Rattler v. Dept. of Rehab. & Corr.

Opinion

IN THE COURT OF CLAIMS OF OHIO

JAMES RATTLER Case No. 2025-00789JD

Plaintiff Magistrate Gary Peterson

v. DECISION OF THE MAGISTRATE

OHIO DEPARTMENT OF REHABILITATION AND CORRECTION

Defendant

{¶1} Plaintiff, an inmate in the custody and control of defendant, brings this action for defamation. The issues of liability and damages were not bifurcated, and the case proceeded to trial.1

Findings of Fact

{¶2} On March 27, 2025, Sergeant Levan found a note taped to plaintiff’s locker wall stating: “If you steal from me, you better bring a knife because I got one.” Sergeant Levan charged plaintiff with a violation of rule 2.1—Threatening bodily harm to another person (with or without a weapon)—and wrote a conduct report documenting the event. Defendant’s Exhibit A. Plaintiff provided a statement that the note was not his; but rather, the note belonged to his bunkie. Id. The conduct report was then referred to the Rules Infraction Board (RIB) for a hearing.

{¶3} Paul Paige, chairman of the RIB at that time, modified the charge from the conduct report. Paige reported that plaintiff acknowledged at the hearing that the note was his, but because there were no victims, the RIB modified the charge. Plaintiff, at trial, maintained that the note was not his and that he would not leave a note threatening other

1 At the beginning of proceedings, plaintiff orally moved to dismiss this matter without prejudice.

Defendant opposed the motion. Because there was no voluntary dismissal filed with the court prior to the commencement of trial, and because the oral motion was opposed, the court denied plaintiff’s motion. See L.C.C.R. 4(A) (generally requiring that motions be written).

people, and that if he needed to threaten someone, he would not leave a note; rather, he would simply proceed with the action. As a result of these events, plaintiff was removed from the honor housing unit, which is a privileged unit reserved for inmates who stay out of trouble.

{¶4} Teresa Crawford, a unit manager who oversees housing assignments in the honor unit, explained that a threatening note is concerning, and that after the sergeant informed the captain’s office regarding the note found at plaintiff’s locker, plaintiff was removed from the honor unit and placed in the transitional programing unit (TPU). Inmates can lose their privileges to be housed in the honor housing unit, and Crawford is typically involved in such decisions. An inmate who loses a spot in the honor unit, may be placed on the waitlist to regain the spot, but that inmate would need to undergo a screening process.

{¶5} Conduct reports are available only to staff of defendant and are not available to inmates, although the inmate who has been charged will receive a copy of that particular conduct report. Defendant’s staff has an interest in maintaining security, particularly where threats of harm have been communicated as such a threat of harm presents an institutional safety concern. Defendant’s policies concerning conduct reports were followed. At no point was the conduct report shared with anyone outside of the institution or with other inmates.

Conclusions of Law and Discussion

{¶6} “In Ohio, defamation occurs when a publication contains a false statement ‘made with some degree of fault, reflecting injuriously on a person’s reputation, or exposing a person to public hatred, contempt, ridicule, shame or disgrace, or affecting a person adversely in his or her trade, business or profession.’” Jackson v. Columbus, 2008-Ohio-1041, ¶ 9, quoting A & B-Abell Elevator Co., Inc. v. Columbus/Cent. Ohio Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 73 Ohio St.3d 1, 7 (1995). “‘Slander’ refers to spoken defamatory words, while ‘libel’ refers to written or printed defamatory words.” Schmidt v. Northcoast Behavioral Healthcare, 2011-Ohio-777, ¶ 8 (10th Dist.).

{¶7} “To succeed on a defamation claim, a plaintiff must establish: (1) a false statement, (2) about the plaintiff, (3) published without privilege to a third party, (4) with fault of at least negligence on the part of the defendant, and (5) the statement was either defamatory per se or caused special harm to the plaintiff.” Watley v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 2008-Ohio-3691, ¶ 26 (10th Dist.).

{¶8} “Under Ohio common law, actionable defamation falls into one of two categories: defamation per se or defamation per quod.” Am. Chem. Soc. v. Leadscope, Inc., 2010-Ohio-2725, ¶ 49 (10th Dist.).

In order to be actionable per se, the alleged defamatory statement must fit within one of four classes: (1) the words import a charge of an indictable offense involving moral turpitude or infamous punishment; (2) the words impute some offensive or contagious disease calculated to deprive a person of society; (3) the words tend to injure a person in his trade or occupation; and (4) in cases of libel only, the words tend to subject a person to public hatred, ridicule, or contempt.

Woods v. Capital Univ., 2009-Ohio-5672, ¶ 28 (10th Dist.).

On the other hand, a statement is defamatory per quod if it can reasonably have two meanings, one innocent and one defamatory. Therefore, when the words of a statement are not themselves, or per se, defamatory, but they are susceptible to a defamatory meaning, then they are defamatory per quod. Whether an unambiguous statement constitutes defamation per se is a question of law.

(Citations omitted.) Woods at ¶ 29.

{¶9} “If a claimant establishes a prima facie case of defamation, a defendant may then invoke a conditional or qualified privilege.” Jackson, 2008-Ohio-1041, at ¶ 9, citing A & B-Abell at 7, citing Hahn v. Kotten, 43 Ohio St. 2d 237, 243 (1975).

The purpose of a qualified privilege is to protect speakers in circumstances where there is a need for full and unrestricted communication concerning a matter in which the parties have an interest or duty. . . . A qualified privilege exists when a statement is: made in good faith on any subject matter in which the person communicating has an interest, or in reference to which he has a right or duty, if made to a person having a corresponding interest or duty on a privileged occasion and in a manner

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and under circumstances fairly warranted by the occasion and duty, right or interest . . . . Further, the essential elements of a communication protected by qualified privilege are: [1] good faith, [2] an interest to be upheld, [3] a statement limited in its scope to this purpose, [4] a proper occasion, and [5] publication made in a proper manner and to proper parties only.

(Internal citations omitted.) Mallory v. Ohio University, 2001 Ohio App. LEXIS 5720, * 21- 22 (10th Dist. Dec. 20, 2021).

{¶10} “A qualified privilege may be defeated only by clear and convincing evidence of actual malice on the part of the defendant. Jacobs v. Frank, 60 Ohio St.3d 111, 114- 115 609 (1991). ‘Actual malice’ is defined as ‘acting with knowledge that the statements are false or acting with reckless disregard as to their truth or falsity.’ Id., at 116.” Watley, 2008-Ohio-3691, at ¶ 32.

{¶11} “The phrase ‘reckless disregard’ applies when a publisher of defamatory statements acts with a ‘high degree of awareness of their probable falsity’ or when the publisher ‘in fact entertained serious doubts as to the truth of his publication.’ (Internal citations omitted.)” Hill v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 2021-Ohio-561, ¶ 19 (10th Dist.), citing Jackson, 2008-Ohio-1041, ¶ 10. “It is not sufficient for a libel plaintiff to show that an interpretation of facts is false; rather, he must prove with convincing clarity that defendant was aware of the high probability of falsity.” Watley, 2008-Ohio-3691, at ¶ 33 (quotations omitted). “Evidence that establishes, at best, the publisher ‘should have known’ of the alleged falsity of the statement is insufficient to establish actual malice.” Hill, at ¶ 19, quoting Varanese v. Gall, 35 Ohio St.3d 78, 82 (1988).

{¶12} For the purposes of this decision, the magistrate will assume that plaintiff established a prima facie case of defamation arising out of the conduct report from 2025.2 Therefore, the magistrate assumes that a false statement was made about plaintiff, published to a third party, and that the statement was defamatory per se in that the statement imports a charge of an indictable offense involving moral turpitude.

2 Defendant moved to dismiss plaintiff’s case pursuant to Civ.R. 41(B)(2); however, because defendant established qualified privilege as a defense, the motion is DENIED as moot.

{¶13} Defendant, however, established that the statement made in the conduct report is subject to a qualified privilege. Crawford and Paige both credibly testified that the conduct report was based on conduct that Sergeant Levan observed—namely a threatening note taped to plaintiff’s locker. The statement in the conduct report solely relates to the note that was found. The conduct report was written in connection with the duties of Sergeant Levan in maintaining institutional security and safety. Indeed, all defendant’s staff who interact with inmates or supervise inmates have duties with respect to maintaining institutional safety and security, and a threatening note found in the institution poses a potential security threat. Authoring a conduct report is the appropriate method of dealing with suspected rule violations in the prison, and the conduct report was only published to those individuals involved in the process of determining whether a rule violation had occurred. Furthermore, because all of defendant’s staff are charged with maintaining institutional security, conduct reports that document threatening behavior or messages that pose a threat to security should be available to all staff who interact with inmates.

{¶14} “Public policy concerns dictate that persons employed within the prison system, especially correction officers who are directly involved with the inmate population, be afforded a qualified privilege in reporting violations of prison rules in order to maintain the safety and security of the institution, its prisoners, and its employees.” Watley, 2008- Ohio-3691, at ¶ 30. Therefore, the magistrate finds that because the statement was made in good faith, with an interest to be upheld (institutional security), that the statement was limited in its scope and purpose, and that the statement was made upon a proper occasion and published in a proper manner to proper parties only, defendant established that the statement made in the conduct report is subject to a qualified privilege. See Watley at ¶ 30 (corrections officer’s statement in a conduct report were made in connection with Defendant’s “interest and duty in ensuring the safety and security of the institution, its prisoners, and its employees”).

{¶15} Plaintiff, however, failed to present clear and convincing evidence of actual malice on the part of defendant. There is no indication that Sergeant Levan knew or should have known that the conduct report was false. There is no indication or evidence that the conduct report was not written in good faith. Indeed, the only evidence before

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the court is that the conduct report was based on personal knowledge of what Sergeant Levan found. Plaintiff denies that he wrote the threatening notes; however, as stated previously, it is not sufficient for a plaintiff to show that an interpretation of facts is false; rather, he must prove with convincing clarity that defendant was aware of the high probability of falsity. Watley, 2008-Ohio-3691, at ¶ 33. Apart from plaintiff’s denial of the allegations, plaintiff failed to present evidence that Sergeant Levan acted with actual malice, i.e., that Sergeant Levan knew the statement was false or acted with reckless disregard as to the truth or falsity. An incorrect interpretation of facts is not enough to establish malice. Hill, 2021-Ohio-561, at ¶ 19. Additionally, it has not been established that Sergeant Levan entertained serious doubts as to the truth of the publication. Jackson, 2008-Ohio-1041, at ¶ 10. To the extent plaintiff relies on the hearing officer’s report finding him not guilty, Paige credibly testified and explained that the charge was only modified because there were no victims. Such testimony is consistent with the documentation in the conduct report. Defendant’s Exhibit A. In short, plaintiff failed to present clear and convincing evidence of actual malice, and as a result, his claim for defamation must fail.

{¶16} Based upon the foregoing, the magistrate recommends that judgment be rendered in favor of defendant.

{¶17} A party may file written objections to the magistrate’s decision within 14 days of the filing of the decision, whether or not the court has adopted the decision during that 14-day period as permitted by Civ.R. 53(D)(4)(e)(i). If any party timely files objections, any other party may also file objections not later than ten days after the first objections are filed. A party shall not assign as error on appeal the court’s adoption of any factual finding or legal conclusion, whether or not specifically designated as a finding of fact or conclusion of law under Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(a)(ii), unless the party timely and specifically objects to that factual finding or legal conclusion within 14 days of the filing of the decision, as required by Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(b).

GARY PETERSON Magistrate

Filed July 10, 2026 Sent to S.C. Reporter 8/19/26