Raul Alcala v. Fidencio Guzman

CourtDistrict Court, C.D. California
DecidedJuly 29, 2022
Docket5:22-cv-01240
StatusUnknown

This text of Raul Alcala v. Fidencio Guzman (Raul Alcala v. Fidencio Guzman) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, C.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Raul Alcala v. Fidencio Guzman, (C.D. Cal. 2022).

Opinion

Case 5:22-cv-01240-JGB-JDE Document 8 Filed 07/29/22 Page 1 of 4 Page ID #:11

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL

Case No. 5:22-cv-01240-JGB-JDE Date July 29, 2022

Title Raul Alcala v. Raymond Madden

Present: The Honorable John D. Early, United States Magistrate Judge

Maria Barr n/a

Deputy Clerk Court Reporter / Recorder

Attorneys Present for Petitioner: Attorneys Present for Respondent:

n/a n/a

Proceedings: (In Chambers) Order to Show Cause On September 22, 2021, Raul Alcala (“Petitioner”), proceeding pro se, filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus by a Person in State Custody pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in the Southern District of California. Dkt. 1 (“Petition” or “Pet.”). The case was transferred to the Central District of California on September 28, 2021 and referred to the undersigned magistrate judge on July 18, 2022. Dkt. 3, 5. The Petition facially asserts two grounds for relief, one of which Petitioner concedes he has not raised in the California Supreme Court. Pet. at 7.

As a matter of comity, a federal court will not entertain a habeas corpus petition unless the petitioner has exhausted the available state judicial remedies on every ground for relief presented in the petition. Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 518-22 (1982). The habeas statute provides that a habeas petition brought by a person in state custody “shall not be granted unless it appears that – (A) the applicant has exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State; or (B)(i) there is an absence of available State corrective process; or (ii) circumstances exist that render such process ineffective to protect the rights of the applicant.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1).

Exhaustion requires that the petitioner’s claims be fairly presented to the state courts, and be disposed of on the merits by the highest court of the state. James v. Borg, 24 F.3d 20, 24 (9th Cir. 1994); Carothers v. Rhay, 594 F.2d 225, 228 (9th Cir. 1979); see also Libberton v. Ryan, 583 F.3d 1147, 1164 (9th Cir. 2009). A claim has not been fairly presented to a state court unless the petitioner has described both the operative facts and the federal legal theory on which the claim is based. Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365-66 (1995) (per curiam); Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275-78 (1971); Greenway v. Schriro, 653 F.3d 790, 801 (9th Cir. 2011). Petitioner has the burden of demonstrating that he has exhausted his available state remedies. See, e.g., Williams v. Craven, 460 F.2d 1253, 1254 (9th Cir. 1972) (per curiam).

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL

Under the total exhaustion rule of Rose v. Lundy, the inclusion of both exhausted and unexhausted claims in a habeas petition renders it mixed and subject to dismissal without prejudice. See Rose, 455 U.S. at 510, 522.

In this case, because Petitioner indicates he has not raised Ground Two in the California Supreme Court, it appears the Petition is partially unexhausted, rendering it subject to dismissal. The Court presents the following options to Petitioner:

Option 1: If Petitioner contends that he has, in fact, exhausted his state court remedies with respect to both grounds for relief, he should clearly explain his position in response to this Order, attaching copies of any documents establishing that his claims are indeed exhausted.

In his response, Petitioner also may include a notice that, if the Court still finds the Petition to be mixed, he alternatively selects one or more of the other options discussed below.

Option 2: Petitioner may request a voluntary dismissal of this action without prejudice pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a). Petitioner is advised, however, that there is a one-year statute of limitations on habeas claims by a prisoner in state custody. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). The limitations period is tolled while a “properly filed” application for state post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending, 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2), but the limitations period is not tolled under section 2244(d) while a petition is pending in federal court. Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 172-75 (2001) (unlike the filing of a state habeas petition, the filing of a federal habeas petition does not toll the statute of limitations).

Option 3: Petitioner may request a voluntary dismissal of Ground Two and elect to proceed on his exhausted claim (Ground One). The Court advises Petitioner that if he elects to proceed now with only Ground One, any future habeas petition containing other claims that could have been raised in the instant Petition may be rejected as a second or successive petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b) or may be time-barred.

Option 4: In Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269, 277-78 (2005), the Supreme Court held that, in “limited circumstances,” courts have the discretion to stay a “mixed petition” containing

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL

both exhausted and unexhausted claims, and to hold it in abeyance while a petitioner exhausts the remaining claims in state court.

Petitioner may request to stay the proceedings and hold the Petition in abeyance while he returns to state court to exhaust his state remedies with respect to Ground Two. To obtain a stay pursuant to Rhines, Petitioner is required to show the following: (a) he has good cause for failing to exhaust the unexhausted claim in state court; (b) the unexhausted claim is potentially meritorious and not “plainly meritless”; and (c) he has not engaged in abusive litigation tactics or intentional delay. See Rhines, 544 U.S. at 277-78. The granting of a Rhines stay will result in an order requiring Petitioner to exhaust his unexhausted claim in state court, and this action may be administratively closed pending the filing of a motion from Petitioner to vacate the stay, demonstrating Ground Two has been exhausted.

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Related

Picard v. Connor
404 U.S. 270 (Supreme Court, 1971)
Rose v. Lundy
455 U.S. 509 (Supreme Court, 1982)
Duncan v. Walker
533 U.S. 167 (Supreme Court, 2001)
Rhines v. Weber
544 U.S. 269 (Supreme Court, 2005)
Greenway v. Schriro
653 F.3d 790 (Ninth Circuit, 2011)
Andreas Kelly v. Larry Small, Warden
315 F.3d 1063 (Ninth Circuit, 2003)
Arthur Robbins, III v. Tom L. Carey
481 F.3d 1143 (Ninth Circuit, 2007)
King v. Ryan
564 F.3d 1133 (Ninth Circuit, 2009)
Libberton v. Ryan
583 F.3d 1147 (Ninth Circuit, 2009)
Duncan v. Henry
513 U.S. 364 (Supreme Court, 1995)

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Bluebook (online)
Raul Alcala v. Fidencio Guzman, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/raul-alcala-v-fidencio-guzman-cacd-2022.