Rawles v. kavanaugh/jones/brock/stapley

• Court: Arizona Supreme Court
• Decided: January 27, 2004
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

SUPREME COURT OF ARIZONA En Banc

TOM RAWLES and LINDA RAWLES ) Arizona Supreme Court individuals and electors, ) No. CV-04-0005-AP/EL ) Petitioners, ) ) Maricopa County v. ) Superior Court ) No. CV2003-024219 DENNIS KAVANAUGH, real party in ) interest; BARBARA JONES, the ) duly appointed City Clerk who is ) named solely in her official ) capacity; R. FULTON BROCK, DON ) STAPLEY, ANDREW M. KUNASEK, MARY ) ROSE WILCOX, and MAX WILSON, as ) duly elected and appointed ) MEMORANDUM DECISION members of the Maricopa County ) (Not for Publication, Board of Supervisors who are ) Ariz. R. Sup. Ct. 111) named solely in their official ) capacity; HELEN PURCELL, the ) duly elected Maricopa County ) Recorder who is named solely in ) her official capacity; and KAREN ) OSBORNE, the duly appointed ) Maricopa County Director of ) Elections who is named solely in ) her official capacity, ) ) Respondents. ) __________________________________)

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County The Honorable Paul A. Katz, Judge

AFFIRMED

MUELLER & DRURY, P.C. Scottsdale by Douglas V. Drury Attorney for Petitioners Rawles

GAMMAGE & BURNHAM, P.L.C. Phoenix by Lisa T. Hauser and Leonard W. Aragon Attorneys for Respondent Kavanaugh CITY OF MESA ATTORNEY’S OFFICE Mesa by Deborah J. Spinner, City Attorney Attorney for Respondent Barbara Jones

RICHARD M. ROMLEY, MARICOPA COUNTY ATTORNEY Phoenix by Bruce P. White, Deputy County Attorney and Jill M. Kennedy, Deputy County Attorney Attorneys for Respondents Brock, Stapley, Kunasek, Wilcox, Wilson, Purcell, and Osborne

B E R C H, Justice

¶1 Respondent-Appellant Dennis Kavanaugh seeks review of

the superior court’s judgment that the term-limits provision in

the Mesa City Charter prohibits him from seeking an additional

term as a City Councilmember. Kavanaugh asserts that the

superior court erred in applying the two-term limitation to

prevent him from seeking a third term because his two terms as a

Councilmember were served in different positions. Kavanaugh

also argues that the claims of Petitioners Tom and Linda Rawles

should be barred by laches. Because of time constraints in this

accelerated election appeal, we previously issued an order

vacating an existing stay order and affirming the superior

court’s order enjoining the printing of electoral ballots

containing Kavanaugh’s name as a candidate for the Mesa City

Council. We stated that a written decision would follow

explaining this court’s ruling. This is that decision.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 In 1996, Dennis Kavanaugh was elected in an “at-large”

election to serve on the Mesa City Council for a four-year term.

- 2 - Under the “at-large” system, all municipal electors were

eligible to vote for all six City Councilmembers. Each

prevailing candidate served a four-year term as Councilmember

representing the entire city. In 1998, the Mesa City Charter

was amended to divide the city into six geographic districts,

each of which elected its own District Councilmember. Under the

new system, an elector may vote only for candidates from the

elector’s home district. In the first election under the

amended system in 2000, Kavanaugh was elected the District 3

Councilmember.

¶3 The Mesa City Charter has contained a term-limits

provision for City Councilmembers since 1967. That provision

prohibits any person from serving as a “Councilmember for more

than two (2) consecutive four- (4-) year terms.” Kavanaugh’s

term as the District’s Councilmember expires this year. After

receiving advice from the Mesa City Attorney that the term-

limits provision did not prevent him from serving an additional

term, Kavanaugh completed the required petitions and submitted

them on December 8, 2003.

¶4 On December 22, 2003, Tom Rawles, the only other

candidate for District 3 Councilmember, and his wife, Linda,

filed a petition in superior court pursuant to Arizona Revised

Statutes (“A.R.S.”) section 16-351(B) (Supp. 2003) challenging

Kavanaugh’s candidacy. The petition alleged that Kavanaugh had

- 3 - already served two terms as a Councilmember and was thus

ineligible to seek a third term. In response, Kavanaugh claimed

that because the Rawleses delayed in seeking relief, their

action was barred by the doctrine of laches. Kavanaugh also

asserted that Mesa’s term-limits provision did not prohibit him

from serving an additional term because he had only served one

term as a “District Councilmember,” the other term having been

served as a “Councilmember at-large.”

¶5 The superior court found that both “at-large

Councilmembers” and “District Councilmembers” served as

“Councilmembers” as that term was used in the term-limits

provision. The court also found that both parties acted in good

faith and there was no undue delay, and therefore rejected

Kavanaugh’s laches defense. The court entered judgment

enjoining the City from listing Kavanaugh as a candidate on the

ballots for the upcoming City Council election. Kavanaugh filed

a timely appeal.

DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

¶6 In an appeal from a declaratory judgment action

brought in the superior court, the reviewing court must defer to

the trial court’s findings of fact, but is not bound by the

trial court’s conclusions of law. Motel 6 Operating Ltd. P’ship

v. City of Flagstaff, 195 Ariz. 569, 570-71, ¶ 7, 991 P.2d 272,

- 4 - 273-74 (App. 1999). The parties agreed that there were no

issues of fact in dispute. Accordingly, we move directly to the

trial court’s legal determinations, which we review de novo.

Id. at 571, 991 P.2d at 274.

B. Merits1

1. Term-Limits Provision

¶7 Kavanaugh appeals the superior court’s judgment that

the Mesa City Charter’s term-limits provision precludes his bid

for reelection as District 3 Councilmember. He asserts that the

provision does not apply to this case because he has only served

a single term as a “District Councilmember.” We disagree with

his analysis.

¶8 Section 201(E) of the Mesa City Charter provides that

“[n]o person shall be eligible to be elected to the office of

Councilmember for more than two (2) consecutive four- (4-) year

terms.” Because we indulge “a presumption in favor of the

eligibility” of candidates, see McCarthy v. State ex rel.

Harless, 55 Ariz. 328, 335, 101 P.2d 449, 451 (1940), we view

1 In the original action before Judge Paul A. Katz, Kavanaugh contested the court’s jurisdiction to hear the dispute, alleging that the Mesa City Charter provided its City Council with original jurisdiction over candidate-qualification disputes. Judge Katz rejected Kavanaugh’s argument, holding that the superior court was an appropriate venue and had jurisdiction under A.R.S. § 16-351. Kavanaugh expressly declined to appeal Judge Katz’s ruling on this issue. Consequently, we do not consider the issue of jurisdiction in this decision.

- 5 - narrowly such limits on a candidate’s ability to serve. Id. at

334-35, 101 P.2d at 451 (noting that we should read restrictions

so as not to “impair[] the right of the people to select

officers of their own choosing”).

¶9 Nonetheless, we interpret statutes, rules and charter

provisions according to their plain language, giving “full

effect to the intent of the lawmaker.” Adams v. Bolin, 74 Ariz.

269, 276, 247 P.2d 617, 621 (1952). The word “Councilmember” in

the 1967 term-limits provision does not distinguish between

district and at-large members. It appears to refer to all

individuals who serve as members of the City Council.

¶10 Kavanaugh contends, however, that the language change

in the City Charter following the 1998 amendments renders “at-

large Councilmember” and “DISTRICT Councilmember” two distinct

positions. Kavanaugh notes that the 1998 amendments changed the

language of Section 201(A) from “[t]here shall be a City Council

consisting of a Mayor and six (6) other Councilmembers” to its

current version: “There shall be a City Council consisting of a

Mayor and six (6) other DISTRICT Councilmembers.” (Emphasis in

original.) Thus, Kavanaugh asserts that “the two-term-

limitation only applies prospectively to the newly created

District Councilmembers.”

¶11 Kavanaugh’s argument is undercut not only by the plain

language of the term-limits provision, but also by the practical

- 6 - effect that such a rigid construction would have on the term-

limits rule. If adopted, the argument that the position of

“District Councilmember” is distinct from that of an “at-large

Councilmember” would eviscerate the term-limits rule. By that

reasoning, if council boundaries shifted, a Councilmember would

hold a new district position, one not subject to the term-limits

rule. Nor under this reasoning would Kavanaugh be barred from

serving a third or fourth term as a Councilmember if he moved

from District 3 to another district. Indeed, because the City

has recently changed to district representation, Kavanaugh’s

interpretation would mean that the term-limits provision applies

to no one for this election cycle. Moreover, if the position of

“District Councilmember” is separate and distinct from the

position of “Councilmember,” the former would appear not to be

bound at all by Section 201(E)’s limitation on the terms of

“Councilmembers.” This could not have been the intent of the

drafters. The plain language of Section 201(E), that “[n]o

person shall be eligible to be elected to the office of

Councilmember for more than two (2) consecutive four- (4-) year

terms,” must be construed to mean what it says.

¶12 Additionally, we note that despite the fact that

Kavanaugh originally served as an “at-large Councilmember”

before becoming a “District Councilmember,” he does the same job

and represents many of the same constituents he represented

- 7 - before. This is not a “new” or “distinct” public office.

Rather, it appears that the 1998 amendments merely added the

term “District” to the position title to highlight that future

Councilmembers would be elected from districts rather than

serving at-large.

¶13 We therefore conclude that Section 201(E) of the Mesa

City Charter should be read to limit the ability of all

Councilmembers to exceed the term-limits rule. This view is

consistent both with a reading of the Charter as a whole and

with an existing Attorney General Opinion that redistricting

should not be permitted to circumvent term limits. See Op.

Ariz. Att’y Gen. I01-019 (noting that term limits reduce the

advantages of incumbency, a purpose that is hindered if a

redistricting process allows an incumbent to run for an

additional term).2

2. Laches

¶14 Kavanaugh asserts that the Rawleses’ claim should be

barred by the doctrine of laches because they failed to

challenge Kavanaugh’s candidacy in a timely manner. We

2 Kavanaugh attempts to distinguish his case by noting that his situation is not one of redistricting, but rather “districting” for the first time. This distinction is not compelling, as the overriding issue remains whether a candidate can exceed a term-limits rule simply by changing constituencies or having his constituency changed. In both situations - redistricting and districting - the candidate is alleging that his term limits are not implicated since he now represents a different constituency.

- 8 - disagree.

¶15 The defense of laches is available in election

disputes. See, e.g., Mathieu v. Mahoney, 174 Ariz. 456, 459,

851 P.2d 81, 84 (1993) (noting that the “concern with timeliness

stems in part from the notion that ‘disputes concerning election

and petition matters must be initiated and heard in time to

prepare the ballots for absentee voting to avoid rendering an

action moot’”) (quoting Kromko v. Superior Court, 168 Ariz. 51,

57, 811 P.2d 12, 18 (1991)). The current case raises concerns

similar to those in Mathieu because it, too, was brought on the

eve of ballot preparation.

¶16 However, the facts of Mathieu differ with respect to

both the extent of and the purpose for the delay in bringing the

action. In Mathieu, the petitioners did not file an action

until more than a year after learning of a group’s intent to

have an initiative placed on the ballot. Id. at 459, 851 P.2d

at 84. The evidence in the current case is that the Rawleses

filed their action within ten days after Kavanaugh qualified for

the ballot, as required by A.R.S. § 16-351.

¶17 Kavanaugh argues that the Rawleses should have brought

this action long before December 22, 2003, the date this case

was filed. He points to evidence that Tom Rawles knew no later

than October 22, 2003, of Kavanaugh’s interest in seeking an

additional term. We note, however, that Kavanaugh did not

- 9 - become an official candidate until he submitted his petitions on

December 8, 2003, the last day for submitting candidacy

petitions. Thus any claim before December 8, 2003 would

arguably not have been ripe. See Winkle v. City of Tucson, 190

Ariz. 413, 415, 949 P.2d 502, 504 (1997) (“The ripeness doctrine

prevents a court from rendering a premature judgment or opinion

on a situation that may never occur.”). Only two weeks passed

between the time that the Rawleses’ action ripened and the time

they filed this action. Consequently, we agree with the trial

court’s determination that both parties acted in good faith and

affirm the court’s conclusion that the doctrine of laches does

not apply.

CONCLUSION

¶18 We affirm the decision of the superior court that the

name of Councilmember Kavanaugh shall not appear on the 2004

District 3 ballot for the City of Mesa, Arizona.

__________________________________ Rebecca White Berch, Justice

CONCURRING:

________________________________________ Charles E. Jones, Chief Justice

________________________________________ Ruth V. McGregor, Vice Chief Justice

- 10 - ________________________________________ Michael D. Ryan, Justice

________________________________________ Andrew D. Hurwitz, Justice

- 11 -