Raton v. Wallace

District Court of Appeal of Florida

Raton v. Wallace

207 So. 3d 978, 2016 Fla. App. LEXIS 18788

CourtDistrict Court of Appeal of Florida

DecidedDecember 22, 2016

DocketCase 5D15-4184

StatusPublished

This text of 207 So. 3d 978 (Raton v. Wallace) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court of Appeal of Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Raton v. Wallace, 207 So. 3d 978, 2016 Fla. App. LEXIS 18788 (Fla. Ct. App. 2016).

Pincite

Opinion

PER CURIAM.

Former Husband, Agustín Raton, appeals the trial court’s denial of his motion seeking to hold Former Wife, Brydie Wallace, in contempt. Former Husband first addresses the trial court’s order finding that Former Wife was entitled to attorney’s fees. The amount of fees, however, has not yet been determined. We dismiss that portion of the appeal without consideration of the merits, because an order awarding attorney’s fees with the amount to be later determined is not an appealable order. See Rausch v. Rausch, 680 So.2d 624, 624-26 (Fla. 6th DCA 1996).

Former Husband secondly asserts that Former Wife should have been found in contempt of court based upon her changing the therapist who provides counseling to their children. The parties’ marital settlement agreement (“MSA”) specified that their children would attend counseling with Dr. Meade, whose office is located in Orange County, Florida. When Former Wife relocated the children to Merritt Island, attending therapy sessions with Dr. Meade became impractical. Former Wife thereafter made arrangements with a different therapist in Merritt Island to provide counseling services for the children. The MSA did not state that Dr. Meade was the only acceptable therapist, nor did it specify how long Dr. Meade was to be the children’s therapist. We agree with the trial court that Former Wife was complying with the intent of the MSA by continuing to take the children for counseling. Thus, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Former Husband’s motion to hold Former Wife in contempt. See Stusch v. Jiruska, 188 So.3d 874, 878 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016); Bertuglia v. Roe, 42 So.3d 285, 285 (Fla. 5th DCA 2010).

AFFIRMED IN PART AND DISMISSED IN PART.

SAWAYA, BERGER, and EDWARDS, JJ., concur.

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PER CURIAM.

Former Husband, Agustín Raton, appeals the trial court’s denial of his motion seeking to hold Former Wife, Brydie Wallace, in contempt. Former Husband first addresses the trial court’s order finding that Former Wife was entitled to attorney’s fees. The amount of fees, however, has not yet been determined. We dismiss that portion of the appeal without consideration of the merits, because an order awarding attorney’s fees with the amount to be later determined is not an appealable order. See Rausch v. Rausch, 680 So.2d 624, 624-26 (Fla. 6th DCA 1996).

Former Husband secondly asserts that Former Wife should have been found in contempt of court based upon her changing the therapist who provides counseling to their children. The parties’ marital settlement agreement (“MSA”) specified that their children would attend counseling with Dr. Meade, whose office is located in Orange County, Florida. When Former Wife relocated the children to Merritt Island, attending therapy sessions with Dr. Meade became impractical. Former Wife thereafter made arrangements with a different therapist in Merritt Island to provide counseling services for the children. The MSA did not state that Dr. Meade was the only acceptable therapist, nor did it specify how long Dr. Meade was to be the children’s therapist. We agree with the trial court that Former Wife was complying with the intent of the MSA by continuing to take the children for counseling. Thus, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Former Husband’s motion to hold Former Wife in contempt. See Stusch v. Jiruska, 188 So.3d 874, 878 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016); Bertuglia v. Roe, 42 So.3d 285, 285 (Fla. 5th DCA 2010).

AFFIRMED IN PART AND DISMISSED IN PART.

SAWAYA, BERGER, and EDWARDS, JJ., concur.

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Bluebook (online)

207 So. 3d 978, 2016 Fla. App. LEXIS 18788, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/raton-v-wallace-fladistctapp-2016.

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