Ratts v. Board of County Commissioners

189 F.R.D. 448, 1999 WL 965705
CourtDistrict Court, D. Kansas
DecidedSeptember 28, 1999
DocketNo. 97-4240-DES
StatusPublished

This text of 189 F.R.D. 448 (Ratts v. Board of County Commissioners) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Kansas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Ratts v. Board of County Commissioners, 189 F.R.D. 448, 1999 WL 965705 (D. Kan. 1999).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

SAFFELS, District Judge.

Now before the court is plaintiffs Cindy and J.D. Ratts’ Motion for Protective Order. (Doc. 127.) Defendants have filed responses.

Plaintiff Cindy Ratts claims that she was subjected to a sexually hostile work environment and unlawful retaliation and discriminated against because of her gender and alleged disability. Ms. Ratts claims defendants’ actions have caused her to suffer emotional distress and the loss and impairment of her ability to perform services as a wife to her husband, J.D. Ratts. Plaintiff J.D. Ratts asserts that defendants’ actions have caused him to suffer emotional distress and the loss and impairment of his ability to perform services as a husband to his wife. Plaintiffs also claim that defendants invaded their privacy, placed them in false light, breached an alleged contract, tortuously interfered with prospective relations and conspired to interfere with their livelihood. Defendants deny the claims of plaintiffs, specifically arguing that Ms. Ratts welcomed the conduct which she has complained of and engaged in a consensual sexual relationship with one of the defendants during her employment with defendant City of Newton.

[450]*450Plaintiffs have filed the instant motion requesting a protective order regarding certain inquiry concerning the consensual sexual activity and/or consensual sexual discussions with any of defendants and/or employees of defendants before the time frame of early summer 1987, which is the time frame after which plaintiff complains that she was subjected to unwelcomed sexual advances and sexual conduct and hostile work environment. Defendants claim the line of inquiry in issue is critically probative of defendants’ theory that the conduct complained of by Ms. Ratts was welcomed and, therefore, did not constitute sexual harassment or subject Ms. Ratts to a sexually hostile work environment.

Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(c) provides:
Upon motion by a party or by the person from whom discovery is sought, ... and for good cause shown, the court in which the action is pending ... may make any order which justice requires to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense, including ... that the disclosure or discovery not be had.

Defendant Robert Maier claims that plaintiffs objected and refused to answer a number of questions raising the attorney-client or marital communication privilege. These questions were neither listed in Exhibit A, attached to plaintiffs’ motion, nor mentioned in plaintiffs’ Motion for Protective Order or supporting brief. Plaintiffs have not filed a reply addressing defendant’s claim. Therefore, the court concludes that plaintiffs are not requesting a protective order as to these questions. The court’s rulings herein will relate solely to the questions listed in Exhibit A, attached to plaintiffs’ Motion for Protective Order.

Plaintiffs’ object to the inquiry in issue on the grounds the information sought is irrelevant. The scope of discovery permitted under Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(b)(1) is as follows:

Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action, whether it relates to the claim or defense of the party seeking discovery or to the claim or defense of any other party, ... The information sought need not be admissible at the trial if the information sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.

Relevancy is to be broadly construed for discovery issues and is not limited to the precise issues set out in the pleadings. Relevancy, for purposes of discovery, has been defined by the United States Supreme Court as encompassing “any matter that could bear on, or that reasonably could lead to other matter that could bear on, any issue that is or may be in the case.” Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340,-351, 98 S.Ct. 2380, 57 L.Ed.2d 253 (1978). Discovery requests should be considered relevant if there is any possibility that the information sought may be relevant to the subject matter of the action. Smith v. MCI Telecommunications Corp., 137 F.R.D. 25, 27 (D.Kan. 1991).

A party does not have to present a prima facie case to justify a request which appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. When the discovery appears relevant ‘the burden is on the party objecting to show that the discovery is not relevant.’ Id. [Smith v. MCI Telecommunications Corp., 137 F.R.D. 25, 27 (D.Kan.1991) ] When ‘relevancy is not apparent, [however,] it is the burden of the party seeking discovery to show the relevancy of the discovery request.’ Universal Money Ctrs., Inc. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., No. 90-2201-0, unpublished op. at 3 (D.Kan. July 15, 1991).

Evello Investments N.V., et al. v. Printed Media Services, Inc., 1995 WL 135613 (D.Kan.1995).

Determining discoverability in a sexual harassment suit requires the court to consider the evidence in the context of Rule 412 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. Stalnaker v. Kmart Corp., No. Civ. A. 95-2444-GTV, 1996 WL 397563, at *3 (D.Kan. July 11, 1996) (citing Burger v. Litton Indus., 91 Civ. 0918[WK][AJP], 1995 WL 476712 [S.D.N.Y. Aug. 10, 1995]). The 1994 Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 412 state:

[451]*451In order not to undermine the rationale of Rule 412, however, courts should enter appropriate orders pursuant to Fed. R.Civ.P. 26(c) to protect the victim against unwarranted inquiries and to ensure confidentiality. Courts should presumptively issue protective orders barring discovery unless the party seeking discovery makes a showing that the evidence sought to be discovered would be relevant under the facts and theories of the particular case, and cannot be obtained except through discovery, (pp. 367-68.)

Fed.R.Evid. 412 governs the admissibility of evidence of an alleged victim’s sexual history in sex offense eases. In 1994, Rule 412 was extended to both criminal and civil proceedings alleging sexual misconduct, including sexual harassment suits. Fed. R.Evid. 412 advisory committee’s notes. Rule 412 does not allow admissibility of evidence intended to prove an alleged victim’s other sexual behavior or an alleged victim’s sexual predisposition. Sexual behavior includes any physical conduct (sexual intercourse or sexual contact) and mental activities (dreams and fantasies). Fed.R.Evid. 412 advisory committee’s notes.

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Related

Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders
437 U.S. 340 (Supreme Court, 1978)
Socks-Brunot v. Hirschvogel Inc.
184 F.R.D. 113 (S.D. Ohio, 1999)
Smith v. MCI Telecommunications Corp.
137 F.R.D. 25 (D. Kansas, 1991)
Barta v. City & County of Honolulu
169 F.R.D. 132 (D. Hawaii, 1996)
Howard v. Historic Tours
177 F.R.D. 48 (District of Columbia, 1997)

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Bluebook (online)
189 F.R.D. 448, 1999 WL 965705, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/ratts-v-board-of-county-commissioners-ksd-1999.