consideration Plaintiff’s complaint (Dkt. 1), a special report prepared by DCF Officials at the direction of the Court, in accordance with Martinez v. Aaron, 570 F.2d 317 (10th Cir. 1978) (Dkt. 22), and Defendants’ motion for summary judgment (Dkt. 26). Plaintiff has not filed a response to the motion. I. Plaintiff’s Allegations Plaintiff alleges in Claim 1 of the complaint that from June 30, 2021, to December 20, 2021, Defendant Unit Manager Martinez made no effort to investigate Plaintiff’s claim that his personal property was stolen when he went to segregation. Plaintiff claims he was not 1 Davis Correctional Facility now is Allen Gamble Correctional Center, an Oklahoma DOC facility. See https://oklahoma.gov/doc.html. allowed to secure or pack his belonging. He had purchased headphones and headphone extensions from the canteen and had received his books by mail. In Claim 2, Plaintiff claims that when he was placed in segregation on December 20, 2021, his television, remote, cable cords, surge protector, and white Rawlings shoes went missing. Plaintiff asserts he submitted Requests to Staff (RTSs) and a grievance about the matter. Plaintiff alleges in Claim 3 that he has written many RTSs and filed a form for lost and stolen property. He asserts in Claim 4 that on March 7, 2022, he was placed on grievance restriction for filing grievances about the DCF staff’s failure to review the cameras to determine what happened to his property. Plaintiff requests relief in the form of monetary reimbursement for his lost or stolen property or replacement of the property from the canteen. He also asks for a transfer from DCF.2 II. Standard of Review Summary judgment is appropriate when “there is no genuine dispute as to any material

fact and the movant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A dispute is genuine if the evidence is such that “a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A fact is material if it “might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.” Id. In making this determination, “[t]he evidence of the non-movant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.” Id. at 255. A party opposing a motion for summary judgment, however, may not simply allege there are disputed issues of fact; rather, the party must support its assertions by citing to the record or by showing the moving

2 As stated above, Plaintiff now is housed at Oklahoma State Penitentiary. 2 party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). Thus, the inquiry for this Court is “whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251-52. A pro se plaintiff’s complaint must be broadly construed under this standard. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). The generous construction to be given to the pro se litigant’s allegations, however, “does not relieve the plaintiff of the burden of alleging sufficient facts on which a recognized legal claim could be based.” Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991). Notwithstanding a pro se plaintiff’s various mistakes or misunderstandings of legal doctrines or procedural requirements, “if a court can reasonably read the pleadings to state a valid claim on which the plaintiff could prevail, it should do so . . . .” Id. A reviewing court need not accept “mere conclusions characterizing pleaded facts.” Bryson v. City of Edmond, 905 F.2d 1386, 1390 (10th Cir. 1990); see also Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. The Court “will not supply additional factual allegations to round out a plaintiff’s complaint or construct a legal

theory on a plaintiff’s behalf.” Whitney v. New Mexico, 113 F.3d 1170, 1173-74 (10th Cir. 1997). With these standards in mind, the court turns to the merits of Defendants’ motion. III. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies Defendants allege, among other things, that Plaintiff has failed to exhaust the administrative remedies for any of his claims. “No action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). Inmates are required to exhaust available administrative remedies, and suits filed before the exhaustion requirement is met

3 must be dismissed. Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 740-41 (2001); Yousef v. Reno, 254 F.3d 1214, 1216 n.1 (10th Cir. 2001). “An inmate who begins the grievance process but does not complete it is barred from pursuing a § 1983 claim under PLRA for failure to exhaust his administrative remedies.” Jernigan v. Stuchell, 304 F.3d 1030, 1032 (10th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted). He must properly complete all required steps of the grievance process to exhaust his administrative remedies. Fields v. Okla. State Penitentiary, 511 F.3d 1109, 1112 (10th Cir. Dec. 28, 2007); see also Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 90 (2006) (“Proper exhaustion demands compliance with an agency’s deadlines and other critical procedural rules . . . .”). Terry Underwood, DCF Grievance Coordinator, states by affidavit that an administrative remedies policy was available for inmates’ use at DCF. (Dkt. 26-4). The policy is Oklahoma DOC’s grievance policy OP-90124. (Dkt. 26-5). The Oklahoma DOC administrative remedies policy clearly sets forth the steps an inmate must follow to exhaust administrative remedies. (Dkt.

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Related

Haines v. Kerner
404 U.S. 519 (Supreme Court, 1972)
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.
477 U.S. 242 (Supreme Court, 1986)
Booth v. Churner
532 U.S. 731 (Supreme Court, 2001)
Woodford v. Ngo
548 U.S. 81 (Supreme Court, 2006)
Erickson v. Pardus
551 U.S. 89 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Yousef v. Reno
254 F.3d 1214 (Tenth Circuit, 2001)
Jernigan v. Stuchell
304 F.3d 1030 (Tenth Circuit, 2002)
Martinez v. Aaron
570 F.2d 317 (Tenth Circuit, 1978)
Fields v. Oklahoma State Penitentiary
511 F.3d 1109 (Tenth Circuit, 2007)
Coburn v. Wilkinson
700 F. App'x 834 (Tenth Circuit, 2017)
Bryson v. City of Edmond
905 F.2d 1386 (Tenth Circuit, 1990)
Hall v. Bellmon
935 F.2d 1106 (Tenth Circuit, 1991)

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Bluebook (online)
Ray v. Norwood, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/ray-v-norwood-oked-2024.