Raul Litonjua, Jr. v. Loretta E. Lynch

Ninth Circuit

Raul Litonjua, Jr. v. Loretta E. Lynch

637 F. App'x 305

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

DecidedFebruary 11, 2016

Docket12-73170

StatusUnpublished

This text of 637 F. App'x 305 (Raul Litonjua, Jr. v. Loretta E. Lynch) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Raul Litonjua, Jr. v. Loretta E. Lynch, 637 F. App'x 305 (9th Cir. 2016).

Pincite

Opinion

MEMORANDUM ***

Raul E. Litonjua, Jr., appeals the decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) that Litonjua is statutorily ineligible for asylum and withholding of removal as a result of being convicted of a particularly serious crime. He also appeals the BIA’s denial of relief under the Convention *306 Against Torture (CAT). We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252.

Because Litonjua does not appeal the BIA’s decision that he was convicted of an aggravated felony drug trafficking crime, the BIA did not err in holding that Liton-jua committed a particularly serious crime for purposes of asylum, see 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(B)(i), and therefore is statutorily ineligible for relief, see 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b) (2) (A) (ii).

Nor did the BIA err in determining that Litonjua’s conviction was a particularly serious crime for purposes of withholding of removal. See 8 U.S.C. § 1231 (b)(3)(B)(ii). The BIA identified and applied the correct legal standard for determining whether a drug trafficking aggravated felony is a particularly serious crime, see Matter of Y-L-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 270, 274-75 (A.G.2002), and we lack jurisdiction to reweigh the Matter of Y-L- factors on appeal or to consider the BIA’s “ultimate conclusion that the ... conviction ... was for a particularly serious crime.” See Anaya-Ortiz v. Holder, 594 F.3d 673, 680 (9th Cir.2010) (citing Delgado v. Holder, 563 F.3d 863, 871 (9th Cir. 2009)). Accordingly, the BIA did not err in denying Litonjua’s application for withholding of removal because he was statutorily barred. See 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(B)(ii).

Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s denial of deferral of removal under CAT. Litonjua failed to demonstrate that he would be subject to discrimination in the Philippines that would rise to the level of torture, see 8 C.F.R, § 208.18(a)(2); see also Vitug v. Holder, 723 F.3d 1056, 1066 (9th Cir.2013), or that the government of the Philippines would acquiesce or turn a blind eye to any torture, see Ornelas-Chavez v. Gonzales, 458 F.3d 1052, 1059 (9th Cir .2006).

PETITION DENIED IN PART AND DISMISSED IN PART.

***

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

MEMORANDUM ***

Raul E. Litonjua, Jr., appeals the decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) that Litonjua is statutorily ineligible for asylum and withholding of removal as a result of being convicted of a particularly serious crime. He also appeals the BIA’s denial of relief under the Convention *306 Against Torture (CAT). We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252.

Because Litonjua does not appeal the BIA’s decision that he was convicted of an aggravated felony drug trafficking crime, the BIA did not err in holding that Liton-jua committed a particularly serious crime for purposes of asylum, see 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(B)(i), and therefore is statutorily ineligible for relief, see 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b) (2) (A) (ii).

Nor did the BIA err in determining that Litonjua’s conviction was a particularly serious crime for purposes of withholding of removal. See 8 U.S.C. § 1231 (b)(3)(B)(ii). The BIA identified and applied the correct legal standard for determining whether a drug trafficking aggravated felony is a particularly serious crime, see Matter of Y-L-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 270, 274-75 (A.G.2002), and we lack jurisdiction to reweigh the Matter of Y-L- factors on appeal or to consider the BIA’s “ultimate conclusion that the ... conviction ... was for a particularly serious crime.” See Anaya-Ortiz v. Holder, 594 F.3d 673, 680 (9th Cir.2010) (citing Delgado v. Holder, 563 F.3d 863, 871 (9th Cir. 2009)). Accordingly, the BIA did not err in denying Litonjua’s application for withholding of removal because he was statutorily barred. See 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(B)(ii).

Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s denial of deferral of removal under CAT. Litonjua failed to demonstrate that he would be subject to discrimination in the Philippines that would rise to the level of torture, see 8 C.F.R, § 208.18(a)(2); see also Vitug v. Holder, 723 F.3d 1056, 1066 (9th Cir.2013), or that the government of the Philippines would acquiesce or turn a blind eye to any torture, see Ornelas-Chavez v. Gonzales, 458 F.3d 1052, 1059 (9th Cir .2006).

PETITION DENIED IN PART AND DISMISSED IN PART.

***

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)

637 F. App'x 305, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/raul-litonjua-jr-v-loretta-e-lynch-ca9-2016.

Opinion

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack