Rawnsley v. Trenton Mutual Life Insurance

9 N.J. Eq. 95
CourtNew Jersey Court of Chancery
DecidedMay 15, 1852
StatusPublished
Cited by7 cases

This text of 9 N.J. Eq. 95 (Rawnsley v. Trenton Mutual Life Insurance) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering New Jersey Court of Chancery primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Rawnsley v. Trenton Mutual Life Insurance, 9 N.J. Eq. 95 (N.J. Ct. App. 1852).

Opinion

The Chancellor.

This bill is filed by Joshua Eawnsley, a policy-holder, and as such, by virtue of its charter, a member of “ The Trenton Mutual Life and Fire Insurance Company,” and by Andrew Barricklo, who alleges himself to be a creditor of the said company.

The proceedings are under the act entitled “An act to prevent frauds by incorporated companies,” and I am asked [96]*96now to - declare this company insolvent, and to' appoint receivers to wind up its concerns. •

By virtue of the general equity powers of the court, this bill could not be maintained. The relief sought for is under and by virtue of the statute which must guide the court in its decision of the case.

The court is authorized by the act, whenever an incorporated company has become insolvent, by petition or bill, exhibited by a creditor or stockholder, setting forth the facts and circumstances of the ease, to hear the matter in a summary way, upon the affidavits, proofs and allegations by or on behalf of the parties. If, upon such inquiry, it shall be made to appear that the said company has become insolvent, it shall be lawful for the Chancellor to restrain the company and its officers, by injunction, from exercising the privileges and franchises granted, and if the circumstances of the case, and the ends of justice require it, to appoint receivers, &c.

The powers conferred upon the court are extraordinary powers, and are to be exercised with caution, and only when the circumstances of the case and the ends of justice require it.

Where a creditor or stockholder comes into court under this act, it is not his particular grievance the court is to redress, or, his individual interest that is to be protected; but the very object of the act is to protect the public at large from imposition, and to promote and s.ecure the general interest of the stockholders and creditors.

Nor is the court bound, as a matter of course, to issue the injunction, though it is made satisfactorily to appear that the company is insolvent. The Chancellor must exercise his best discretion, and exert the powers conferred, for the safety of the public and the advantage of the stockholders and creditors.

Nor has the Chancellor any right to act in the premises except on the case made before him. The bill or petition, the act expressly says, must set forth the facts and circumstances of the case.

Affidavits and proofs may be read, but for no purpose ex[97]*97cept to sustain the ease made by the bill, and by the opposite party in its disproof and denial. It will not do simply to charge that the company is insolvent, and then take affidavits to show facts and circumstances not alluded to in the bill, to make out such insolvency. It is no trifling matter for the court, where the legislature have incorporated a company with extensive powers, by the exercise of which a large amount of capital has become employed, and in which thousands of our citizens have become interested and their property involved, to strip it in a summary way of all its franchises and privileges, and determine the rights of individuals connected with it. It is a case where the court is to exercise great caution ; and I think I may safely say, where a single stockholder, together with a creditor of the company, files a bill under this act, if the bill, taking all the facts and circumstances stated as true, will not justify the issuing of an injunction •, no affidavits, or proofs, respecting collateral matters, though they tend to prove the company insolvent, will justify the court in granting the prayer of the bill. The complainant may amend his bill, and make a case upon which the court can act. But it would be in violation of the well-established practice of this court, and I think unjust, for the court to exercise the powers conferred by this act of the legislature, unlesá the facts and circumstances of the ease, as set out in the bill, will warrant it. It is a summary proceeding, and, in its nature and effect, a final hearing upon its merits. By every principle of practice and pleading, the proofs must be pertinent to the issue: seoundum allegata.

It is very proper in a case of this kind, when there has been any fraudulent conduct on the part of the directors or agents of the company, any misapplication of funds or violation of trust, to set out such acts and violations of duty in the bill, not because the court can, upon any or all of these grounds, grant the relief contemplated by the act, but because they have a bearing upon the question at issue, and give point and strength to the circumstances relied upon to make the insolvency of the company.

[98]*98But it is not competent, where there are no corresponding charges in the bill, to impugn, by affidavits, the character or conduct of the directors or agents of the company, and make a case upon which the court is to act, not even alluded to in the bill of complaint.

These remarks are made because they have a direct bearing upon the ease in hand.

This company was incorporated by an act of the 5th of February, 1847, and the privileges and franchises conferred upon it may be summed up in a few words. It has power to insure lives, and to make all and every insurance appertaining to or connected with life risks, of whatever kind or nature, and also to insure all kinds of property, both real and personal, against loss or damage by fire. And. the act would seem to confer power enough to devise and contrive, at the discretion of the directors, any and all schemes to insure life risks, and against fire, and to any extent the public might see fit to embark in the risk. There are no restrictions in the charter, except that the company is subject to those contained in the act entitled' “An act concerning corporations/ and which, in this case, amounts to little or nothing in limiting the discretion of the directors in the exercise of the powers conferred by the charter.

By the second section of the act, it is declared that all persons insured in the association, while they so continue, shall be deemed and taken as members thereof.

Joshua Rawnsley, one of the complainants, effected an insurance on his house in the city of Trenton for the sum of $3000, for which he paid $12 cash, and gave his premium note for $120, on which the $12 was credited.

Andrew Barrieklo, the other complainant, had ah insurance upon his store goods to the amount of $3000. His goods were destroyed by fire, and he claims to be a creditor to the amount of this insurance.

Do these complainants make out a case by their bill, to justify the court in declaring the company insolvent ?

The bill charges distinctly that the company is insolvent. [99]*99But what are the facts and circumstances stated to sustain the charge ?

.Let us look first at the general, and then at the specific allegations.

It is charged “ that the said the Trenton Mutual Life and Eire Insurance Company, on or about the 21st day of April, 1852, stopped payment, and stopped carrying on the business of insurance, and have neglected and refused to pay their losses for want of funds, when the same were presented for that purpose ; and neglect and refuse to pay their just debts when demanded within the usual hours of business ; and have suspended from the time last mentioned the ordinary business of the said company for want of funds to carry on their business.”

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Bluebook (online)
9 N.J. Eq. 95, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/rawnsley-v-trenton-mutual-life-insurance-njch-1852.