Raul Toledo v. Martha's Vineyard Mobile Home Park

• Court: Court of Appeals of Texas
• Decided: April 10, 2025
• Docket: 13-24-00182-CV
• Status: Published

Opinion

NUMBER 13-24-00182-CV

COURT OF APPEALS

THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG

RAUL TOLEDO, Appellant,

v.

MARTHA’S VINEYARD MOBILE HOME PARK, Appellee.

ON APPEAL FROM THE COUNTY COURT AT LAW NO. 5 OF NUECES COUNTY, TEXAS

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before Chief Justice Tijerina and Justices West and Cron Memorandum Opinion by Justice Cron

Appellant, Raul Toledo, acting pro se, appeals the county court’s judgment in favor

of appellee, Martha’s Vineyard Mobile Home Park (Mobile Home Park), in a forcible-

detainer action. See TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 24.002. Concluding that Toledo’s sole issue

has been inadequately briefed, see TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i), we affirm. I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On January 5, 2024, the Mobile Home Park sought to evict Toledo and all other

occupants from property 1 located at the Mobile Home Park (the premises) in a Nueces

County justice court. After Toledo failed to appear, a default judgment was entered

against him for possession of the premises. Toledo appealed to a county court in Nueces

County, and the appeal was heard on March 28, 2024. Toledo again failed to appear, and

the county court issued a judgment in favor of the Mobile Home Park awarding, among

other things, possession of the premises. This appeal followed. See TEX. PROP. CODE

ANN. § 24.007.

II. DISCUSSION

By his sole issue, Toledo contends, “I am appealing my Motion for Eviction from

my Residence at the Martha’s Vineyard Mobil[e] Home Park due to concerns and

discrepancies sited by the Park Site Manager. I have corrected any and all issues related

to this Case.” The Mobile Home Park did not file a brief. 2 See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.2. Even

if we liberally construe Toldeo’s contention as a potentially meritorious claim of a right to

immediate possession of the premises, it nevertheless fails for inadequate briefing. See

TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i); TEX. R. CIV. P. 510.3(e); Shields Ltd. P’ship v. Bradberry, 526

S.W.3d 471, 478 (Tex. 2017) (“The sole focus of a forcible-detainer action is the right to

immediate possession of real property.”); Marshall v. Hous. Auth. of City of San Antonio,

198 S.W.3d 782, 785 (Tex. 2006) (same); Dormandy v. Dinero Land & Cattle Co., 61

S.W.3d 555, 557 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2001, pet. dism’d w.o.j.) (same).

1 We have refrained from identifying the exact address of the property for privacy reasons.

2 The Mobile Home Park later separately filed a motion to dismiss, which we previously denied.

2 To elaborate, within the summary of argument section of his brief, Toledo

references four appellate rules, but fails to shape these rules into any cogent argument

that we can review. 3 See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i); Katy Springs & Mfg., Inc. v. Favalora,

476 S.W.3d 579, 607 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2015, pet. denied) (“It is not this

court’s duty to review the record, research the law, and then fashion a legal argument for

appellant when [it] has failed to do so.” (alteration in original) (citation omitted)); see also

Arevalo v. Llamas, No. 13-20-00497-CV, 2022 WL 3264628, at *6 (Tex. App.—Corpus

Christi–Edinburg Aug. 11, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op.); In re J.O.A.M., No. 01-23-00691-

CV, 2024 WL 1169432, at *23 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Mar. 19, 2024, no pet.)

(mem. op.). Nowhere else in Toledo’s five-page brief is there any authority cited or record

references made. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i); Harvel v. Tex. Dep’t of Ins.-Div. of Workers’

Comp., 511 S.W.3d 248, 253 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2015, pet. denied)

(“The appellant’s brief must contain a clear and concise argument for the party’s contest

accompanied by appropriate citations to authorities and to the record.”) (citation omitted);

see also Jimison v. MAEDC-Hulen Bend Senior Cmty., L.P., No. 02-23-00206-CV, 2024

WL 3282544, at *8 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth July 3, 2024, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“[F]ailure to

cite legal authority or provide substantive analysis of the legal issue presented results in

waiver of the complaint.” (quoting Valadez v. Avitia, 238 S.W.3d 843, 845 (Tex. App.—El

Paso 2007, no pet.))).

Although we understand that Toledo is a pro se litigant, he still must comply with

the applicable rules of appellate procedure. See Mansfield State Bank v. Cohn, 573

3 We note that the sentence in Toledo’s brief which references the four appellate rules is as follows:

“Pursuant to TEX.R.APP.P. 42.3 in reference to TEX.R.APP.9.1(b), 9.5, 25.1(d)(2, 4, 8)[.] Plus[,] I’ve been a resident over 20 yrs.” 3 S.W.2d 181, 185 (Tex. 1978); Sweed v. City of El Paso, 195 S.W.3d 784, 786 (Tex.

App.—El Paso 2006, no. pet); see also TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i). Because Toledo has

inadequately briefed his sole issue, we conclude it has been waived and overrule it. See

TEX. R. APP. P. 38.(i); see also Vaiz v. Fed. Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n, No. 13-14-00110-CV, 2015

WL 6768657, at *3 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg Nov. 5, 2015, pet. dism’d)

(mem. op.) (overruling second issue based on inadequate briefing after reasoning in part

that “there is no cogent argument or citation to applicable legal authorities”).

III. CONCLUSION

We affirm the county court’s judgment.

JENNY CRON Justice

Delivered and filed on the 10th day of April, 2025.