Ray Marshall, Secretary of Labor v. Charles T. Sink, Trading and Doing Business as Sink Coal Company, Sink No. 1 Mine

614 F.2d 37, 1980 U.S. App. LEXIS 21094, 1980 CCH OSHD 24,175
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
DecidedJanuary 24, 1980
Docket77-2614
StatusPublished
Cited by7 cases

This text of 614 F.2d 37 (Ray Marshall, Secretary of Labor v. Charles T. Sink, Trading and Doing Business as Sink Coal Company, Sink No. 1 Mine) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Ray Marshall, Secretary of Labor v. Charles T. Sink, Trading and Doing Business as Sink Coal Company, Sink No. 1 Mine, 614 F.2d 37, 1980 U.S. App. LEXIS 21094, 1980 CCH OSHD 24,175 (4th Cir. 1980).

Opinion

BUTZNER, Circuit Judge:

Charles T. Sink appeals from a decision of the district court upholding the constitutionality of warrantless, routine inspections under the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969, 30 U.S.C. § 801 et seq., and enjoining Sink from interfering with the inspections of his mine. The sole issue on appeal is whether 30 U.S.C. § 813, authorizing warrantless inspections of mines, violates Sink’s fourth amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches. We affirm.

Sink owns and operates without employees a small mine in West Virginia. When federal coal mine inspectors attempted to make a routine inspection of Sink’s mine pursuant to 30 U.S.C. § 813, Sink refused entry. The Secretary of the Interior then brought this action requesting the district court to enjoin Sink from interfering with *38 inspections of the mine. 1 The district court granted a preliminary injunction, and Sink filed this appeal.

The parties do not dispute that coal mine inspections are searches within the meaning of the fourth amendment. Nor is it disputed that § 813(a) authorizes warrantless searches. It is also settled that Sink’s mine is subject to federal regulation. 2 The only remaining issue is whether the warrantless inspections authorized by § 813(a) violate Sink’s fourth amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches.

In Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 98 S.Ct. 1816, 56 L.Ed.2d 305 (1978), the Supreme Court, affirming the general rule that warrantless searches are unreasonable, held that warrantless inspections to enforce the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 violate the fourth amendment. See also Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 87 S.Ct. 1727, 18 L.Ed.2d 930 (1967) (building code); See v. Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 87 S.Ct. 1737, 18 L.Ed.2d 943 (1967) (fire code). Barlow’s recognized exceptions to this general rule. It affirmed the validity of warrantless searches of premises occupied by businesses that historically have been subject to pervasive governmental regulation. Persons engaging in such businesses have no reasonable expectation of privacy. 436 U.S. at 313, 98 S.Ct. 1816. See, e. g., United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 92 S.Ct. 1593, 32 L.Ed.2d 87 (1972) (firearms); Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72, 90 S.Ct. 774, 25 L.Ed.2d 60 (1970) (liquor).

In addition, the Court responded to the argument that requiring warrants for OSHA inspections would invalidate warrantless inspections under all other regulatory schemes by explaining, 436 U.S. at 321, 98 S.Ct. at 1825, that:

The reasonableness of a warrantless search, however, will depend upon the specific enforcement needs and privacy guarantees of each statute. Some of the statutes cited apply only to a single industry, where regulations might already be so pervasive that a Colonnade-Biswell exception to the warrant requirement could apply. Some statutes already envision resort to federal-court enforcement when entry is refused, employing specific language in some cases .

As an illustration of such statutes, the Court referred to 30 U.S.C. § 818, the enforcement provision of the 1977 Mine Safety Act, which is the jurisdictional basis of this proceeding. 436 U.S. at 321-22 n.18, 98 S.Ct. 1816.

Clearly, the validity of a warrantless inspection of Sink’s mine depends on whether Barlow’s general rule or the Colonnade-Bis-well exception applies. Three courts, relying on this exception, have concluded that warrantless, routine inspections authorized by the Act are permissible. Marshall v. Nolichuckey Sand Co., 606 F.2d 693 (6th Cir. 1979); Marshall v. Stoudt’s Ferry Preparation Co., 602 F.2d 589 (3d Cir. 1979); Youghiogheny and Ohio Coal Co. v. Morton, 364 F.Supp. 45 (S.D.Ohio 1973) (three-judge court). All three decisions held that the congressional authorization of warrantless searches was not unreasonable because of the strong governmental interest in unannounced inspections, the limitations placed on the searches by the statute, and the pervasive governmental regulation of the mining industry. Stoudt’s Ferry and Nolichuckey distinguish Barlow’s on the *39 grounds that inspections under the Coal Act only affect one industry, are limited by specific provisions in the Act, and serve an overriding governmental interest in the safety of miners. Also, as Stoudt’s Ferry notes, Congress specifically approved Youghiogheny. 3 United States v. Consolidation Coal Co., 560 F.2d 214 (6th Cir. 1977), vacated and remanded, 436 U.S. 942, 98 S.Ct. 2842, 56 L.Ed.2d 783 (opinion on remand) 579 F.2d 1011 (6th Cir. 1978), on which Sink relies because of its requirement of an administrative warrant, does not conflict with these cases. The criminal nature of the investigation and the seizure of papers in the company’s office distinguish Consolidation from this appeal, which deals only with a routine safety inspection of Sink’s mine.

Although Sink’s small mine was not subject to federal regulation until 1969, his premises are not exempted from warrant-less inspections. See Marshall v. Nolichuckey Sand Co., 606 F.2d 693 (6th Cir. 1979); Marshall v. Stoudt’s Ferry Preparation Co., 602 F.2d 589 (3d Cir. 1979). Conditions in his mine may be as hazardous as the general mine conditions that prompted federal regulation.

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614 F.2d 37, 1980 U.S. App. LEXIS 21094, 1980 CCH OSHD 24,175, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/ray-marshall-secretary-of-labor-v-charles-t-sink-trading-and-doing-ca4-1980.