Raul Matos-Salazar v. Attorney General United States of America

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
• Decided: June 2, 2026
• Docket: 25-1370
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT ______________

No. 25-1370 ______________

RAUL MATOS-SALAZAR; ELIZABETH ROSARIO VASQUEZ; B. M-V; F. M-V, Petitioners v.

ATTORNEY GENERAL UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ______________

On Petition for Review of a Decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (Agency Nos. A240-828-422, A240-636-473, A240-827-533, A240-827-799) Immigration Judge: Nicole Beason-Lane _________________

Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) on January 20, 2026

Before: RESTREPO, FREEMAN, and MASCOTT, Circuit Judges

(Filed: June 2, 2026)

_________________

OPINION* _________________

RESTREPO, Circuit Judge

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and, under I.O.P. 5.7, is not binding precedent. Petitioners are natives and citizens of Peru, and they petition for review of the

final Order of removal entered by the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA” or “Board”)

that dismissed their appeal from the decision of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”). The IJ

denied the application of lead petitioner, Raul Matos-Salazar (“Petitioner”), for asylum,

withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”)

regulations.1 For reasons that follow, we deny the petition for review.

I.2

Petitioners entered the United States without authorization on May 13, 2022. In

July of 2022, the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) filed Notices to Appear

(“NTAs”) with the Immigration Court, charging them with removability pursuant to

Section 212(a)(6)(A)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), 8 U.S.C. §

1182(a)(6)(A)(i), for being present in the United States without having been admitted or

paroled. In written pleadings, filed through counsel, they admitted the allegations in their

NTAs and conceded that they were removable as charged.

On October 12, 2022, Petitioner filed counseled applications for asylum,

withholding of removal, and CAT protection. He sought asylum and withholding of

removal based on his claim of persecution on account of his asserted membership in three

particular social groups (“PSGs”): (1) Peruvian nuclear families who resist organized

crime control; (2) Peruvian nuclear families who report organized crime groups to the

1 The remaining petitioners are listed as derivative beneficiaries on the asylum application. 2 Because we write solely for the parties, we assume familiarity with the facts. 2 police; and (3) Peruvian nuclear families who have no protection from the government.

In support of the applications, Petitioner submitted, among other things, his own

affidavit, a police report, and affidavits from individuals in Peru. He also testified at a

March 4, 2024 hearing.

On March 4, 2024, the IJ issued a decision denying the applications. The IJ found

that Petitioner’s testimony and corroboration were credible, and the asylum application

was timely filed. The IJ further determined that none of Petitioner’s three proposed PSGs

was cognizable under the INA and, among other things, that Petitioner failed to establish

past persecution or a well-founded fear of future persecution based on a protected ground.

Since Petitioner failed to satisfy the lower burden of proof required for asylum, the IJ also

concluded he failed to satisfy the more stringent clear probability of persecution standard

required for withholding of removal. Finally, the IJ denied protection under CAT

because he found that Petitioner failed to establish the necessary requirements that it was

more likely than not he would be tortured if removed to Peru or that any such speculative

torture would be committed by, at the instigation of, or with the consent or acquiescence

of Peruvian public officials.

The BIA dismissed the appeal and affirmed the IJ’s determination that none of

Petitioner’s three proposed PSGs was cognizable under the INA. The Board further

affirmed the IJ’s determination that, even assuming Petitioner had presented a cognizable

PSG, he failed to demonstrate “the required nexus between the harm he suffered and

fears and his membership in the groups.” AR 5-6. Accordingly, the BIA affirmed the

denial of asylum, and thus also Petitioner’s failure to meet the higher burden of proof for

3 withholding of removal. Finally, the BIA affirmed the denial of Petitioner’s CAT

application and determined that, “[g]iven the [IJ’s] findings of fact, [Petitioner] did not

establish that he would be subjected to treatment that qualifies as ‘torture’ with the

necessary governmental acquiescence under the governing CAT regulations and the

relevant precedents.” AR 7.

II.

We are vested with jurisdiction to review final orders from the BIA under 8 U.S.C.

§ 1252(a). We review the BIA’s decision as well as the IJ’s decision to the extent the

BIA adopted the IJ’s findings or reasoning. See Singh v. Att’y Gen., 839 F.3d 273, 282

(3d Cir. 2016). We review legal determinations de novo and “accept factual findings if

supported by substantial evidence.” Sesay v. Att’y Gen., 787 F.3d 215, 220 (3d Cir.

2015) (quoting Gonzalez-Posadas v. Att’y Gen., 781 F.3d 677, 684 n.5 (3d Cir. 2015)).

Under the deferential substantial evidence standard, “findings of fact are conclusive

unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.” 8

U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); Abdille v. Ashcroft, 242 F.3d 477, 483-84 (3d Cir. 2001) (“[T]he

BIA’s finding must be upheld unless the evidence not only supports a contrary

conclusion, but compels it.”).

(A) Eligibility for Asylum and Withholding of Removal

A removable noncitizen is eligible for asylum if he demonstrates that he is “unable

or unwilling to return to, and is unable or unwilling to avail himself . . . of the protection

of [the country to which he would be removed] because of persecution or a well-founded

4 fear of persecution on account of . . . membership in a [PSG].” 8 U.S.C. §

1101(a)(42)(A). A noncitizen is eligible for withholding of removal if he shows “that it

is more likely than not that he . . . would be persecuted on account of . . . membership in

a [PSG] . . . upon removal to [the designated] country.” 3 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(b)(2).

Thus, the standard for withholding of removal is similar to the standard for asylum, but it

carries a higher burden. Because withholding of removal requires proof of a higher

likelihood of future persecution, “an applicant who cannot meet the standard for asylum

will necessarily be unable to meet the standard for withholding of removal.” Gomez-

Zuluaga v. Att’y Gen., 527 F.3d 330, 348-49 (3d Cir. 2008).

To establish a cognizable PSG for purposes of asylum and withholding of

removal, an applicant must establish that the proposed group is “(1) composed of

members who share a common immutable characteristic, (2) defined with particularity,

and (3) socially distinct within the society in question.” S.E.R.L. v. Att’y Gen., 894 F.3d

535, 547 (3d Cir. 2018) (internal quotation marks omitted). On appeal, petitioners

challenge the finding that the second proposed PSG - Peruvian nuclear families who

report organized crime groups to the police – is not cognizable under the INA.

3 “Though asylum and withholding are two separate forms of relief with different standards of proof, a petitioner who bases his or her claim for either on membership in a [PSG] must, inter alia, establish that the [PSG] in question is legally cognizable.” Radiowala v. Att’y Gen., 930 F.3d 577, 583 (3d Cir. 2019). 5 Specifically, petitioners assert that the proposed PSG satisfies the requirements of

immutability, particularity, and social distinction. Id.

However, as respondent points out, the BIA reasonably determined that the

proposed PSG is not cognizable because it does not satisfy the social distinction

requirement. The social distinction requirement asks “whether the people of a given

society would perceive a proposed group as sufficiently separate or distinct.” Id. at 550

(internal quotation marks omitted). In articulating the social-distinction requirements,

“persecutory conduct alone cannot define a group.” Radiowala, 930 F.3d at 585 (quoting

S.E.R.L., 894 F.3d at 549). A group of persons “indistinguishable from those in the

general public whom a criminal gang might otherwise suspect as having informed on it,”

without more, does not qualify as a PSG. Id. at 584.

Here, the proposed PSG fails the social-distinction requirement, and the Board

properly affirmed the IJ’s decision, concluding that Petitioner failed to show that the

group possesses fundamental identifying characteristics which cause such individuals to

be perceived as a distinct social group by Peruvian society. Although petitioners cite

Guzman Orellana v. Attorney General, 956 F.3d 171 (3d Cir. 2020), to support their

proposed PSG, as petitioners concede, Guzman Orellana involved “witnesses who have

publicly provided assistance to law enforcement against major Salvadoran gangs.” Id. at

179-80. As the BIA pointed out, “the fact that [Petitioner’s proposed PSG] is comprised

of individuals whose cooperation with law enforcement was not public in nature suggests

that the proposed group is not cognizable.” AR 5. Providing assistance to law

enforcement in public, such as the act of testifying in open court, “lends itself to societal

6 recognition – generally, speaking in open court means that all are readily aware of the

group and its members.” Radiowala, 930 F.3d at 583. That the “informant status may

have, by a means unlike and other than testifying publicly, been disclosed to alleged

persecutors does not change the analysis.” Id. at 584; see Ngugi v. Lynch, 826 F.3d 1132,

1138 (8th Cir. 2016) (rejecting a proposed PSG of “witnesses to the criminal activities”

of a group in part because there was no evidence that the petitioner “ever served as a

witness against the [group] in any public proceedings”).

Further, to the extent the petitioners argue that the proposed PSG is socially

distinct as a group of persons targeted for their willingness to speak the truth at great risk

to themselves, such a proposed group “is a non-starter” because such a group is defined

by the harm or potential harm posed to its members, and “persecutory conduct alone

cannot define a group.” Radiowala, 930 F.3d at 585 (quoting S.E.R.L., 894 F.3d at 549).

Here, Petitioner does not claim that he provided assistance to law enforcement in public,

and he fails to show the BIA erred in concluding that the proposed PSG does not possess

fundamental identifying characteristics which cause such individuals to be perceived as a

distinct social group by Peruvian society for purposes of the INA. He fails to meet his

burden to identify evidence compelling reversal of the agency’s no-social-distinction

finding. See, e.g., DeLeon-Ochoa v. Att’y Gen., 622 F.3d 341, 357 (3d Cir. 2010); 8

U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B). Because the proposed PSG in question is not legally cognizable

7 under the INA, petitioners’ claims for asylum and withholding of removal fail.4 See

supra note 3; Radiowala, 930 F.3d at 583.

(B) Eligibility for CAT Relief

An applicant is eligible for CAT protection if he establishes that it is more likely

than not that he would be tortured if removed and that public officials will commit or

acquiesce to the torture. Quinteros v. Att’y Gen., 945 F.3d 772, 786 (3d Cir. 2019).

Here, Petitioner can show neither of the requirements for eligibility, and the BIA had

ample reason to conclude Petitioner did not meet his burden of establishing that he would

be subjected to treatment that qualifies as “torture” with the necessary governmental

acquiescence under the CAT regulations.

The record does not compel the finding that Petitioner established that it is more

likely than not that he will face torture if he returns to Peru, defined as “an extreme form

of cruel and inhuman treatment” and includes only “severe pain or suffering.” 8 C.F.R. §

1208.18(a)(1)-(2) (2020); Galeas Figueroa v. Att’y Gen., 998 F.3d 77, 92 (3d Cir. 2021).

As the IJ found and the BIA affirmed, the evidence supports the conclusion that

Petitioner did not have any personal encounters with members of the relevant criminal

4 Having found Petitioner failed to show the proposed PSG is socially distinct within the society in question, it is unnecessary to address the other two required characteristics of a PSG under the INA. Nor is it necessary to address whether Petitioner established the required nexus between past or feared harm and membership in a proposed PSG. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (petitioner must show a well-founded fear of persecution “on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion”) (emph. added). However, we note that the timing of the events Petitioner recounted does not support a nexus. 8 organization after they robbed him one time, members of that organization told his

mother they were looking for him but did not convey any threats about him to his mother,

and Petitioner has not received any communications from members since the robbery and

has no direct evidence that he is being targeted by the criminal organization.

The BIA also properly concluded that Petitioner did not establish the requisite

state action. He is unable to establish that Peruvian officials would instigate, consent or

acquiesce to his torture. See Quinteros, 945 F.3d at 786. As the Board pointed out, the

evidence indicates that Petitioner filed a police report and proceeded to leave Peru soon

thereafter without following up with the police. Moreover, Petitioner testified that he

learned the police arrested and incarcerated one of the members who robbed him.

III.

For the foregoing reasons, we deny the petition for review.