1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 2 DISTRICT OF NEVADA
3 EVAN RATCLIFF, Case No. 2:19-cv-01275-GMN-NJK
4 Plaintiff SCREENING ORDER
5 v.
6 SCOTT MATTINSON et al.,
7 Defendants
8 9 Plaintiff, who is in the custody of the Nevada Department of Corrections (“NDOC”), 10 has submitted a civil rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and has filed an application 11 to proceed in forma pauperis, a motion for preliminary injunction, and a motion requesting 12 preliminary injunction be granted. (ECF Nos. 1, 1-1, 3, 4). The matter of the filing fee will 13 be temporarily deferred. The Court now screens Plaintiff’s civil rights complaint under 28 14 U.S.C. § 1915A and addresses the motions. 15 I. SCREENING STANDARD 16 Federal courts must conduct a preliminary screening in any case in which an 17 incarcerated person seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of 18 a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). In its review, the court must identify 19 any cognizable claims and dismiss any claims that are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a 20 claim upon which relief may be granted, or seek monetary relief from a defendant who is 21 immune from such relief. See id. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). Pro se pleadings, however, must be 22 liberally construed. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). 23 To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: 24 (1) the violation of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States, and 25 (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under color of state law. 26 See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). 27 In addition to the screening requirements under § 1915A, pursuant to the Prison 28 Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), a federal court must dismiss an incarcerated person’s 1 claim if “the allegation of poverty is untrue” or if the action “is frivolous or malicious, fails 2 to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a 3 defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Dismissal of a 4 complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted is provided for in 5 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), and the court applies the same standard under 6 § 1915 when reviewing the adequacy of a complaint or an amended complaint. When a 7 court dismisses a complaint under § 1915(e), the plaintiff should be given leave to amend 8 the complaint with directions as to curing its deficiencies, unless it is clear from the face 9 of the complaint that the deficiencies could not be cured by amendment. See Cato v. 10 United States, 70 F.3d 1103, 1106 (9th Cir. 1995). 11 Review under Rule 12(b)(6) is essentially a ruling on a question of law. See 12 Chappel v. Lab. Corp. of Am., 232 F.3d 719, 723 (9th Cir. 2000). Dismissal for failure to 13 state a claim is proper only if it is clear that the plaintiff cannot prove any set of facts in 14 support of the claim that would entitle him or her to relief. See Morley v. Walker, 175 F.3d 15 756, 759 (9th Cir. 1999). In making this determination, the court takes as true all 16 allegations of material fact stated in the complaint, and the court construes them in the 17 light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Warshaw v. Xoma Corp., 74 F.3d 955, 957 (9th 18 Cir. 1996). Allegations of a pro se complainant are held to less stringent standards than 19 formal pleadings drafted by lawyers. See Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 9 (1980). While 20 the standard under Rule 12(b)(6) does not require detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff 21 must provide more than mere labels and conclusions. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 22 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). A formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action is 23 insufficient. Id. 24 Additionally, a reviewing court should “begin by identifying pleadings [allegations] 25 that, because they are no more than mere conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption 26 of truth.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). “While legal conclusions can provide 27 the framework of a complaint, they must be supported with factual allegations.” Id. “When 28 there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then 1 determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Id. “Determining 2 whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief . . . [is] a context-specific task that 3 requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. 4 Finally, all or part of a complaint filed by an incarcerated person may therefore be 5 dismissed sua sponte if that person’s claims lack an arguable basis either in law or in fact. 6 This includes claims based on legal conclusions that are untenable (e.g., claims against 7 defendants who are immune from suit or claims of infringement of a legal interest which 8 clearly does not exist), as well as claims based on fanciful factual allegations (e.g., 9 fantastic or delusional scenarios). See Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327–28 (1989); 10 see also McKeever v. Block, 932 F.2d 795, 798 (9th Cir. 1991). 11 II. SCREENING OF COMPLAINT 12 In the complaint, Plaintiff sues multiple defendants for events that took place while 13 Plaintiff was incarcerated at High Desert State Prison (“HDSP”) and Southern Desert 14 Correctional Center (“SDCC”). (ECF No. 1-1 at 1). Plaintiff sues Defendants Director of 15 Nursing Scott Mattinson, Medical Director Michael Minev, and Associate Warden J. Nash. 16 (Id. at 1-2). Plaintiff alleges one count and seeks monetary and injunctive relief. (Id. at 17 4, 9). 18 The complaint alleges the following: In 2016, Plaintiff acquired a “lingering chronic 19 cough and chest pains” that has lasted for three years. (Id. at 3). In 2016, Plaintiff wrote 20 medical kites about his lingering chronic cough and chest pains. (Id. at 4). However, 21 Plaintiff was never diagnosed and none of the treatments that prison officials provided to 22 Plaintiff have helped. (Id.) 23 On June 26, 2018, Plaintiff filed an informal grievance because he had not seen a 24 doctor to give him a proper diagnosis. (Id.) The response stated that Plaintiff’s grievance 25 had been resolved but Plaintiff had not received any diagnosis by a doctor and had not 26 seen a doctor. (Id.) Plaintiff filed more kites on July 16, 2018, July 31, 2018, and August 27 2, 2018 because the medication prison officials had given Plaintiff was not helping.
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1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 2 DISTRICT OF NEVADA
3 EVAN RATCLIFF, Case No. 2:19-cv-01275-GMN-NJK
4 Plaintiff SCREENING ORDER
5 v.
6 SCOTT MATTINSON et al.,
7 Defendants
8 9 Plaintiff, who is in the custody of the Nevada Department of Corrections (“NDOC”), 10 has submitted a civil rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and has filed an application 11 to proceed in forma pauperis, a motion for preliminary injunction, and a motion requesting 12 preliminary injunction be granted. (ECF Nos. 1, 1-1, 3, 4). The matter of the filing fee will 13 be temporarily deferred. The Court now screens Plaintiff’s civil rights complaint under 28 14 U.S.C. § 1915A and addresses the motions. 15 I. SCREENING STANDARD 16 Federal courts must conduct a preliminary screening in any case in which an 17 incarcerated person seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of 18 a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). In its review, the court must identify 19 any cognizable claims and dismiss any claims that are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a 20 claim upon which relief may be granted, or seek monetary relief from a defendant who is 21 immune from such relief. See id. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). Pro se pleadings, however, must be 22 liberally construed. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). 23 To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: 24 (1) the violation of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States, and 25 (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under color of state law. 26 See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). 27 In addition to the screening requirements under § 1915A, pursuant to the Prison 28 Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), a federal court must dismiss an incarcerated person’s 1 claim if “the allegation of poverty is untrue” or if the action “is frivolous or malicious, fails 2 to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a 3 defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Dismissal of a 4 complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted is provided for in 5 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), and the court applies the same standard under 6 § 1915 when reviewing the adequacy of a complaint or an amended complaint. When a 7 court dismisses a complaint under § 1915(e), the plaintiff should be given leave to amend 8 the complaint with directions as to curing its deficiencies, unless it is clear from the face 9 of the complaint that the deficiencies could not be cured by amendment. See Cato v. 10 United States, 70 F.3d 1103, 1106 (9th Cir. 1995). 11 Review under Rule 12(b)(6) is essentially a ruling on a question of law. See 12 Chappel v. Lab. Corp. of Am., 232 F.3d 719, 723 (9th Cir. 2000). Dismissal for failure to 13 state a claim is proper only if it is clear that the plaintiff cannot prove any set of facts in 14 support of the claim that would entitle him or her to relief. See Morley v. Walker, 175 F.3d 15 756, 759 (9th Cir. 1999). In making this determination, the court takes as true all 16 allegations of material fact stated in the complaint, and the court construes them in the 17 light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Warshaw v. Xoma Corp., 74 F.3d 955, 957 (9th 18 Cir. 1996). Allegations of a pro se complainant are held to less stringent standards than 19 formal pleadings drafted by lawyers. See Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 9 (1980). While 20 the standard under Rule 12(b)(6) does not require detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff 21 must provide more than mere labels and conclusions. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 22 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). A formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action is 23 insufficient. Id. 24 Additionally, a reviewing court should “begin by identifying pleadings [allegations] 25 that, because they are no more than mere conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption 26 of truth.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). “While legal conclusions can provide 27 the framework of a complaint, they must be supported with factual allegations.” Id. “When 28 there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then 1 determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Id. “Determining 2 whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief . . . [is] a context-specific task that 3 requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. 4 Finally, all or part of a complaint filed by an incarcerated person may therefore be 5 dismissed sua sponte if that person’s claims lack an arguable basis either in law or in fact. 6 This includes claims based on legal conclusions that are untenable (e.g., claims against 7 defendants who are immune from suit or claims of infringement of a legal interest which 8 clearly does not exist), as well as claims based on fanciful factual allegations (e.g., 9 fantastic or delusional scenarios). See Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327–28 (1989); 10 see also McKeever v. Block, 932 F.2d 795, 798 (9th Cir. 1991). 11 II. SCREENING OF COMPLAINT 12 In the complaint, Plaintiff sues multiple defendants for events that took place while 13 Plaintiff was incarcerated at High Desert State Prison (“HDSP”) and Southern Desert 14 Correctional Center (“SDCC”). (ECF No. 1-1 at 1). Plaintiff sues Defendants Director of 15 Nursing Scott Mattinson, Medical Director Michael Minev, and Associate Warden J. Nash. 16 (Id. at 1-2). Plaintiff alleges one count and seeks monetary and injunctive relief. (Id. at 17 4, 9). 18 The complaint alleges the following: In 2016, Plaintiff acquired a “lingering chronic 19 cough and chest pains” that has lasted for three years. (Id. at 3). In 2016, Plaintiff wrote 20 medical kites about his lingering chronic cough and chest pains. (Id. at 4). However, 21 Plaintiff was never diagnosed and none of the treatments that prison officials provided to 22 Plaintiff have helped. (Id.) 23 On June 26, 2018, Plaintiff filed an informal grievance because he had not seen a 24 doctor to give him a proper diagnosis. (Id.) The response stated that Plaintiff’s grievance 25 had been resolved but Plaintiff had not received any diagnosis by a doctor and had not 26 seen a doctor. (Id.) Plaintiff filed more kites on July 16, 2018, July 31, 2018, and August 27 2, 2018 because the medication prison officials had given Plaintiff was not helping. (Id.) 28 On September 27, 2018, Plaintiff filed a grievance explaining that his condition 1 continued and that he had not seen a doctor yet. (Id. at 5). Mattinson granted the 2 grievance in Plaintiff’s favor. (Id.) However, Plaintiff had still not received a diagnosis 3 and had not seen a doctor. (Id.) On October 3, 2018 and October 15, 2018, Plaintiff 4 wrote more medical kites about his condition. (Id.) In October or November 2018, Plaintiff 5 saw a doctor who gave Plaintiff medication. (Id.) However, the medication did not help 6 with Plaintiff’s condition. (Id.) On December 6, 2018, Plaintiff wrote another kite to be 7 seen by a doctor again and noted that he had not been given a diagnosis. (Id.) On 8 December 27, 2018 and January 19, 2019, Plaintiff filed two more medical kites because, 9 despite seeing the doctor, nothing was helping Plaintiff’s condition. (Id.) “Things were 10 only getting worse” for Plaintiff and he still had no diagnosis. (Id.) Plaintiff’s cough 11 continues to get worse along with his chest pains. (Id.) Mattinson was aware of Plaintiff’s 12 condition. (Id.) Some days Plaintiff’s chest pain was unbearable. (Id. at 6). Plaintiff 13 alleges a claim for Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference to serious medical needs. 14 (Id. at 4). 15 The Eighth Amendment prohibits the imposition of cruel and unusual punishment 16 and “embodies ‘broad and idealistic concepts of dignity, civilized standards, humanity, 17 and decency.’” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976). A prison official violates the 18 Eighth Amendment when he acts with “deliberate indifference” to the serious medical 19 needs of an inmate. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 828 (1994). “To establish an 20 Eighth Amendment violation, a plaintiff must satisfy both an objective standard—that the 21 deprivation was serious enough to constitute cruel and unusual punishment—and a 22 subjective standard—deliberate indifference.” Snow v. McDaniel, 681 F.3d 978, 985 (9th 23 Cir. 2012). 24 To establish the first prong, “the plaintiff must show a serious medical need by 25 demonstrating that failure to treat a prisoner’s condition could result in further significant 26 injury or the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.” Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 27 1096 (9th Cir. 2006) (internal quotations omitted). To satisfy the deliberate indifference 28 prong, a plaintiff must show “(a) a purposeful act or failure to respond to a prisoner’s pain 1 or possible medical need and (b) harm caused by the indifference.” Id. “Indifference may 2 appear when prison officials deny, delay or intentionally interfere with medical treatment, 3 or it may be shown by the way in which prison physicians provide medical care.” Id. 4 (internal quotations omitted). When a prisoner alleges that delay of medical treatment 5 evinces deliberate indifference, the prisoner must show that the delay led to further injury. 6 See Shapley v. Nevada Bd. of State Prison Comm’rs, 766 F.2d 404, 407 (9th Cir. 1985) 7 (holding that “mere delay of surgery, without more, is insufficient to state a claim of 8 deliberate medical indifference”). 9 However, “a complaint that a physician has been negligent in diagnosing or 10 treating a medical condition does not state a valid claim of medical mistreatment under 11 the Eighth Amendment. Medical malpractice does not become a constitutional violation 12 merely because the victim is a prisoner.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). 13 Even gross negligence is insufficient to establish deliberate indifference to serious 14 medical needs. See Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1060 (9th Cir. 2004). 15 The Court finds that Plaintiff fails to allege a colorable claim at this time. Plaintiff 16 has not sufficiently alleged that prison officials failed to respond to his medical need. 17 Based on the allegations, prison medical officials have seen Plaintiff and have prescribed 18 him medication. However, it appears that the medical professionals—both doctors and 19 nurses—do not know what Plaintiff’s condition is because they have been unable to 20 properly diagnosis him and prescribe him effective medication. These allegations do not 21 state an Eighth Amendment violation. As such, the Court dismisses the complaint in its 22 entirety, without prejudice, with leave to amend. 23 Plaintiff is granted leave to file an amended complaint to cure the deficiencies of 24 the complaint. If Plaintiff chooses to file an amended complaint he is advised that an 25 amended complaint supersedes (replaces) the original complaint and, thus, the amended 26 complaint must be complete in itself. See Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner & 27 Co., Inc., 896 F.2d 1542, 1546 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that “[t]he fact that a party was 28 named in the original complaint is irrelevant; an amended pleading supersedes the 1 original”); see also Lacey v. Maricopa Cnty., 693 F.3d 896, 928 (9th Cir. 2012) (holding 2 that for claims dismissed with prejudice, a plaintiff is not required to reallege such claims 3 in a subsequent amended complaint to preserve them for appeal). Plaintiff’s amended 4 complaint must contain all claims, defendants, and factual allegations that Plaintiff wishes 5 to pursue in this lawsuit. Moreover, Plaintiff should file the amended complaint on this 6 Court’s approved prisoner civil rights form and it must be entitled “First Amended 7 Complaint.” 8 The Court notes that if Plaintiff chooses to file an amended complaint curing the 9 deficiencies, as outlined in this order, Plaintiff will file the amended complaint within 30 10 days from the date of entry of this order. If Plaintiff chooses not to file an amended 11 complaint curing the stated deficiencies, this action will be dismissed with prejudice for 12 failure to state a claim. 13 III. MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION 14 Plaintiff files a motion for preliminary injunction based on the allegations in his 15 complaint. (See generally ECF No. 3). Plaintiff also states that he has seen a provider 16 about four times, has had different diagnoses of both bronchitis and pneumonia, and has 17 been given medication. (Id. at 4). However, Plaintiff’s condition continues to worsen. 18 (Id.) 19 Injunctive relief, whether temporary or permanent, is an “extraordinary remedy, 20 never awarded as of right.” Winter v. Natural Res. Defense Council, 555 U.S. 7, 24 21 (2008). “A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must establish that he is likely to 22 succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of 23 preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in 24 the public interest.” Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 559 F.3d 1046, 25 1052 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Winter, 555 U.S. at 20). Furthermore, under the Prison 26 Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), preliminary injunctive relief must be “narrowly drawn,” 27 must “extend no further than necessary to correct the harm,” and must be “the least 28 intrusive means necessary to correct the harm.” 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(2). 1 The Court denies the motion for preliminary injunction (ECF No. 3) without 2 prejudice. As discussed above, Plaintiff has not established that he is likely to succeed 3 on the merits of his claim. Moreover, Plaintiff’s motion seems to allege facts that support 4 the notion of negligent treatment or diagnosis—which is not a constitutional violation— 5 rather than a claim for Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference to serious medical 6 needs. 7 The Court also denies the motion to grant the motion for preliminary injunction 8 (ECF No. 4). 9 IV. CONCLUSION 10 For the foregoing reasons, it is ordered that a decision on the application to 11 proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 1) is deferred. 12 It is further ordered that the Clerk of the Court file the complaint (ECF No. 1-1) and 13 send Plaintiff a courtesy copy. 14 It is further ordered that the complaint (ECF No. 1-1) is dismissed in its entirety, 15 without prejudice, with leave to amend. 16 It is further ordered that, if Plaintiff chooses to file an amended complaint curing 17 the deficiencies of his complaint, as outlined in this order, Plaintiff will file the amended 18 complaint within 30 days from the date of entry of this order. 19 It is further ordered that the Clerk of the Court will send to Plaintiff the approved 20 form for filing a § 1983 complaint and instructions for the same. If Plaintiff chooses to file 21 an amended complaint, he should use the approved form and he will write the words “First 22 Amended” above the words “Civil Rights Complaint” in the caption. 23 It is further ordered that, if Plaintiff fails to file an amended complaint curing the 24 deficiencies outlined in this order, this action will be dismissed with prejudice for failure to 25 state a claim. 26 It is further ordered that the motion for preliminary injunction (ECF No. 3) is denied 27 without prejudice. 28 It is further ordered that the motion to grant the motion for preliminary injunction 1 (ECF No. 4) is denied. 2 3 DATED THIS __2_3__ day of October 2019. 4
5 Gloria M. Navarro, Judge United States District Court 6
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