Ray E. Loper Lumber Company, Inc. v. United States of America, W. P. Brown and Son Lumber Company v. United States of America, Brown Lumber Company v. United States of America, the Mobile and Gulf Railroad Company v. United States

444 F.2d 301, 28 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 5074, 1971 U.S. App. LEXIS 9330
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
DecidedJune 24, 1971
Docket20786
StatusPublished

This text of 444 F.2d 301 (Ray E. Loper Lumber Company, Inc. v. United States of America, W. P. Brown and Son Lumber Company v. United States of America, Brown Lumber Company v. United States of America, the Mobile and Gulf Railroad Company v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Ray E. Loper Lumber Company, Inc. v. United States of America, W. P. Brown and Son Lumber Company v. United States of America, Brown Lumber Company v. United States of America, the Mobile and Gulf Railroad Company v. United States, 444 F.2d 301, 28 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 5074, 1971 U.S. App. LEXIS 9330 (6th Cir. 1971).

Opinion

444 F.2d 301

71-2 USTC P 9514

RAY E. LOPER LUMBER COMPANY, Inc., Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
UNITED STATES of America, Defendant-Appellee.
W. P. BROWN AND SON LUMBER COMPANY, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
UNITED STATES of America, Defendant-Appellee.
BROWN LUMBER COMPANY, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
UNITED STATES of America, Defendant-Appellee.
The MOBILE AND GULF RAILROAD COMPANY, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
UNITED STATES of America, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 20786.

United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.

June 24, 1971.

Charles F. Wood, Louisville, Ky., for plaintiffs-appellants.

William E. Estabrook, Tax Division, Dept. of Justice, Washington, D.C., for defendant-appellee; Johnnie M. Walters, Asst. Atty. Gen., Joseph M. Howard, Bennet N. Hollander, William S. Estabrook, III, Attys., Tax Division, Dept. of Justice, Washington, D.C., on brief; George J. Long, U.S. Atty., Louisville, Ky., of counsel.

Before PHILLIPS, Chief Judge, PECK, Circuit Judge, and McALLISTER, Senior Circuit Judge.

PHILLIPS, Chief Judge.

Accumulated earnings taxes were assessed against the appellant corporations under 531 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954. The narrow issue presented in this case is when did interest begin to run on these assessments.

The Government contends that interest runs from the due dates of the income tax returns of the taxpayers for the various taxable years in question. The taxpayers assert that interest did not begin to run until the date of notice and demand by the Commissioner.

In addition to the principal amount of accumulated earnings taxes assessed against them (the validity of which they do not contest), the taxpayer corporations paid interest totaling $272,866.86, calculated under the interpretation of the statute insisted upon by the Government. After denial of their claims for refund, the taxpayers filed this action for recovery of the interest.

The District Court held in favor of the Government. We reverse.

The facts were stipulated and are summarized in the findings of fact of the District Court. These undisputed findings are incorporated herein as Appendix A.

In support of its position the Government relies on 26 U.S.C. 6601(a), which provides as follows:

'6601. Interest on underpayment, nonpayment, or extensions of time for payment, of tax

'(a) General rule.-- If any amount of tax imposed by this title (whether required to be shown on a return, or to be paid by stamp or by some other method) is not paid on or before the last date prescribed for payment, interest on such amount at the rate of 6 percent per annum shall be paid for the period from such last date to the date paid.'

Under this section interest runs from the last day prescribed for payment of the tax to the date on which payment is received. The determinative question is what is the 'last date prescribed for payment' of accumulated earnings tax. To answer the question we look to the language of the applicable sections of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, together with the purpose of the accumulated earnings tax, the mode of its determination and the mechanics of its assessment.

The accumulated earnings tax is a surtax on any corporation 'formed or availed of for the purpose of avoiding the income tax with respect to its shareholders * * * by permitting earnings and profits to accumulate instead of being divided or distributed.' 26 U.S.C. 532. The tax is distinct from the income tax on corporations. It is a 'congressional attempt to deter use of a corporate entity to avoid personal income taxes.' Its purpose "is to compel the company to distribute any profits not needed for the conduct of its business so that, when so distributed, individual stockholders will become liable' for taxes on the dividends received.' United States v. Donruss Co., 393 U.S. 297, 303, 89 S.Ct. 501, 505, 21 L.Ed.2d 495.

The following description of the distinction between the tax on accumulated earnings and the corporate income tax is quoted from H. Mullis, Interest on the Accumulated Earnings Tax, 57 A.B.A.J. 378 (1971):

'Apart from its apparent prohibitive character, there are several additional respects in which the accumulated earnings tax differs noticeably from the other Chapter 1 corporate taxes. First, it is not required to be self-assessed by the corporation, i. e., there is no provision made in the corporate income tax return for its reporting, nor are there any schedules or instructions for current reporting of the item. Second, the tax is initiated and imposed in practice only after a prior administrative determination that corporate earnings and profits have been accumulated 'beyond the reasonable needs of the business'. Finally, liability for the tax is determined only after complex and difficult evaluations, i.e., whether the corporation was formed or availed of with the condemned intent and whether the accumulation exceeded the reasonable needs of the business.'

For a comprehensive statement of the history, development and purpose of the accumulated earnings tax, reference is made to the opinion of the Court of Claims in Motor Fuel Carriers, Inc. v. United States, 420 F.2d 702, 190 Ct.Cl. 385. In that decision the court held that interest on the accumulated earnings tax begins to run only after notice and demand. The court placed emphasis upon the fact that the tax is not selfassessing, saying:

'Even though the statute has not, since 1924, explicitly required the Commissioner of Internal Revenue to make a determination that the accumulation is unreasonable, and therefore that the tax is imposable, the actual practice is, and has been, that the tax is not 'self-assessing' but is levied only after and by determination of the Revenue Service. There is no provision in, or part of, Treasury Form 1120 (the return form) for reporting the amount subject to this tax; nor are there any schedules or instructions for reporting the item. It is left wholly to the Government's initiative. See Mertens, Law of Federal Income Taxation, Vol. 7, 39.57 (Rev. ed. 1967).

'This procedure has not come about by happenstance, the Treasury's neglect, or the irresponsibility of corporate taxpayers. It is inherent in the nature of the tax-- and was formerly recognized specifically by Congress-- that a taxpayer can hardly determine for itself, with any accuracy, if the tax is due, and if so to what extent.

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Related

United States v. Donruss Co.
393 U.S. 297 (Supreme Court, 1969)
Motor Fuel Carriers, Inc. v. The United States
420 F.2d 702 (Court of Claims, 1970)
Ray E. Loper Lumber Co. v. United States
444 F.2d 301 (Sixth Circuit, 1971)

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Bluebook (online)
444 F.2d 301, 28 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 5074, 1971 U.S. App. LEXIS 9330, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/ray-e-loper-lumber-company-inc-v-united-states-of-america-w-p-brown-ca6-1971.