KINCAID, J. pro tem.
Appeal is taken herein by plaintiff from a judgment for the defendants following a motion made pursuant to section 631.8 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and from a denial of plaintiff’s motion for a new trial.
Plaintiff’s cause of action is one for specific performance of a written agreement, dated June 27, 1961, made and entered into between Erwin Rautenberg, plaintiff and appellant herein, and John L. Westland, Jr. and John L. Westland & Son, Inc., the defendants and respondents herein.
The complaint seeks aid of the court to specifically compel defendants to sell and transfer 86 shares of the defendant corporation’s capital stock and to enjoin the corporation
from disposing of any of its property, from the holding of any meeting of its shareholders and from the use of its assets for purposes other than the conduct of business of the corporation.
The trial court, among other things, in its findings of
fact, found as follows: 1. That the agreement entered into between the parties is not only for the sale of certain shares of stock, but is also an agreement for the rendition of personal services. 2. That the agreement entered into between the parties is not severable. 3. That the agreement is not specifically enforceable in that it lacks mutuality of remedy. 4. That said agreement is uncertain in its provisions.
Appellant now contends that the trial court erred in its foregoing findings in that (1) the lack of mutuality of remedy does not necessarily bar specific performance of the agreement to convey shares of stock to appellant; (b) plaintiff has satisfied the mutuality of remedy requirement by substantially performing his part of the contract between the parties; and (c) the agreement between the parties is not so uncertain that the remedy of specific performance would be denied to plaintiff.
Plaintiff is, and was at the time of the agreement, a licensed customhouse broker, and president and sole stockholder of Air-Sea Forwarders, Inc. Westland was the owner of 422 shares, being all of the outstanding and issued stock of defendant corporation.
Among other things, the agreement provides that Westland will sell 50 per cent of the outstanding shares of the corporation stock to plaintiff for the agreed price of $10 per share, subject to plaintiff’s option to be exercised within a time limit of 365 days from the date of the agreement, such stock to be purchased in not more than five instalments.
The agreement further provides that plaintiff is to perform personal services for defendant corporation as its general manager, for which he is to be compensated at the end of the first year by a bonus in a sum to be mutually agreed upon at that time. Westland is to work in assisting the management of the corporation, and will additionally provide personal services for plaintiff and assist him in such business enterprises as are controlled by him. Westland is to be compensated for his services to the corporation at $750 per month for at least six months, a new rate of compensation thereafter to be agreed upon. For his services to plaintiff and his business enterprises Westland is to receive the sum of $550 per month for one year, or less if either party is dissatisfied.
Pursuant to the terms of the agreement, plaintiff purchased 125 shares of the stock of defendant corporation from Westland. Plaintiff paid Westland’s salary for the rendition of services to plaintiff and his business enterprises for the months of July and August 1961, when this arrangement was terminated.
In December 1961 the contractual arrangements whereby the plaintiff would be employed by and would perform personal services for defendant corporation were terminated. Plaintiff thereupon requested a bonus which was to compensate him for his managerial services to defendant corporation, but he has not been paid, and the amount thereof has never been agreed upon.
On April 23, 1962, plaintiff requested the transfer of an additional 86 shares of defendant corporation’s capital stock from Westland and tendered payment therefor. The sale and transfer of such shares were refused.
Both the evidence and the provisions of the written agreement herein support the findings of the court that such agreement is one not only for the sale and purchase of certain shares of stock but is additionally for the rendition of personal services; that said agreement is not severable and lacks mutuality of remedy.
The very premise of the sale of the stock by Westland to plaintiff is the declared purpose in paragraph three of the agreement, “to bring together the two parties in a business venture that should be mutually profitable for each, and that the aim be that eventually each become a true partner of the other in their respective business enterprises that they are
now engaged in or will become engaged in the future, as long as they mutually agree to maintain such relationship. ”
Paragraph seven provides for the employment of Westland by defendant corporation to assist in its management as well as to solicit outside business in its behalf.
Paragraph eight provides for the employment of Westland by plaintiff to oversee the offices and business enterprises of plaintiff not connected with defendant corporation and including the promotion of plaintiff’s wholly owned Air-Sea Forwarders company. The salary payable to Westland as provided for in paragraph eight is the obligation of plaintiff personally and not that of defendant corporation.
Paragraph six obligates plaintiff to perform equally unique personal services for defendant corporation in that, as general manager, he is to be primarily in charge of its internal management and financial operation including the expenditure of funds, entering into of contracts, and the assigning, hiring or discharging of personnel.
By the terms of the agreement their obligations one to the other and to the corporation may continue only so “long as they mutually agree to maintain such relationship.” When these obligations cease the primary reason and consideration for their agreement fails.
Whatever remedy the plaintiff herein may have for recovery of damages for claimed breach of the agreement, it is clear from its express terms that the main purpose of the parties thereto was to secure the personal services of both plaintiff and Westland for each other and for the corporation. The agreement obligates the individual parties to perform acts requiring an exercise of personal judgment and a degree of cooperation in making the several enterprises successful which cannot be compelled by a court decree of specific performance.
Several code sections are applicable to the situation herein presented. They provide, in pertinent part, as follows:
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
KINCAID, J. pro tem.
Appeal is taken herein by plaintiff from a judgment for the defendants following a motion made pursuant to section 631.8 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and from a denial of plaintiff’s motion for a new trial.
Plaintiff’s cause of action is one for specific performance of a written agreement, dated June 27, 1961, made and entered into between Erwin Rautenberg, plaintiff and appellant herein, and John L. Westland, Jr. and John L. Westland & Son, Inc., the defendants and respondents herein.
The complaint seeks aid of the court to specifically compel defendants to sell and transfer 86 shares of the defendant corporation’s capital stock and to enjoin the corporation
from disposing of any of its property, from the holding of any meeting of its shareholders and from the use of its assets for purposes other than the conduct of business of the corporation.
The trial court, among other things, in its findings of
fact, found as follows: 1. That the agreement entered into between the parties is not only for the sale of certain shares of stock, but is also an agreement for the rendition of personal services. 2. That the agreement entered into between the parties is not severable. 3. That the agreement is not specifically enforceable in that it lacks mutuality of remedy. 4. That said agreement is uncertain in its provisions.
Appellant now contends that the trial court erred in its foregoing findings in that (1) the lack of mutuality of remedy does not necessarily bar specific performance of the agreement to convey shares of stock to appellant; (b) plaintiff has satisfied the mutuality of remedy requirement by substantially performing his part of the contract between the parties; and (c) the agreement between the parties is not so uncertain that the remedy of specific performance would be denied to plaintiff.
Plaintiff is, and was at the time of the agreement, a licensed customhouse broker, and president and sole stockholder of Air-Sea Forwarders, Inc. Westland was the owner of 422 shares, being all of the outstanding and issued stock of defendant corporation.
Among other things, the agreement provides that Westland will sell 50 per cent of the outstanding shares of the corporation stock to plaintiff for the agreed price of $10 per share, subject to plaintiff’s option to be exercised within a time limit of 365 days from the date of the agreement, such stock to be purchased in not more than five instalments.
The agreement further provides that plaintiff is to perform personal services for defendant corporation as its general manager, for which he is to be compensated at the end of the first year by a bonus in a sum to be mutually agreed upon at that time. Westland is to work in assisting the management of the corporation, and will additionally provide personal services for plaintiff and assist him in such business enterprises as are controlled by him. Westland is to be compensated for his services to the corporation at $750 per month for at least six months, a new rate of compensation thereafter to be agreed upon. For his services to plaintiff and his business enterprises Westland is to receive the sum of $550 per month for one year, or less if either party is dissatisfied.
Pursuant to the terms of the agreement, plaintiff purchased 125 shares of the stock of defendant corporation from Westland. Plaintiff paid Westland’s salary for the rendition of services to plaintiff and his business enterprises for the months of July and August 1961, when this arrangement was terminated.
In December 1961 the contractual arrangements whereby the plaintiff would be employed by and would perform personal services for defendant corporation were terminated. Plaintiff thereupon requested a bonus which was to compensate him for his managerial services to defendant corporation, but he has not been paid, and the amount thereof has never been agreed upon.
On April 23, 1962, plaintiff requested the transfer of an additional 86 shares of defendant corporation’s capital stock from Westland and tendered payment therefor. The sale and transfer of such shares were refused.
Both the evidence and the provisions of the written agreement herein support the findings of the court that such agreement is one not only for the sale and purchase of certain shares of stock but is additionally for the rendition of personal services; that said agreement is not severable and lacks mutuality of remedy.
The very premise of the sale of the stock by Westland to plaintiff is the declared purpose in paragraph three of the agreement, “to bring together the two parties in a business venture that should be mutually profitable for each, and that the aim be that eventually each become a true partner of the other in their respective business enterprises that they are
now engaged in or will become engaged in the future, as long as they mutually agree to maintain such relationship. ”
Paragraph seven provides for the employment of Westland by defendant corporation to assist in its management as well as to solicit outside business in its behalf.
Paragraph eight provides for the employment of Westland by plaintiff to oversee the offices and business enterprises of plaintiff not connected with defendant corporation and including the promotion of plaintiff’s wholly owned Air-Sea Forwarders company. The salary payable to Westland as provided for in paragraph eight is the obligation of plaintiff personally and not that of defendant corporation.
Paragraph six obligates plaintiff to perform equally unique personal services for defendant corporation in that, as general manager, he is to be primarily in charge of its internal management and financial operation including the expenditure of funds, entering into of contracts, and the assigning, hiring or discharging of personnel.
By the terms of the agreement their obligations one to the other and to the corporation may continue only so “long as they mutually agree to maintain such relationship.” When these obligations cease the primary reason and consideration for their agreement fails.
Whatever remedy the plaintiff herein may have for recovery of damages for claimed breach of the agreement, it is clear from its express terms that the main purpose of the parties thereto was to secure the personal services of both plaintiff and Westland for each other and for the corporation. The agreement obligates the individual parties to perform acts requiring an exercise of personal judgment and a degree of cooperation in making the several enterprises successful which cannot be compelled by a court decree of specific performance.
Several code sections are applicable to the situation herein presented. They provide, in pertinent part, as follows:
Civil Code, section 3386: “Neither party to an obligation can be compelled specifically to perform it, unless the other party thereto has performed, or is compellable specifically to perform, everything to which the former is entitled under the same obligation, either completely or nearly so, together with full compensation for any want of entire performance. ”
Civil Code, section 3390: “The following obligations cannot be specifically enforced: 1. An obligation to render per
sonal service;
2.
An obligation to employ another in personal service;...”
Equity will not require the specific performance of the agreement herein, providing as it does for the rendition of services by the parties of a purely personal and discretionary nature. Such a remedy would not be mutual in that neither party could compel the other to perform or carry out such duties or services.
(O’Brien
v.
O’Brien,
197 Cal. 577, 588 [241 P. 861];
Adams
v.
Williams Resorts, Inc.,
210 Cal.App.2d 456, 462, 463 [26 Cal.Rptr. 656];
Lyon
v.
Goss,
19 Cal.2d 659, 674, 675 [123 P.2d 11]; and
Long Beach Drug Co.
v.
United Drug Co.,
13 Cal.2d 158, 171 [88 P.2d 698, 89 P.2d 386].)
Plaintiff contends that he has satisfied the mutuality of remedy requirement by substantially performing his part of the contract between the parties. The trial court specifically found that he had not so performed. Such services as were rendered by plaintiff for defendants took place over a relatively short period of time on an employment agreement providing for its continuance for a time only so long as the parties were mutually agreeable and at a compensation subject to future agreement. Under these indefinite circumstances, the trial court was entitled to conclude that no sufficient showing of substantial performance was made by plaintiff.
The further ground that the agreement between the parties is so uncertain as to bar a decree of specific performance need not be discussed. For the reasons heretofore stated such agreement is not specifically enforceable and the judgment herein is affirmed. The purported appeal from the order denying a motion for a new trial is dismissed.
Fourt, Acting P. J., and Lillie, J., concurred.
A petition for a rehearing was denied June 22, 1964.