Rawlings v. State

720 S.W.2d 561, 1986 Tex. App. LEXIS 8594
CourtCourt of Appeals of Texas
DecidedAugust 13, 1986
Docket3-85-215-CR
StatusPublished
Cited by7 cases

This text of 720 S.W.2d 561 (Rawlings v. State) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Rawlings v. State, 720 S.W.2d 561, 1986 Tex. App. LEXIS 8594 (Tex. Ct. App. 1986).

Opinion

EARL W. SMITH, Justice.

Appellant, Michael Rawlings, was convicted by the jury of the offense of aggravated sexual assault as alleged in the indictment, which alleged that Rawlings used and exhibited a deadly weapon, to wit, a knife, in the commission of the offense. Tex.Pen.Code Ann. §§ 22.011 and 22.021 (Supp.1986). The jury also found the allegations in paragraph two of the indictment, that Rawlings had been convicted previously of the felony offense of theft, were “True,” and assessed punishment at confinement in the Department of Corrections for 99 years. Tex.Pen.Code Ann. § 12.-42(c) (Supp.1986). The trial court adjudged Rawlings guilty and assessed punishment as found by the jury.

Rawlings filed a motion to suppress “any photographs offered into evidence used in any pre-trial photographic line-up” and to suppress “any in-court identification of Defendant by the alleged victim who viewed an impermissibly suggestive photographic line-up of Defendant” and alleged, further:

II.
The photographic identification process by the State of Texas prior to any in-court proceedings was conducted in such a manner as to deny Defendant due process of law under the United States Constitution for the following reasons:
(a) Defendant was not represented by counsel at the time;
(b) Defendant was not personally present at the time;
(c) the alleged victim, [W.R.] at the time of the alleged incident made the basis of the charge against Defendant:
1. had a limited opportunity to view any assailant who allegedly sexually assaulted her on September 28, 1984.
2. was excited and emotional at the time of the alleged sexual assault;
3. had poor conditions in which to view any assailant who allegedly sexually assaulted her;
4. was only able to give a general description of her alleged assailant immediately after the incident;
(d) conflicts exist between the alleged victim’s first description of assailant and the actual appearance of Defendant; and
(e) The alleged victim, [W.R.], had been told prior to being shown the photograph of Defendant’s hand that he was a suspect.
*563 III.
The photographic identification proceeding was conducted in such a manner as to make it impermissibly suggestive and conducive to irreparable harm of mistaken identity.

On the date of the trial, but before the introduction of evidence, a hearing was held on the motion to suppress. At the conclusion of evidence and argument thereon, the trial court overruled the motion without making any oral or written findings of fact or conclusions of law to aid this Court on appeal — a practice suggested, but not made mandatory, by the Court of Criminal Appeals in Martinez v. State, 437 S.W.2d 842 (Tex.Cr.App.1969). In his motion for new trial, Rawlings contended that the trial court erred in overruling his motion to suppress.

In his first two grounds of error, Rawl-ings contends that the trial court abused its discretion in overruling his motion for new trial, because (1) the out-of-court photographic lineup of defendant was impermis-sibly suggestive and gave rise to a substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification and (2) the trial court erred in allowing the victim’s in-court identification of appellant, because such identification was tainted by the out-of-court photographic line-up and the in-court identification was not shown to be of independent origin.

In his third ground of error, Rawlings contends that the trial court erred in allowing evidence concerning the out-of-court identification because the defendant was in custody and the photographic display was conducted in the absence of counsel in violation of the defendant’s rights under the Sixth and Fourteenth amendments of the United States Constitution.

In discussing appellant’s grounds of error, we find that the sole method of identification of Rawlings as the person who sexually assaulted W.R., the alleged victim, was based upon a tattoo on his left hand; i.e., W.R. could not, and did not, identify Rawlings in any other manner. For example, W.R. testified:

Q. So the person that was arrested, you could not identify except for that ta-too in that picture? [Picture of the left hand of appellant showing the tattoo on it] 1
A. Uh-huh.

Such method of identification is conceded by the State in its brief:

The identification of victim’s assailant turned not on facial recognition, but the identification of a tatoo that the assailant had on the web area between the thumb and forefinger of his left hand. The victim observed the tatoo during the sexual assault on September 23, 1981

It is further conceded by the State in its argument to the jury:

If you believe her, then I believe you’ve got one choice to make, just one choice. If you believe her, the eyewitness, the person who studied the tatoo on that person’s arm, she said his fingernails were well clipped. If you believe her that she saw that and she had collected her thoughts long enough to know that that was going to be important, that was her only chance and that’s all it comes down to and you know that. It all comes down to that tatoo and that was her one chance to be able to identify that person. Don’t you know she knew that was important? She didn’t look at anything else but that hand.

(Emphasis added.)

There being no question that W.R. was assaulted, we therefore address ourselves to the controlling issue, to wit:

WERE THE OUT-OF-COURT IDENTIFICATION PROCEDURES AND METHODS BASED ON SO IMPERMIS-SIBLY SUGGESTIVE TACTICS EMPLOYED BY THE STATE AS TO GIVE RISE TO A SUBSTANTIAL LIKELIHOOD OF IRREPARABLE MISIDEN- *564 TIPI CATION; AND IF SO, WAS THE IN-COURT IDENTIFICATION OF THE TATTOO TAINTED BY SUCH PROCEDURES, OR WAS IT OF INDEPENDENT ORIGIN?
THE SEXUAL ASSAULT AND DESCRIPTION OF ASSAILANT’S TATTOO

On Saturday night, September 23, 1984, W.R. completed her eight-hour shift as a waitress and arrived at her two-bedroom apartment (which she shared with a male roommate) at midnight. She took a shower, ate a sandwich while watching television, went to bed and fell asleep almost immediately. Since her roommate, Scott Manley, was out of town, no one else was in the apartment. At 2:00 a.m. she awoke when someone opened her door and peeked in. The time was fixed by W.R. looking at her clock when she awoke. She asked who it was, getting a reply: “It’s James.” There was a dim light outside her door, which came from a table lamp in the living room.

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Bluebook (online)
720 S.W.2d 561, 1986 Tex. App. LEXIS 8594, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/rawlings-v-state-texapp-1986.