18-2127 Ravi v. Barr BIA Hom, IJ A205 941 618 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals 2 for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall 3 United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of 4 New York, on the 2nd day of December, two thousand twenty. 5 6 PRESENT: 7 DEBRA ANN LIVINGSTON, 8 Chief Judge, 9 PIERRE N. LEVAL, 10 RICHARD J. SULLIVAN, 11 Circuit Judges. 12 _____________________________________ 13 14 RAVI, AKA RAVI KUMAR, 15 Petitioner, 16 17 v. 18-2127 18 NAC 19 WILLIAM P. BARR, UNITED STATES 20 ATTORNEY GENERAL, 21 Respondent. 22 _____________________________________ 23 24 FOR PETITIONER: Jaspreet Singh, Esq., Jackson 25 Heights, NY. 26 27 FOR RESPONDENT: Ethan P. Davis, Acting Assistant 28 Attorney General; Edward E. 29 Wiggers, Senior Litigation 30 Counsel, Nicole J. Thomas-Dorris, 31 Trial Attorney, Office of 32 Immigration Litigation, United 33 1 States Department of Justice, 2 Washington, DC. 3 4 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a
5 Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby
6 ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review
7 is DENIED.
8 Petitioner Ravi, also known as Ravi Kumar, a native and
9 citizen of India, seeks review of a June 25, 2018 decision of
10 the BIA affirming a July 28, 2017 decision of an Immigration
11 Judge (“IJ”) denying asylum, withholding of removal, and
12 relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). In re
13 Ravi Kumar, No. A205 941 618 (B.I.A. June 25, 2018), aff’g
14 No. A205 941 618 (Immig. Ct. N.Y.C. July 28, 2017). We assume
15 the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and
16 procedural history.
17 Under the circumstances of this case, we have reviewed
18 both the IJ’s and BIA’s decisions. Wangchuck v. Dep’t of
19 Homeland Sec., 448 F.3d 524, 528 (2d Cir. 2006). We review
20 the agency’s factual findings under the substantial evidence
21 standard, treating them as “conclusive unless any reasonable
22 adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.”
23 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); see also Corovic v. Mukasey, 519
24 F.3d 90, 95 (2d Cir. 2008). “We review de novo questions of
2 1 law and the application of law to undisputed fact.”
2 Salimatou Bah v. Mukasey, 529 F.3d 99, 110 (2d Cir. 2008).
3 To establish asylum eligibility, an applicant must show
4 that he has suffered past persecution, or has a well-founded
5 fear of future persecution, “on account of race, religion,
6 nationality, membership in a particular social group, or
7 political opinion.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42). If the
8 applicant is found to have suffered past persecution, he is
9 presumed to have a well-founded fear of future persecution on
10 the basis of the original claim. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1).
11 I. Past Persecution
12 “[P]ersecution is ‘an extreme concept that does not
13 include every sort of treatment our society regards as
14 offensive.’” Mei Fun Wong v. Holder, 633 F.3d 64, 72 (2d
15 Cir. 2011) (quoting Ai Feng Yuan v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice,
16 416 F.3d 192, 198 (2d Cir. 2005)). Past persecution may
17 “encompass[] a variety of forms of adverse treatment,
18 including non-life-threatening violence and physical abuse,”
19 but the harm must be sufficiently severe, rising above
20 “mere harassment.” Ivanishvili v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 433
21 F.3d 332, 341 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and
22 brackets omitted). “‘[T]he difference between harassment and
3 1 persecution is necessarily one of degree,’ . . . the degree
2 must be assessed with regard to the context in which the
3 mistreatment occurs.” Beskovic v. Gonzales, 467 F.3d 223,
4 226 (2d Cir. 2006) (quoting Ivanishvili, 433 F.3d at 341).
5 In evaluating past persecution, the agency must consider the
6 harm suffered in the aggregate. Poradisova v. Gonzales, 420
7 F.3d 70, 79–80 (2d Cir. 2005).
8 The agency did not err by determining that Ravi’s past
9 harm did not rise to the level of persecution. Ravi alleged
10 two incidents lasting five to seven minutes in which he was
11 slapped and then slapped and punched by three individuals
12 whom he believed were members of the Congress Party. He
13 contended that they targeted him because he was hanging
14 posters for his own party, the Indian National Lok Dal
15 (“INLD”). But although he stated that these incidents caused
16 “deep injuries,” he provided no description of them and did
17 not seek any treatment. We attach small importance to his
18 failure to seek treatment because he testified that he was
19 threatened with death if he sought treatment. Nonetheless,
20 speaking conclusorily of “deep injuries,” Ravi provided no
21 details. Accordingly, given the lack of specific evidence
22 of injury and the fact that the incidents did not occur in
4 1 the context of an arrest or detention, we find no error in
2 the agency’s conclusion that this harm did not rise to the
3 level of persecution. See Jian Qiu Liu v. Holder, 632 F.3d
4 820, 821–22 (2d Cir. 2011) (upholding agency’s conclusion
5 that applicant’s beating by family planning officials did not
6 rise to level of persecution where it occurred prior to
7 detention and applicant required no formal medical
8 attention); Beskovic, 467 F.3d at 226 (“The BIA must,
9 therefore, be keenly sensitive to the fact that a ‘minor
10 beating’ or, for that matter, any physical degradation
11 designed to cause pain, humiliation, or other suffering, may
12 rise to the level of persecution if it occurred in the context
13 of an arrest or detention on the basis of a protected
14 ground.”).
15 II. Fear of Future Persecution
16 Absent a finding of past persecution, an applicant may
17 establish asylum eligibility based on a fear of
18 future persecution, but the applicant must show that “he
19 subjectively fears persecution and establish that his fear is
20 objectively reasonable.” Ramsameachire v. Ashcroft, 357 F.3d
21 169, 178 (2d Cir. 2004). Although a fear may be objectively
22 reasonable “even if there is only a slight, though
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18-2127 Ravi v. Barr BIA Hom, IJ A205 941 618 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals 2 for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall 3 United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of 4 New York, on the 2nd day of December, two thousand twenty. 5 6 PRESENT: 7 DEBRA ANN LIVINGSTON, 8 Chief Judge, 9 PIERRE N. LEVAL, 10 RICHARD J. SULLIVAN, 11 Circuit Judges. 12 _____________________________________ 13 14 RAVI, AKA RAVI KUMAR, 15 Petitioner, 16 17 v. 18-2127 18 NAC 19 WILLIAM P. BARR, UNITED STATES 20 ATTORNEY GENERAL, 21 Respondent. 22 _____________________________________ 23 24 FOR PETITIONER: Jaspreet Singh, Esq., Jackson 25 Heights, NY. 26 27 FOR RESPONDENT: Ethan P. Davis, Acting Assistant 28 Attorney General; Edward E. 29 Wiggers, Senior Litigation 30 Counsel, Nicole J. Thomas-Dorris, 31 Trial Attorney, Office of 32 Immigration Litigation, United 33 1 States Department of Justice, 2 Washington, DC. 3 4 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a
5 Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby
6 ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review
7 is DENIED.
8 Petitioner Ravi, also known as Ravi Kumar, a native and
9 citizen of India, seeks review of a June 25, 2018 decision of
10 the BIA affirming a July 28, 2017 decision of an Immigration
11 Judge (“IJ”) denying asylum, withholding of removal, and
12 relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). In re
13 Ravi Kumar, No. A205 941 618 (B.I.A. June 25, 2018), aff’g
14 No. A205 941 618 (Immig. Ct. N.Y.C. July 28, 2017). We assume
15 the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and
16 procedural history.
17 Under the circumstances of this case, we have reviewed
18 both the IJ’s and BIA’s decisions. Wangchuck v. Dep’t of
19 Homeland Sec., 448 F.3d 524, 528 (2d Cir. 2006). We review
20 the agency’s factual findings under the substantial evidence
21 standard, treating them as “conclusive unless any reasonable
22 adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.”
23 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); see also Corovic v. Mukasey, 519
24 F.3d 90, 95 (2d Cir. 2008). “We review de novo questions of
2 1 law and the application of law to undisputed fact.”
2 Salimatou Bah v. Mukasey, 529 F.3d 99, 110 (2d Cir. 2008).
3 To establish asylum eligibility, an applicant must show
4 that he has suffered past persecution, or has a well-founded
5 fear of future persecution, “on account of race, religion,
6 nationality, membership in a particular social group, or
7 political opinion.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42). If the
8 applicant is found to have suffered past persecution, he is
9 presumed to have a well-founded fear of future persecution on
10 the basis of the original claim. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1).
11 I. Past Persecution
12 “[P]ersecution is ‘an extreme concept that does not
13 include every sort of treatment our society regards as
14 offensive.’” Mei Fun Wong v. Holder, 633 F.3d 64, 72 (2d
15 Cir. 2011) (quoting Ai Feng Yuan v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice,
16 416 F.3d 192, 198 (2d Cir. 2005)). Past persecution may
17 “encompass[] a variety of forms of adverse treatment,
18 including non-life-threatening violence and physical abuse,”
19 but the harm must be sufficiently severe, rising above
20 “mere harassment.” Ivanishvili v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 433
21 F.3d 332, 341 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and
22 brackets omitted). “‘[T]he difference between harassment and
3 1 persecution is necessarily one of degree,’ . . . the degree
2 must be assessed with regard to the context in which the
3 mistreatment occurs.” Beskovic v. Gonzales, 467 F.3d 223,
4 226 (2d Cir. 2006) (quoting Ivanishvili, 433 F.3d at 341).
5 In evaluating past persecution, the agency must consider the
6 harm suffered in the aggregate. Poradisova v. Gonzales, 420
7 F.3d 70, 79–80 (2d Cir. 2005).
8 The agency did not err by determining that Ravi’s past
9 harm did not rise to the level of persecution. Ravi alleged
10 two incidents lasting five to seven minutes in which he was
11 slapped and then slapped and punched by three individuals
12 whom he believed were members of the Congress Party. He
13 contended that they targeted him because he was hanging
14 posters for his own party, the Indian National Lok Dal
15 (“INLD”). But although he stated that these incidents caused
16 “deep injuries,” he provided no description of them and did
17 not seek any treatment. We attach small importance to his
18 failure to seek treatment because he testified that he was
19 threatened with death if he sought treatment. Nonetheless,
20 speaking conclusorily of “deep injuries,” Ravi provided no
21 details. Accordingly, given the lack of specific evidence
22 of injury and the fact that the incidents did not occur in
4 1 the context of an arrest or detention, we find no error in
2 the agency’s conclusion that this harm did not rise to the
3 level of persecution. See Jian Qiu Liu v. Holder, 632 F.3d
4 820, 821–22 (2d Cir. 2011) (upholding agency’s conclusion
5 that applicant’s beating by family planning officials did not
6 rise to level of persecution where it occurred prior to
7 detention and applicant required no formal medical
8 attention); Beskovic, 467 F.3d at 226 (“The BIA must,
9 therefore, be keenly sensitive to the fact that a ‘minor
10 beating’ or, for that matter, any physical degradation
11 designed to cause pain, humiliation, or other suffering, may
12 rise to the level of persecution if it occurred in the context
13 of an arrest or detention on the basis of a protected
14 ground.”).
15 II. Fear of Future Persecution
16 Absent a finding of past persecution, an applicant may
17 establish asylum eligibility based on a fear of
18 future persecution, but the applicant must show that “he
19 subjectively fears persecution and establish that his fear is
20 objectively reasonable.” Ramsameachire v. Ashcroft, 357 F.3d
21 169, 178 (2d Cir. 2004). Although a fear may be objectively
22 reasonable “even if there is only a slight, though
5 1 discernible, chance of persecution,” Diallo v. INS, 232 F.3d
2 279, 284 (2d Cir. 2000), a fear is not objectively reasonable
3 if it lacks “solid support” in the record and is merely
4 “speculative at best,” Jian Xing Huang v. U.S. INS, 421 F.3d
5 125, 129 (2d Cir. 2005). To demonstrate a well-founded fear,
6 an applicant must show either a reasonable possibility that
7 he would be singled out for persecution or that the country
8 of removal has a pattern or practice of persecuting
9 individuals similarly situated to him. 8 C.F.R.
10 § 1208.13(b)(2)(iii). The agency did not err in determining
11 that Ravi failed to establish a well-founded fear of future
12 persecution because the country conditions evidence reported
13 general corruption and criminal activity by the Congress
14 Party, but identified attacks mainly against INLD leaders,
15 not members, and reflected that the police had intervened to
16 stop clashes between the parties during 2009 elections.
17 Ravi’s failure to meet his burden for asylum is also
18 dispositive of withholding of removal. See Lecaj v. Holder,
19 616 F.3d 111, 119 (2d Cir. 2010).
20 III. Torture
21 Ravi’s CAT claim fails for the same reasons. The alleged
22 past harm did not rise to the level of torture. See 8 C.F.R.
6 1 § 1208.18(a)(2), (4) (defining torture as “extreme form of
2 cruel and inhuman treatment” that “does not include lesser
3 forms of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment” and
4 requiring, in relevant part, “severe physical pain and
5 suffering” or “threat of imminent death”); Kyaw Zwar Tun v.
6 INS, 445 F.3d 554, 567 (2d Cir. 2006) (“[T]orture requires
7 proof of something more severe than the kind of treatment
8 that would suffice to prove persecution”). And the country
9 conditions evidence discusses general corruption and crime or
10 attacks against party leaders and thus does not show that
11 someone in Ravi’s particular circumstances faces a likelihood
12 of torture. See Jian Xing Huang, 421 F.3d at 129; Mu Xiang
13 Lin v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 432 F.3d 156, 160 (2d Cir. 2005)
14 (requiring “particularized evidence” beyond general country
15 conditions to support a CAT claim).
16 For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is
17 DENIED. All pending motions and applications are DENIED and
18 stays VACATED.
19 FOR THE COURT: 20 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, 21 Clerk of Court