Raul V. v. Frank Bisignano, Commissioner of Social Security

Opinion

8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORINIA 10

11 RAUL V.,1 Case No.: 25cv1035-MSB 12

Plaintiff, v. REMANDING COMMISSIONER’S 14 DECISION [ECF NOS. 13 & 15] FRANK BISIGNANO, Commissioner of 15 Social Security, 2 16 Defendant. 17 18 19 On April 24, 2025, Plaintif Raul V. (“Plaintiff”) filed a Complaint pursuant to 42 20 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c)(3) seeking judicial review of a final adverse decision by the 21 Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner”). (ECF No. 1.) Based on all parties’ 22 consent [see ECF Nos. 4, 6], this case is before the undersigned as presiding judge for all 23

24 1 Under Civil Local Rule 7.1(e)(6)(b), “[o]pinions by the Court in [Social Security cases under 42 U.S.C. § 25 405(g)] will refer to any non-government parties by using only their first name and last initial.” 2 On May 7, 2025, Frank Bisignano became the Commissioner of Social Security. See SSA 26 Commissioners, https://www.ssa.gov/history/bisignano.html (last visited on July 1, 2026). Accordingly, Frank Bisignano is substituted for Leland Dudek as the Defendant in this lawsuit. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 27 25(d) (“An action does not abate when a public officer who is a party in an official capacity dies, 2 before the Court is Plaintiff’s Opening Brief, claiming error by the Administrative Law 3 Judge (“ALJ”) who conducted the administrative hearing and issued the decision denying 4 Plaintiff’s application for disability insurance benefits. (ECF No. 13.) The Court has 5 carefully reviewed the Complaint [ECF No. 1], the Administrative Record (“AR”) [ECF No. 6 10], Plaintiff’s Opening Brief [ECF No. 13], and the Commissioner’s Responsive Brief [ECF 7 No. 15]. For the reasons set forth below, the Court ORDERS judgment be entered 8 REVERSING the Commissioner’s decision and REMANDING this matter for further 9 administrative proceedings consistent with this Order. 11 On February 20, 2018, Plaintiff applied for disability and disability insurance 12 benefits under Titles II and XVIII of the Social Security Act, alleging disability beginning 13 on March 3, 2015. (AR 151–153.) The Commissioner denied his application initially on 14 May 16, 2018, and again upon reconsideration on September 26, 2018. (AR 85–88; AR 15 90–94.) On November 21, 2018, Plaintiff requested an administrative hearing. (AR 96– 16 97.) ALJ Kevin W. Messer held a hearing on October 23, 2019, during which Plaintiff 17 appeared with counsel; Plaintiff and vocational expert, Katie Macy-Powers, testified. 18 (AR 13–42.) In a written decision dated December 2, 2019, the ALJ concluded Plaintiff 19 had not been under a disability from January 1, 2018,3 through the date of decision. (AR 20 67–84). 21 On February 2, 2020, Plaintiff requested that the Appeals Council review the ALJ’s 22 decision. (AR 143–145.) The Appeals Council denied the request for review on August 23 24, 2020. (AR 1–9.) Plaintiff then sought review by this Court on December 7, 2020.4 24

25 3 Although Plaintiff initially alleged disability beginning on March 3, 2015 [AR 152], during the first 26 administrative hearing Plaintiff moved to amend the onset date to January 1, 2018, and ALJ Messer granted the oral motion. (AR 40–41.) However, the written decision erroneously referred to the 27 alleged onset date as November 1, 2018. (AR 81.) 2 summary judgment to Plaintiff, and remanded the case for further administrative 3 proceedings. (AR 678–699.) On January 31, 2023, the Appeals Council vacated the 4 Commissioner’s decision and remanded the case to an ALJ. (AR 700–704.) 5 On remand, ALJ Messer conducted a new administrative hearing on November 6 17, 2023, during which Plaintiff was represented by counsel. (AR 630–657.) Both 7 Plaintiff and an impartial vocational expert, Sonia Peterson, testified. (Id.) In a written 8 decision dated March 14, 2024, the ALJ denied Plaintiff’s application, concluding that 9 Plaintiff has not been under a disability from January 1, 2018, through the date of the 10 decision. (AR 608–624.) On April 15, 2024, Plaintiff requested review of the ALJ’s 11 decision. (AR 797–803.) The Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request on March 3, 12 2025, making the ALJ’s decision final. (AR 591–598.) See also 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)–(h). 13 This timely civil action followed. 15 In rendering his decision, the ALJ applied the Commissioner’s five-step sequential 16 evaluation process. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520. At step one, the ALJ found Plaintiff had 17 not engaged in substantial gainful activity since January 1, 2018, the alleged onset date. 18 (AR 614.) At step two, the ALJ found Plaintiff has the following severe impairments: 19 degenerative disc disease of lumbar spine, retrolisthesis, lumbar radiculopathy, chronic 20 pain disorder, right-sided sciatica, bipolar mood disorder, generalized anxiety disorder, 21 major depression disorder, panic disorder, and post-traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”). 22 (Id.) The ALJ noted these medically determinable impairments significantly limit 23 Plaintiff’s ability to perform basic work activities.5 (Id.) 24 At step three, the ALJ determined Plaintiff does not have an impairment or 25 combination of impairments that meets or medically equals the severity of one of the 26

27 5 The ALJ also found that the following medically determinable impairments have a minimal effect on 2 the ALJ found Plaintiff’s physical impairments do not meet or medically equal listing 1.15 3 (disorders of the skeletal spine resulting in compromise of a nerve root) or 1.16 (lumbar 4 spinal stenosis resulting in compromise of the cauda equina). (Id.) See also 20 C.F.R. § 5 Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App’x 1 § 1.01. Additionally, the ALJ concluded Plaintiff’s mental 6 impairments do not meet or medically equal the criteria of both paragraphs B and C of 7 listing 12.04 (depressive, bipolar and related disorders). (AR 615–616.) See also 20 8 C.F.R. § Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App’x 1 § 12.00. 9 Ultimately, the ALJ determined Plaintiff has the residual functional capacity 10 (“RFC”) to do the following: 11 [P]erform light work . . . except [Plaintiff] is limited to occasional climbing of ramps/stairs, occasional climbing of ladders/ropes/scaffolds, and occasional 12 balancing, stooping, kneeling, crouching, and crawling. [Plaintiff] can 13 understand, remember, and carry out simple, routine tasks, have only occasional interaction with the general public, only occasional work- 14 related, non-personal, non-social interaction with co-workers and 15 supervisors, and is limited to jobs requiring only simple work-related decisions; however, [Plaintiff] can keep pace sufficient to complete tasks 16 and meet quotas typically found in unskilled work. 17 (AR 616–17.) In making this determination, the ALJ noted he considered all symptoms, 18 medical opinions, and prior administrative medical findings. (AR 617.) The ALJ found 19 that while Plaintiff’s “medically determinable impairments could reasonably be 20 expected to cause the alleged symptoms . . . [Plaintiff’s] statements concerning the 21 intensity, persistence and limiting effects of these symptoms are not consistent with the 22 medical evidence and other evidence in the record.” (AR 618.) 23 At step four, the ALJ found Plaintiff could not perform his past relevant work as an 24 automobile mechanic. (AR 622.) Finally, at step five the ALJ determined there are other 25 jobs existing in significant numbers in the national economy that Plaintiff can perform 26 considering his age, education, work experience, and RFC. (AR 623.) The ALJ identified 27 the following occupations: Office Helper, Dictionary of Occupational Titles (“DOT”) 2 individual with Plaintiff’s RFC, age, education, and work experience would be able to 3 make a successful adjustment to other work that exists in significant numbers in the 4 national economy. (AR 624.) Thus, the ALJ concluded Plaintiff has not been under a 5 disability from January 1, 2018, through March 14, 2024. (Id.) 7 Plaintiff raises two issues as grounds for reversal: 8 1. Whether the ALJ properly evaluated Dr. Bhavsar’s medical opinion. 9 2. Whether the ALJ properly considered Plaintiff’s subjective symptom testimony. 10 (ECF No. 13 at 10–29.) 12 Section 405(g) of the Social Security Act allows unsuccessful applicants to seek 13 judicial review of the Commissioner’s final decision. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The scope 14 of judicial review is limited, and the denial of benefits will only be disturbed if the final 15 decision is not supported by substantial evidence or contains a legal error. Luther v. 16 Berryhill, 891 F.3d 872, 875 (9th Cir. 2018) (internal citations omitted). “Substantial 17 evidence” is a “‘term of art’ used throughout administrative law to describe how courts 18 are to review agency factfinding.” Biestek v. Berryhill, 587 U.S. 97, 102 (2019) (quoting 19 T-Mobile S., LLC v. City of Roswell, Ga., 574 U.S. 293, 301 (2015)). The Supreme Court 20 has said substantial evidence means “more than a mere scintilla,” but only “such 21 relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a 22 conclusion.” Id. (quoting Consol. Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)) (internal 23 quotation marks omitted). The Ninth Circuit explained that substantial evidence is 24 “more than a mere scintilla, but less than a preponderance.” Revels v. Berryhill, 874 25 F.3d 648, 654 (9th Cir. 2017) (quoting Desrosiers v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 846 26 F.2d 573, 576 (9th Cir. 1988)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

27 The reviewing court “must consider the entire record as a whole, weighing both 2 quantum of supporting evidence.” See Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1009 (9th Cir. 3 2014) (quoting Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028, 1035 (9th Cir. 2007)) (internal 4 quotation marks omitted). Overall, the substantial-evidence standard is “highly 5 deferential.” Kitchen v. Kijakazi, 82 F.4th 732, 738 (9th Cir. 2023) (citing Rounds v. 6 Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin., 807 F.3d 996, 1002 (9th Cir. 2015)). Where the evidence is 7 susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, the ALJ’s decision must be upheld. 8 See Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1038 (9th Cir. 2008) (internal citations 9 omitted). This includes deferring to the ALJ’s credibility determinations and resolutions 10 of evidentiary conflicts. See Lewis v. Apfel, 236 F.3d 503, 509 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing 11 Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 722 (9th Cir. 1998). Thus, the court may overturn the 12 ALJ’s decision only if the ALJ’s conclusions are not supported by substantial evidence or 13 the ALJ applied the wrong legal standard. See Smith v. Kijakazi, 14 F.4th 1108, 1111 (9th 14 Cir. 2021); Batson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 359 F.3d 1190, 1193 (9th Cir. 2004). 15 However, the reviewing court “may not reverse an ALJ’s decision on account of an error 16 that is harmless.” Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1111 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing Stout v. 17 Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin., 454 F.3d 1050, 1055–56 (9th Cir. 2006)). 19 A. Whether the ALJ Properly Evaluated Dr. Bhavsar’s Medical Opinion 20 1. Parties’ arguments 21 Plaintiff argues the ALJ improperly rejected Dr. Bhavsar’s opinion without 22 providing an explanation supported by substantial evidence. (ECF No. 13 at 10–19.) 23 Specifically, Plaintiff contends the ALJ did not conduct the required analysis of the 24 supportability and consistency factors when finding Dr. Bhavsar’s opinion only “partially 25 persuasive.” (Id. at 13–14.) Plaintiff contends the ALJ committed legal error by failing to 26 engage in a reasoned discussion, as the decision neither identified contradictory medical

27 evidence nor addressed Dr. Bhavsar’s key findings regarding Plaintiff’s severe functional 2 minimal ongoing mental health treatment, while disregarding Plaintiff’s broader 3 treatment history, documented impairments, and the overall severity and persistence of 4 his symptoms. (Id. at 15–17.) In sum, Plaintiff argues the record supports Dr. Bhavsar’s 5 findings of more severe limitations, and the ALJ’s selective adoption of Dr. Bhavsar’s 6 opinion renders the RFC determination legally deficient. (Id. at 19.) 7 In response, the Commissioner argues the ALJ’s determination that Dr. Bhavsar’s 8 opinion was only partially persuasive was reasonable and supported by substantial 9 evidence. (ECF No. 15 at 5–11.) First, to show Plaintiff’s alleged limitations are 10 inconsistent with the record, the Commissioner contends the ALJ properly highlighted 11 Plaintiff’s diagnosis of only moderate depression and limited ongoing mental health 12 treatment. (Id. at 6–7 (citing AR 546, 619–20, 641–43, 648–49, 1024).) Additionally, the 13 Commissioner argues that it is insufficient for Plaintiff to highlight isolated evidence that 14 supports his position; rather, Plaintiff must demonstrate that no reasonable factfinder 15 could have reached the same conclusion as the ALJ, a burden the Commissioner argues 16 he has not met. (Id. at 7–8.) Further, the Commissioner contends “even with the 17 presence of mental impairments, a lack of treatment can sometimes just be evidence 18 that the claimant’s mental impairments were not causing significant symptoms 19 warranting treatment,” which the Commissioner asserts was the case here. (Id. at 8.) 20 With respect to supportability, the Commissioner argues the ALJ properly 21 concluded Dr. Bhavsar’s opinion was “not supported by the generally normally mental 22 status results [Dr. Bhavsar] documented during Plaintiff’s examination.” (Id. at 8 (citing 23 AR 559–60, 622).) Based on Plaintiff’s normal results, the ALJ reasonably concluded 24 Plaintiff’s mental impairments were not as severe as alleged. (Id. at 9.) The 25 Commissioner argues that the ALJ discussed Dr. Bhavsar’s opinion at multiple points in 26 his decision and detailed which findings from Dr. Bhavsar’s mental status examination

27 failed to support more severe limitations. (Id.) Thus, the Commissioner maintains that 2 regulations.” (Id. at 10.) Accordingly, the Commissioner argues the ALJ’s evaluation of 3 Dr. Bhavsar’s opinion was reasonable and supported by substantial evidence. (Id. at 11.) 4 2. Applicable law 5 Plaintiff applied for disability insurance benefits on February 20, 2018. (AR 151– 6 153.) Because this is after March 27, 2017, the Social Security Administration’s revised 7 regulations for considering medical opinions apply. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c (2017). 8 Under the revised regulations, the ALJ does “not defer or give any specific evidentiary 9 weight, including controlling weight, to any medical opinion(s).” Id. § 404.1520c(a). 10 Instead, the ALJ must the evaluate the persuasiveness of those opinions using the 11 following factors: supportability, consistency, the relationship between the source and 12 the claimant, the source’s specialization, and other factors such as the source’s 13 knowledge of other evidence and whether there was subsequently submitted evidence. 14 Id. § 404.1520c(c)(1)–(5). The two most important factors are supportability and 15 consistency. Id. § 404.1520c(b)(2). “Supportability” measures the degree to which 16 objective medical evidence and supporting explanations buttress a medical finding. Id. 17 §§ 404.1520c(c)(1); 416.920c(c)(1). “Consistency” is the extent to which an opinion or 18 finding is consistent with evidence from other medical sources and non-medical sources 19 in the record. Id. §§ 404.1520c(c)(2); 416.920c(c)(2). 20 Under the revised regulations, “an ALJ’s decision, including the decision to 21 discredit any medical opinion, must simply be supported by substantial evidence.” 22 Woods v. Kijakazi, 32 F. 4th 785, 787 (9th Cir. 2022); see also Johnathan F. v. Bisignano, 23 No. 24CV1774-WQH (MSB), 2026 WL 35975, at *4 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 6, 2026), report and 24 recommendation adopted sub nom. Fay v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 3:24-CV-1774-WQH- 25 MSB, 2026 WL 836345 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 2026). The ALJ must address how they 26 considered the consistency and supportability factors in sufficient detail to allow a

27 reviewing court to determine whether that reasoning is supported by substantial 2 20-3180, 2021 WL 2794533, at *6 (10th Cir. July 6, 2021) (applying the substantial 3 evidence standard under the new 2017 regulations). In addition to the supportability 4 and consistency factors, the ALJ may consider the treatment or examining relationship, 5 specialization, and other factors, but need not explain how these factors were 6 considered. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920c(b)(2), (c)(1)-(5); Woods, 32 F.4th at 792. 7 3. Dr. Bhavsar’s opinion 8 On September 4, 2018, Dr. Bhavsar performed a complete psychiatric evaluation 9 of Plaintiff. (AR 557–61.) At the time of the examination, Dr. Bhavsar noted there were 10 no medical records available for review. (AR 558.) Plaintiff’s chief complaints were 11 depression, indecisiveness, and bipolar disorder. (AR 557.) Plaintiff reported having 12 “off and on” depression, irritable mood, and anxiety attacks. (AR 558.) Additionally, he 13 described experiencing racing thoughts and difficulty sleeping but denied suicidal 14 ideations and homicidal thoughts. (Id.) He denied any prior inpatient psychiatric 15 treatment but reported receiving past outpatient psychiatric counseling. (Id.) Plaintiff 16 reported difficulty with concentration and memory. (Id.) Dr. Bhavsar noted Plaintiff 17 was taking medication for pain and discomfort stemming and had a history of head 18 injury, hypertension, and neck and lower back pain. (Id.) 19 The mental status examination revealed that Plaintiff was anxious but 20 cooperative, with normal speech and a clear, coherent voice. (AR 559.) His mood was 21 depressed with blunted affect, though he showed no psychomotor retardation and 22 denied suicidal or homicidal ideation. (Id.) Plaintiff’s thought processes were organized 23 with no signs of looseness of association, flight of ideas, or tangential thinking. (Id.) 24 However, Plaintiff exhibited paranoid and persecutory delusions, while denying other 25 disturbances such as thought broadcasting or phobias. (Id.) Plaintiff denied 26 hallucinations across all sensory modalities and was alert and fully oriented to time,

27 place, person, and purpose. (AR 559–60.) Furthermore, his memory, concentration, 2 with psychotic features and severe generalized anxiety disorder. (Id.) Additionally, Dr. 3 Bhavsar determined Plaintiff was severely limited in the following functional areas: (1) 4 ability to follow detailed instructions; (2) ability to interact with the public, coworkers, 5 and supervisors; (3) ability to comply with job rules, such as safety and attendance; (4) 6 ability to respond to changes in a routine work setting; and (5) ability to respond to 7 work pressure in a usual working setting. (AR 561.) However, Dr. Bhavsar opined 8 Plaintiff was not limited in his ability to follow simple oral and written instructions and in 9 his performance of daily activities. (Id.) 10 4. The ALJ’s treatment of Dr. Bhavsar’s findings 11 In his written decision, the ALJ first discussed Dr. Bhavsar’s findings when 12 assessing the following areas of mental functioning: (1) understanding, remembering, or 13 applying information; (2) interacting with others; and (3) concentrating, persisting, or 14 maintaining pace. (See AR 615–16.) For example, the ALJ referenced Dr. Bhavsar’s 15 observations that Plaintiff “did not exhibit looseness of association, thought 16 disorganization, flight of ideas, thought blocking, tangentiality or circumstantiality” 17 when finding he had only a moderate limitation in understanding, remembering or 18 applying information. (AR 615.) Similarly, the ALJ highlighted Dr. Bhavsar’s report that 19 Plaintiff presented appropriately dressed and well groomed, had good eye contact, and 20 normal speech when finding he had only a moderate limitation in interacting with 21 others. (Id.) The ALJ then summarized Dr. Bhavsar’s opinion as follows: 22 [Dr. Bhavsar] performed a psychological consultative examination, noting symptoms of an irritable mood off and on, racing thoughts, feelings of 23 sadness, hopelessness, and has difficulty sleeping, as well as feeling 24 depressed and angry on some days, but denied hallucinations. In a mental status exam, Dr. Bhavsar reported the claimant did not exhibit looseness of 25 association, thought disorganization, flight of ideas, thought blocking, 26 tangentiality or circumstantiality. Dr. Bhavsar reported the claimant denied auditory, visual, tactile, or olfactory hallucinations . . . Dr. Bhavsar reported 27 the claimant was alert and was oriented to time, place, person and 2 to spell the word “music” forward and backward. The above findings are not consistent with the alleged severity of the claimant’s mental 3 impairments. (AR 619–20 (internal citations omitted).) 4 The ALJ noted Dr. Bhavsar’s diagnoses of “bipolar mood disorder, mixed type, 5 severe and with psychotic features and generalized anxiety disorder, severe,” and the 6 various limitations he prescribed Plaintiff. (AR 621–22.) Ultimately, the ALJ found Dr. 7 Bhavsar’s opinion to be partially persuasive, explaining: 8 This opinion is only partially persuasive. The undersigned finds the mental 9 status results reached by Dr. Bhavsar persuasive because they are 10 consistent with the claimant’s moderate PHQ-9 score. However, Dr. Bhavsar otherwise overestimates the claimant’s limitations. There is 11 minimal evidence of ongoing mental health treatment in the medical 12 record, which is inconsistent with severe mental limitations. In support of this finding, the undersigned notes generally normal mental status results, 13 which is inconsistent with severe limitations. 14 (Id. at 622 (internal citations omitted).) 15 5. Analysis 16 The ALJ was required to address both the consistency and supportability factors 17 when assessing the persuasiveness of Dr. Bhavsar’s opinion. § 404.1520c(c)(1)–(5); 18 Woods, 32 F. 4th at 787. Here, the Court finds the ALJ sufficiently considered the 19 consistency factor but ignored the supportability factor. Nevertheless, this error is 20 harmless because the ALJ’s conclusion that Dr. Bhavsar’s opinion was only “partially 21 persuasive” is otherwise supported by substantial evidence. Woods, 32 F. 4th at 787. 22 a. Consistency 23 “Consistency” is the extent to which an opinion or finding is consistent with 24 evidence from other medical sources and non-medical sources in the record. §§ 25 404.1520c(c)(2); 416.920c(c)(2). In other words, “the consistency factor looks outward” 26 at the entire record. Deniz v. O'Malley, No. CV 24-00332 SASP-RT, 2025 WL 4355512, at 27 *3 (D. Haw. Sept. 11, 2025). Here, the ALJ concluded Dr. Bhavsar’s opinion was 2 Bhavsar’s assignment of severe functional limitations was inconsistent with Plaintiff’s 3 minimal mental health treatment. (AR 622.) The ALJ noted Plaintiff did not take 4 psychotropic medication, he was not psychiatrically hospitalized, and he participated in 5 only four months of counseling at the time of the hearing. (AR 618 (citing AR 641–43).) 6 Furthermore, Plaintiff’s case manager stated in December 2023 that Plaintiff had 7 attended five counseling sessions, during which he worked on finding employment, 8 enrolling in parenting classes, and attending education and financial workshops. (AR 9 620 (citing AR 1024).) 10 Second, the ALJ concluded that Dr. Bhavsar’s assignment of severe limitations in 11 five functional areas was inconsistent with Plaintiff’s normal mental status results. (AR 12 622.) Specifically, the ALJ noted that contemporaneous with Dr. Bhavsar’s September 13 2018 consultative examination, Plaintiff exhibited only moderate depressive symptoms 14 reflected by a PHQ-96 score of 12. (AR 619 (citing AR 546).) The ALJ found Dr. Bhavsar’s 15 opinion partially persuasive to the extent it aligned with a PHQ-9 score of 12, but found 16 the opinion otherwise overstated the severity of Plaintiff’s condition. (AR 622.) 17 Plaintiff contends the ALJ mischaracterized the record by relying on a PHQ-9 score 18 of 12 signifying moderate depression, while ignoring higher scores ranging from 13 to 19 20. (ECF No. 13 at 14–15 (citing AR 1124, 1143, 1155).) Where, as here, the record 20 contains conflicting medical evidence, it is the ALJ’s responsibility to assess credibility 21 and resolve conflicts. Chaudhry v. Astrue, 688 F.3d 661, 671 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing 22 Benton v. Barnhart, 331 F.3d 1030, 1040 (9th Cir. 2003)). “[T]he ALJ is the final arbiter 23 with respect to resolving ambiguities in the medical evidence.” Tommasetti, 533 F.3d at 24 1038. Moreover, if the evidence is “‘susceptible to more than one rational 25

26 6 “PHQ-9” is a screening tool used to diagnose depression. Scores follow the following scale: 0–4 signifies minimal to no depression; 5–9 signifies mild depression; 10–14 signifies moderate depression; 27 15–19 signifies moderately severe depression; and 20–27 signifies severe depression. See Maria Ablao, 2 F.4th 485, 488 (9th Cir. 2022) (quoting Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 679 (9th Cir. 3 2005)). Based on a thorough review of the record, the Court finds the ALJ’s 4 interpretation as to the consistency of Dr. Bhavsar’s opinion is rational. Plaintiff does 5 not point to specific evidence to support disturbing the ALJ’s rational interpretation. 6 (See generally ECF No. 13 at 10–19.) 7 In sum, the Court finds the ALJ provided substantial evidence in concluding Dr. 8 Bhavsar’s opinion was inconsistent with other medical evidence. Biestek, 587 U.S. 97; 9 Revels, 874 F.3d at 654. Namely, the ALJ emphasized the absence of intensive 10 psychiatric interventions, Plaintiff’s normal mental status findings, and Plaintiff’s 11 moderate PHQ-9 score. (AR 618–22.) Therefore, the ALJ properly addressed the 12 consistency factor. 13 b. Supportability 14 “Supportability” is the extent to which a medical source supports their opinion 15 with relevant objective medical evidence and supporting explanations. 20 C.F.R. § 16 416.920c(c)(1). In other words, “[t]he supportability factor looks inward” at the source 17 itself. Deniz, 2025 WL 4355512, at *3. The more relevant the objective medical 18 evidence and supporting explanations presented by a medical source, the more 19 persuasive the medical opinion will be. Zhu, 2021 WL 2794533, at *6 (quoting 20 C.F.R. 20 § 404.1520c(c)). Here, the ALJ failed to articulate how he considered the supportability 21 factor and instead appeared to conflate it with the consistency factor. See Cross v. 22 O’Malley, 89 F.4th 1211, 1214 (9th Cir. 2024) (“ALJs must explain how persuasive they 23 find the medical opinion by expressly considering the two most important factors for 24 evaluating such opinions: ‘supportability’ and ‘consistency.’”) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 25 416.920c(b)(2)). The ALJ did not explain why Dr. Bhavsar’s examination findings (e.g., 26 irritable mood, racing thoughts, depressed feelings, but intact memory and thought

27 process) supported the severe functional limitations Dr. Bhavsar assessed, or whether 2 “supportability” whatsoever. (See AR 619–20, 621–22.) Thus, the ALJ did not explicitly 3 articulate why Dr. Bhavsar’s opinion is unsupported. This omission is significant because 4 Dr. Bhavsar’s evaluation notes the doctor did not review any other medical records. (AR 5 558.) The Court is unable to trace the path of the ALJ’s reasoning without any specific 6 articulation of the supportability factor, thereby constituting error. 7 The Court may nonetheless affirm the ALJ’s decision, so long as the error is 8 harmless. Ford, 950 F.3d at 1154 (citing Tommasetti, 533 F.3d at 1038). Here, the Court 9 finds there is substantial evidence supporting the ALJ’s finding that Dr. Bhavsar’s opinion 10 was only partially persuasive. For example, the ALJ referenced Dr. Bhavsar’s 11 observations that Plaintiff’s appearance and presentation were normal, he had a 12 cooperative attitude, his speech was clear, and his thought process was logical. ( AR 13 615–22 (citing AR 557–61).) These normal findings are similarly reflected in treatment 14 notes from October to December 2019, where Plaintiff was cooperative; exhibited 15 normal body movements; maintained good eye contact; spoke with normal tone, 16 volume, and rate; and was alert and oriented to time, place, person, and purpose. (AR 17 1123–59.) 18 Additionally, it is the ALJ’s responsibility, not the claimant’s physicians, to 19 determine an individual’s RFC. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545. Here, the ALJ reasonably 20 incorporated portions of Dr. Bhavsar’s opinion that were supported by objective 21 evidence into his RFC, while omitting portions lacking support. (AR 616–17.) 22 Specifically, the RFC limited Plaintiff to simple, routine tasks; occasional interaction with 23 the general public; and only occasional, work-related, non-personal interaction with 24 coworkers and supervisors. (AR 617.) This corresponds with Dr. Bhavsar’s findings that 25 Plaintiff had no limitations with respect to following simple oral and written instructions 26 and performing daily activities. (AR 561.) At the same time, the ALJ properly declined to

27 adopt Dr. Bhavsar’s findings of “severe” limitations in functional areas such as the ability 2 limitation in a medical opinion, so long as it reasonably translates the supported findings 3 into concrete functional terms. Turner v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 613 F.3d 1217, 1223 (9th 4 Cir. 2010) (finding no error where an ALJ’s RFC incorporated some, but not all, 5 limitations identified by medical opinions); Stubbs-Danielson v. Astrue, 539 F.3d 1169, 6 1174 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding the same). Here, the record contains multiple 7 interpretations of Plaintiff’s mental status, with varying assessments of limitations. 8 Accordingly, the ALJ’s RFC reflects a rational interpretation of the record and 9 incorporates Dr. Bhavsar’s supported findings while excluding those that were neither 10 explained nor corroborated. Burch, 400 F.3d at 679. For the foregoing reasons, the 11 Court finds that the ALJ’s determination that Dr. Bhavsar’s opinion was only partially 12 persuasive is supported by substantial evidence, and his failure to discuss the 13 supportability factor was harmless. 14 6. Conclusion 15 After finding Dr. Bhavsar’s opinion “partially persuasive,” the ALJ was required to 16 discuss the consistency and supportability factors in some detail. Zhu, 2021 WL 17 2794533, at *6. Although the ALJ adequately addressed consistency by comparing Dr. 18 Bhavsar’s opinion with the broader medical record, he did not separately analyze 19 supportability. However, the Court finds the ALJ’s failure to articulate his supportability 20 analysis was harmless error because the ALJ’s conclusion is otherwise supported by 21 substantial evidence. Accordingly, the Court concludes the ALJ did not err in finding Dr. 22 Bhavsar’s medical opinion partially persuasive. 23 B. Whether the ALJ Properly Considered Plaintiff’s Subjective Symptom Testimony 24 1. Summary of the parties’ arguments 25 Plaintiff argues that the ALJ impermissibly rejected his subjective symptom 26 testimony. (ECF No. 13 at 19–29.) After determining that Plaintiff had underlying

27 impairments that could reasonably produce his alleged pain and other symptoms, 2 reasons for rejecting his testimony are insufficient. (Id.) First, Plaintiff argues that 3 “beyond the conclusory statement that the objective evidence does not support the 4 testimony, the ALJ nowhere connects any of [Plaintiff’s] testimony to the ALJ’s analysis.” 5 (Id. at 23.) Next, Plaintiff contends “the ALJ’s routine statement that [Plaintiff’s] 6 testimony is not entirely consistent with the ‘other evidence in the record’” is also 7 inadequate. (Id. at 24.) Furthermore, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ improperly parceled 8 through the record, selectively relying on certain entries while disregarding others. (Id. 9 at 25–26.) Finally, Plaintiff maintains that the ALJ improperly rejected Plaintiff’s 10 testimony because he can perform certain daily activities. (Id. at 27–28.) 11 In response, the Commissioner argues substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s 12 evaluation of Plaintiff’s subjective symptom testimony. (ECF No. 15 at 11–18.) The 13 Commissioner asserts the ALJ properly considered Plaintiff’s testimony, found parts of it 14 persuasive, and “incorporated multiple limitations into his RFC.” (Id. at 11.) However, 15 the ALJ “stopped short of adopting all of Plaintiff’s complaints . . . because they were 16 inconsistent with the objective medical findings, Plaintiff’s improvement with 17 treatment, and his activities.” (Id. at 12.) Therefore, the Commissioner contends the 18 ALJ reasonably found Plaintiff’s alleged limitations were inconsistent with the medical 19 evidence, citing various medical records supporting less severe limitations. (Id. at 12– 20 14.) Regarding Plaintiff’s contention that the ALJ merely summarized the evidence 21 without any analysis, the Commissioner responds that the ALJ provided “multiple, 22 specific reasons for discounting Plaintiff’s subjective complaints.” (Id. at 14.) For 23 example, the ALJ reasonably found Plaintiff’s allegations were inconsistent with his 24 reported ability to walk one mile, three times a week, perform many household chores, 25 and work part-time as a mechanic. (Id. at 15–17.) The Commissioner concludes that the 26 ALJ reasonably determined “Plaintiff was not as limited as he claimed.” (Id. at 17.)

27 Thus, because substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s analysis, the Commissioner 2 When evaluating the credibility of a claimant’s allegations regarding subjective 3 symptoms such as pain, the ALJ must engage in a two-step analysis. See Johnson v. 4 Kijakazi, No. 19-17359, 2022 WL 1553259, at *1 (9th Cir. May 17, 2022); Lingenfelter v. 5 Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028, 1035–36 (9th Cir. 2007). First, the ALJ must determine whether 6 there is objective medical evidence of an underlying impairment that “could reasonably 7 be expected to produce the pain or other symptoms alleged.” Trevizo v. Berryhill, 871 8 F.3d 664, 678 (9th Cir. 2017) (quoting Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1014–15. The claimant is 9 not required to show that an underlying impairment could reasonably be expected to 10 cause the severity of the pain or other symptoms alleged, but only that it could have 11 reasonably caused some degree of the symptoms. Vasquez v. Astrue, 572 F.3d 586, 591 12 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing Lingenfelter, 504 F.3d at 1036). 13 Second, if the claimant meets the first step and there is no evidence of 14 malingering, then the ALJ may reject the claimant’s statements about the severity of her 15 symptoms “only by offering specific, clear and convincing reasons for doing so.” 16 Trevizo, 871 F.3d at 678 (quoting Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1014–15). “The clear and 17 convincing standard is the most demanding required in Social Security cases.” Revels, 18 874 F.3d at 655 (quoting Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1014–15). General findings are 19 insufficient, and the ALJ must identify which specific pain and symptom statements are 20 being discounted and what evidence undermines those claims. See Lambert v. Saul, 980 21 F.3d 1266, 1277 (9th Cir. 2020) (citing Treichler v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 775 F.3d 22 1090, 1102 (9th Cir. 2014)); see also Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 680 (9th Cir. 2005) 23 (“The ALJ must specify what testimony is not credible and identify the evidence that 24 undermines the claimant's complaints.”) 25 “Because symptoms, such as pain, are subjective and difficult to quantify,” the ALJ 26 considers “all of the evidence presented,” including information about the claimant’s

27 prior work record, statements about their symptoms, evidence submitted by their 2 objective medical evidence, include Plaintiff’s daily activities; the location, duration, 3 frequency, and intensity of their pain or other symptoms; precipitating and aggravating 4 factors; the type, dosage, effectiveness, and side effects of any medication taken to 5 alleviate pain; treatment; and any other measures used to relieve pain. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 6 404.1529(c)(3), 416.929(c)(3); Titles II & XVI: Evaluation of Symptoms in Disability 7 Claims, Social Security Ruling (“SSR”) 16-3P, 2017 WL 5180304, at *7–8 (S.S.A. Oct. 25, 8 2017). The ALJ may also consider inconsistencies between Plaintiff’s statements 9 regarding pain and the medical evidence. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(c)(4), 416.929(c)(4); 10 SSR 16-3p, 2017 WL 5180304, at *8–9. 11 3. Plaintiff’s testimony7 12 At the administrative hearing on November 17, 2023, Plaintiff testified about his 13 physical limitations, pain, and treatment, among other things. (AR 630–57.) Plaintiff 14 testified he spends approximately eight hours a week working on cars, performing “little 15 maintenance” on vehicles for family and friends. (AR 636–37.) These tasks include 16 replacing brakes, oil, wiper blades, or air filters—“minor things that [don’t] involve me 17 bending over for long periods of time.” (AR 637.) Plaintiff further testified he dedicates 18 one to two hours per day to reselling items online, which also requires him to attend 19 garage sales or swap meets to obtain items for sale. (AR 636.) When asked what 20 physically limits him from doing more work, Plaintiff reported that his lower back is the 21 primary issue. (AR 639.) “[I]f I stand long periods of time it starts aching. If I sit long 22 periods of time it starts aching and then there’s the worse pain when I bend over mostly 23 to the front.” (Id.) 24 Regarding treatment, Plaintiff said he does daily exercises and takes Hydrocodone 25 but has not had surgery. (Id.) He further testified he does not use an assistive device 26 when walking, he can walk approximately one block without taking a break, and he can

27 2 carry thirty to forty pounds when bending is not required. (AR 640.) Plaintiff testified 3 that he has a bracing device but does not typically use it because it hurts his ribs. (Id.) 4 Since applying for disability in 2018, Plaintiff said his symptoms have gotten worse and 5 “the periods of pain are longer.” (AR 641.) Plaintiff said he has never sought treatment 6 in an emergency room or been hospitalized for physical health issues. (AR 643.) 7 As to his mental impairments, Plaintiff reported experiencing worry, stress, 8 depression, and feelings of hopelessness. (AR 641.) Plaintiff testified that he 9 participated in helpful counseling classes for approximately four months at the time of 10 the hearing. (AR 642.) Plaintiff further stated he has never been hospitalized or taken 11 medication for mental health issues. (AR 643.) Additionally, he said he has difficulty 12 maintaining focus or concentration, noting this occurs approximately ten minutes into 13 starting any activity. (Id.) Plaintiff explained that he loses focus ten minutes into an 14 activity. (AR 647–48.) 15 Plaintiff said that he has full custody of his two sons, ages ten and twelve. (AR 16 643.) He explained that his family members assist with caring for his children, while he 17 cares for himself by maintaining basic hygiene, dressing, grooming, running errands, and 18 completing chores around the house. (AR 643–45.) Plaintiff noted he experiences 19 persistent pain while performing these activities. (AR 644.) Plaintiff stated that his only 20 meaningful relief comes from laying down or resting. (Id.) 21 4. Analysis 22 The Court now undertakes the two-step analysis to determine whether the ALJ 23 properly challenged Plaintiff’s subjective testimony. See Johnson, 2022 WL 1553259, at 24 *1; Lingenfelter, 504 F.3d at 1035–36. The ALJ found that Plaintiff’s medically 25 determinable impairments could reasonably be expected to cause his alleged 26 symptoms, therefore satisfying the first prong. (AR 618.) See, e.g., Vasquez, 572 F.3d at

27 591 (finding the ALJ satisfied step one where the “ALJ acknowledged that [plaintiff’s] 2 alleges there is any evidence of malingering. (See generally ECF Nos. 13 & 15.) Thus, 3 the ALJ may reject Plaintiff’s testimony “only by providing specific, clear, and convincing 4 reasons.” See Brown-Hunter v. Colvin, 806 F.3d 487, 489 (9th Cir. 2015). In addition to 5 giving “clear and convincing” reasons, the ALJ “must specifically identify the testimony 6 she or he finds not to be credible and must explain what evidence undermines the 7 testimony.” Holohan v. Massanari, 246 F.3d 1195, 1208 (9th Cir. 2001). Failure to do so 8 is a harmful legal error, as it precludes the court from conducting a meaningful review of 9 the ALJ’s reasoning. See Brown-Hunter, 806 F.3d at 492 (“If the ALJ fails to specify his or 10 her reasons for finding claimant testimony not credible, a reviewing court will be unable 11 to review those reasons meaningfully without improperly ‘substitut[ing] our conclusions 12 for the ALJ’s, or speculat[ing] as to the grounds for the ALJ’s conclusions.’”) (quoting 13 Treichler, 775 F.3d at 1103). Here, the Court finds that the ALJ failed to meet the 14 demanding “clear and convincing” standard. 15 a. Specificity 16 First, the ALJ failed to identify which of Plaintiff’s statements he found not 17 credible and why, leaving this Court without the necessary information to conduct a 18 meaningful review. See Brown-Hunter, 806 F.3d at 493; Reddick, 157 F.3d at 722 19 (“General findings are insufficient; rather, the ALJ must identify what testimony is not 20 credible and what evidence undermines the claimant’s complaints.”) (internal citations 21 omitted). The ALJ merely explained that Plaintiff’s “statements concerning the intensity, 22 persistence and limiting effects of these symptoms are not entirely consistent with the 23 medical evidence and other evidence in the record.” (AR 618.) The Ninth Circuit has 24 held that this boilerplate language does not rise to the level of “specific, clear, and 25 convincing” reasons for discounting a claimant's subjective testimony. See, e.g., 26 Treichler, 775 F.3d at 1103 (holding that a boilerplate introductory sentence falls short

27 of “meeting the ALJ’s responsibility” to discuss the objective evidence); Vasquez, 572 2 subjective testimony). 3 The ALJ spent several pages summarizing Plaintiff’s administrative hearing 4 testimony and various reports Plaintiff made to medical providers. (AR 617–22.) At no 5 point did the ALJ specifically identify which of Plaintiff’s statements he found not 6 credible or explain why. (Id.) Because the ALJ only broadly referred to Plaintiff’s 7 statements, the Court cannot truly review whether the ALJ provided clear and 8 convincing reasons for rejecting his testimony. (AR 618.) See Lambert, 980 F.3d at 1277 9 (holding that while the ALJ does not have to perform a “line-by-line exegesis of the 10 claimant’s testimony,” the ALJ must offer more than a non-specific conclusion that the 11 testimony was inconsistent with medical treatment). Nevertheless, the Court assesses 12 the ALJ’s purported reasons for discounting Plaintiff’s testimony in turn. 13 b. Objective medical evidence 14 The ALJ appears to primarily discredit Plaintiff’s testimony because Plaintiff’s 15 symptoms are “inconsistent with the overall longitudinal record.” (AR 620.) An ALJ’s 16 identification of inconsistencies between a plaintiff’s testimony and the objective 17 medical evidence may be a clear and convincing reason for discounting testimony. See, 18 e.g., Ferguson v. O’Malley, 95 F.4th 1194, 1200 (9th Cir. 2024); Koch v. Berryhill, 720 F. 19 App’x 361, 364 (9th Cir. 2017). However, an ALJ cannot rely solely on objective medical 20 evidence to discredit an individual’s symptom testimony. See 20 C.F.R § 404.1529(c)(2); 21 SSR 16-3p, 2017 WL 5180304, at *5 (“[W]e will not disregard an individual’s statements 22 about the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of symptoms solely because the 23 objective medical evidence does not substantiate the degree of impairment-related 24 symptoms alleged by the individual”). 25 Based on the Court’s review of the record, it is evident that the ALJ emphasized 26 certain favorable medical evidence while underplaying other, less favorable medical

27 evidence. See Holohan, 246 F.3d at 1207 (finding an ALJ may not “selectively rely on 2 summarily concluded “the full record shows his symptoms are not disabling.” (AR 618.) 3 The ALJ cited various treatment notes showing mostly normal findings. For example, 4 the ALJ emphasized an examination by Dr. Sabourin, which revealed “normal and 5 painless range of motion” in Plaintiff’s cervical spine and “moderate reduction in range 6 of motion” in Plaintiff’s lumbar spine. (Id. (citing AR 483–86).) Additionally, the ALJ 7 noted that PA-C Kirui reported Plaintiff had “normal gait and otherwise unremarkable 8 findings.” (Id. (citing AR 1064).) Similarly, the ALJ stated Dr. Kobayashi observed only 9 “mild lumbar tenderness, no weakness in the right leg and no edema” on one occasion 10 and “no leg weakness, no leg edema, and normal gait” on another occasion. (AR 618–19 11 (citing AR 1046, 1076).) Simultaneously, the ALJ underplayed other findings from these 12 same providers’ notes, including: ten epidural injections [AR 1109], referral for 13 orthopedic surgery [AR 1048], chronic lumbar degenerative disc disease [AR 1050, 1075, 14 1078], and chronic right-sided low back pain [AR 1046, 1064, 1101, 1107]. The ALJ failed 15 to explain how these findings were weighed against the “normal” and “mild” 16 observations. (AR 618–19.) 17 With respect to Plaintiff’s mental impairments, the ALJ simply stated that the 18 record shows that the Plaintiff “has mental health impairments; however, a review of 19 the full record shows his symptoms are not disabling.” (AR 619.) After acknowledging 20 Plaintiff’s testimony of on and off irritable mood, racing thoughts, difficulty sleeping, 21 and feelings of sadness, hopelessness, and depression, the ALJ emphasized treatment 22 notes observing only “moderate depression.” (AR 618–21.) The ALJ downplayed 23 findings of generalized anxiety disorder [AR 144, 1129, 1153], major depressive disorder 24 [AR 1129, 1137, 1149], bipolar mood disorder [AR 144], and other severe mental 25 impairments. As discussed above, the ALJ made much of Plaintiff’s PHQ-9 score 26 correlating to moderate depression, without discussing his other PHQ-9 scores

27 indicating severe depression. (Compare AR 550, 619, with AR 1124, 1143, 1155) 2 providing any specific explanation. (AR 619–20.) 3 Ultimately, an ALJ may not cherry-pick evidence that supports a finding of non- 4 disability while ignoring other evidence that supports a finding of disability. See, e.g., 5 Jones v. O'Malley, No. 23-16136, 2024 WL 3963835, at *2 (9th Cir. Aug. 28, 2024) 6 (finding error where the ALJ relied on a “single medical note” rather than the full 7 record); Ghanim v. Colvin, 763 F.3d 1154, 1164 (9th Cir. 2014) (finding error where the 8 ALJ “cherry-picked” certain characterizations of symptoms without considering context). 9 While it may be possible to draw inferences about what testimony is inconsistent, it is 10 the duty of the ALJ to identify those inconsistencies with specificity. Lambert, 980 F.3d 11 at 1278 (citing Brown-Hunter, 806 F.3d at 494) (“Although the inconsistencies identified 12 by the district court could be reasonable inferences drawn from the ALJ’s summary of 13 the evidence, the credibility determination is exclusively the ALJ's to make,” and the 14 reviewing court is “constrained to review the reasons the ALJ asserts.”). Thus, the ALJ’s 15 selective citation to certain objective medical evidence is not a clear and convincing 16 reason for discounting Plaintiff’s testimony. 17 c. Symptom management 18 The ALJ also seemingly discounts Plaintiff’s testimony because his “back pain 19 symptoms improved with treatment.” (AR 619.) The Ninth Circuit has held “it is error to 20 reject a claimant’s testimony merely because symptoms wax and wane in the course of 21 treatment.” Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1017. Here, the ALJ noted Plaintiff’s back pain 22 improved from steroidal injections, medication, chiropractic care, and physical therapy. 23 (AR 619 (citing AR 233, 273, 295, 307, 479, 503, 562).) However, the ALJ failed to assess 24 Plaintiff’s alleged improvements as they relate to his “overall well-being and nature of 25 his symptoms.” Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1017. Moreover, although the record reflects 26 some successful symptom management, it also shows Plaintiff’s pain was “unchanged

27 with hydrocodone” and he was prescribed a higher dosage for more pain relief. (AR 2 sweepingly rejects Plaintiff’s testimony based on his alleged improvement with 3 treatment, without evaluating the full context of his pain and symptoms. Therefore, this 4 is not a clear, convincing reason for discrediting Plaintiff’s testimony. 5 d. Daily activities 6 Lastly, the ALJ discounts Plaintiff’s testimony because “the longitudinal record 7 shows [Plaintiff] participates in a range of activities of daily living that are not consistent 8 with the allegations of disabling limitations.” (AR 620–21.) Daily activities may be used 9 to discredit an individual’s testimony about the severity of his symptoms “‘if a claimant 10 is able to spend a substantial part of his day engaged in pursuits involving the 11 performance of physical functions that are transferable to a work setting.’” Orn v. 12 Astrue, 495 F. 3d 625, 639 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Fair v. Bowen, 885 F.2d 597, 603 (9th 13 Cir. 1989)). “[T]he mere fact that a plaintiff has carried on certain daily activities . . . 14 does not in any way detract from her credibility as to her overall disability.” Vertigan v. 15 Halter, 260 F.3d 1044, 1050 (9th Cir. 2001). An individual need not be “utterly 16 incapacitated” to receive disability benefits. Id. 17 In Vertigan, the Court determined an ALJ erred by discrediting a claimant’s pain 18 allegations because she could “go grocery shopping with assistance, walk approximately 19 an hour in the malls, get together with her friends,” among other activities. Vertigan, 20 260 F.3d at 1050. Here, Plaintiff testified to doing activities such as running errands, 21 doing chores around his home, and performing maintenance on cars for friends and 22 family. (AR 635–44.) There is substantial evidence in the record that Plaintiff completes 23 these activities while experiencing disabling pain. Like in Vertigan, Plaintiff’s daily 24 activities are “not necessarily transferable to the work setting” and certainly not 25 dispositive of his ability to work eight hours a day, five days a week. 260 F.3d at 1050. 26 The ALJ did not make any connections between the rejected testimony and

27 contradictory daily activities. Therefore, the ALJ’s conclusion that Plaintiff’s daily 2 symptom testimony. See Leza v. Kijakazi, No. 21-16079, 2022 WL 819782, at *2 (9th. 3 Cir. Mar. 17, 2022) (citing Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1016). 4 5. Conclusion 5 In conclusion, the ALJ committed a legal error by failing to specifically identify 6 which of Plaintiff’s statements he found not credible or explain why. Holohan, 246 F.3d 7 at 1208. Additionally, the ALJ erred by failing to provide clear and convincing reasons, 8 supported by substantial evidence in the record, to support his non-credibility 9 determination. Brown-Hunter, 806 F.3d at 494. 11 The reviewing court may enter a “judgment affirming, modifying, or reversing” 12 the Commissioner’s decision. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The reviewing court may also remand 13 the case to the Social Security Administration for further proceedings. Id. The reviewing 14 court has discretion in determining whether to remand for further proceedings or award 15 benefits. See Salvador v. Sullivan, 917 F.2d 13, 15 (9th Cir. 1990); McAllister v. Sullivan, 16 888 F.2d 599, 603 (9th Cir. 1989). Remand for further proceedings is warranted where 17 additional administrative proceedings could remedy defects in the decision. See Kail v. 18 Heckler, 722 F.2d 1496, 1497 (9th Cir. 1984). Remand for the payment of benefits is 19 appropriate where no useful purpose would be served by further administrative 20 proceedings, where the record has been fully developed, or where remand would 21 unnecessarily delay the receipt of benefits to which the disabled plaintiff is entitled. See 22 Benecke v. Barnhart, 379 F.3d 587, 593 (9th Cir. 2004); Hoffman v. Heckler, 785 F.2d 23 1423, 1425 (9th Cir. 1986). 24 The Court finds that remand for further administrative proceedings is appropriate 25 because additional proceedings could remedy the defects in the ALJ’s decision. 26 Specifically, the Court REMANDS so that the ALJ may reexamine Plaintiff’s subjective

27 pain and symptom testimony and the applicable clear and convincing standard in a 1 || judgement be entered REVERSING the decision of the Commissioner and REMANDING 2 || this matter for further administrative proceedings pursuant to sentence four of 42 3 |/U.S.C. § 405(g). 5 Dated: July 10, 2026

Honorable Michael S. Berg United States Magistrate Judge 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28