ACCEPTED 13-14-00006-CR THIRTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS FILED CORPUS CHRISTI, TEXAS IN THE 13TH COURT OF APPEALS 1/7/2015 5:08:45 PM CORPUS CHRISTI DORIAN RAMIREZ CLERK 1/7/15 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS DORIAN E. RAMIREZ, CLERK BY JParedes FOR THE THIRTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF TEXAS RECEIVED IN 13th COURT OF APPEALS CORPUS CHRISTI/EDINBURG, TEXAS CT.APP. 13-14-00006-CR & 13-14- 1/7/2015 5:08:45 PM DORIAN E. RAMIREZ 00007-CR Clerk
RAUL GARZA SALAZAR, APPELLANT
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE
ON APPEAL FROM: THE 445TH DISTRICT COURT OF CAMERON COUNTY, TEXAS CAUSE NO. 2013-DCR-1700 & 2013-DCR-1701
* * * * * * * * * * APPELLANT'S BRIEF * * * * * * * * * *
Larry Warner Attorney at Law 3109 Banyan Drive Harlingen, Texas Phone (956)230-0361 Fax (866) 408-1968 Office@larrywarner.com www.larrywarner.com Texas Bar#20871500;USDC,SDTX 1230; Board Certified, Criminal Law, Texas Board of Legal Specialization(1983) ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT`
APPELLANT REQUESTS ORAL ARGUMENT, PURSUANT TO TEX.R.APP.PROC.39.7 AND 13TH TEX.APP.(CORPUS CHRISTI)LOC.R.4 Pursuant to Tex.R.App.Proc.38.1(a),Appellant provides the following identity of parties and counsel:
PARTIES AND INTERESTED PERSONS
1. Victor Ramirez, Attorney at Law, SBOT No. 24048750, 905 E Jackson St.,Brownsville, TX 78520-5923. Phone: (956) 621-2446. DEFENSE ATTORNEY AT TRIAL
2. Gustavo Garza, Assistant District Attorney, SBOT No. 07731700, 964 E Harrison St., Brownsville, TX 78520. Phone: (956) 544-0849. PROSECUTING ATTORNEY AT TRIAL
3. Ismael Hinojosa, Assistant District Attorney, SBOT No. 24041102, 964 E Harrison St., Brownsville, TX 78520. Phone: (956) 544-0849. PROSECUTING ATTORNEY AT TRIAL
4. Hon. Luis Saenz, Cameron County District Attorney, SBOT No. 17514880, 964 E Harrison St., Brownsville, TX 78520. Phone: (956) 544-0849. PROSECUTING ATTORNEY AT TRIAL
5. Larry Warner, Law Office of Larry Warner, SBOT No. 20871500, 3109 Banyan Circle, Harlingen, TX 78550. Phone: (956) 230-0361. DEFENSE ATTORNEY AT SENTENCING AND ON APPEAL
-ii- Pursuant to Tex.R.App.Proc.38.1(b,Appellant provides the following table of contents:
TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE IDENTITY OF PARTIES ii
TABLE OF CONTENTS iii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES iv
STATEMENT OF CASE v
STATEMENT RE ORAL ARGUMENT vi
ISSUES PRESENTED 1-3
STATEMENT OF FACTS 4-7
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 8
ARGUMENT 12-39
CONCLUSION AND REQUEST FOR RELIEF 40-41
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 42
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE 43
-iii- Pursuant to Tex.R.App.Proc.38.1(c),Appellant provides the following index of authorities arranged alphabetically and indicating the pages of the brief where the authorities are cited: INDEX OF AUTHORITIES CASES PAGES Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 Chabot v. State, 300 S.W.3d 768(Tex.Crim.App.2009) . . . . . 21 Clements v. State, 576 S.W.2d 390(Tex.Crim.App.1979) . . . . 13 Duggan v. State, 778 S.W.3d 465(Tex.Crim.App.1989) . . . . . 23 Duncan v. Louisiana,391 U.S.145(1968) . . . . . . . . . . . 35-36 Estrada v. State,313 S.W.3d 274(Tex.Crim.App.2010) . . 3,6,11,19 Ex parte Adams,768 S.W.2d 281(Tex.Crim.App.1989) . . . 2,5,10,25 Ex parte Carmona,185 S.W.3d 192(Tex.Crim.App.2006) . . . . 31-32 Ex Parte Ellis,275 S.W.3d109,126 hn20(Tex.App.--Austin 2008,no pet.) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vi Ex Parte Ghahremani,332 S.W.3d 470(Tex.Crim.App.2011) . . . 16-18 Ex Parte Givens, 619 S.W.2d 184(Tex.Crim.App. 1981) . . . . . 39 Hough v. State,828 S.W.2d97,101 hn6(Tex.App.–Beaumont 1992,pet.ref’d) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13,14 Mellinger v. City of Houston, 68 Tex. 37, 3 S.W. 249, 252–53 (1887) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 Parle v. Runnels,505 F.3d 922(9th Cir.2007) . . . . 3,6,11,36,37 Ramirez v. State,96 S.W.3d 386(Tex.App.–Austin 1992,pet.ref’d)26-27 Stroud v. VBFSB Holding Corp., 917 S.W.2d 75, 78 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1996, writ denied) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 Turner v. State,677 S.W.2d 518,523 hn13(Tex.Crim.App.[en banc]1984) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 681-82, 105 S.Ct. 3375, 87 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 Webb v. State,341 S.W.3d 415(Tex.Crim.App.2011) . . . . . . . 32 Yates v. State,171 S.W.3d 215(Tex.App.–Houston[1st Dist.]2005,pet.ref’d) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
-iv- Pursuant to Tex.R.App.P.38.1(a), Appellant provides the following statement of the case, stating concisely the nature of the case, the course of the proceedings, and the trial court's disposition of the case:
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The defendant was indicted for tampering with
governmental records relating to the testing of and by
Roberto Cadriel and 2 counts of abuse of official
capacity. (Count I, Clerk Record pages 4-5) (Count II,
Clerk’s Record pages 4-5)
The defendant pleaded not guilty and tried the
matter to a jury. (Count I, Clerk’s Record, Page 20)
(Count II, Clerk’s Record, Page 14)
The jury found the defendant guilty as charged.(Count
I, Clerk’s Record, Pages 101-103) (Count II, Clerk’s
Record, Pages 68-70)
The trial court sentenced the defendant to a term of
10 months in the county jail.(Count I, Clerk’s Record,
Page 146-147) (Count I, Clerk’s Record, Page 128-129)
Defendant timely filed his notice of appeal on
December 18, 2013. (Count I, Clerk’s Record, Page 128-
129) (Count II, Clerk’s Record, Page 87-88)
-v- Pursuant to Tex.R.App.P.38.1(e), Appellant explains why oral argument would be helpful
to the decision making process.
STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT
A Court of Appeals explained that it allows oral argument “in order to clarify or expound upon the issues raised in the.. briefs”. Ex Parte Ellis,275 S.W.3d109,126 hn20(Tex.App.--Austin 2008,no pet.) If the Court of Appeals were to allow oral argument, counsel could respond at once to any of the questions any of the Justices of the Court might have. Since Magistrates and Counsel would doubtless be most focused on the law and the facts of this case at the time of any argument, answering any inquiries at once would resolve any queries the Justices might have as well as making clear which issues were dispositive. Counsel would be prepared to discuss any of the issues set out in the briefs. The Court of Criminal Appeals requires counsel to advise it in advance of oral argument which issue counsel propose to discuss. Counsel is at the Court’s disposition.
-vi- Pursuant to Tex.R.App.Proc.38.1(e), Appellant presents this statement of issues presented:
ISSUES PRESENTED
1. The Court of Appeals should grant a new trial in
the interest of justice.
2. The verdict is contrary to the law and the
evidence.
3. The state presented misleading testimony
calculated to harm the defendant by putting on testimony
that Ernie Hernandez and Raul Salazar retaliated against
county employees by reorganizing county departments.
4. The state presented misleading evidence when the
state said that the defendant denied Susan Marfelino and
Dalia Salinas due process.
5. The state presented misleading testimony
that Commissioner Ernie Hernandez (unindicted alleged co-
conspirator) and Raul Salazar retaliated against county
employees by reorganizing county departments.
6. The state presented misleading evidence when the
state alleged that the defendant denied Assistant Human
Resources Director Susan Marfelino and Civil Service INITIAL BRIEF - 1 Coordinator Dalia Salinas due process regarding a
“demotion” that never occurred.
7. The witness failed to identify the defendant prior
to trial. At trial, she denied failing to identify the
defendant. The prosecutor failed to correct the falsity.
Habeas granted. Ex parte Adams,768 S.W.2d
281(Tex.Crim.App.1989) This issue is raised now on
appeal.
8. The State alleged that Commissioner Hernandez and
the defendant caused the placement of an agenda item that
called for the demotion / reorganization of Assistant
Human Resources Director Susan Marfelino and Civil
Service Coordinator Dalia Salinas.
In closing argument, the prosecutor held up a piece
of paper and told the jury that there was an item on the
agenda of the Commissioners’ Court to demote the two
women as retaliation. There was no agenda on that day.
The misleading argument warrants a new trial.
9. Overall conduct by the prosecutor in presenting
misleading argument and abuse of grand jury subpoenas,
inter alia, warrants dismissal of the indictment with
INITIAL BRIEF - 2 prejudice to refile the same.
10. Cumulative error deprived the defendant of a fair
trial. TEX.CONST.,art.I,sec.10 Estrada v. State,313
S.W.3d 274(Tex.Crim.App.2010)
11. Cumulative error deprived the defendant of a fair
trial. U.S.CONST.amend.VI; Parle v. Runnels,505 F.3d
922(9th Cir.2007)
12. The indictment fails to state an offense.
Conviction for conduct which does not constitute an
offense violates due course and due process.
INITIAL BRIEF - 3 Pursuant to Tex.R.App.Proc.38.1(f), Appellant provides the following statement of facts stating concisely without argument the facts pertinent to the issues of points presented:
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The following issues will be proved up by bills of
exception:
INITIAL BRIEF - 4 state alleged that the defendant denied Assistant Human
Resources Director Susan Marfelino and Civil Service
Coordinator Dalia Salinas due process regarding a
7. The witness failed to identify the defendant
prior to trial. At trial, she denied failing to identify
the defendant. The prosecutor failed to correct the
falsity. Habeas granted. Ex parte Adams,768 S.W.2d
INITIAL BRIEF - 5 9. Overall conduct by the prosecutor in presenting
prejudice to refile the same.
Appellant has moved the Court of Appeals to extend
the time to file the bills of exception, of which the
Court of Appeals will please take judicial notice.
TEX.R.EVID.201; Stroud v. VBFSB Holding Corp., 917 S.W.2d
75, 78 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1996, writ denied) (A Court
of Appeals may take judicial notice of its own records.)
Appellant as Applicant has filed an Application for
a Post-Conviction Writ of Habeas Corpus, pursuant to
TEX.CODE CRIM.P.art. 11.09. Appellant as Applicant is
asking the Trial Judge to hold a hearing on his Bills of
Exception at the same time that the Trial Judge holds a INITIAL BRIEF - 6 hearing on his Application for Post-Conviction Writ of
Habeas Corpus, pursuant to TEX.CODE CRIM.P.art. 11.09.
Appellant here seeks leave of the Court of Appeals to
supplement this brief with a reference to approved or
qualified bills of exception once that hearing has taken
place and once the Trial Judge has taken action on
approving or qualifying the verified bills.
INITIAL BRIEF - 7 Pursuant to Tex. R. App. Proc. 38.1(g), Appellant provides the following summary of the argument, a succinct and accurate statement of the argument made in the body of the brief not merely a repetition of the issues or points presented for review:
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The indictment fails to state an offense. While there
was no motion and ruling on a motion to quash, the Court
of Appeals should consider the inadequacy of the state’s
pleading in determining if Appellant had a fair trial.
It should also consider whether this pleading is one
which does implicate due course.
which does implicate due process.
Yes, it is true that the state amended its
constitution re such inadequate pleadings and the failure
of the defense to move to quash. A state cannot avoid
the requisites of federal due process by amending the
state’s constitution. The state’s own requirement of due
course will not abide a conviction and confinement for
acts which do not constitute an offense...elsewise we
should still have abode in the penitentiary for those
convicted of homosexuality, those culpable of seduction
upon false promise of marriage, etcetera.
INITIAL BRIEF - 8 The following things deprived the defendant of a fair
trial, considering either due course or due process:
INITIAL BRIEF - 9 Coordinator Dalia Salinas due process regarding a
INITIAL BRIEF - 10 prejudice to refile the same.
INITIAL BRIEF - 11 Pursuant to Tex. R. App. Proc. 38.1(h), Appellant provides the following argument or the contentions made, with appropriate citations to the authorities and to the record:
ARGUMENT
The reorganization was never suggested by Ernie
Hernandez. Rather, the reorganization was at the
instance Juan Hernandez and Arnold Flores. This is
important because at Garza-Salazar’s trial, the state
consistently advanced evidence against Ernie Hernandez,
averring that Ernie Hernandez and Raul Garza-Salazar were
co-conspirators in getting an answer key to the civil
service examination to Hernandez’ brother in law,
Cadriel, and in retaliating against the two women who
were to be demoted or reassigned.
INITIAL BRIEF - 12 There was never any demotion of any human resources
personnel.
This harmed the defendant because it was a crime not
charged in the indictment. The crime charged was
tampering with witnesses, Susan Marfileno and Dalia
Salinas, by demoting them.
But they were not demoted.
It is fundamental error for one to be convicted of a crime not charged in the indictment. Clements v. State, 576 S.W.2d 390(Tex.Crim.App.1979)
Defendant was convicted in the 174th Judicial District Court, Harris County, George D. Taylor, Special Judge, of aggravated robbery, and he appealed. The Court of Criminal Appeals, Dally, J., held that fundamental error was committed so as to mandate reversal where instruction authorized a conviction for a theory not charged in indictment. Reversed and remanded. Clements v. State, 576 S.W.2d 390(Tex.Crim.App.1979)
It is error for the prosecutor to charge the
defendant in final argument with a crime not specified in
the indictment. Hough v. State,828 S.W.2d97,101
hn6(Tex.App.–Beaumont 1992,pet.ref’d)
Hough was charged with “illegal expenditure”. Hough
at 97. In final argument the prosecutor accused him of
selling cocaine:
INITIAL BRIEF - 13 “Point of error three alleges that the prosecutor made improper argument in urging the jury to convict the appellant of crimes of which he was not charged in the indictment. The error allegedly occurred during final argument when the Assistant District Attorney stated: Which do you think is the greater danger in Lufkin, Texas? That your sons and daughters and your grandparents are going to be caught up with Roys threat or your third graders and forth [sic] graders are likely to find someone selling cocaine?”Hough v. State,828 S.W.2d97,101 hn6(Tex.App.–Beaumont 1992,pet.ref’d)
The Court found the argument error, but harmless, in
view of the impact on the jury, the jury arguments, and
the evidence at trial. In Hough, most of the evidence was
about illegal investment, financing dope deals, not
selling cocaine. In Salazar, the indictment did not
charge Salazar with retaliating against witnesses or
tampering with witnesses. It charged him with tampering
with a public document.
There probably was an adverse impact on the jury. A
jury might understand trying to get someone a job who was
living in his truck and who could not read or write. It
would not pass over demoting two women who were potential
witnesses and trying to pass it off as reorganization.
INITIAL BRIEF - 14 The jury arguments emphasized generalized corruption
in Cameron County and implications of what Ernie
Hernandez did. One argument did accuse Salazar of a crime
not charged in the indictment...retaliation against the
two women who were demoted. (But they were not demoted.)
The evidence was equivocal. All the state’s
witnesses got immunity. Ernie Hernandez, the averred
mastermind, did not testify, claiming a privilege not to
testify against himself. The main witness, Cadriel, who
could neither read nor write, had said that another
person gave him the answer key. Threatened by the
prosecutor, and told by the prosecutor who the prosecutor
believed had given Cadriel the answer key, Cadriel then
changed his story and said that Salazar gave Cadriel the
answer key. This is not the compelling evidence of
Hough.
This Court should find that the argument was
erroneous but that it was not harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt. The District Court should order a new
trial.
The misleading evidence offered by the state
INITIAL BRIEF - 15 And it is not true that Ernie Hernandez was the one
who placed an item on the commissioners’ court agenda for
November 21, 2013. The trial ended on November 15, 2013.
The person who placed the item on the commissioners’
court agenda for November 21, 2013 was Juan Hernandez, of
the Civil Division, the requester. The one who wanted
the item placed on the agenda was Arnold Flores, the
Human Resources Director.
Presenting materially misleading evidence violates
the guaranties of due course and due process.
TEX.CONST.art.I,secs.13 & 19 and U.S.CONST.amend.XIV. Ex
Parte Ghahremani,332 S.W.3d 470(Tex.Crim.App.2011)
The applicant applied for writs of habeas corpus,
arguing that the State unconstitutionally suppressed
the July police report FN5 and presented false
testimony in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. The
applicant argues that the State gave the jury the
misleading impression that all of L.S.'s psychological
treatment was the result of the applicant's assault,
but that the relationship between L.S. and Davis could
INITIAL BRIEF - 16 have been partly responsible for L.S.'s need for
treatment. FN5. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87,
83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963) (due process is
violated when the State refuses to disclose requested
evidence that is favorable to the defendant regarding
either punishment or guilt); United States v. Bagley,
473 U.S. 667, 681-82, 105 S.Ct. 3375, 87 L.Ed.2d 481
(1985) (due process requires reversal if the State,
regardless of whether the defense made a request,
failed to disclose relevant, mitigating evidence to the
defendant).
The false evidence in Salazar was that the two
women had been demoted...and that Ernie Hernandez and
Salazar were responsible. But the two women were not
demoted. But the impact on the jury was that they had
indeed been demoted ...and that Ernie Hernandez and
Raul Garza Salazar were responsible for the retaliation
against these witnesses or this tampering with these
witnesses.
There was no doubt that Ghahremani had vaginal
intercourse with the virgin 13-year old girl. Even so,
INITIAL BRIEF - 17 presenting false and misleading evidence of the cause
of psychological problems required a new punishment
In Salazar the misleading evidence was presented at
the guilt/innocence phase of the trial; the Court
assessed the sentence. The Court should grant a new
trial on guilt or innocence, since the misleading
evidence tainted the guilt innocence trial.
The District Court should grant a new trial on
punishment, as was done in Ghahremani. While Judges are
presumed to disregard irrelevant evidence, that is
different from the state’s presenting misleading
evidence or simply false evidence.
state said that the defendant denied Susan Marfelino
and Dalia Salinas due process.
Both women got due process. Each was given a
notice. On Nov. 23, 2013 Arnold Flores sent both an
email telling county employees that he was going to
reorganize and to come and talk to him if anyone had a
question.
INITIAL BRIEF - 18 ***
The state’s presenting false testimony, whether by
design or by carelessness, warrants a new trial.
“We have judicially noticed the TDCJ regulation. This information, now properly before this Court, demonstrates there is a fair probability that appellant's death sentence was based upon Merillat's incorrect testimony as evidenced by the jury's notes. See Simmons, 512 U.S. at 160, 165-66, 114 S.Ct. 2187 (defendant "was prevented from rebutting information that the [jury] considered, and upon which it may have relied, in imposing the sentence of death" and jury "was denied a straight answer about [defendant's] parole eligibility even when it was requested" in a jury note). We believe that the Supreme Court would find this to be constitutionally intolerable. See id.; Johnson v. Mississippi, 486 U.S. 578, 590, 108 S.Ct. 1981, 100 L.Ed.2d 575 (1988) (death sentence based on "materially inaccurate" evidence violates Eighth Amendment); Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736, 740-41, 68 S.Ct. 1252, 92 L.Ed. 1690 (1948) (it violates due process to base conviction on "materially untrue" information "whether caused by carelessness or design"); Ex parte Chabot, 300 S.W.3d 768, 771 (Tex.Crim.App.2009) (State's unknowing use of perjured testimony violates due process); Ex parte Carmona, 185 S.W.3d 492, 497 (Tex.Crim.App.2006) (plurality op.) (revocation of community supervision based solely on perjured testimony violates due process). After having independently examined the merits of the State's confessed error, we are satisfied that appellant presents a meritorious substantive claim in point of error two.” Estrada v. State,313 S.W.3d 274(Tex.Crim.App.2010)
INITIAL BRIEF - 19 The women got due process. It was not true that they
did not. It was not true that Ernie Hernandez and Raul
Garza Salazar deprived them of notice and an opportunity
to be heard. This evidence harmed Salazar because the
state’s theory was that Salazar gave Cadriel the answer
key and retaliated against the two women as potential or
actual witnesses.
The result should be the same as in Estrada, a new
trial on punishment.
5. The state presented misleading testimony calculated
to harm the defendant by putting on testimony that
Commissioner Ernie Hernandez (unindicted alleged co-
The reorganization was never suggested by Commissioner
Ernie Hernandez or Raul Salazar as alleged by the State
and supported by inaccurate testimony by the Cameron
County Administrator Pedro Sepulveda and Assistant County
Administrator David Garcia. Rather, the proposed
reorganization was a result of long term planning by Human
Resource Director Arnold Flores, and approved and
INITIAL BRIEF - 20 submitted by County Attorney Juan Gonzalez.
The testimony during trial was that Robert Lopez was
responsible for ordering unindicted co-conspirator Carmen
Vera to take the test for unindicted co-conspirator
Roberto Cadriel. The existence or nonexistence of the
defendant’s participation as to “ordering” Carmen Vera to
take the exam is an element of the offense that the State
has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt. The
introduction of inaccurate testimony influenced the jury
by misleading the jury to believe that this
“reorganization”, that actually never occurred, was caused
by the defendant. The alleged retaliation described by
the State as a “reorganization” would have led any
reasonable juror to convict on emotion and not consider
the facts or any evidence favorable to the accused.
Presentation of false testimony by the state deprives
the defendant of due process of law, even if the state is
unaware that it is false. Chabot v. State, 300 S.W.3d
768(Tex.Crim.App.2009) After trial in Chabot there were
dna tests. The state’s witness had said that the state’s
INITIAL BRIEF - 21 witness had not had sex with the victim. The dna showed
that the state’s witness had indeed had sex with the
victim. The dna also excluded the defendant as the one who
left the sperm. The state’s witness was the only one to
place defendant at the crime. A new trial was ordered.
Retaliating against witnesses or pre-emptively
attacking in order to tamper with those witnesses is some
evidence from which a juror could conclude that Salazar
must have given Cadriel the answer key because Salazar
tampered with those two witnesses.
But there was no tampering. There was no retaliation.
Due course and due process provide the same
protection. TEX.CONST.art.I,secs.13 &19 While the Texas
Constitution is textually different in that it refers to
“due course” rather than “due process,” we regard these
terms as without meaningful distinction. Mellinger v. City
of Houston, 68 Tex. 37, 3 S.W. 249, 252–53 (1887).
INITIAL BRIEF - 22 Coordinator Dalia Salinas due process regarding a
“demotion” that never occurred. (See Exhibit 1 page 6-9)
The newly discovered evidence will show that both
women were afforded due process. On October 23, 2013
Human Resource Director Arnold Flores sent both employees
an email advising of his intent to reclassify the
department to enhance operational efficiency of the
department. And as of today’s date no actual reassignment
of duties or reorganization has been carried out. Mr.
Flores also provided each, in writing, an opportunity to
contact him if either employee had questions.
It is reversible error for the prosecutor not to
correct material misstatements by state’s witnesses.
Duggan v. State, 778 S.W.3d 465(Tex.Crim.App.1989) The
prosecutor left uncorrected a statement by accomplices
that they had not been promised anything for their
testimony. They had indeed been promised leniency for the
testimony. The matter was remanded for a harm analysis.
Throughout the trial the state alleged
tampering/retaliation, and urged the jury to find Salazar
guilty of providing the answer key to Cadriel because
INITIAL BRIEF - 23 Salazar had tampered with/retaliated against witnesses.
But there was not tampering or retaliation. The District
Court should find harm and should order a new trial.
7. The new evidence will further show that on
October 24, 2013, Civil Service Coordinator Dalia Salinas
responded to the proposed changes via email and addressed
her concern directly to Arnold Flores. In Dalia Salinas’
response there is no mention or suggestion of Commissioner
Hernandez or the defendant participating in retaliation
against Mrs. Salinas as alleged by the State.
On October 24, 2013, Civil Service Coordinator Dalia
Salinas further asserted a complaint to Cameron County
Director Pedro Sepulveda against Human Resource Director
Arnold Flores for the suggested reclassification. The
complaint never suggested the involvement of Commissioner
Ernie Hernandez or the defendant as suggested by the State
Administrator David Garcia. In fact her concern was
regarding a new hire, Anthony Lopez, taking over her
duties and alleging discrimination.
INITIAL BRIEF - 24 The witness failed to identify the defendant prior to
trial. At trial, she denied failing to identify the
281(Tex.Crim.App.1989)
The moral of Adams is that presentation of false
evidence may even be brought up on collateral attack. Here
Salazar presents the matter on direct appeal. The result
should be the same as in Adams, a new trial.
8. The new evidence will further show that the
State’s allegation that Commissioner Hernandez and the
defendant caused the placement of an agenda item that
Human Resources Director Susan Marfelino and Civil Service
Coordinator Dalia Salinas, as a direct result of the
State’s subpoenas having been issued and served on the two
aforementioned persons prior to trial. When in fact, the
newly discovered evidence will show that a proposed
memorandum to reassign duties was prepared on October 15,
2013 and prior to the execution of the State’s subpoenas
which were executed on October 24, 2013.
INITIAL BRIEF - 25 Yates v. State,171 S.W.3d 215(Tex.App.–Houston[1st
Dist.]2005,pet.ref’d) The state’s expert on post-partum
depression testified that he had been on television and
discussed postpartum depression. He had not. The state
used his testimony to argue against Yates’ post partum
defense. Habeas granted. New trial ordered.
The result here should be the same as in Yates. The
harm here is worse, since, in closing argument, the
prosecutor held up a piece of paper and told the jury that
there was an item on the agenda of the Commissioners’
Court to demote the two women as retaliation. There was
no agenda on that day. There had been a draft, but no
final agenda. Using a draft agenda was misleading because
it was merely potential, rather than actual, as the
prosecutor portrayed it.
This is the difference between, “The defendant had a
gun” and “The defendant shot the clerk with the gun he
had”.
Failure to correct material misstatements which might
have impacted the jury’s verdict requires a new trial.
Ramirez v. State,96 S.W.3d 386(Tex.App.–Austin
INITIAL BRIEF - 26 1992,pet.ref’d) The complaining witness in the criminal
case had hired a civil lawyer to file suit. At the
criminal trial she said she had not hired a lawyer. But
she had. The prosecutor knew. He did not correct the
misstatement. The Third Court held that it was reasonably
likely that the misstatement affected the jury’s verdict.
The capital murder conviction was reversed. Ramirez v.
State,96 S.W.3d 386(Tex.App.–Austin 1992,pet.ref’d)
In Ramirez, the witness’ statement that she had not
done something was not so. In Salazar, the prosecutor’s
representation that there was an agenda in existence to
retaliate against witnesses was a mere draft, simply
potential. The prosecutor’s argument effectively urged the
jury to find Salazar guilty because of the impending
retaliation. But there was no agenda in being. And there
was no demotion. And there was no retaliation. So, the
draftness of the paper which the prosecutor waived in
front of the jury was misleading, because at the time of
the argument there was no agenda in being.
9. Defendant contended (erroneously) that the newly
discovered evidence would show that the State’s allegation
INITIAL BRIEF - 27 that Roberto Cadriel received a benefit in the form of a
paycheck and/or insurance and /or retirement was not true.
Defendant finally found out that Cadriel did receive
a benefit, one check. But the prosecutor used grand jury
subpoenas to impede discovery. This prosecutorial conduct
warrants dismissal of the indictment with prejudice to
refile the same.
“Benefit” is an element charged by the State and
must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. On December 19,
2013, an open records request was made to the Cameron
County Auditor’s Office, Martha Galarza requesting the
production of copies of any checks, cancelled checks,
deposits, electronic transfers, bank statements,
documents, notes, memos, emails, texts, or faxes that
would tend to show any item of benefit provided to, paid
to, given to, conveyed to, or the like to the following
person and/or entity for the year 2011 and listed below:
Robert Cadriel, Robert Cadriel – D.O.B. 6/6/57, Robert
Cadriel- XXX-XX-2797, Robert Cadriel – DL# - Tx.02449646,
IBC Bank Account No. – 11011100525 Routing No. –
114911580.
INITIAL BRIEF - 28 The deadline to respond was December 30, 2013. The
Auditor’s Office failed to respond and on January 2, 2014
a grand jury subpoena was served on the Auditor’s Office
which prohibited the dissemination of the requested
information.
The systematic method that the State was utilizing
regarding the grand jury process was interfering with the
ability of the defendant to discover exculpatory evidence
favorable to the accused. In support of this allegation
the defendant will further show that the State issued
grand jury subpoenas for the following persons: Juan
Gonzalez-County Attorney and Arnold Flores – Director of
Human Resources, immediately after learning that the
truths which are asserted in the present motion were made
in efforts to prevent disclosure of said truth to any
inquiring person / entity.
The following actions by the State deprive the
defendant of his 5th, 6th, and 14th Amendments of the United
States Constitution.
The defendant further alleged that the State,
INITIAL BRIEF - 29 materially misrepresented the aforementioned items above
during its closing. The State acted recklessly and at
minimum, negligently, by presenting to the jury
uninvestigated, inaccurate, and misleading information
which includes: 1) nonexistent retaliation as allegedly
committed by this defendant; 2) nonexistent demotion, 3)
nonexistent deprivation of due process on Susan Marfileno
and Dalia Salinas; 4) nonexistent benefit obtained by any
indicted or unindicted person; nonexistent participation
of defendant placing items of reorganization / demotion of
Susan Marfileno and Dalia Salinas on the Commissioner’s
Court Agenda; and 5) nonexistent retaliation by defendant
in response to Susan Marfileno and Dalia Salinas being
served with subpoenas. In the words of the Third Court in
Ramirez, supra, it is reasonably likely that the
misleading statements and evidence affected the jury’s
verdict.
9. The foregoing and following misuse of the grand
jury subpoenas was part of overall prosecutorial conduct
which warrants dismissal of the indictment with prejudice
to refile the same.
INITIAL BRIEF - 30 The systematic method in which this inaccurate
information was presented influenced the jury and
presented an “aggravating factor” that would not have
existed had the inaccurate information not been presented.
Counsel for the defendant could not have reasonably
foreseen false testimony, therefore, could in no way have
had an opportunity to prepare for an effective cross-
examination of States witness. This conduct of the State
deprived movant of his 5th, 6th, and 14th Amendment Rights
of the U.S. Constitution. As to the Fifth Amendment (as
applied to the states through the Fourteenth), defense
counsel was unable effectively to confront and cross-
examine witnesses because he could not have anticipated
the cited misleading statements and simply not-true
As to the Sixth, defense counsel could not effectively
provide a fair trial and effective counsel in the face of
evidence and statements which were misleading or simply
not true. As to the Fourteenth, such misleading or false
statements or evidence violate the guaranty of due process
of law. U.S.CONST.amend.XIV Ex parte Chabot, supra, at 770
INITIAL BRIEF - 31 hn1, citing Ex parte Carmona,185 S.W.3d
192(Tex.Crim.App.2006)
The protections of due process, in the Union Basic
Law, and those of due course, in Texas’ own Constitution,
are generally coterminous. Usually the due course
protection of the Texas Constitution is congruent with
that of the due process guaranty of the federal
constitution. Webb v. State, 3 4 1 S.W.3d
415(Tex.Crim.App.2011). Salazar complains that his right
to due course of law, promised by TEX.CONST.art.I,secs.13
and 19, were violated by the use of such misleading or
untrue statements or evidence.
trial. TEX.CONST.,art.I,sec.10 Estrada v. State,313 S.W.3d
274(Tex.Crim.App.2010) Estrada consistently claimed that
he was denied a fair trial throughout his brief. The
Court of Criminal Appeals found that false testimony was
presented at the punishment stage and ordered a new
punishment trial.
The combination of the presentation of testimony and
evidence and arguments which were at the very least INITIAL BRIEF - 32 materially misleading, combined with using grand jury
subpoenas to deprive the Trial Court at hearing on Motion
for New Trial of further evidence of misleading evidence
(that Cadriel was in fact never paid a penny by the
county, never got a benefit), aggregate to deprive the
defendant of a fair trial at trial and to deprive him of
due process and due course of law at his hearing on his
motion for new trial. The District Court should order a
new trial.
The Motion for New Trial is effectively part of the
Trial. The defendant is entitled to compulsory process to
obtain witnesses and evidence on his behalf.
U.S.CONST.amend.V; TEX.CONST.art.I,sec.10. The Open
Records Act is like a subpoena. Defendant tried to use it
to get information that Cadriel had never been paid
farthing by Cameron County. The state had to prove that
Cadriel got some benefit...payment as a security guard.
The Auditor, Ms. Gallarza, has that information. Testimony
at the hearing on the Motion for New Trial will show that
she is married to Mr. Garza, the prosecutor in this case.
Testimony at the hearing on the Motion for New Trial will
INITIAL BRIEF - 33 show that the state sued out grand jury subpoenas after
the Open Records Act request was made and further that
because of those grand jury subpoenas the information has
not been disclosed to defendant so that he can present it
at a hearing on the Motion for New Trial.
While Defendant will present evidence and testimony
relating to the Grand Jury subpoenas, the District Court
should take judicial notice of the grand jury subpoenas.
TEX.R.EVID.201 “[A] trial court may take judicial notice
of its own orders, records, and judgments rendered in
cases involving the same subject matter and between
practically the same parties. 1 Ray, Texas Practice, Sec.
186.” Turner v. State,677 S.W.2d 518,523
hn13(Tex.Crim.App.[en banc]1984)
Separately Defendant moves to quash those grand jury
subpoenas in time to present information to the District
Court at hearing on Motion for New Trial that Cadriel was
never paid anything by Cameron County. If the subpoenas
are quashed, the Open Records Act will require Ms.
Gallarza to disclose that information to the Court.
As to depriving defendant of a fair trial as well as
INITIAL BRIEF - 34 due course and due process, “Why sue out grand jury
subpoenas after the trial is over?” There already were
two indictments. The defendant has been tried and a
judgment rendered on a jury verdict. Upon a proper plea
and proof of collateral estoppel or double jeopardy or
both, he cannot be tried for either or both of these
offenses again, save if he himself petitions for a new
trial, as he does. What need then of further grand jury
subpoenas if not to deprive Defendant of the information
the Open Records Act promises?
The District Court should determine that defendant
was denied a fair trial and is being denied the due course
and due process necessary (the Open Records Act
information) to prove up his allegation in the Motion for
New Trial that Cadriel never received a benefit from
Cameron County. The District Court should order a new
11. Cumulative error deprived the defendant of a
fair trial. U.S.CONST.amend.VI The Federal Constitution
promises a fair trial. That guaranty applies to the states
through the adoption of the post-bellum Fourteenth
INITIAL BRIEF - 35 Amendment. Duncan v. Louisiana,391 U.S.145(1968)
A state court found cumulative error. The state court
found that the cumulative error did not deprive the
defendant of a fair trial. On collateral attack, a United
States Court of Appeals found the state court’s decision
“objectively unreasonable” and granted habeas corpus
[motion to vacate] relief. The Court of Appeals here
should cite the Sixth Amendment promise of a fair trial
and grant the same relief here, a new trial.
In Parle,
“The Court of Appeals, Hawkins, Circuit Judge, held that state appellate court's conclusion that cumulative effect of evidentiary errors made during murder trial did not violate petitioner's due process rights was objectively unreasonable application of clearly established federal law, and thus warranted federal habeas relief.” [Westlawnext’s reporter’s synopsis,lw] Parle at 922
The United States Court of Appeals reiterated the
governing principle for cumulative error in the light of
the Fourteenth Amendment’s guaranty of due process as well
as the Sixth’s promise of a fair trial:
“Under traditional due process principles, cumulative error warrants habeas relief only where the errors have “so infected the trial with unfairness as to
INITIAL BRIEF - 36 make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.” Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 643, 94 S.Ct. 1868, 40 L.Ed.2d 431 (1974). Such “infection” occurs where the combined effect of the errors had a “substantial and injurious effect or influence on the jury's verdict.” Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637, 113 S.Ct. 1710 (internal quotations omitted); see also Thomas, 273 F.3d at 1179–81 (noting similarity between Donnelly and Brecht standards and concluding that “a Donnelly violation necessarily meets the requirements of Brecht ”). In simpler terms, where the combined effect of individually harmless errors renders a criminal defense “far less persuasive than it might [otherwise] have been,” the resulting conviction violates due process. See Chambers, 410 U.S. at 294, 302–03, 93 S.Ct. 1038.” Parle at 927 hn9
“The “logical corollary” of this harmless error doctrine is that trial errors are more likely to be prejudicial to a defendant—i.e., not harmless—when the government's case on a critical element is weak.” Parle at 928 hn11
The District Court will recall the evidence. At first
Cadriel said that someone other than Salazar gave Cadriel
the answer key. Later, after being interviewed again by
the prosecutor, Cadriel, who can neither read nor write,
who made up the story about an injury sustained when he
was a child and is thus suspect for prevarication, changed
his testimony and said that Salazar was the one who gave
Cadriel the answer key. INITIAL BRIEF - 37 It is fair to characterize this evidence as weak.
Here is the consequence of that weakness in the light
of cumulative error:
“Accordingly, in determining whether the combined
effect of multiple errors rendered a criminal defense “far
less persuasive” and had a “substantial and injurious
effect or influence” on the jury's verdict, the overall
strength of the prosecution's case must be considered
because “a verdict or conclusion only weakly supported by
the record is more likely to have been affected by errors
than one with overwhelming record support.” Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 696, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d
674 (1984).” Parle at 928 hn11
12. The indictment fails to state an offense. While
there was no motion and ruling on a motion to quash, the
Court of Appeals should consider the inadequacy of the
state’s pleading in determining if Appellant had a fair
It should also consider whether this pleading is one INITIAL BRIEF - 38 which does implicate due process.
of the defense to move to quash. A state cannot avoid the
requisites of federal due process by amending the state’s
constitution. The state’s own requirement of due course
will not abide a conviction and confinement for acts which
do not constitute an offense...elsewise we should still
have abode in the penitentiary for those convicted of
homosexuality, those culpable of seduction upon false
promise of marriage, etcetera.
The indictment does not allege that the act of giving
answers was done without the consent of the owner. When a
material element is omitted from the indictment, it fails
to state an offense. Ex Parte Givens, 619 S.W.2d
184(Tex.Crim.App. 1981) Such process violates both due
course and due process. TEX.CONST.arts.13 & 19 as well as
U.S. CONST.amend.14, Givens.
INITIAL BRIEF - 39 Pursuant to Tex. R. App. Proc. 38.1(I), Appellant provides a short conclusion that clearly states the nature of the relief sought:
CONCLUSION AND REQUEST FOR RELIEF The Court should find that the state presented misleading testimony calculated to harm the Defendant. The Court should find that the argument was erroneous but that it was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The Court should grant a new trial on guilt or innocence, since the misleading evidence tainted the guilt/innocence trial. The Court should grant a new trial on punishment. The Court should find that the state presented false testimony and that the defendant was deprived of due process and due course of law. The Court should find that the misleading statements and evidence from the state affected the jury’s verdict. The Court should find harm and should order a new trial. The Court should find that cumulative error deprived the defendant of a fair trial and order a new trial. The Court should find that the grand jury subpoenas that the state sued out stopped witnesses from testifying at a motion for new trial. The Court of Appeals should find this a deprivation of due process and due course. It should provide an appropriate remedy, dismissal of the indictment with prejudice to refile the same. The District Court should determine that the defendant was denied a fair trial and was being denied the due course and due process necessary to prove up his allegation in the Motion for New Trial that Cadriel never INITIAL BRIEF - 40 received a benefit from Cameron County. Respectfully submitted
/s/Larry Warner Larry Warner, Counsel for Respondent 3109 Banyan Circle Harlingen,Tx 78550 Phone 956 230 0361; Fax 866 408 1968 Tex.State Bar# 20871500 Usdc,Stdx# 1230 office@larrywarner.com website: larrywarner.com Member, Bar of the Supreme Court of the United States(1984) Board Certified, Criminal Law Texas Board of Legal Specialization(1983)
INITIAL BRIEF - 41 Certificate of Service
I will hand a copy of this Motion for New Trial and
Motion Setting Hearing on this Motion for New Trial to the
prosecutor in the courtroom and inform the court that I
have done so. I am emailing a copy of this instrument to
Gustavo Garza, Assistant District Attorney, and Ismael
Hinojosa, Assistant District Attorney, email:
,
and on January 7, 2015.
Respectfully submitted January 7, 2015,
/s/Larry Warner Larry Warner, Counsel for Defendant
INITIAL BRIEF - 42 Pursuant to Tex.R.App.Proc.9.4(i)(C) Appellant provides this Certificate of Compliance:
I, the undersigned counsel, certify that this reply brief was prepared using WordPerfect X3 and complies with TexR.App.Proc. 9.4(I)(C) and contains 6,704 words in Courier New 14pt.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, JANUARY 7, 2015.
/s/Larry Warner Larry Warner Attorney for Appellant 3109 Banyan Circle Harlingen, Texas 78550 PHONE 956 230 0361; FAX 866 408 1968 email: office@larrywarner.com website: larrywarner.com State Bar of Tx 20871500; USDC,SDTX 1230(1981) Board.Certified,Criminal Law, Texas Board Legal Specialization(1983) Member of the Bar of the Supreme Court of the United States(1984)
INITIAL BRIEF - 43