Ray v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration

Opinion

1 WO 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

9 Donna Ray, No. CV-19-05821-PHX-JJT

10 Plaintiff, ORDER

11 v.

12 Commissioner of Social Security Administration, 13 Defendant. 14

15 16 At issue is the denial of Plaintiff Donna Ray’s Application for Disability Insurance 17 benefits by the Social Security Administration (SSA) under the Social Security Act (“the 18 Act”). Plaintiff filed a Complaint (Doc. 1) with this Court seeking judicial review of that 19 denial, and the Court now addresses Plaintiff’s Opening Brief (Doc. 13, “Pl. Br.”), 20 Defendant SSA Commissioner’s Answering Brief (Doc. 16, “Def. Br.”), and Plaintiff’s 21 Reply (Doc. 17, “Reply”). The Court has reviewed the briefs and Administrative Record 22 (Doc. 12, “R.”), and now affirms the Administrative Law Judge’s (“ALJ”) decision (R. at 23 14–36) as upheld by the Appeals Council (R. at 1–6). 24 I. BACKGROUND 25 Plaintiff filed her Application for Disability Insurance benefits on February 13, 26 2014, alleging disability beginning February 2, 2014. (Id. at 122.) After a hearing before 27 an ALJ, Plaintiff’s claim was denied on May 11, 2016. (Id. at 146–68.) On June 25, 2018, 28 the Appeals Council remanded Plaintiff’s case for a new hearing. (Id. at 169–174.) On 1 March 7, 2019, Plaintiff again appeared for a hearing on her claim, which the ALJ again 2 denied on May 21, 2019. (Id. at 14–26, 73–120.) On October 17, 2019, the Appeal Council 3 denied Plaintiff’s request for review. (Id. at 1–6.) 4 The Court has reviewed the medical evidence and will discuss the pertinent 5 evidence in addressing the issues raised by the parties. Upon considering the medical 6 records and opinions, the ALJ evaluated Plaintiff’s disability based on the following severe 7 impairments: cervical and lumbar radiculopathy; lumbar spondylosis; peripheral vascular 8 disease; carotid artery stenosis with right carotid artery endarterectomy; hypertension, 9 chronic pain syndrome; and hyperlipidemia. (Id. at 19.) The ALJ also determined that 10 Plaintiff’s medically determinable impairments of major depressive disorder, generalized 11 anxiety disorder, and panic disorder are “nonsevere” impairments. (Id. at 20.) Still, the ALJ 12 found that Plaintiff’s mental impairments cause her mild limitations in the functional areas 13 of (1) interacting with others and (2) concentrating, persisting, or maintaining pace. (Id. 14 at 20.) 15 Ultimately, the ALJ evaluated the medical evidence and testimony and concluded 16 that Plaintiff was not disabled from the alleged disability-onset date through the date of the 17 decision. (Id. at 25.) The ALJ found that Plaintiff “does not have an impairment or 18 combination of impairments that meets or medically equals the severity of one of the listed 19 impairments in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1.” (Id. at 20.) Next, the ALJ 20 calculated Plaintiff’s residual functional capacity (“RFC”) and concluded that “[Plaintiff] 21 has the [RFC] to perform the full range of sedentary work.” (Id. at 21.) The ALJ further 22 found that “[Plaintiff] is unable to perform any past relevant work . . . but has acquired 23 work skills from past relevant work.” (Id. at 24.) Specifically, the ALJ found that Plaintiff 24 acquired “the following skills: use of office equipment, direct interaction with customers, 25 and customer service in an office environment.” (Id.) Accordingly, the ALJ found that 26 Plaintiff “acquired work skills from past relevant work that are transferable to other 27 occupations with jobs existing in significant numbers in the national economy.” (Id.) 28 . . . . 1 II. LEGAL STANDARDS 2 In determining whether to reverse an ALJ’s decision, the district court reviews only 3 those issues raised by the party challenging the decision. See Lewis v. Apfel, 236 F.3d 503, 4 517 n.13 (9th Cir. 2001). The Court may set aside the Commissioner’s disability 5 determination only if it is not supported by substantial evidence or is based on legal error. 6 Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 630 (9th Cir. 2007). Substantial evidence is relevant evidence 7 that a reasonable person might accept as adequate to support a conclusion considering the 8 record as a whole. Id. To determine whether substantial evidence supports a decision, the 9 Court must consider the record as a whole and may not affirm simply by isolating a 10 “specific quantum of supporting evidence.” Id. Generally, “[w]here the evidence is 11 susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, one of which supports the ALJ’s 12 decision, the ALJ’s conclusion must be upheld.” Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 954 13 (9th Cir. 2002) (citations omitted). 14 To determine whether a claimant is disabled for purposes of the Act, the ALJ 15 follows a five-step process. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a). The claimant bears the burden of 16 proof on the first four steps, but the burden shifts to the Commissioner at step five. Tackett 17 v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1098 (9th Cir. 1999). At the first step, the ALJ determines whether 18 the claimant is presently engaging in substantial gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. 19 § 404.1520(a)(4)(i). At step two, the ALJ determines whether the claimant has a “severe” 20 medically determinable physical or mental impairment. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(ii). At 21 step three, the ALJ considers whether the claimant’s impairment or combination of 22 impairments meets or medically equals an impairment listed in Appendix 1 to Subpart P 23 of 20 C.F.R. Part 404. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iii). If so, the claimant is automatically 24 found to be disabled. Id. At step four, the ALJ assesses the claimant’s RFC and determines 25 whether the claimant is still capable of performing past relevant work. 20 C.F.R. 26 § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv). If not, the ALJ proceeds to the fifth and final step, where she 27 determines whether the claimant can perform any other work in the national economy 28 1 based on the claimant’s RFC, age, education, and work experience. 20 C.F.R. 2 § 404.1520(a)(4)(v). If not, the claimant is disabled. Id. 3 III. ANALYSIS 4 Plaintiff raises three central arguments for the Court’s consideration. First, Plaintiff 5 argues that the Commissioner failed to meet his burden at step five to establish that Plaintiff 6 can perform other work that exists in the national economy. (Pl. Br. at 4.) Plaintiff develops 7 this argument in two distinct ways. She argues first that the ALJ incorrectly determined 8 that Plaintiff acquired transferrable skills from her past relevant work; instead, she argues 9 that the ALJ identified mere “aptitudes” rather than skills. (Id. at 9–11.) She also argues 10 that the ALJ incorrectly found that the occupations Plaintiff could perform would not 11 require “very little, if any, vocational adjustment,” as required. (Id. at 6–8.) Plaintiff’s next 12 argument is that because the ALJ incorrectly rejected the opinions of her treating 13 psychiatrist, the ALJ erroneously found that her mental impairments are nonsevere. (Id. at 14 13–17.) Finally, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ miscalculated her RFC by failing to include 15 mental limitations stemming from mild limitations in two functional domains that the ALJ 16 found she has at step 2. (Id. at 17–18.) 17 The Court rejects each of Plaintiff’s arguments. First, substantial evidence supports 18 the ALJ’s determination that Plaintiff can perform work that exists in the national 19 economy. Specifically, the ALJ properly determined that Plaintiff acquired transferrable 20 skills—use of office equipment, direct interaction with customers, and customer service in 21 an office environment—from her past relevant work. (R. at 24.) Similarly, the ALJ properly 22 relied on vocational expert (VE) testimony to determine that those skills are transferable to 23 sedentary work with very little, if any, adjustment. (Id. at 108.) Next, the ALJ did not err 24 by concluding that Plaintiff’s mental impairments were nonsevere, nor by rejecting the 25 opinion of Plaintiff’s treating physician. (Id. at 20, 24.) Finally, substantial evidence 26 supports the ALJ’s calculation of Plaintiff’s RFC, even though the ALJ did not include any 27 mental limitations. (Id. at 21.) 28 . . . . 1 A. Substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s step five determination that Plaintiff has work skills that are transferable to other occupations with 2 jobs existing in significant numbers in the national economy. 3 4 Once an ALJ determines that a claimant cannot perform her past relevant work, the 5 burden shifts to the Commissioner to establish that there is other work in the national 6 economy based on the claimant’s RFC, age, education, and work experience that she can 7 perform. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(v). If a claimant is age 55 or older and has severe 8 impairments that limit her to sedentary work, the Commissioner “will find that [the 9 claimant] cannot make an adjustment to other work unless [she has] skills that [she] can 10 transfer to other skilled or semiskilled work. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1568(d)(4). “A finding of 11 transferability is most probable among jobs that involve: (1) the same or lesser degree of 12 skill; (2) a similarity of tools; and (3) a similarity of services or products.” 20 C.F.R. 13 § 404.1568(d)(2). However, “[c]omplete similarity of skills ... is not necessary.” 20 C.F.R. 14 § 404.1568(d)(3). Furthermore, “[i]n order to find transferability of skills to skilled 15 sedentary work for individuals who are of advanced age (55 and over), there must be very 16 little, if any, vocational adjustment required in terms of tools, work processes, work 17 settings, or the industry.” 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404 Subpt. P, App. 2 § 201.00(f). 18 Skills are “knowledge of a work activity which requires the exercise of significant 19 judgment that goes beyond the carrying out of simple job duties and is acquired through 20 performance of an occupation which is above the unskilled level . . . . A skill gives a person 21 a special advantage over unskilled workers in the labor market.” See Social Security Ruling 22 82-41(2)(a). Conversely, certain qualities such as perception and motor coordination are 23 properly considered aptitudes rather than skills. See Paulson v. Bowen, 836 F.2d 1249 (9th 24 Cir. 1988). 25 Here, the ALJ properly determined that Plaintiff has skills—and not merely 26 aptitudes—that are transferrable to other occupations with jobs existing in significant 27 numbers in the national economy. Further, the ALJ properly relied on VE testimony that 28 1 Plaintiff’s skills are “transferrable to sedentary work in which there would be very little, if 2 any, vocational adjustment.” (R. at 108.) 3 1. The ALJ correctly found that Plaintiff had transferrable skills rather than mere aptitudes. 4 5 Plaintiff argues that “the ALJ failed to make an effective transferrable skills analysis 6 when she relied on the VE’s testimony regarding not skills, but rather a general aptitude 7 for using basic office equipment.” (Pl. Br. at 10.) Plaintiff further argues that “the VE 8 identified no specific skills in her testimony. Nor did she provide enough information to 9 glean what actual skills might transfer in this situation. Further, the ALJ took it upon herself 10 to identify skills that the VE herself did not . . . . At best, the VE identified a single general 11 aptitude for using telephones and fax machines.” (Id. at 10–11) (emphasis in original). 12 The Court rejects Plaintiff’s arguments because she understates the VE’s testimony 13 and ignores Ninth Circuit precedent. Initially, the VE testified that Plaintiff had transferable 14 “clerical, office, and customer service types of skills.” (R. at 108.) Next, the VE 15 immediately elaborated, testifying that “the skills [that] would be acquired would have 16 been general use of office equipment, so that would transfer to a number of occupations as 17 well as direct interaction with customers, [and] customer service in the environment.” (Id.) 18 Thus, Plaintiff’s argument plainly understates that the VE merely “identified a single 19 general aptitude for using telephones and fax machines.” (Pl. Br. at 10–11.) Unlike the 20 cases Plaintiff cites for support, here, the ALJ did not mischaracterize aptitudes like 21 perception or motor coordination as skills. Indeed, Plaintiff asserts without support that 22 “‘general use of office equipment’ is an aptitude, not a skill category, under Agency 23 policy.” (Pl. Br. at 10.) However, the Ninth Circuit has held that “knowledge of office 24 procedures” and “administrative, interpersonal, and analytical [abilities]” are properly 25 classified as skills rather than aptitudes. See Anglin v. Massanari, 18 F. App’x 551, 553– 26 54 (9th Cir. 2001); see also Hartley v. Colvin, No. 2:13-CV-1863 AC, 2014 WL 6058652, 27 at *4 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 12, 2014), aff’d, 672 F. App’x 743 (9th Cir. 2017) (finding that the 28 ability to work with office equipment and perform customer service are properly 1 characterized as skills); see also Olguin v. Astrue, No. EDCV 11-1802-OP, 2012 WL 2 4711775, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 1, 2012) (finding that basic decision-making skills, 3 communication skills, the ability to work effectively with the public and professionals, 4 ability to work within an office, and using office equipment were properly classified as 5 skills rather than aptitudes). Accordingly, the ALJ’s finding is consistent with the law and 6 the VE’s testimony that Plaintiff has transferrable skills and not merely aptitudes. 7 2. The ALJ correctly determined that Plaintiff’s skills would be transferrable to sedentary work with very little, if any, 8 adjustment. 9 10 Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erroneously found that the occupations Plaintiff can 11 perform “would not require ‘very little, if any, vocational adjustment,’ as is required in 12 determining transferrable skills in this case.” (Pl. Br. at 8.) Plaintiff bases her argument on 13 the differences between the “tools, work processes, work settings, and industries” of her 14 past work and the work the ALJ found she can perform. (Id. at 6–8.) Essentially, Plaintiff 15 argues that her past relevant work and the occupations the ALJ found she can perform 16 “involve[] different basic materials processed, different final products made, different 17 subject matters or data dealt with or applied, different services rendered, and different work 18 processes and products.” (Id. at 7–8.) Thus, Plaintiff asserts that substantial evidence does 19 not support the conclusion that “very little, if any, vocational adjustment” would be 20 required. (Id. at 8.) 21 Here again, Plaintiff overlooks caselaw and the VE’s testimony, which support the 22 ALJ’s conclusion that Plaintiff has transferable skills that allow her to perform occupations 23 with little or no vocational adjustment. Importantly, alternate work does not mean identical 24 work and the testimony of a VE can help determine the extent to which a claimant’s skills 25 are transferable. Thompson v. Barnhart, 148 F. App’x 634, 635–36 (9th Cir. 2005); 26 20 C.F.R §§ 404.1566(e), 404.1568(d)(3). Moreover, Plaintiff’s argument—based on 27 differing Dictionary of Occupational Titles codes—that the occupations the ALJ found 28 Plaintiff actually would require more than a little vocational adjustment lacks support and 1 has been previously rejected by other district courts in this circuit. See e.g., Solomon v. 2 Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 376 F. Supp. 3d 1012, 1018 (D. Ariz. 2019); See, e.g., 3 Cherwink v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 2018 WL 1050194, *6 (N.D. Cal. 2018). Here, the VE 4 specifically testified that Plaintiff’s skills are transferable to sedentary work with “very 5 little, if any, adjustment in terms of tools, work processes, work settings or the industry.” 6 (R. at 108.) The ALJ permissibly relied on the VE’s expertise in determining that Plaintiff’s 7 skills were transferable to sedentary work with minimal adjustment. Accordingly, the ALJ 8 properly relied on the VE’s testimony and substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s finding 9 that Plaintiff has acquired work skills that are transferrable to other occupations with jobs 10 existing in significant numbers in the national economy. (Id. at 24.) 11 B. The ALJ correctly found that Plaintiff’s mental impairments were nonsevere and appropriately calculated Plaintiff’s RFC. 12 13 Plaintiff raises interrelated arguments regarding the ALJ’s evaluation of Plaintiff’s 14 mental impairments and the ALJ’s calculation of Plaintiff’s RFC. (Pl. Br. at 13–20.) First, 15 Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erroneously concluded that Plaintiff’s mental impairments 16 were nonsevere. (Pl. Br. at 13–17.) Plaintiff bases this argument on another argument that 17 the ALJ improperly gave little weight to the opinions of treating psychiatrist Dr. Bill 18 Sbiliris, M.D. (Id.) Second, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erroneously failed to include any 19 mental limitations in Plaintiff’s RFC. Specifically, Plaintiff urges that since the ALJ found 20 at step two that Plaintiff has mild limitations in the functional areas of interacting with 21 others and concentrating, persisting, or maintaining pace, the ALJ erred by not including 22 any mental limitations in Plaintiff’s RFC. (Id. at 17–20.) 23 The Court rejects Plaintiff’s arguments. First, the ALJ correctly determined that 24 Plaintiff’s mental impairments were nonsevere and appropriately evaluated Dr. Sbiliris’s 25 opinions. Second, substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s calculation of Plaintiff’s RFC, 26 even though the ALJ did not include any mental limitations. 27 . . . . 28 . . . . 1 1. The ALJ provided specific and legitimate reasons supported by substantial evidence for rejecting Dr. Sbiliris’s opinions. 2 3 Dr. Sbiliris authored two opinions regarding Plaintiff’s mental limitations, which 4 the ALJ rejected for two reasons.1 (R. at 24, 663–65, 869–71, 878–80, 910–12.) First, the 5 ALJ found that Dr. Sbiliris’s opinions were inconsistent with his own progress notes, 6 including Plaintiff’s repeated denials of psychiatric problems or symptoms. (Id. at 24.) 7 Second, the ALJ discounted the opinions because they were in “checklist format and 8 provide little, if any, supporting evidence.” (Id.) 9 An ALJ can find that an impairment or combination of impairments is nonsevere 10 only if it has “no more than a minimal effect on an individual’s ability to work.” Smolen v. 11 Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1290 (9th Cir. 1996). Only one severe impairment is required for a 12 claimant to survive the step-two severe impairment analysis. Id. The ALJ must consider all 13 a claimant’s medically determinable impairments when calculating her RFC, regardless of 14 whether they are severe. Id.; 20 C.F.R. § 404.1523. Consequently, an ALJ’s errant failure 15 to treat an impairment as severe is typically harmless if the claimant survives step-two and 16 the ALJ considers all the claimant’s medically severe impairments, severe or otherwise. 17 See Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 682 (9th Cir. 2005). An ALJ’s step-two 18 determination will be upheld when substantial evidence supports her finding that a 19 claimant’s impairment is nonsevere. Webb v. Barnhart, 433 F.3d 683, 687 (9th Cir. 2005). 20 There are unique considerations when a claimant alleges that a mental impairment 21 is severe. The ALJ rates a claimant’s degree of functional limitation in four broad 22 functional areas to determine whether her mental impairments are severe. 20 C.F.R. § 23 404.1520a(c). The functional areas are: (1) understand, remember, or apply information; 24 (2) interact with others; (3) concentrate, persist, or maintain pace; and (4) adapt or manage 25 oneself. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520a(c)(3). The ALJ rates the level of impairment on a five-point 26 scale: none, mild, moderate, marked, and extreme. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520a(c)(3). If the ALJ

27 1 Plaintiff erroneously claims that Dr. Sbiliris authored four opinions. (Pl. Br. at 15.) 28 However, two of the opinions Plaintiff cites are duplicates of Dr. Sbiliris’s January 21, 2016 opinion. (R. at 869–71, 878–80, 910–12.) 1 finds that the degree of limitation is only mild in each functional area, then she will 2 generally find that the claimant’s mental impairment is nonsevere. 20 C.F.R. 3 § 404.1520a(d)(1). 4 While “[t]he ALJ must consider all medical opinion evidence,” there is a hierarchy 5 among the sources of medical opinions. Tommasetti, 533 F.3d at 1041. Those who have 6 treated a claimant are treating physicians, those who examined but did not treat the claimant 7 are examining physicians, and those who neither examined nor treated the claimant are 8 nonexamining physicians. Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830 (9th Cir. 1995). If a treating 9 physician’s opinion is not given controlling weight, then the ALJ must consider the relevant 10 factors listed in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(1)–(6) and determine the appropriate weight to 11 give the opinion. Orn, 495 F.3d at 632. If a treating physician’s opinion “is contradicted 12 by another doctor’s opinion, the ALJ cannot reject the treating physician’s opinion unless 13 he provides specific and legitimate reasons that are based on substantial evidence in the 14 record.” Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 1216 (9th Cir. 2005). 15 Plaintiff’s argument that the ALJ erroneously characterized her mental impairments 16 as nonsevere would ordinarily be inconsequential since she survived step two of the ALJ’s 17 analysis, i.e., the ALJ found she has severe impairments. Further, any mischaracterization 18 by the ALJ would normally be harmless error if the ALJ properly accounted for the 19 claimant’s mental impairments in her RFC. Here, however, Plaintiff argues that more than 20 a mischaracterization occurred; instead, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ understated the 21 limiting effects of Plaintiff’s mental impairments by undervaluing Dr. Sbiliris’s opinions. 22 Thus, if the ALJ undervalued Dr. Sbiliris’s opinions and understated the severity of 23 Plaintiff’s mental impairments, it is possible the ALJ did not appropriately account for 24 Plaintiff’s mental impairments in her RFC. (Pl. Br. at 17.) 25 Plaintiff’s arguments are valid but unsupported by the evidence. Therefore, the 26 Court finds that the ALJ correctly rejected Dr. Sbiliris’s opinions and did not err by finding 27 Plaintiff’s mental limitations nonsevere. Here, the ALJ’s first reason—that Dr. Sbiliris’s 28 opinions are inconsistent with his medical records—is sufficient. Dr. Sbiliris’s treatment 1 records largely demonstrate that Plaintiff repeatedly denied psychiatric problems or 2 symptoms. (R. at 550, 552, 554, 556, 558, 560, 688, 772.) This lack of corroboration was 3 a sufficient justification for rejecting Dr. Sbiliris’s opinion and it is supported by substantial 4 evidence. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(3). Plaintiff’s argument that the ALJ “fail[ed] to cite to 5 any record evidence that would support her rejection of the four opinions of the treating 6 psychiatrist” is entirely misplaced. (Pl. Br. at 14) (emphasis in original). Though the ALJ 7 did not cite to the record in the paragraph of her opinion analyzing Dr. Sbiliris’s opinions, 8 the ALJ referenced psychiatric findings that she thoroughly detailed and cited just two 9 paragraphs prior. (R. at 23–24.) 10 Because the ALJ correctly found that Dr. Sbiliris’s opinions were inconsistent with 11 his own treatment records, she did not err by rejecting those opinions. Consequently, 12 substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s finding that Plaintiff’s mental impairments are 13 nonsevere. 14 2. The ALJ did not err by not including any mental limitations in Plaintiff’s RFC. 15 16 Plaintiff argues that “the ALJ’s RFC finding is defective because it fails to in any 17 way account for Plaintiff’s admitted mental functional limitations.” (Pl. Br. at 19.) 18 Specifically, Plaintiff argues that since the ALJ found at step 2 that Plaintiff has mild 19 limitations in interacting with others and in concentrating, persisting, or maintaining pace, 20 the ALJ must account for these limitations in Plaintiff’s RFC. (Id. at 17–19.) 21 The Court rejects Plaintiff’s argument. Though Plaintiff is correct that the ALJ must 22 account for all limitations in the RFC—those stemming from severe impairments or 23 otherwise—this does not mean that any particular limitation must stem from the ALJ’s step 24 two analysis. See Buck v. Berryhill, 869 F.3d 1040, 1048 (9th Cir. 2017) (“Step two is 25 merely a threshold determination meant to screen out weak claims.”); see also Bray v. 26 Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 554 F.3d 1219, 1228–29 (9th Cir. 2009) (“Bray offers no 27 authority to support the proposition that a severe mental impairment must correspond to 28 limitations on a claimant’s ability to perform basic work activities.”) In her opinion, the || ALJ correctly explained that Plaintiffs mild mental limitations at step two “are not a [RFC] || assessment but are used to rate the severity of [Plaintiff's] mental impairments.” (R. at 20.) || And because Plaintiff had no more than mild limitations in any functional area, the ALJ 4|| determined that her mental impairments are nonsevere. (/d.) Further, as discussed above, 5 || substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s finding that Plaintiff's mental impairments cause 6|| “no more than a minimal effect on an individual’s ability to work.” Smolen, 80 F.3d at 7\| 1290. Since, they cause no more than a minimal effect on an [Plaintiff]’s ability to work,” || the ALJ was justified in not including any mental limitations in Plaintiff's RFC. /d. In 9|| support, the ALJ detailed the minimal effect Plaintiffs mental impairments (and || underlying mild functional limitations) have on her functioning. The ALJ did not err by 11 || failing to include mental limitations in Plaintiff's RFC. (R. at 20, 23-24.) IV. CONCLUSION 13 Substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s nondisability determination. The ALJ 14]| correctly determined that Plaintiff has work skills—rather than aptitudes—that are 15 || transferable to other occupations with jobs existing in significant numbers in the national 16 || economy. In making this finding, the ALJ also correctly relied on VE testimony that those skills are transferable to sedentary work with very little, if any, vocational adjustment. 18 || Further, substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s calculation of Plaintiff's RFC, including || her conclusion that Plaintiff's mental impairments are nonsevere and her non-inclusion of || mental limitations in Plaintiff's RFC. 21 IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED affirming the May 21, 2019 decision of the 22 || Administrative Law Judge (R. at 14-36), as upheld by the Appeals Council (R. at 1-6). 23 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED directing the Clerk to enter final judgment 24 || consistent with this Order and close this case. 25 Dated this 18th day of November, 2020. CN 26 “wok: 97 wefholee— Unifga State#District Judge 28

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