Fourth Court of Appeals San Antonio, Texas MEMORANDUM OPINION No. 04-12-00539-CR
Raul GARZA, III, Appellant
v. The STATE of The STATE of Texas, Appellee
From the 175th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas Trial Court No. 2011-CR-6698 Honorable Mary D. Roman, Judge Presiding
Opinion by: Rebeca C. Martinez, Justice
Sitting: Catherine Stone, Chief Justice Marialyn Barnard, Justice Rebeca C. Martinez, Justice
Delivered and Filed: July 31, 2013
AFFIRMED
Raul Garza, III, challenges his conviction for impersonating a public servant, arguing that
the evidence is insufficient to support the jury’s verdict. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
BACKGROUND
The complainant, Jessica Gonzales, testified that on the evening of June 24, 2011, she was
working as a prostitute in southeast San Antonio when Garza grabbed her by the back of the hair
while she was at a payphone. Garza told Gonzales that he was a Bexar County Sheriff and made
her get into his vehicle. Gonzales stated that as a prostitute in the area, she frequently saw vehicles 04-12-00539-CR
similar to Garza’s Crown Victoria 1 and that such vehicles are commonly associated with police
officers. Once inside the vehicle, Garza threatened to take Gonzales to jail unless she performed
oral sex on him. Gonzales testified that she initially requested payment; however, Garza said he
would not pay her because he was a police officer. Gonzales complied despite Garza’s refusal to
pay because she was afraid of going to jail. Gonzales stated that she became alarmed when Garza
asked her to “do it like a little boy would like it.” Garza also asked whether she had any children,
and if he could photograph them. Gonzales testified that after she performed oral sex, she spit
Garza’s semen onto a blue napkin and threw it out the window. The police department’s forensic
scientist testified that the DNA found on the blue napkin at the crime scene matched the DNA
taken from Garza’s penile swabs.
Gonzales further testified that after getting out of the vehicle, she telephoned 911 to report
Garza out of concern for her children and her belief that he was a pedophile. Gonzales told the
911 dispatcher that Garza claimed to be a Bexar County Sheriff. Gonzales described Garza’s
physical appearance, vehicle, license plate number, and the location where the incident occurred.
Gonzales testified that she believed Garza to be a police officer because of his appearance, his
vehicle, the spotlessness of the interior of his vehicle, his aggressive demeanor, and because he
claimed to be a Bexar County Sheriff.
Garza was interrogated by police later that night, and the video recording of his statement
was played for the jury; Garza also testified in court. Garza stated that prostitutes often think he
is a police officer based on his appearance, posture, and way of speaking. Garza denied forcing
Gonzales into his vehicle, and also denied that he presented himself as a Bexar County Sheriff or
police officer. Garza stated that he initially agreed to pay Gonzales for oral sex, but later decided
1 Another witness testified that Garza’s vehicle was actually a Lincoln, which is similar to the Crown Victoria used by police and sheriffs as undercover vehicles.
-2- 04-12-00539-CR
not to because he was dissatisfied and thought she was “hideous.” Garza stated that as a result,
Gonzales became upset and refused to exit his vehicle. Garza then threatened Gonzales that unless
she exited his vehicle, he was going to “put her on profile,” while taking out a pen and piece of
paper to write down information. Garza stated that he did this to intimidate her to get out of the
vehicle. Garza testified that Gonzales did not ask for clarification about what he meant by saying
she would be “put on your profile,” so no clarification was offered, and she got out of his car.
Garza stated that the “profile” he was referring to was a ratings website.
On the night of the offense, Garza only had $10 cash on his person. Garza stated that the
average rate for oral sex was $20, and that a prostitute would not do anything for less than $20.
Garza stated that although he knew it was wrong not to pay for sexual acts, he has refused to pay
prostitutes on several occasions and intimidated them to get out of his vehicle with the threat of
putting them “on profile.” Garza admitted that this phrase could lead someone to believe that he
was referring to a profile associated with law enforcement. When asked if in fact he was using
this language to sound like an officer and intimidate prostitutes, he answered, “it is what it is.”
After giving his statement to police, Garza was escorted by Officer Elizabeth Padron to the
hospital so that penile swabs could be taken. Padron testified that Garza told her that he would tell
prostitutes that he was a Bexar County Sheriff’s officer to get out of paying them because they
were disgusting and not worth the money.
DISCUSSION
On appeal, Garza challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction,
arguing that he never held himself out to be a Bexar County Sheriff. In particular, Garza claims
that no reasonable jury could have found him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt because his
testimony was more believable than Gonzales’s, a prostitute who admitted to using heroin on the
night of the offense and who had a criminal record consisting of 17 prior arrests. -3- 04-12-00539-CR
Standard of Review
In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we determine whether, viewing all the
evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, any rational trier of fact could have found the
essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307,
319 (1979); Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 899 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). In conducting a legal
sufficiency review, we defer to the jury’s assessment of the credibility of the witnesses and the
weight to be given to their testimony. Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 899. The jury may make reasonable
inferences from the evidence presented. Williams v. State, 235 S.W.3d 742, 750 (Tex. Crim. App.
2007) (jury may draw reasonable inferences from the basic facts to the ultimate facts). We resolve
any inconsistencies in the evidence in favor of the judgment. Curry v. State, 30 S.W.3d 394, 406
(Tex. Crim. App. 2000).
Applicable Law and Analysis
A person commits the offense of impersonating a public servant if he “impersonates a
public servant with intent to induce another to submit to his pretended official authority or to rely
on his pretended official acts[.]” TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 37.11(a)(1) (West 2011). Count I of
the indictment charged that on June 24, 2011, Garza impersonated a public servant, namely; a
peace officer and/or a Bexar County Sheriff’s Office Employee with intent to induce J. Gonzales
to submit to his pretended official authority or to rely on his pretended official acts by (1) grabbing
her and/or telling her that she could go to jail; and/or (2) by having J. Gonzales perform oral sex;
and/or (3) by not paying for a sex act performed by J. Gonzales. To support the conviction, the
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Fourth Court of Appeals San Antonio, Texas MEMORANDUM OPINION No. 04-12-00539-CR
Raul GARZA, III, Appellant
v. The STATE of The STATE of Texas, Appellee
From the 175th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas Trial Court No. 2011-CR-6698 Honorable Mary D. Roman, Judge Presiding
Opinion by: Rebeca C. Martinez, Justice
Sitting: Catherine Stone, Chief Justice Marialyn Barnard, Justice Rebeca C. Martinez, Justice
Delivered and Filed: July 31, 2013
AFFIRMED
Raul Garza, III, challenges his conviction for impersonating a public servant, arguing that
the evidence is insufficient to support the jury’s verdict. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
BACKGROUND
The complainant, Jessica Gonzales, testified that on the evening of June 24, 2011, she was
working as a prostitute in southeast San Antonio when Garza grabbed her by the back of the hair
while she was at a payphone. Garza told Gonzales that he was a Bexar County Sheriff and made
her get into his vehicle. Gonzales stated that as a prostitute in the area, she frequently saw vehicles 04-12-00539-CR
similar to Garza’s Crown Victoria 1 and that such vehicles are commonly associated with police
officers. Once inside the vehicle, Garza threatened to take Gonzales to jail unless she performed
oral sex on him. Gonzales testified that she initially requested payment; however, Garza said he
would not pay her because he was a police officer. Gonzales complied despite Garza’s refusal to
pay because she was afraid of going to jail. Gonzales stated that she became alarmed when Garza
asked her to “do it like a little boy would like it.” Garza also asked whether she had any children,
and if he could photograph them. Gonzales testified that after she performed oral sex, she spit
Garza’s semen onto a blue napkin and threw it out the window. The police department’s forensic
scientist testified that the DNA found on the blue napkin at the crime scene matched the DNA
taken from Garza’s penile swabs.
Gonzales further testified that after getting out of the vehicle, she telephoned 911 to report
Garza out of concern for her children and her belief that he was a pedophile. Gonzales told the
911 dispatcher that Garza claimed to be a Bexar County Sheriff. Gonzales described Garza’s
physical appearance, vehicle, license plate number, and the location where the incident occurred.
Gonzales testified that she believed Garza to be a police officer because of his appearance, his
vehicle, the spotlessness of the interior of his vehicle, his aggressive demeanor, and because he
claimed to be a Bexar County Sheriff.
Garza was interrogated by police later that night, and the video recording of his statement
was played for the jury; Garza also testified in court. Garza stated that prostitutes often think he
is a police officer based on his appearance, posture, and way of speaking. Garza denied forcing
Gonzales into his vehicle, and also denied that he presented himself as a Bexar County Sheriff or
police officer. Garza stated that he initially agreed to pay Gonzales for oral sex, but later decided
1 Another witness testified that Garza’s vehicle was actually a Lincoln, which is similar to the Crown Victoria used by police and sheriffs as undercover vehicles.
-2- 04-12-00539-CR
not to because he was dissatisfied and thought she was “hideous.” Garza stated that as a result,
Gonzales became upset and refused to exit his vehicle. Garza then threatened Gonzales that unless
she exited his vehicle, he was going to “put her on profile,” while taking out a pen and piece of
paper to write down information. Garza stated that he did this to intimidate her to get out of the
vehicle. Garza testified that Gonzales did not ask for clarification about what he meant by saying
she would be “put on your profile,” so no clarification was offered, and she got out of his car.
Garza stated that the “profile” he was referring to was a ratings website.
On the night of the offense, Garza only had $10 cash on his person. Garza stated that the
average rate for oral sex was $20, and that a prostitute would not do anything for less than $20.
Garza stated that although he knew it was wrong not to pay for sexual acts, he has refused to pay
prostitutes on several occasions and intimidated them to get out of his vehicle with the threat of
putting them “on profile.” Garza admitted that this phrase could lead someone to believe that he
was referring to a profile associated with law enforcement. When asked if in fact he was using
this language to sound like an officer and intimidate prostitutes, he answered, “it is what it is.”
After giving his statement to police, Garza was escorted by Officer Elizabeth Padron to the
hospital so that penile swabs could be taken. Padron testified that Garza told her that he would tell
prostitutes that he was a Bexar County Sheriff’s officer to get out of paying them because they
were disgusting and not worth the money.
DISCUSSION
On appeal, Garza challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction,
arguing that he never held himself out to be a Bexar County Sheriff. In particular, Garza claims
that no reasonable jury could have found him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt because his
testimony was more believable than Gonzales’s, a prostitute who admitted to using heroin on the
night of the offense and who had a criminal record consisting of 17 prior arrests. -3- 04-12-00539-CR
Standard of Review
In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we determine whether, viewing all the
evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, any rational trier of fact could have found the
essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307,
319 (1979); Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 899 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). In conducting a legal
sufficiency review, we defer to the jury’s assessment of the credibility of the witnesses and the
weight to be given to their testimony. Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 899. The jury may make reasonable
inferences from the evidence presented. Williams v. State, 235 S.W.3d 742, 750 (Tex. Crim. App.
2007) (jury may draw reasonable inferences from the basic facts to the ultimate facts). We resolve
any inconsistencies in the evidence in favor of the judgment. Curry v. State, 30 S.W.3d 394, 406
(Tex. Crim. App. 2000).
Applicable Law and Analysis
A person commits the offense of impersonating a public servant if he “impersonates a
public servant with intent to induce another to submit to his pretended official authority or to rely
on his pretended official acts[.]” TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 37.11(a)(1) (West 2011). Count I of
the indictment charged that on June 24, 2011, Garza impersonated a public servant, namely; a
peace officer and/or a Bexar County Sheriff’s Office Employee with intent to induce J. Gonzales
to submit to his pretended official authority or to rely on his pretended official acts by (1) grabbing
her and/or telling her that she could go to jail; and/or (2) by having J. Gonzales perform oral sex;
and/or (3) by not paying for a sex act performed by J. Gonzales. To support the conviction, the
State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Garza committed any one of the three
acts described in the indictment with the requisite intent.
A person acts intentionally, or with intent, with respect to the nature of his conduct or result
of his conduct when it is his conscious objective or desire to engage in the conduct or cause the -4- 04-12-00539-CR
result. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 6.03(a) (West 2011). The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has
consistently held that intent may be inferred from the conduct of, and remarks by, an accused and
the circumstances surrounding the acts engaged in by an accused. See, e.g., Turner v. State, 600
S.W.2d 927, 929 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1980).
We conclude that Gonzales’s and Padron’s testimony supports a finding that Garza
intended to induce reliance on his pretended authority by telling Gonzales he was a Bexar County
Sheriff and threatening to put her “on profile” in order to intimidate her to exit his vehicle without
payment after performing oral sex. These statements were made with intent to induce Gonzales
to submit to Garza’s pretended authority. To the extent Garza claims Gonzales’s testimony is
inconsistent with his, the jury was the factfinder, and we defer to the jury’s resolution of any
conflicts in the evidence and to its assessment of the witnesses’ credibility. See Brooks, 323
S.W.3d at 899; Curry, 30 S.W.3d at 406; see also Marc v. State, 166 S.W.3d 767, 772 (Tex. App.—
Fort Worth 2005, pet. ref’d) (jury was free to believe victim despite her history as a prostitute,
drug user, and criminal convictions). Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
verdict, we hold the evidence is sufficient to support the jury’s finding that Garza impersonated a
public servant within the meaning of section 37.11. Garza’s issue is therefore overruled.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Rebeca C. Martinez, Justice
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